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# 中国户籍制度的历史、 功能及近态

讨论记录

## The Household Registration System and Migrant Labour in China

Notes on a Debate

陈金永 • Chan Kamwing

FOR more than half a century, the *hukou* (household registration) system in China has segregated the rural and urban populations, initially in geographical terms, but more fundamentally in social, economic, and political terms. It is the foundation of China's divisive dualistic socioeconomic structure and the country's two classes of citizenship. Under this system, some 700-800 million people are in effect treated as second-class citizens, deprived of the opportunity to settle legally in cities and of access to most of the basic welfare and state-provided services enjoyed by regular urban residents. To an individual, *hukou* status is an important ascribed attribute in determining one's social and economic circumstances. The existence of such an overt discriminatory state institution is starkly incompatible with a rapidly modernizing China, aspiring to great power status.

Over the years, there have been hundreds of calls to change, if not abolish, the system. In China's current public discourse, "*hukou* reform" is again a prominent issue. This short commentary provides some background on the origin and functions of the *hukou* system and notes some recent developments that may signal coming changes.

### The *Hukou* System

After the Communist Revolution in 1949, China opted for the traditional, Stalinist growth strategy of rapid industrialization centred on heavy industry in cities and extraction of agricultural surplus from the peasantry.<sup>(1)</sup> This strategy in turn required strong mechanisms to prevent a rural exodus. From the mid-1950s, the government repeatedly introduced measures to stem rural outflows,<sup>(2)</sup> culminating, in 1958, in the formal codification of a comprehensive registration system to

control population mobility. The regulation decreed that all internal migration be subject to approval by the relevant local government.<sup>(3)</sup> From that point, Chinese citizens lost the freedom of residence and migration within their own country. Each person has a *hukou* (registration status), classified as "rural" or "urban," in a specific administrative unit.<sup>(4)</sup> The *hukou* mechanism, as a central instrument of the command system established for the big-push industrialization, was intended to prevent what were held to be "undesirable" rural-to-urban migratory flows.

The industrialization strategy thus led China to create, in effect, two very different societies: on the one hand the urban class, whose members worked in the priority and protected industrial sector and who had access to (at least basic) social welfare and full citizenship; and on the other hand the peasants, who were tied to the land to produce an agricultural surplus for industrialization and who had to fend for themselves. *Hukou* conversion, referring to change from the rural to the urban category, was tightly controlled and permitted only under very limited conditions, usually when needed for the state's industrialization objectives.<sup>(5)</sup> In essence, the *hukou* system was not merely a means of limiting rural-urban population and labour mobility, as it is commonly depicted, but also a system of social control aimed at excluding the rural population from access to state-provided goods, welfare, and entitlements.<sup>(6)</sup> Indeed, in the Maoist era, the ban on rural outflow, along with an array of related measures, such as the collectivization of farmland and the restriction on its conversion to non-agricultural uses, ensured that rural populations remained bottled up in the countryside. These measures effectively circumscribed the peasantry's economic, social, and political opportunities and rights, creating a massive pool of super-low-cost rural labour tied to land of very little market value—essentially a *de facto* underclass.<sup>(7)</sup>

It was on this macro socioeconomic foundation that China at the end of the 1970s launched the reforms that unleashed its economic dynamism. The reforms yielded dramatically higher rural productivity and in

1. See Chan, 1994; Lin, Cai, and Li, 1996; Naughton, 2007.
2. Tien, 1973; Cheng and Selden, 1994.
3. Details are in Cheng and Selden, 1994; Wang, 2005; Chan, 1994, 2009a.
4. For the newborn, the *hukou* classification followed that of the mother until 1998 (Chan and Buckingham, 2008).
5. Details are in Chan, 2009a.
6. Beginning with the most basic, food grain, in the early 1960s (Wang, 1997; Chan, 2009a).
7. See Qin, 2005; Kelly, 2008.

