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Amato, Jeffery D Communication and monetary policy / Jeffery D Amato, Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin Pub info Basel, Switzerland : Bank for International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Dept., 2003
http://www.bis.org/publ/work123.pdf [GovPub Internatl Stacks BIS W893 no.123]

Date: Mon, 30 Jun 2003 16:14:58 -0700
From: imals as 
To: krumme@u.washington.edu
Subject: From the Library Catalog

Record 1 of 7
LOCATIONS    Bothell/CCC Library & Tacoma Campus Library
TITLE        Following the money : the Enron failure and the state of 
               corporate disclosure / George Benston ... [et al.]
PUBL INFO    Washington, D.C. : AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
               Studies, c2003.
PHYS DESC    ix, 126 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
NOTE         Includes bibliographical references (p. 105-116) and index.
NOTE         The crisis in corporate disclosure -- What's wrong--and--right 
               with corporate accounting and auditing in the United States -- 
               Fixing corporate disclosure -- Disclosure challenges ahead.
SUBJECT      Disclosure in accounting -- United States.
SUBJECT      Corporations -- United States -- Accounting.
SUBJECT      Corporations -- United States -- Auditing.
SUBJECT      Accounting -- Standards -- United States.
SUBJECT      Financial statements -- United States.
SUBJECT      Capital market -- United States.
SUBJECT      Enron Corp. -- Corrupt practices.
ADD AUTHOR   Benston, George J.
ADD AUTHOR   AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies.
LCCN         2003000068.
ISBN         0815708904 (cloth : alk. paper)
OCLC #       51330584.
1 > Bothell/CCC Stacks      HF5658 .F65 2003               AVAILABLE
2 > Tacoma Stacks           HF5658 .F65 2003               IN PROCESS

Record 2 of 7 LOCATIONS Suzz/Allen&Auxiliary Locs AUTHOR Gupta, Deepak, Dr. TITLE Corporate social accountability : disclosures and practices / Deepak Gupta. EDITION 1st ed. PUBL INFO New Delhi : Mittal Publications, 1995. PHYS DESC xi, 122 p. ; 23 cm. NOTE Study of divergent social responsibility disclosure practices in Indian companies, both in the public as well as private sector. NOTE Includes bibliographical references (p. [117]-118) and index. SUBJECT Disclosure in accounting -- India. SUBJECT Corporations -- India -- Accounting. SUBJECT Social responsibility of business -- India. LCCN 95910743. ISBN 817099621X. OTHER # I-E-95910743. OCLC # 34114513. 1 > Suzzallo/Allen Stacks HF5658 .G86 1995 AVAILABLE
Record 3 of 7 LOCATIONS Foster Business Library AUTHOR Riahi-Belkaoui, Ahmed, 1943- TITLE The nature and determinants of disclosure adequacy : an international perspective / Ahmed Riahi-Belkaoui. PUBL INFO Westport, Conn. : Quorum, 1997. PHYS DESC xii, 227 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. NOTE Includes bibliographical references and index. SUBJECT Disclosure in accounting. SUBJECT Comparative accounting. LCCN 96026868. ISBN 1567200869 (alk. paper) OCLC # 34958820. 1 > Foster General Stacks HF5658 .R5 1997 AVAILABLE
Record 4 of 7 LOCATIONS Bothell/CCC Library & Tacoma Campus Library TITLE Following the money : the Enron failure and the state of corporate disclosure / George Benston ... [et al.] PUBL INFO Washington, D.C. : AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, c2003. PHYS DESC ix, 126 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. NOTE Includes bibliographical references (p. 105-116) and index. NOTE The crisis in corporate disclosure -- What's wrong--and--right with corporate accounting and auditing in the United States -- Fixing corporate disclosure -- Disclosure challenges ahead. SUBJECT Disclosure in accounting -- United States. SUBJECT Corporations -- United States -- Accounting. SUBJECT Corporations -- United States -- Auditing. SUBJECT Accounting -- Standards -- United States. SUBJECT Financial statements -- United States. SUBJECT Capital market -- United States. SUBJECT Enron Corp. -- Corrupt practices. ADD AUTHOR Benston, George J. ADD AUTHOR AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies. LCCN 2003000068. ISBN 0815708904 (cloth : alk. paper) OCLC # 51330584. 1 > Bothell/CCC Stacks HF5658 .F65 2003 AVAILABLE 2 > Tacoma Stacks HF5658 .F65 2003 IN PROCESS
Record 5 of 7 LOCATIONS Bothell/CCC Library & Foster Business Library AUTHOR Duska, Ronald F., 1937- TITLE Accounting ethics / Ronald F. Duska and Brenda Shay Duska. PUBL INFO Malden, MA : Blackwell Pub., 2003. PHYS DESC li, 277 p. ; 24 cm. TRACED SER Foundations of business ethics ; 2. NOTE The nature of accounting and the chief ethical difficulty : true disclosure -- Ethical behavior in accounting : what is ethics? -- Ethical behavior in accounting : ethical theory -- Accounting as a profession -- Accounting codes of ethics : the principles -- Accounting codes of ethics : the rules -- Ethics in auditing : the auditing function -- The ethics of managerial and financial accounting -- The ethics of tax accounting -- The ethics of the accounting firm : the accounting profession in crisis. SUBJECT Accountants -- Professional ethics. SUBJECT Accounting -- Moral and ethical aspects. ADD AUTHOR Duska, Brenda Shay. LCCN 2002004856. ISBN 0631216502 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN 0631216510 (pbk. : alk. paper) OTHER # UKM bA304884. OCLC # 49495010. 1 > Bothell/CCC Stacks HF5625.15 .D87 2003 IN PROCESS 2 > Foster General Stacks HF5625.15 .D87 2003 IN PROCESS
Record 6 of 7 LOCATIONS Government Publications AUTHOR Amato, Jeffery D. TITLE Communication and monetary policy / Jeffery D Amato, Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin. PUBL INFO Basel, Switzerland : Bank for International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Dept., 2003. PHYS DESC 22 p. : ill. ; 30 cm. TRACED SER BIS working papers ; no. 123. NOTE "January 2003." SUBJECT Monetary policy. SUBJECT Disclosure of information. ADD AUTHOR Morris, Stephen. ADD AUTHOR Shin, Hyun Song. ADD AUTHOR Bank for International Settlements. Monetary and Economic Dept. OCLC # 51735458. 1 > GovPub Internatl Stacks BIS W893 no.123 AVAILABLE



