2021 SISG Module 8: Bayesian Statistics for Genetics Lecture 9: Bayes and Frequentist Testing

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Departments of Statistics and Biostatistics University of Washington Review of *p*-Values and Bayes Factors

Multiple Testing

Conclusions

Appendix Bayes Bonferroni Bayes Mixture Model

Review of *p*-Values and Bayes Factors

We review frequentist and Bayesian test procedures.

- We begin with a very simple situation in which we have a single parameter of interest θ.
- Assume the null of interest is

$$H_0: \theta = 0$$

with θ , for example, a treatment difference, or a log odds ratio, or a log hazard ratio.

- We assume an analysis yields a statistic *T* for which large values indicate departures from the null asymptotically χ₁².
- ► For example, the squared Wald statistic, $T = \hat{\theta}^2 / V$, with V the asymptotic variance of the MLE¹.
- An alternative is the likelihood ratio statistic.

 $^{^{1}}T=Z^{2}$ where Z is the Z-score

The observed p-value is,

$$p = \Pr(T > t_{\scriptscriptstyle obs} | H_0)$$

where t_{obs} is a number that is evaluated for the data at hand.

- The p-value is not saying anything about the probability of the null being true!!
- To report p only, gives a pure significance test.
- A small *p*-value can arise because:
 - H_0 is true but we were "unlucky".
 - H₀ is not true.

- to decide which explanation is responsible depends crucially on the prior belief on whether H_0 is true or not.

Key question: How small is small?

Types of Testing

A test of significance sets a cut-off value (e.g. α = 0.05) and rejects H₀ if p < α.</p>

Again: How to pick α ?

- A type I error is to reject H₀ when it is true, and a test of significance controls the type I error (whereas a pure significance test does not).
- A type II error occurs when H_1 is true but H_0 is not rejected.
- A hypothesis test goes one step further and specifies an alternative hypothesis.
- A decision is then taken as to which of H_0 and H_1 is chosen.
- The celebrated Neyman-Pearson lemma shows that for fixed α-level the likelihood ratio statistic maximizes the power.
- Wouldn't it be more reasonable to balance type I and type II errors?

The Dangers of Fixed Significance Levels

• Example: Sample, Y_1, \ldots, Y_n of size *n* from N(θ , 1),

$$H_0: \theta = 0, \quad H_1: \theta = 1.$$

Obvious that we should reject H_0 for $\overline{Y}_n > k(n)$, a constant².

The table below illustrates the problems of choosing a fixed α, regardless of sample size — imbalance in α and β as a function of *n*:

п	α	β	k(n)
1	0.01	0.91	2.33
25	0.01	0.0038	0.46
100	0.01	8×10^{-15}	0.23

- Also: Statistical versus practical significance.
- For both *p*-values and α levels we need thresholds that decrease as a function of the sample size *n*. Pearson (1953, p. 68), "...the quite legitimate device of reducing α as *n* increases".


²Note that the threshold for $T = [\overline{Y}_n/(1/\sqrt{n})]^2$ is constant

A quite remarkable result!

• With $\pi_0 = \Pr(H_0)$, Sellke *et al.* (2001) show that:

$$\Pr(H_0 | \text{ data }) \ge \left\{ 1 - \frac{1}{2.72 \, \rho \log \rho} \times \frac{1 - \pi_0}{\pi_0} \right\}^{-1} \tag{1}$$

A small p-value doesn't translate to a small probability that the null is not true.



p-value

Why does anyone use *p*-values?

- Historically, it was usual to carry out well-powered (single) experiments, and the prior on the alternative was not small.
- With respect to (1) and with $\pi_0 = 0.5$:
 - *p*-value = 0.05 gives $Pr(H_0 | data) > 0.29$.
 - *p*-value = 0.01 gives $Pr(H_0 | data) > 0.11$.
- Scientists well-calibrated in their own discipline?
- Perhaps, but if you're going to be subjective, why not be formal about it?
- Aside: Reason for lack of replication in observational epidemiology? Along with confounding, data dredging, measurement error,...