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半个多世纪以来，中国的户口（户籍）制度将农村人口和城镇人口隔离开来，早期是严格控制农村人口向城镇流动与迁移，但更为根本的是在社会、经济和政治方面制造一个城乡二元结构，农村人口和城镇人口是两类不同的公民。在这一制度下，约 7 至 8 亿人实际上被当作二等公民对待，他们被剥夺了可以往城市合法定居的权利；也被剥夺了可享受与城市居民同等基本福利和服务。对个人而言，拿什么样的户口决定了一个人的社会、经济和政治的地位。中国还存在这种公开的歧视性的国家制度，与中国受人称赞的经济发展、渴求泱泱大国地位格格不入。

多年来，要求改革、甚至废除户籍制度的呼声不断。当前，户籍改革再次成为中国公共舆论的焦点。本评论简要介绍户籍制度的历史与功能，并介绍近期的动态，预示这制度可能的改变。

### 户籍制度

1949 年革命后，中国选择了传统的斯大林高速工业化的增长模式，以城市

重工业为中心，通过工农剪刀差，提取农民的剩余。<sup>(1)</sup> 这种战略要用强有力的机制以防止农村人口外流。从 50 年代中期起，政府不断采取措施，遏止农村人口外流。<sup>(2)</sup> 1958 年初，政府终于正式出台法规，建立一个控制人口流动迁移的全面登记制度。该制度规定，所有的境内迁移须经有关地方政府批准。<sup>(3)</sup> 从这开始，人民失去了在自己国家迁徙和选择居住地的自由。在每个行政地域里，每一家都要登记一个户口，而户口有“农村”和“城镇”性质之分。<sup>(4)</sup> 户籍制度是政府推行高速工业化战略的核心工具，旨在防止那些被认为不符合计划从农村到城镇的移民。

中国这种工业化战略制造两个截然不同的社会：一个是城市社会。其成员在重点的、受保护的工业部门工作，且能够获得（至少基本的）社会福利和较完整的公民权；另一个是农民社会。农民

1. 见 Chan, 1994; Lin, Cai, and Li, 1996; Naughton, 2007.
2. Tien, 1973; Cheng and Selden, 1994.
3. 细节见于 Cheng and Selden, 1994; Wang, 2005; Chan, 1994, 2009a.
4. 1998 年之前，新生儿的户口随母亲户口的性质及所在地 (Chan and Buckingham, 2008).

consequence a greatly enlarged labour surplus. In the mid-1980s, China latched onto a labour-intensive, export-oriented growth strategy, emulating what the successful Asian “tiger” economies had done in the 1960s and 1970s. As in South Korea and Taiwan, this strategy generated large numbers of jobs, helping to lift a substantial segment of low-skilled labour out of poverty. However, there were some fundamental differences. Most notably, in China the *hukou* system, a major instrument of the socialist command apparatus, remained alive and potent; the Asian tigers, in contrast, never sought to formally control internal migration.

For nearly two decades from the system’s inception, rural dwellers were barred from urban areas. In the 1970s from time to time, beginning as a temporary, ad hoc measure, small numbers of peasant workers were brought into the cities to satisfy labour needs. These “temporary contract workers” did not have an urban *hukou*, hence did not have access to urban social services. This practice of allowing peasant labourers (“rural migrant labour”) to enter the cities to fill unwanted (almost totally manual work) positions was gradually expanded in the early 1980s. When China’s export-processing industry moved into high gear in the mid-1980s and the 1990s, deployment of rural labour en masse to the cities to supply the industry’s demand became a major state strategy. By the mid-1990s, rural-*hukou* labour had become the backbone of the export industry and, more generally, of the manufacturing sector. Rural-*hukou* labour also came to staff most of the low-end services in urban areas. In coastal export centres such as Shenzhen and Dongguan, migrant labour

now accounts for by far the greater part (70 to 80 percent) of the labour force.<sup>(8)</sup>

“Rural migrant labour” (*nongmingong*) has a specific meaning in China: it refers to industrial and service workers with rural *hukou*. These labourers, though working on urban jobs and residing for the most part in towns and cities, are not considered legally to be urban workers. Neither are they (nor, under the current system, will they one day be) treated as “locals”: *rural migrant* is not a probational status but permanent. They are not eligible for regular urban welfare benefits (access to local schools, urban pension plans, public housing, etc.) and other rights that are available to those with urban *hukou*. Rather, rural migrant workers are treated legally as part of the rural-*hukou* population, even though they may have worked and lived in an urban area for many years. Their numbers have grown rapidly: even excluding those employed in township or village enterprises close to their home villages, the rural migrant labour force has risen from about 20-30 million in the early 1980s to about 140 million by the end of 2008 and about 150 million in mid-2009.<sup>(9)</sup> The increase in the number of people without local *hukou* (also called “non-*hukou* migrants” or “floating population”) has become the hallmark of China in the last quarter century.

