Lecture notes, week 7

The (second?) New Archaeology (1960s and 70s)

In the social sciences generally:

    Internal rejections of positivism (of naturalist research programs)

    Of “saving the phenomena” and avoiding “unobservables” and speculation “as if observation and experience by themselves can create a science”

    In psychology, of behaviorism. Look instead for social and individual causes of behavior

    In history (objectivism vs. anti-objectivism): cannot avoid speculation if only observable data are “legitimate” and the emergence of specializations (women’s history, black history and emphasis on interpretation of data, role of perspective and values, etc.)

    In sociology, role of theories in determining selection of facts (and its selectivity); use data as a resource to move beyond the realm of the observable

    In each critique, a role for realism

 Paradoxes and ironies in The New Archaeology

    On the one hand, parallel arguments against empiricism

    On the other, insist they are using positivist methodologies to avoid empiricism

Associating positivism with Hempel’s deductive models of explanation and confirmation

Aspects of empiricism said to be abandoned:

Inductivist models of discovery and emphasis on data over theorizing

Realism: “The past is knowable” (Binford)
        
“We are not restricted to thinking in terms of artifacts alone” (Renfrew)

Explanation and anthropological goals

Publication of New Perspectives in Archaeology (1968)

1.    What are Lee’s and Aberle’s main criticisms of the collection (82)?

2.    What are the levels of explanation advocated by Deetz and Fritz? (82 right column-top of right column on 83)?

3.    What ambiguities arise in terms of the covering law model (1st full paragraph on 83-end of first paragraph right column on 84)?

4.    What are the further problems outlined beginning in the first full paragraph of the right column on 84-top of right column 85?