Date: Mon, 30 Jun 2003 19:58:22 -0400 (EDT) From: webspirs@silverplatter.com To: krumme@u.washington.edu Subject: WebSPIRS5 records Search History #1 disclosure(889 records)


Record 1 of 10 in EconLit 1991-2003/06 TI: An Integrated Trading Environment: To Improve Market Transparency and Efficiency AU: Lau,-Adela-S-M SO: Review-of-Pacific-Basin-Financial-Markets-and-Policies. December 2002; 5(4): 533-49 DT: Journal-Article AI: Yes AB: During the 1997 financial turmoil, the overall boom and slump was mainly due to the collapse of ill-informed speculation and a non-regulated stock market system. This collapse has probably created mistrust among the public and greatly impaired confidence in securities as an investment. From this painful experience, the government should control share prices and prevent extreme fluctuations by improving the transparency and efficiency in trading information transmission, market monitoring and document disclosure. Therefore, online trading system, cross-market monitoring system and electronic filing system will be recommended in order to improve the low transparency and efficiency of financial information transmission. More importantly, all the information in these systems is inter-related for market monitoring or financial analysis. Thus, an integrated trading environment results in order to reduce redundancy work, error prone and information inefficiency. DE: Economic-Development-Financial-Markets; Saving-and-Capital-Investment -(Financial-Intermediation) (O160); Asset-Pricing (G120); Securities-; Stock -Market; Stocks-; General-Financial-Markets-Government-Policy-and-Regulation (G180) AN: 0647324 WEBLH: Check UW Holdings http://catalog.lib.washington.edu:4550/resserv?sid=ws5&author=Lau%2c-Adela-S -M&issn=0129-0915&title=Review-of-Pacific-Basin-Financial-Markets-and -Policies&atitle=An%20Integrated%20Trading%20Environment%3a%20To%20Improve%20Mar ket%20Transparency%20%20and%20Efficiency&volume=5&issue=4&pages=533 -49&date=2002&dbid=ECON&cas=&spage=533&aulast=