Calibrating α -Levels

• We want $\Pr(H_0|$ data), where "data" corresponds to the event $T > t_{fix}$, but to obtain this we must specify alternatives – consider a simple alternative, say $H_1 : \theta = \theta_1$.

► Then,

Posterior Odds of
$$H_0 = \frac{\Pr(H_0 \mid \text{data})}{\Pr(H_1 \mid \text{data})}$$

= $\frac{\Pr(T > t_{\text{fix}} \mid H_0)}{\Pr(T > t_{\text{fix}} \mid H_1)} \times \frac{\Pr(H_0)}{\Pr(H_1)}$
= $\frac{\alpha}{1 - \beta} \times \text{Prior Odds of } H_0$

- For ranking associations (which does not involve the prior odds if constant across tests): must consider the power, Pr(data |H₁).
- For calibration: must consider the prior odds of H_0 .

A Sanity Check via a Simple Example

► The model:

$$Y_i | \theta \sim_{iid} N(\theta, \sigma^2), \quad \sigma^2 \text{ known},$$

i = 1, . . . , *n*.

The distribution of the MLE is:

$$\widehat{ heta} = \overline{m{Y}} \sim {\sf N}(heta,m{V})$$

with
$$V = \sigma^2/n$$
,

$$T = \frac{n\overline{Y}^2}{\sigma^2}.$$

Null and alternative hypotheses are

$$H_0: \theta = 0, \quad H_1: \theta \neq 0.$$

- Under H_1 assume the prior $\theta \sim N(0, W)$.
- Recall from previous lectures that the evidence in the data for a pair of hypotheses is summarized in the Bayes factor:

$$\mathsf{BF} = \frac{\rho(\boldsymbol{y}|H_0)}{\rho(\boldsymbol{y}|H_1)} = \frac{\prod_{i=1}^n \mathsf{N}(y_i|0,\sigma^2)}{\int_{\theta} \prod_{i=1}^n \mathsf{N}(y_i|\theta,\sigma^2) \times \mathsf{N}(\theta|0,W)d\theta}.$$

A reminder of the ingredients for decision theory;

- ► Loss function $L(\theta, d)$: how bad it would be if the truth were θ but you took decision d. (Optimists: note we could equivalently define utility as $-L(\theta, d)$ how good it would be economists do this)
- Expected posterior loss E[L(θ, d)] loss for some decision d averaged over posterior uncertainty

The Bayes rule is the decision *d* that minimizes $E[L(\theta, d)]$ – but for testing, *d* is 0 or 1, so this means checking whether

 $\mathsf{E}[L(\theta, d=0)] \le \mathsf{E}[L(\theta, d=1)],$

i.e., do we expect less loss deciding d = 0 or d = 1?

$$\begin{array}{c|c} & \text{Truth} \\ \theta = 0 \quad \theta \neq 0 \\ \hline \text{Decision} \quad d = 0 \quad 0 \quad L_1 \\ d = 1 \quad L_2 \quad 0 \end{array}$$

With respect to this table, the posterior expected cost associated with the decision d is

$$\mathsf{E}[L(\theta, d)] = L(\theta = 0, d) \operatorname{Pr}(\theta = 0 | \mathbf{y}) + L(\theta \neq 0, d) \operatorname{Pr}(\theta \neq 0 | \mathbf{y}).$$

The two possible decisions (report $\theta = 0$ or $\theta \neq 0$) the expected losses are:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{E}[L(\theta, d=0)] &= 0 \times \mathsf{Pr}(\theta=0|\boldsymbol{y}) + L_2 \, \mathsf{Pr}(\theta\neq0|\boldsymbol{y}) \\ \mathsf{E}[L(\theta, d=1)] &= L_1 \, \mathsf{Pr}(\theta=0|\boldsymbol{y}) + 0 \times \mathsf{Pr}(\theta\neq0|\boldsymbol{y}) \end{aligned}$$

Testing

We now have to find the decision that minimizes the posterior expected loss, as a function of $Pr(\theta \neq 0 | \mathbf{y}) = Pr(\theta | \mathbf{y})$.

