2 shifts in phil of science that involve making more use of science: philosophy of special sciences and naturalism
Naturalism calls for attention to insights of psychology and cognitive science, and there is far more attention to social and historical studies of science
Strong naturalism: abandon philosophical methods in favor of “scientific methods” in undertaking epistemology of science
Accd'g to Wylie, philosophical methods (conceptual analysis, reflective equilibrium (Rawls), or intuitionism) are not unique to philosophy but crucial to good scientific practice
2 shifts as transforming the enterprise of phil of science
abandonment
of the “unity of science” thesis (methodological, metaphysical and/or epistemic)
attention to detailed study of specific sciences or specialties
In the work to naturalize and “socialize” the philosophy of science, a role for non-cognitive factors increasingly recognized, and for some there is convergence with the focus of SSK on the “social determinants of inquiry”; for others, the convergence is limited to the recognition of the role of facts, and they don't agree with the strong constructivism of early SSK
Shifts in SSK: Its current state reflects that detailed attention to the sciences shows that neither purely sociological nor purely philosophical approaches are sufficient
A recognition of the “multiplicity, patchiness and heterogeneity of scientific practices” and the strong degree of stability
Wylie uses Hacking as an example of a normative as well as descriptive approach that embraces aspects of naturalism
Analytic metaarchaeology
Evolution in philosophical approaches to archaeology: from approaches making use of standard phil of science (Hempel and deductivist models of confirmation and explanation) to calls within archaeology for an “internal” phil of archaeology
These things in turn lead to new philosophical questions that emerged from the particulars of archaeological practice themselves
Some adopt a systems-analysis approach rather than covering law model of explanation: the development of formal models that capture the interrelationships and structure of a cultural system (or cultural: environmental system)
Questions:
Does explanatory understanding require more? How and why
do the elements of a culture interact the way they do?
How to identify causal and statistical factors that “make a difference”?
Realism?
Pragmatism?
Parallels with political revolutions:
Circularity of arguments for each paradigm
No super-institutional framework to adjudicate between competing paradigms
Competing paradigms, like arguments in political revolutions, are “incommensurable”
So “political
recourse” fails in the case of political revolutions, and neither logic nor
data can settle things in the case of scientific revolutions.
Techniques of persuasion and sense of crisis carry the
day.
Examples:
Newtonian physics/relativity
Ptolemaic/Copernican astronomy
Design/Natural selection
Revolutions as changes in world view
Appeal to theory-ladenness of observation, prohibitions and inclusions dictated by paradigms
Like but more importantly unlike subjects of gestalt experiences
Examples: changes in the sky post-Copernican revolution; evidence of extinctions and of jury-rigging post Darwin