Record 2 of 10 in EconLit 1991-2003/06 TI: CEO Compensation, Option Incentives, and Information Disclosure AU: Conyon,-Martin-J; Sadler,-Graham-V SO: Review-of-Financial-Economics. January 2001; 10(3): 251-77 DT: Journal-Article AI: Yes AB: This paper examines the impact of information disclosure on the valuation of CEO options and the incentives created by those options. Prior executive compensation research in the US has made assumptions about key input variables that can affect the calculation of option values and financial incentives. Accordingly, biases may have ensued due to incomplete information disclosure about noncurrent option grants. Using new data on a sample of UK CEOs, we value executive option holdings and incentives for the first time and estimate the levels of distortion created by the less than complete US-style disclosure requirements. We also investigate the levels of distortion in the UK for the minority of companies that choose to reveal only partial information. Our results suggest that there have to date been few economic biases arising from less than complete information disclosure. Furthermore, we demonstrate that researchers using US data, who made reasonable assumptions about the inputs of noncurrent option grants, are unlikely to have made significant errors when calculating CEO financial incentives or option wealth. However, the recent downturn in the US stock market could result in the same assumptions, producing exaggerated incentive estimates in the future. DE: Personnel-Economics-Compensation-and-Compensation-Methods-and-Their-Effects -(stock-options,-fringe-benefits,-incentives,-seniority-issues) (M520); CEO-; Compensation-; Executives-; Incentives-; Personnel-Management; executive -compensation (M120) AN: 0647299 FTXT: ScienceDirect (tm) http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=GatewayURL&_origin=SilverLinker&_urlver sion=4&_method=citationSearch&_volkey=1058%2d3300%2310%23251%233&_version=1&md5= 6ce376105b01f9b337a5d398bb8d28ea WEBLH: Check UW Holdings http://catalog.lib.washington.edu:4550/resserv?sid=ws5&author=Conyon%2c-Martin -J&issn=1058-3300&title=Review-of-Financial -Economics&atitle=CEO%20Compensation%2c%20Option%20Incentives%2c%20and%20Informa tion%20Disclosure&volume=10&issue=3&pages=251 -77&date=2001&dbid=ECON&cas=&spage=251&aulast=


Record 3 of 10 in EconLit 1991-2003/06 TI: Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers AU: Fishman,-Michael-J; Hagerty,-Kathleen-M SO: Journal-of-Law,-Economics,-and-Organization. April 2003; 19(1): 45-63 DT: Journal-Article AI: Yes AB: Numerous rules mandate the disclosure of sellers' information. This article analyzes two questions regarding disclosure: (i) Why wouldn't sellers voluntarily disclose their information? and (ii) Who gains and who loses with mandatory disclosure? Previous analyses assume that all customers are knowledgeable enough to understand a seller's disclosure, and a key result is that there is no role for mandatory disclosure. Either voluntary disclosure is forthcoming, or if it is not, no one prefers mandatory disclosure. We generalize the standard model by considering the case in which not all customers understand a seller's disclosure. We show that if the fraction of customers who can understand a disclosure is too low, voluntary disclosure may not be forthcoming. If so, mandatory disclosure benefits informed customers, is neutral for uninformed customers, and harms the seller. Our results suggest that we should find mandatory disclosure in markets where product information is relatively difficult to understand. DE: Information-and-Product-Quality; Standardization-and-Compatibility (L150); Information-; Search-; Learning-; Information-and-Knowledge (D830) AN: 0646925 FTXT: HighWire http://jleo.oupjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/19/1/45 WEBLH: Check UW Holdings http://catalog.lib.washington.edu:4550/resserv?sid=ws5&author=Fishman%2c -Michael-J&issn=8756-6222&title=Journal-of-Law%2c-Economics%2c-and -Organization&atitle=Mandatory%20versus%20Voluntary%20Disclosure%20in%20Markets% 20with%20Informed%20%20and%20Uninformed%20Customers&volume=19&issue=1&pages=45 -63&date=2003&dbid=ECON&cas=&spage=45&aulast=


Record 4 of 10 in EconLit 1991-2003/06 TI: Moral Hazard and Legal Regulation in the Financial Market: Japan, East Europe and China AU: Shimizu,-Yoshinori SO: Journal-of-Asian-Economics. February 2003; 14(1): 23-33 DT: Journal-Article AI: Yes AB: This paper analyses the moral hazard occurred in most countries during the transition to more deregulated financial markets. An international comparison of the fiscal cost of financial crises is made. Japan stands by far on the top of the list in terms of the amount of the money involved. An empirical research is made for the case of mega-bank mergers in Japan. Moral hazard is common for all economies with a rapid change in the financial system, both in developed and developing countries. The public belief on the consistency of the legal enforcement of the regulation bears the critical importance in reducing moral hazard and hence the magnitude of financial crises. A greater reliance on the market discipline backed by full disclosure is the key to control the problem. A political leadership is needed to establish a judicial system that have a consistent and transparent enforcement mechanism. DE: Economic-Development-Financial-Markets; Saving-and-Capital-Investment -(Financial-Intermediation) (O160); Financial-Institutions-and-Services -Government-Policy-and-Regulation (G280); Socialist-Institutions-and-Their -Transitions-Financial-Economics (P340); Bank-; Financial-Market; Regulation-; Banks-; Other-Depository-Institutions; Mortgages (G210) AN: 0646700 WEBLH: Check UW Holdings http://catalog.lib.washington.edu:4550/resserv?sid=ws5&author=Shimizu%2c -Yoshinori&issn=1049-0078&title=Journal-of-Asian -Economics&atitle=Moral%20Hazard%20and%20Legal%20Regulation%20in%20the%20Financi al%20Market%3a%20Japan%2c%20%20East%20Europe%20and%20China&volume=14&issue=1&pag es=23-33&date=2003&dbid=ECON&cas=&spage=23&aulast=


