What
then is the nature of the more professional and esoteric research
that a group's reception of a single paradigm permits? If the paradigm
represents work that has been done once and for all, what further
problems does
it leave the united group to resolve? Those questions will seem even
more
urgent if we now note one respect in which the terms used so far may be
misleading.
In its established usage, a paradigm is an accepted model or pattern,
and that
aspect of its meaning has enabled me, lacking a better word, to
appropriate
'paradigm' here. But it will shortly be clear that the sense of 'model'
and
'pattern' that permits the appropriation is not quite the one
usual in
defining 'paradigm.' In grammar, for example, 'amo, amas, amat' is
a
paradigm because it displays the pattern to be used in conjugating
a large
number of other Latin verbs, e.g., in producing 'laudo, laudas,
laudat.'
In this standard application, the paradigm functions by permitting
the
replication of examples any one of which could in principle serve to
replace
it. In a science, on the other hand, a paradigm is rarely an object for
replication. Instead, like an accepted judicial decision in the common
law, it
is an object for further articulation and specification under new or
more
stringent conditions.
To see
how this can be so, we must recognize how very limited in both
scope and precision a paradigm can be at the time of its first
appearance.
Paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their
competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners
has come
to recognize as acute. To be more successful is not, however, to be
either
completely successful with a single problem or notably successful
with any
large number. The success of a paradigm—whether ' Aristotle's analysis
of
motion, Ptolemy's computations of planetary position, Lavoisier's
application
of the balance, or Maxwell's mathematization of the
electromagnetic field—is
at the start largely a promise of success discoverable in selected and
still incomplete
examples. Normal science consists in the actualization of that promise,
an
actualization achieved by extending the knowledge of those facts that
the
paradigm displays as particularly revealing, by increasing the extent
of the
match between those facts and the paradigm's predictions, and by
further
articulation of the paradigm itself.
Few
people who are not actually practitioners of a mature science
realize how much mop-up work of this sort a paradigm leaves to be done
or quite
how fascinating such work can prove in the execution. And these points
need to
be understood. Mopping-up operations are what engage most scientists
throughout
their careers, They constitute what I am here calling normal science.
Closely
examined, whether historically or in the contemporary laboratory,
that
enterprise seems an attempt to force nature into the preformed and
relatively
inflexible box that the paradigm supplies. No part of the aim of normal
science
is to call forth new sorts of phenomena; indeed those that will not fit
the box
are often not seen at all. Nor do scientists normally aim to invent new
theories, and they are often intolerant of those invented by
others. Instead,
normal-scientific research is directed to the articulation of those
phenomena
and theories that the paradigm already supplies.
Perhaps
these are defects. The areas investigated by normal science are,
of course, minuscule; the enterprise now under discussion has
drastically
restricted vision. But those restrictions, born from confidence in a
paradigm,
turn out to be essential to the development of science. By focusing
attention
upon a small range of relatively esoteric problems, the paradigm forces
scientists
to investigate some part of nature in a detail and depth that would
otherwise
be unimaginable. And normal science possesses a built-in mechanism
that
ensures the relaxation of the restrictions that bound research whenever
the
paradigm from which they derive ceases to function effectively. At that
point
scientists begin to behave differently, and the nature of their
research
problems changes. In the interim, however, during the period when the
paradigm
is successful, the profession will have solved problems that its
members could
scarcely have imagined and would never have undertaken without
commitment to
the paradigm. And at least part of that achievement always proves to be
permanent. …
Three
classes of problems—determination of significant fact, matching of
facts with theory, and articulation of theory—exhaust, I think, the
literature
of normal science, both empirical and theoretical. They do not, of
course,
quite exhaust the entire literature of science. There are also
extraordinary
problems, and it may well be their resolution that makes the scientific
enterprise
as a whole so particularly worthwhile. But extraordinary problems are
not to be
had for the asking. They emerge only on special occasions prepared by
the
advance of normal research. Inevitably, therefore, the overwhelming
majority of
the problems undertaken by even the very best scientists usually
fall into
one of the three categories outlined above. Work under the paradigm can
be
conducted in no other way, and to desert the paradigm is to cease
practicing
the science it defines. We shall shortly discover that such desertions
do
occur. They are the pivots about which scientific revolutions turn. But
before
beginning the study of such revolutions, we require a more
panoramic view of
the normal-scientific pursuits that prepare the way.