In short, rural migrant labour is urban labour carrying rural *hukou*, earning wages that allow a bare minimum standard of living. These workers have no entitlement to urban unemployment relief or to “minimum protection” benefits. They are equivalent to the cheap migrant labour in the classical Lewis model of the unlimited supply of labour. The legally “temporary” status of this group’s members and their permanent ineligibility for local “citizenship” in the form of urban *hukou* make them forever vulnerable and easily expendable. They are trapped in low-end factory and service jobs—albeit, for most of them, preferable to rural idleness or underemployment. Indeed, in many cities and export zones, local decrees have forbidden migrants from taking up jobs other than those in the low-skilled 3-D (“dangerous, dirty, and demeaning,” and often physically demanding) category.<sup>(10)</sup> The

8. See Liang, 1999; Chan, 2009c. Even for a more typical urban location, like the inland city of Wuhan, workers without local (urban) *hukou* accounted for 43 percent of employment in manufacturing in 2000 (Chan, 2009c). Rural migrant labour’s contribution to the GDP was estimated at about 30 and 31 percent of the GDP of Beijing and Shanghai in 2007 (*Caijing*, 2009).
9. Chan, 2010b; National Bureau of Statistics, 2009. Including persons working in nearby enterprises, “rural migrant labour” totaled 225 million in 2008.
10. See Solinger, 1999; Cai, 2007; Fan, 2008. In addition to low wages, violations of labour rights, abuses, and industrial injuries are commonplace (Chan, 2001).

被紧紧地拴在土地上耕作，除了自己养家糊口外，同时要为工业部门、城市居民贡献低廉的农产品。户籍的改变(从农业户口转非农业户口，即“农转非”)受到严格的控制，农转非的条件非常苛刻，一般只有在国家需要时才被批准。<sup>5)</sup>人们通常认为户籍制度主要是限制人口及劳动力由农村向城市流动的手段，实际上，它更重要作用的是将农村人口排除在国家供应、福利制度及公民权利之外。<sup>6)</sup>在毛泽东的时代，禁止农村人口外流，连同其他一系列相关措施，如公社制度、农村土地制度(土地也不能“农转非”)，将农民禁锢在农村里。这些措施实际上大大限制了农民的经济社会发展的机会和政治权利，将大批的超低成本农村劳动力限制在几乎没有市场价值的土地上，使农村人口成为二等公民。<sup>7)</sup>

从这样的社会经济历史，中国在 20 世纪 70 年代末在农村开始推行改革，从而极大地促进了经济发展。改革大大提高了农村生产率，同时也产生了大量的剩余农村劳动力。到 80 年代中期，中国仿效亚洲“四小龙”在 60 年代及 70 年代的做法，实行劳动力密集型、出口型的经济增长战略。同韩国和台湾一样，这种战略创造了大量的工作机会，使很多低技能劳动者摆脱了农村的贫困。但是中国的情况与亚洲“四小龙”并不完全一样。最为显著的是，亚洲“四小龙”从未实行过类似户籍制度的人口内部迁移控制，而在中国大陆，户籍制度今天的力量依然强大。

在户籍制度实施后的首 20 年，农村人口基本上不可迁移流动到城镇。70 年代，作为一项临时措施，政府允许少量农民工进城以满足劳动力需求。这些“临时合同工”没有城镇户口，也就不能享受城镇社会福利。80 年代早期开始，被允许进入城市的农民工(农村流动劳动力)数量

逐渐增加，这些人主要从事那些城里人不愿做的工作(基本上是体力劳动)。80 年代中期至 90 年代，随着中国出口加工业的高速发展，大量农村劳动力进城以满足工业发展需要，成为中国一项重要的战略。到 90 年代中期，持农村户籍的劳动力已经成为出口工业、甚至是工业的主要劳动力。农村户口劳动力也是城镇低端服务行业从业人员的骨干。在深圳、东莞这样的沿海出口中心城市，农民工占了总劳动力的绝大多数(70%至 80%)。<sup>8)</sup>