A little rearrangement leads to reporting $\theta \neq 0$ if

$$\Pr(\theta \neq 0 | \mathbf{y}) \geq \frac{L_1}{L_1 + L_2} = \frac{1}{1 + L_2/L_1} = \frac{1}{1 + R},$$

or equivalently

$$\Pr(\theta = \mathbf{0}|\mathbf{y}) < \frac{1}{1+R}.$$

Examples:

If $L_1 = L_2$ ($\mathbf{R} = 1$), report $\theta \neq 0$ if $\Pr(\theta \neq 0 | \mathbf{y}) \ge \frac{1}{2}$.

If $L_1 = 3 \times L_2$ ($\mathbf{R} = 1/3$), report $\theta \neq 0$ if $\Pr(\theta \neq 0 | \mathbf{y}) \geq \frac{3}{4}$.

If $L_2 = 3 \times L_1$ ($\mathbf{R} = 3$), report $\theta \neq 0$ if $\Pr(\theta \neq 0 | \mathbf{y}) \geq \frac{1}{4}$.

A Sanity Check via a Simple Example

- ▶ We take $W = \sigma^2$, which corresponds to the "unit information prior" of Kass and Wasserman (1995) (this choice not so important).
- With a prior odds, PO, and ratio of costs of type II to type I errors, *R*, this gives the decision rule to reject *H*₀:

Posterior Odds =
$$BF \times PO$$

= $\sqrt{1+n} \times \exp\left(-\frac{T}{2}\frac{n}{1+n}\right) \times PO < R$

Notice how this depends on T and n.

A Bayesian Test Statistics Threshold

Rearrangement gives a threshold for rejection of:

$$T > \frac{2(1+n)}{n} \log\left(\frac{PO}{R}\sqrt{1+n}\right)$$

- ► For relatively large prior odds on the null PO: require *T* to be larger (more evidence).
- For relatively large cost of Type II errors R (so that we are averse to type II error, i.e. missing signals): require T to be smaller (less evidence).
- Not such a simply summarization for *n* but, beyond a certain point, as *n* gets larger, we require larger *T* (more evidence).
- The above should be contrasted with the usual frequentist approach of

T > const

with the constant usually chosen to control the type I error.

A Bayesian Test Statistic Threshold

- The table below evaluates the probability of rejection given H_0 . We assume R = 1.
- For π₀ = 0.5 and n = 20, 50, 100 the thresholds give ≈ 0.05 — the situation in which this infamous threshold was first derived?

	$\pi_0 = 0.25$	$\pi_0 = 0.50$	$\pi_0 = 0.95$
<i>n</i> = 10	0.64	0.10	0.0025
<i>n</i> = 20	0.35	0.074	0.0022
<i>n</i> = 50	0.18	0.045	0.0016
<i>n</i> = 100	0.12	0.031	0.0011
<i>n</i> = 1000	0.030	0.0085	0.00034

Calibration with *p*-values

- The ABF can be inverted to give a rule for Z² that depends on PO, R and n (as with the simple example presented previously).
- For more details, see Wakefield (2009).
- Figure 1 shows the behavior of this rule as a function of the sample size *n*, and for different choices of the prior on the alternative π_1 and the ratio of costs of type II to type I errors.

The curves have the expected ordering and, as n gets large, a greater and greater level of evidence is required.




Figure 1: Regression threshold, on $\log_{10}(p)$ -value scale, vs sample size.

This is as we would expect because as the sample size increases we want both Type I and Type II errors to go to zero.