IV. Normal Science as Puzzle-solving
Perhaps
the most striking feature of the normal research problems we
have just encountered is how little they aim to produce major
novelties,
conceptual or phenomenal. Sometimes, as in a wave-length measurement,
everything but the most esoteric detail of the result is known in
advance, and
the typical latitude of expectation is only somewhat wider. Coulomb's
measurements need not, perhaps, have fitted an inverse square law; the
men who
worked on heating by compression were often prepared for any one of
several
results. Yet even in cases like these the range of anticipated, and
thus of
assimilable, results is always small compared with the range that
imagination
can conceive. And the project whose outcome does not fall in that
narrower
range is usually just a research failure, one which reflects not on
nature but
on the scientist.
In the
eighteenth century, for example, little attention was paid to the
experiments that measured electrical attraction with devices like the
pan
balance. Because they yielded neither consistent nor simple
results, they
could not be used to articulate the paradigm from which they derived.
Therefore, they remained mere facts, unrelated and
unrelatable to the
continuing progress of electrical research. Only in retrospect,
possessed of a
subsequent paradigm, can we see what characteristics of electrical
phenomena
they display. Coulomb and his contemporaries, of course, also
possessed this
later paradigm or one that, when applied to the problem of attraction,
yielded
the same expectations. That is why Coulomb was able to design
apparatus that
gave a result assimilable by paradigm articulation. But it is also why
that
result surprised no one and why several of Coulomb's contemporaries had
been
able to predict it in advance. Even the project whose goal is paradigm
articulation does not aim at the unexpected novelty.
But if
the aim of normal science is not major substantive novelties—if
failure to come near the anticipated result is usually failure as a
scientist—then why are these problems undertaken at all? Part of the
answer has
already been developed. To scientists, at least, the results
gained in normal
research are significant because they add to the scope and
precision with
which the paradigm can be applied. That answer, however, cannot account
for the
enthusiasm and devotion that scientists display for the problems of
normal
research. No one devotes years to, say, the development of a better
spectrometer or the production of an improved solution to the problem
of
vibrating strings simply because of the importance of the information
that will
be obtained. The data to be gained by computing ephemerides or by
further
measurements with an existing instrument are often just as significant,
but
those activities are regularly spurned by scientists because they are
so
largely repetitions of procedures that have been carried through
before. That
rejection provides a clue to the fascination of the normal
research problem.
Though its outcome can be anticipated, often in detail so great
that what
remains to be known is itself uninteresting, the way to achieve
that outcome
remains very much in doubt. Bringing a normal research problem to a
conclusion
is achieving the anticipated in a new way, and it requires the solution
of all
sorts of complex instrumental, conceptual, and mathematical puzzles.
The man
who succeeds proves himself an expert puzzle-solver, and the challenge
of the
puzzle is an important part of what usually drives him on.
The
terms 'puzzle' and 'puzzle-solver' highlight several of the themes
that have become increasingly prominent in the preceding pages.
Puzzles are,
in the entirely standard meaning here employed, that special category
of
problems that can serve to test ingenuity or skill in solution.
Dictionary
illustrations are 'jigsaw puzzle' and 'crossword puzzle,' and it is the
characteristics that these share with the problems of normal
science that we
now need to isolate. One of them has just been mentioned. It is no
criterion of
goodness in a puzzle that its outcome be intrinsically interesting or
important. On the contrary, the really pressing problems, e.g., a cure
for
cancer or the design of a lasting peace, are often not puzzles at all,
largely
because they may not have any solution. Consider the jigsaw puzzle
whose pieces
are selected at random from each of two different puzzle boxes. Since
that
problem is likely to defy (though it might not) even the most ingenious
of men,
it cannot serve as a test of skill in solution. In any usual sense it
is not a
puzzle at all. Though intrinsic value is no criterion for a puzzle, the
assured
existence of a solution is.