在中国，“农民工”一词有着特定的含义，它指的是持有农村户口的工业及服务产业的工人。这些人虽然在城镇工作，大部分时间在城镇生活，但是在法律上他们并不是城市工人。按照现行的制度，他们现在不是、将来也不能成为城市居民的一员：农民工不是一个临时的称呼，而是永久的身份。他们无权享受城镇社会福利(例如参加城镇社会保险计划、入住公共保障住房、子女进入当地学校等)及其他城镇户口居民所享有的权利。农民工在法律上仍被视为农村户口人口，即使他们在城里已经工作了许多年。农民工的数量增长很快，就算不包括在附近乡镇企业工作的农民工，2008 年底为 1 亿 4 千万，到 2009 年年中，这个数字已达 1.5 亿人，<sup>9)</sup> 相对上个世纪 80 年代初，农民工的数量只有 2-3 千万人。在过去 25 年中，无本地户口人员(或称之为“非户口迁移者”或“流动人口”)数量的急剧增长已成为中国社会的一个突出的标记。

5. 细节见于 Chan, 2009a.


6. 从二十世纪 60 年代开始，国家严格商品粮供应，农民不能享受粮食定量供应的保障(Wang, 1997; Chan, 2009a).

7. 见秦, 2005; Kelly, 2008.

8. 见 Liang, 1999; Chan, 2009c. 就算在典型的内陆城市，如武汉市，无本地户口劳动力在 2000 年制造业劳动力中占了 43%(Chan, 2009c)。2007 年，农民工对北京、上海的 GDP 的贡献分别约为 30% 与 31%。(《财经》，2009)。

9. Chan, 2010b; 国家统计局, 2009. 如果包括在就近乡镇企业工作的农民，2008 年“农民工”的总数为二亿二千五百万。

图 / Figure 1 Percentages of "urban" populations in China, 1958-2008  
 中国城镇常住人口与户籍人口的百分比, 1958-2008年



1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

SOURCES: Compiled by the author from *Chinese Statistical Yearbook* and *China Population Statistical Yearbook*, various year. / 资料来源: 根据《中国统计年鉴》和《中国人口统计年鉴》不同年份的数据编制而成。

denial of local urban *hukou* to migrant workers, combined with their plentiful supply and lack of access to legal information and support, has created a large, easily exploitable, highly mobile, and flexible industrial workforce for China's export economy.<sup>(11)</sup>

This workforce of peasant labour without urban rights has greatly contributed to China's emergence as the world's "most efficient" (i.e., lowest-cost) producer. Effectively, the *hukou* system has delayed the time when the labour surplus is exhausted—the "turning point" identified in the Lewis model of development in a labour-surplus economy.<sup>(12)</sup> China could

continue to draw labour from rural areas to urban industries and services and to the export-processing zones at wages not much above rural subsistence levels. Many observers have noted that in the two decades since the early 1980s, despite rapid economic growth, there was hardly any increase in the real wages of rural migrant workers in the coastal areas.<sup>(13)</sup> The result has been the "China price"—China's ability to price its manufactured exports below those of its major developing-country competitors.<sup>(14)</sup> The direct and close relationship that exists between migrant labour, the *hukou* system, and the industrial economy is epitomized by the Pearl River Delta, the forerunner of China's economic reforms and a region now often called the "world's factory".<sup>(15)</sup> Some 20-25 million rural migrants live and work in the Delta.

The *hukou* system allows China to separate almost totally the two aspects of internal migration: the actual movement and the granting of full community membership at the destination. The separation is analogous to what typically happens in the case of international migration, where immigrant workers do not automatically acquire the rights of citizenship. In China one is allowed to move to a city in order, say, to work in a factory, but may be permanently barred from access to services and welfare based on community membership. Since the early 1980s the gap between the proportion of China's population that is de facto urban and the proportion with urban-*hukou* status has been steadily widening (see Figure 1)—demonstrating the increasing use of disenfranchised labour in cities and towns.<sup>(16)</sup>

### Hukou reform

Not surprisingly, the *hukou* system has elic-

11. Lee, 1998; Alexander and Chan, 2004.

12. In the Lewis model, industrial wages in a developing country begin to rise quickly after the turning point is reached. For an examination of this concept as applied to China, see Cai, 2007 and Chan, 2009b.

13. *Guangzhou ribao*, 2009.

14. Chan and Ross, 2003. One estimate puts the costs of rural migrant labour at only about 44 percent of regular urban labour costs in 1995 (Lu, Zhao, and Bai, 2009). Such accounting still excludes many subsidies urban residents receive. Statistical analyses by many scholars have clearly demonstrated that, keeping other variables constant, the lack of local *hukou* status results in migrant workers being paid significantly less than those with local *hukou* status (see Knight and Song, 1999; Yang and Chan, 2000).