Record 5 of 10 in EconLit 1991-2003/06 TI: Measuring Transparency and Disclosure at Firm-Level in Emerging Markets AU: Patel,-Sandeep-A; Balic,-Amra; Bwakira,-Liliane SO: Emerging-Markets-Review. December 2002; 3(4): 325-37 DT: Journal-Article AI: Yes AB: Transparency and disclosure are integral to corporate governance. In this paper, we use a new dataset to analyze Transparency & Disclosure scores (T&D score) in 19 emerging markets for 354 firms representing 70% of S&P/IFCI Index market capitalization over the 3 years ending in 2000. We analyze differences across countries, economic sectors and trend over the 3 years. We find that the Asian emerging markets and South Africa have significantly higher transparency and disclosure compared to the Latin American, Eastern European, and Middle Eastern emerging markets. The gap between the Asian emerging markets and South Africa over other emerging markets has increased over the last 3 years. We do not find any significant differences in T&D scores among economic sectors. Changes in the T&D scores over the last 3 years, however, differ by economic sectors for the 6 markets with the largest investable market capitalization and/or number of observations, viz. Brazil, Poland, South Africa, India, Thailand, and Korea. We then study the relationships between T&D scores and cross-holdings for the 6 emerging markets. For the 6 markets except Korea, correlation between cross-holdings and T&D scores is negative. For the 6 markets except South Africa, correlation between price-to -book ratios and T&D scores is positive. We conclude with a discussion on further research. DE: Economic-Development-Financial-Markets; Saving-and-Capital-Investment -(Financial-Intermediation) (O160); Asset-Pricing (G120); Accounting (M410); Socialist-Institutions-and-Their-Transitions-Financial-Economics (P340); Corporate-Governance; Firm-Level; Firm-; Governance-; Mergers-; Acquisitions-; Restructuring-; Voting-; Proxy-Contests; Corporate-Governance (G340) AN: 0646339 WEBLH: Check UW Holdings http://catalog.lib.washington.edu:4550/resserv?sid=ws5&author=Patel%2c-Sandeep -A&issn=1566-0141&title=Emerging-Markets -Review&atitle=Measuring%20Transparency%20and%20Disclosure%20at%20Firm -Level%20in%20Emerging%20%20Markets&volume=3&issue=4&pages=325 -37&date=2002&dbid=ECON&cas=&spage=325&aulast=


Record 6 of 10 in EconLit 1991-2003/06 TI: Evidence and Policy and Naming and Shaming AU: Pawson,-Ray SO: Policy-Studies. Sept.-Dec. 2002; 23(3-4): 211-30 DT: Journal-Article AI: Yes AB: The debate on the potential of evidence-based policy is now in full flow, though opinions differ on whether we have reached zenith or nadir in our capacity to transform public data into public service. Clearly, we are not short of "evidence"; there is a plethora of programme evaluators and policy analysts out there, and a surfeit of their publications--official, academic and grey. What is at issue is the method of Synthesizing that evidence, a research strategy that goes by the name of "systematic review". In particular, there is considerable doubt about how to handle the variegated and contested evidence base that typifies most sectors of public policy. Can it ever be made to yield to the formal statistical techniques of meta-analysis? And if not, can evidence-based policy ever match the precision of the demanding blueprint represented by evidence-based medicine? This paper seeks to go beyond these old antagonisms by proposing a novel model of evidence synthesis based on the principles of realist evaluation. Under this approach, systematic review changes from a data-driven exercise to a process of theory development and refinement. The core of the paper is a demonstration project, consisting of an embryonic review of public disclosure initiatives, a policy better known as "naming and shaming". Six initiatives are examined in order to develop an elementary theory of the conditions under which shaming sanctions might work. The paper concludes with reflections on how such a process of "realist synthesis" may feed into policy making. DE: Bureaucracy-; Administrative-Processes-in-Public-Organizations; Corruption (D730); Policy-; Positive-Analysis-of-Policy-Making-and-Implementation (D780) AN: 0638369 WEBLH: Check UW Holdings http://catalog.lib.washington.edu:4550/resserv?sid=ws5&author=Pawson%2c -Ray&issn=0144-2872&title=Policy-Studies.%20Sept. -Dec&atitle=Evidence%20and%20Policy%20and%20Naming%20and%20Shaming&volume=23&iss ue=3-4&pages=211-30&date=2002&dbid=ECON&cas=&spage=211&aulast=