We
have already seen, however, that one of the things a scientific
community acquires with a paradigm is a criterion for choosing problems
that,
while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to have
solutions. To a
great extent these are the only problems that the community will admit
as
scientific or encourage its members to undertake. Other problems,
including
many that had previously been standard, are rejected as metaphysical,
as the
concern of another discipline, or sometimes as just too problematic to
be worth
the time. A paradigm can, for that matter, even insulate the community
from
those socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle
form,
because they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and
instrumental tools
the paradigm supplies. Such problems can be a distraction, a lesson
brilliantly
illustrated by several facets of seventeenth-century Baconianism
and by some
of the contemporary social sciences. One of the reasons why normal
science
seems to progress so rapidly is that its practitioners concentrate on
problems
that only their own lack of ingenuity should keep them from solving.
If,
however, the problems of normal science are puzzles in this sense,
we need no longer ask why scientists attack them with such passion and
devotion. A man may be attracted to science for all sorts of reasons.
Among
them are the desire to be useful, the excitement of exploring new
territory, the
hope of finding order, and the drive to test established knowledge.
These
motives and others besides also help to determine the particular
problems that
will later engage him. Furthermore, though the result is occasional
frustration, there is good reason why motives like these should first
attract
him and then lead him on. The scientific enterprise as a whole does
from time
to time prove useful, open up new territory, display order, and test
long-accepted belief. Nevertheless, the individual engaged on a
normal
research problem is almost never doing any one of these things.
Once
engaged, his motivation is of a rather different sort. What then
challenges
him is the conviction that, if only he is skilful enough, he will
succeed in
solving a puzzle that no one before has solved or solved so well. Many
of the
greatest scientific minds have devoted all of their professional
attention to
demanding puzzles of this sort. On most occasions any particular field
of
specialization offers nothing else to do, a fact that makes it no less
fascinating to the proper sort of addict.
Turn
now to another, more difficult, and more revealing aspect of the
parallelism between puzzles and the problems of normal science. If it
is to
classify as a puzzle, a problem must be characterized by more than an
assured
solution. There must also be rules that limit both the nature of
acceptable
solutions and the steps by which they are to be obtained. To solve a
jigsaw
puzzle is not, for example, merely "to make a picture." Either a
child or a contemporary artist could do that by scattering
selected pieces, as
abstract shapes, upon some neutral ground. The picture thus produced
might be
far better, and would certainly be more original, than the one from
which the
puzzle had been made. Nevertheless, such a picture would not be a
solution. To
achieve that all the pieces must be used, their plain sides must be
turned
down, and they must be interlocked without forcing until no holes
remain. Those
are among the rules that govern jigsaw-puzzle solutions. Similar
restrictions
upon the admissible solutions of crossword puzzles, riddles, chess
problems,
and so on, are readily discovered.
If we
can accept a considerably broadened use of the term 'rule'—one
that will occasionally equate it with 'established viewpoint' or with
'preconception'—then the problems accessible within a given
research tradition
display something much like this set of puzzle characteristics. The man
who
builds an instrument to determine optical wave lengths must not be
satisfied with
a piece of equipment that merely attributes particular numbers to
particular
spectral lines. He is not just an explorer or measurer. On the
contrary, he
must show, by analyzing his apparatus in terms of the established body
of
optical theory, that the numbers his instrument produces are the ones
that
enter theory as wave lengths. If some residual vagueness in the theory
or some
unanalyzed component of his apparatus prevents his completing that
demonstration, his colleagues may well conclude that he has measured
nothing at
all. For example, the electron-scattering maxima that were later
diagnosed as
indices of electron wave length had no apparent significance when first
observed and recorded. Before they became measures of anything, they
had to be
related to a theory that predicted the wave-like behavior of matter in
motion.
And even after that relation was pointed out, the apparatus had to be
redesigned so that the experimental results might be correlated
unequivocally
with theory. Until those conditions had been satisfied, no problem
had been
solved.
Similar
sorts of restrictions bound the admissible solutions to
theoretical problems. Throughout the eighteenth century those
scientists who
tried to derive the observed motion of the moon from Newton's laws of
motion
and gravitation consistently failed to do so. As a result, some of them
suggested replacing the inverse square law with a law that deviated
from it at
small distances. To do that, however, would have been to change the
paradigm,
to define a new puzzle, and not to solve the old one. In the event,
scientists
preserved the rules until, in 1750, one of them discovered how they
could
successfully be applied.