15. In Shenzhen, for example, of its de facto population of some 8 million in 2005, about 7 million did not have Shenzhen's *hukou* and were excluded from government-provided welfare and other benefits (Chan, 2009c).

16. Multiple "urban population" definitions used in China, including the two indicated here, have contributed greatly to confusion about the level of China's urbanization and its city sizes. See Chan, 2007.

简言之，农民工就是城市里持有农村户口的就业人员，一般他们的收入仅能维持最低的生活水平，却无权享受城市失业救济或“低保”等权利。他们相当于刘易斯模型中所论及的无限劳动力供给的廉价农村劳动力。由于法律上农民工属“临时”居住身份，永远无权获得城镇居民资格，导致他们始终处在“呼之则来，挥之则去”的弱势地位，极易被资方剥削。由于种种的限制，农民工只能从事低端的生产及服务性工作，当然这总比呆在农村赋闲或失业要好一点。实际上，很多城市和加工区的法规都局限外来人口的就业在低技术，“险、脏、苦”行业，特别是体能要求高的工作。<sup>(10)</sup> 由于农民工的劳动力供给充裕，农民工又无法获得当地城镇户口、又缺乏法律知识及援助，农民工使中国的出口经济获得了大量顺从的、高度灵活（“呼之则来，挥之则去”）的廉价又好用的劳动力。<sup>(11)</sup>

这支由农民工组成的、没有城镇居民权利的劳动大军，为中国工业迅速成为全球“最高效率”（即低成本）的产业作出了巨大贡献。在功能上，户籍制度起着推迟“刘易斯拐点”到来的作用，<sup>(12)</sup> 延长了剩余劳动力供给的年数，使廉价劳动力的供应增加，中国可以继续用农村水平的工资，吸引农村劳动力到城市就业。有些论者指出，自上个世纪80年代后的二十年里，虽然中国沿海地区的经济增长很快，但是农民工的实际工资水平却基本上没变。<sup>(13)</sup> 这便是“中国价格”厉害之处——相比与之竞争的其他发展中国家，中国往往有能力以更低的价格出口产品。<sup>(14)</sup> 农民工、户籍制度和出口经济三者之间的直接、紧密的关系在珠江三角洲地区表现最为明显。该地区是中国改革时期经济发展的先锋，是“世界工厂”的核心地区，也是大规模民工的集中地（目前大约有 2-2.5 千万

农民工在珠三角地区生活、工作）。<sup>(15)</sup>

户籍制度使中国可以将国内人口流动迁移的两个方面完全分割开来：一个是人口的迁入，一个是获得目的地居民的权利和福利。这种做法极似有些国家处理外国来的劳动力：入境的外来劳工（特别是“客工”）不能获得该国的社会福利。在中国，农村劳动力可以进入城市工作，但却永远被排斥在当地福利制度之外。自 80 年代早期，中国城镇常住人口与城镇户籍人口之间的比例在逐步扩大（见图 1），这表明城镇使用农村户籍的劳动力的比例一直在增加。<sup>(16)</sup>

### 户籍改革

毫不令人惊讶，在过去 20 年中，中国的户口制度在国内外受到不少的批评。政府也做了一些措施，“改善”这一制度。<sup>(17)</sup> 第一种措施是，随着财政权和管理权下放到地方，户籍的管理权也从中央政府下放到地方政府。自 90 年代中期，大部分地方政府获得了决定本地城镇人口数量的管理权。这一变化使地方政府可以向那些拥有财产或受过高等教育的外来人员提供城镇户口。因为城市扩张，一些城市还允许近郊的农村人口转为城镇户籍人口，享受部分城镇福利，条件是他们必须

10. 见 Solinger, 1999; 蔡, 2007; Fan, 2008。除了低工资外，劳动者的权利受侵犯、遭意外伤害、工伤等事件经常发生 (Chan, 2001)。

11. Lee, 1998; Alexander and Chan, 2004。

12. 在刘易斯模型中，发展中国家工人的工资会在其到达某个转折点迅速提高。关于这个模型在中国的应用及讨论，可参阅读，2007 与 Chan, 2009b。

13. 《广州日报》，2009。

14. Chan and Ross, 2003。1995 年的一项估计认为，雇佣农民工的成本仅为雇佣一般城镇劳动力成本的 44% (卢、赵、白 2009)。如此的估计还不包括城镇居民所享受的许多福利。据一些学者的统计分析，假定其它变量值相同，不具备当地户口的民工的收入远远小于拥有当地户口的劳动者 (见 Knight and Song, 1999; 杨、陈, 2000)。