Record 7 of 10 in EconLit 1991-2003/06 TI: Discussion of "Compensation Policy and Discretionary Disclosure" AU: Barth,-Mary-E SO: Journal-of-Accounting-and-Economics. January 2003; 34(1-3): 311-18 DT: Journal-Article AI: Yes AB: Nagar, et al. (J. Accounting Econom. 34 (2003)) posits that stock-based compensation motivates managers to increase public disclosure of their private information. The hypothesis is intriguing and new to the literature, and the findings are consistent with it. However, developing the hypothesis depends on some unsupported assumptions and the link between the hypothesis and the empirical evidence is indirect, raising concerns about the validity of the study's inferences about the effects on disclosure of stock-based compensation. DE: Personnel-Economics-Compensation-and-Compensation-Methods-and-Their-Effects -(stock-options,-fringe-benefits,-incentives,-seniority-issues) (M520); Financing-Policy; Capital-and-Ownership-Structure; financial-ratios; value-of -firm (G320); Compensation-Packages; Payment-Methods-(piece-rates,-time-rates, -bonuses,-profit-sharing) (J330); Personnel-Management; executive-compensation (M120); Compensation-; Stocks-; Asset-Pricing (G120) AN: 0637548 FTXT: ScienceDirect (tm) http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=GatewayURL&_origin=SilverLinker&_urlver sion=4&_method=citationSearch&_volkey=0165%2d4101%2334%23311&_version=1&md5=bfec c85e14180622a57869f55307cbe8 WEBLH: Check UW Holdings http://catalog.lib.washington.edu:4550/resserv?sid=ws5&author=Barth%2c-Mary -E&issn=0165-4101&title=Journal-of-Accounting-and -Economics&atitle=Discussion%20of%20%22Compensation%20Policy%20and%20Discretiona ry%20Disclosure%22&volume=34&issue=1-3&pages=311 -18&date=2003&dbid=ECON&cas=&spage=311&aulast=