15. 比如，2005 年深圳市的 800 万常住人口中，约有 700 万人没有深圳户口，不能参加城镇福利与保险计划 Chan, 2009a。

16. 中国有不同的“城镇人口”口径，包括本文使用的两个。这些不同的口径往往造成了对中国城市化水平及其城市规模的严重误解，见 Chan, 2007。

17. 本段采自 Chan and Buckingham, 2008。

ited much criticism within and outside China over the past two decades. In that time there have been two kinds of attempts to “improve” the system.<sup>(17)</sup> The first kind has entailed the devolution of fiscal and administrative powers to lower levels of government. Management has been moved from central control to local governments. From the mid-1990s, local governments have largely gained the power to decide the numbers of additions to the urban-*hukou* population in their administrative jurisdictions. This change allows cities to offer local urban *hukou* to those who meet stipulated levels of wealth or education (usually the rich or the college-educated). Some neighbouring rural-*hukou* populations are also given an urban *hukou*, with access to some welfare benefits, in exchange for giving up their rural land-use rights to allow for urban expansion. (This in effect adds a new local/non-local division to the pre-existing rural/urban division.)<sup>(18)</sup> Moreover, *hukou* conversions in small towns where state-provided welfare is minimal have been made easy since 1997—without much effect since small towns tend not to attract rural migrants. The second kind of reform measure has been concerned with making the *hukou* system more “humane”: for example, offering urban *hukou* to the children or elderly parents of migrants who have already gained that status. (Children of rural-*hukou* urban migrants, even if born in the city, are deemed rural.)

These adjustments, however, have done little to alter the core of the dualistic structure buttressed by the *hukou* system. The longstanding discrimination against the rural-*hukou* population, including the large segment

of it comprising migrant workers in the cities, continues. The seriously disadvantaged condition of this latter group was intensified by the 2008-09 global financial crisis, in which some 23 million rural migrant workers lost their jobs as a result of the drop in demand for China’s exports.<sup>(19)</sup> In the early months of the crisis (late 2008), high levels of unemployment among migrant labourers in the Pearl River Delta combined with claims for wage arrears and severance pay triggered mass protests, and angry laid-off workers clashed with riot police. The increasing number of “second-generation” migrant workers, more educated and rights-conscious than their parents, may be less tolerant of abuses and injustice and readier to defend their interests when badly treated.<sup>(20)</sup>

The main economic argument for *hukou* reform is compelling. It is widely agreed by both academics and policymakers in China that the economy’s heavy dependence on exports over the last 20 years or so is a reflection of a major structural problem of insufficient domestic consumption demand. The root cause of this sluggish demand, clearly linked to the *hukou* system, is the meager income of the rural population and migrant workers—that is, of the rural-*hukou* population.<sup>(21)</sup>

A number of recent events suggest the importance attached to *hukou* reform by China’s top leadership. At the well-publicized “Central Economic Work” meeting in December 2009, setting the economic agenda for the country in 2010, an initiative to institute reform in small and medium-sized cities (with population less than 500,000) was suggested as a means to boost domestic consumption.<sup>(22)</sup> The same initiative was proposed in the Communist Party’s Central Committee Document number 1, issued at the end of January 2010: rural migrant workers should be allowed to settle permanently in small and medium cities and enjoy the same public facilities and services as those with local urban *hukou*. Premier Wen Jiabao discussed the proposal in some widely watched webcasts in February. The subject also attracted wide media interest, although

17. This section draws on Chan and Buckingham, 2008.

18. As a result, some college graduates with *hukou* registered in other locales are also excluded from access to the local urban welfare system.

19. Data are from National Bureau of Statistics, 2009; see also details in Chan, 2010b.

20. See Harney, 2009.

21. The director of China’s National Bureau of Statistics has pointed out that to increase the proportion of household consumption in the economy, China needs to focus on raising the income of the poor. See *Singtao Daily*, 2009.

22. See Tao, 2010.



交出原有的土地使用权(这在原有的城乡户籍差别上又增加了本地人/外地人的户籍区别)。(18) 还有,自1997年起,在一些福利非常有限的小城镇,户口迁移也放开。但小城镇的户籍改革并未带来实际的效果,因为小城镇对农村流动人口来说并没有太多的吸引力。第二种措施是使户籍制度更加“人性化”。例如,城镇户籍向城镇居民的父母及子女放松(但是在城市的农民工,其子女即使在城市出生,户口也还是农村的)。

但是,这些调整措施并未动摇由户籍制度所支撑的二元结构。中国长期存在的对农村户籍人口(包括在城市的农村人口)的方方面面的歧视依然存在。农民工的恶劣状况在2008-2009年全球经济危机中进一步恶化。在该次危机中,全球对中国出口产品的需求降低,导致大约二千三百万农民工失去了工作。(19) 在经济危机的头几个月中(2008年下半年),珠江三角洲地区农民工失业率大幅度增加,工资拖欠的现象严重,引起了大规模的抗议示威,甚至发生了失业民工与防暴警察冲突。在农民工中,“第二代”民工的数量不断增加;他们这一代比起他们的父母,受过更多的教育、较懂得自己的权利,不再像上一代那样默默忍受不公平的待遇;在遇到不合理的情况时,更愿意出来捍卫自己的权益。(20)

大部分的论者都认同户籍改革对中国的经济有利。中国的学术界及决策者普遍认为,过去20余年中国经济发展过度依赖出口,其实反映了经济结构的一个大问题——国内消费需求不足。这种内需不足,显然跟户籍制度有关,其根本原因在于农村人口及农民工(即农村户籍人口)的收入十分微薄。(21)

最近发生的一系列事件表明中国最高领导层重视户籍制度改革。2009年12月,媒体大力宣传的“中央经济工作会议”,规划了2010年国家经济发展重

点,提出在人口少于50万的中小城镇推行户籍改革,刺激国内消费。(22) 2010年1月底的中共中央一号文件中也提出了相同的设想:在中小城镇,允许农民工进城落户,享有同当地城镇的福利。2月份,温家宝总理在网上直播中也多次与网友广讨论户籍问题。该议题也引起了媒体的广泛关注,3月1日多家地方报纸发表了呼吁废除户籍制度的联合社论,不过政府并未作出积极回应。


显然,中国不可能如有些论者所希望的那样,在短期内彻底取消户籍制度。(23) 正如上文所述,户籍制度是中国社会经济结构及发展战略不可分割的一部分,任何较彻底的户籍改革都不仅仅是一项政策的问题。只有打破中国目前的二元结构,使全民、而不单是城镇居民,可享受国家的社会保障和其他社会福利,如医疗保健服务(目前的覆盖率,大约只有全国三分之一的人口)。中国必须着手进行实质性的户籍改革,不能再延误。如何设计一套可行的改革措施是当前一项紧迫的课题。(24)

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18. 结果是,许多户口从本国其他地方来的大学毕业生也被排除在当地城市的福利系统之外。
19. 数据来源于国家统计局,2009;细节请见Chan, 2010b。
20. 见Harney, 2009。
21. 中国国家统计局局长曾指出,扩大居民消费,需要把提高穷人的收入作为重点。《星岛日报》,2009。
22. 见Tao, 2010。
23. 最显而易见的是,彻底取消户籍制度从财政上看,短期内是不可行的。见Kong, 2010。
24. 我曾提议,户籍改革的第一步是户籍向为外地大学毕业生与有技术农民工开放。见Chan, 2010a。

the government did not respond favorably to a joint editorial urging reform published in a number of newspapers in March.

Obviously, it is impossible to dismantle the *hukou* system completely in the near future, as some observers may wish.<sup>(23)</sup> As this short commentary has made clear, the *hukou* system is integral to China's socioeconomic structure and development strategy. Any thorough reform or abolition is much more than a straightforward policy issue. It entails breaking down China's current dualistic structure, universalizing state-provided social security and some other social services, such as affordable health care, that are currently enjoyed by only about one third of the population. But China cannot further delay making substantive reforms. The search for workable reform measures is an urgent task.<sup>(24)</sup> 

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23. At the most obvious level, a complete abolition is fiscally not feasible in the short run. See Kong, 2010.
24. I have proposed that, as a first step, China extend local urban *hukou* to all college-educated workers and skilled migrant labourers. See Chan, 2010a. in the short run. See Kong, 2010.
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