Record 8 of 10 in EconLit 1991-2003/06 TI: Discretionary Disclosure and Stock-Based Incentives AU: Nagar,-Venky; Nanda,-Dhananjay; Wysocki,-Peter SO: Journal-of-Accounting-and-Economics. January 2003; 34(1-3): 283-309 DT: Journal-Article AI: Yes AB: We examine the relation between managers' disclosure activities and their stock price-based incentives. Managers are privy to information that investors demand and are reluctant to publicly disseminate it unless provided appropriate incentives. We argue that stock price-based incentives in the form of stock-based compensation and share ownership mitigate this disclosure agency problem. Consistent with this prediction, we find that firms' disclosures, measured both by management earnings forecast frequency and analysts' subjective ratings of disclosure practice, are positively related to the proportion of CEO compensation affected by stock price and the value of shares held by the CEO. DE: Personnel-Economics-Compensation-and-Compensation-Methods-and-Their-Effects -(stock-options,-fringe-benefits,-incentives,-seniority-issues) (M520); Financing-Policy; Capital-and-Ownership-Structure; financial-ratios; value-of -firm (G320); Compensation-Packages; Payment-Methods-(piece-rates,-time-rates, -bonuses,-profit-sharing) (J330); Personnel-Management; executive-compensation (M120); Compensation-; Earnings-; Firm-; Firms-; Incentives-; Management-; Ownership-; Shares-; Stock-Price; Stocks-; Asset-Pricing (G120) AN: 0637547 FTXT: ScienceDirect (tm) http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=GatewayURL&_origin=SilverLinker&_urlver sion=4&_method=citationSearch&_volkey=0165%2d4101%2334%23283&_version=1&md5=edc2 822df6372abb3d2abcc72a9bc745 WEBLH: Check UW Holdings http://catalog.lib.washington.edu:4550/resserv?sid=ws5&author=Nagar%2c -Venky&issn=0165-4101&title=Journal-of-Accounting-and -Economics&atitle=Discretionary%20Disclosure%20and%20Stock -Based%20Incentives&volume=34&issue=1-3&pages=283 -309&date=2003&dbid=ECON&cas=&spage=283&aulast= Record 9 of 10 in EconLit 1991-2003/06 TI: Should Firms Disclose Everything to Everybody? A Discussion of "Open vs. Closed Conference Calls: The Determinants and Effects of Broadening Access to Disclosure" AU: Skinner,-Douglas-J SO: Journal-of-Accounting-and-Economics. January 2003; 34(1-3): 181-87 DT: Journal-Article AI: Yes AB: Bushee, et al. (J. Accounting Econom. 34 (2003) 149-180) is a timely study in an area--corporate disclosure policy--that is increasingly important to regulators, corporate managers, and academics. The authors report several results that will be of interest to these groups. I describe the corporate disclosure issues that make the authors' research questions of broader relevance than their specific topic might suggest. I then provide comments on theoretical and empirical aspects of the study. Overall, the study is likely to be useful in helping us understand some of the forces at work as corporate disclosure becomes more rapid, more comprehensive, and more open. DE: Financing-Policy; Capital-and-Ownership-Structure; financial-ratios; value -of-firm (G320); General-Financial-Markets-Government-Policy-and-Regulation (G180); Firm-; Policy-; Information-and-Market-Efficiency; Event-Studies (G140) AN: 0637542 FTXT: ScienceDirect (tm) http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=GatewayURL&_origin=SilverLinker&_urlver sion=4&_method=citationSearch&_volkey=0165%2d4101%2334%23181&_version=1&md5=da3f 4d1b4abacd5887417a13374369f3 WEBLH: Check UW Holdings http://catalog.lib.washington.edu:4550/resserv?sid=ws5&author=Skinner%2c -Douglas-J&issn=0165-4101&title=Journal-of-Accounting-and -Economics&atitle=Should%20Firms%20Disclose%20Everything%20to%20Everybody%3f%20A %20Discussion%20of%20%20%22Open%20vs.%20Closed%20Conference%20Calls%3a%20The%20D eterminants%20and%20Effects%20%20of%20Broadening%20Access%20to%20Disclosure%22&v olume=34&issue=1-3&pages=181-87&date=2003&dbid=ECON&cas=&spage=181&aulast= Record 10 of 10 in EconLit 1991-2003/06 TI: Open versus Closed Conference Calls: The Determinants and Effects of Broadening Access to Disclosure AU: Bushee,-Brian-J; Matsumoto,-Dawn-A; Miller,-Gregory-S SO: Journal-of-Accounting-and-Economics. January 2003; 34(1-3): 149-80 DT: Journal-Article AI: Yes AB: Recent advances in information technology allow firms to provide broader access to their disclosures. We examine the determinants and effects of the decision to provide unlimited real-time access to conference calls (i.e., "open" conference calls). Our evidence suggests that the decision to provide open calls is associated with the composition of a firm's investor base and, to some degree, the complexity of its financial information. We also find that open calls are associated with a greater increase in small trades (consistent with individuals trading on information released during the call) and higher price volatility during the call period. DE: Information-and-Market-Efficiency; Event-Studies (G140); Pension-Funds; Other-Private-Financial-Institutions; Institutional-Investors (G230); Financial -Institutions-and-Services-Government-Policy-and-Regulation (G280); Financing -Policy; Capital-and-Ownership-Structure; financial-ratios; value-of-firm (G320); Firm-; Asset-Pricing (G120) AN: 0637541 FTXT: ScienceDirect (tm) http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=GatewayURL&_origin=SilverLinker&_urlver sion=4&_method=citationSearch&_volkey=0165%2d4101%2334%23149&_version=1&md5=058c e9c3d0ec726a8da01baaa77c0f17 WEBLH: Check UW Holdings http://catalog.lib.washington.edu:4550/resserv?sid=ws5&author=Bushee%2c-Brian -J&issn=0165-4101&title=Journal-of-Accounting-and -Economics&atitle=Open%20versus%20Closed%20Conference%20Calls%3a%20The%20Determi nants%20and%20Effects%20%20of%20Broadening%20Access%20to%20Disclosure&volume=34& issue=1-3&pages=149-80&date=2003&dbid=ECON&cas=&spage=149&aulast=