- p-values are widely misinterpreted but are not going away and so it's important to interpret correctly.
- p-values are hard to calibrate without knowing the sample size/power.
- Thresholds for significance should increase (i.e., *p*-values should be smaller) as *n* increases.
- Bayes factors provide an alternative (and they produce thresholds with desirable properties), but they are not without their issues (prior specification, calibration,...).
- ► To get at Pr(H₀| data) you can't get away from specifying π₀ = Pr(H₀), and the posterior probability is horribly sensitive to the value chosen.
- Better to use estimation procedures if you can.

Multiple Testing

Motivation for Multiple Testing

We have covered testing procedures, both frequentist and Bayesian, in the context of single tests.

How to proceed, when multiple tests are envisaged, is a big topic:



A lot of interest lately, given the advent of technologies that allow huge numbers of experiments to be performed.

As with single tests, this topic is controversial.

- We follow a running example with data from a microarray study of 102 men, 52 with prostate cancer and 50 normal controls (Efron and Hastie, 2016).
- Gene expression levels were measured for m = 6033 genes.
- A two-standard t-test was carried out.

A transformation was made so that the resultant statistic z_i, has distribution under the null:

 $H_{0i}: z_i \sim N(0, 1),$

- for $i = 1, \ldots, m$ genes.
- Under the alternative:

 $H_{1i}: z_i \sim \mathsf{N}(\mu_i, 1),$

for $i = 1, \ldots, m$ genes.




Figure 2: Histogram of *z*-values for prostate microarray study, with N(0, 1) distribution in red.

The aim is to find genes with non-zero μ_i.

Framework for Multiple Testing

Possibilities with m tests and when K are flagged as requiring further attention:

	Non-Flagged	Flagged	
H_0	A	В	m_0
H_0 H_1	С	D	<i>m</i> 1
	m – K	K	m

- m_0 is the number of true nulls.
- B is the number of type I errors.
- *C* is the number of type II errors.

Problem: To select a rule that will determine *K*.

We discriminate between:

- A sensible criterion.
- How the criterion should depend on sample size.

	Non-Flagged	Flagged	
H_0	A	В	m_0
H_0 H_1	С	D	<i>m</i> ₁
	<i>m</i> – <i>K</i>	K	m

The family-wise error rate (FWER) is the probability of making at least one Type I error, i.e.

 $\Pr(B \ge 1 | \text{ all } H_0 \text{ true }).$

► Let B_i be the event that the *i*-th null is incorrectly rejected, so that $B = \bigcup_{i=1}^{m} B_i$ is the total number of incorrectly rejected nulls.

The Family-Wise Error Rate

The FWER is given by:

$$FWER = Pr(B \ge 1 | all H_0 true) = Pr(\bigcup_{i=1}^m B_i | all H_0 true)$$
$$\leq \sum_{i=1}^m Pr(B_i | all H_0 true)$$
$$= m\alpha^*$$

where α^{\star} is the level for each test.

- This is true regardless of whether the tests are independent or not.
- ▶ Bonferroni takes $\alpha^* = \alpha/m$ to give FWER $\leq \alpha$.
- ► Example: For control at $\alpha = 0.05$ with m = 6033 tests take $\alpha^* = 0.05/6033 = 8.3 \times 10^{-6}$.
- Such stringent rules lead to a loss of power, but not ridiculous if you think there is a reasonable chance that all nulls could be true (but α should depend on n, in particular should decrease as n gets larger and larger).

If tests are independent:

$$Pr(B \ge 1) = 1 - Pr(B = 0) = 1 - Pr(\bigcap_{i=1}^{m} B'_{i}) = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{m} Pr(B'_{i}) = 1 - (1 - \alpha^{*})^{m} = FWER$$

So to achieve FWER = α take *p*-value threshold as α^{*} = 1 − (1 − α)^{1/m} — the Sidak correction (Sidák, 1967).
 Example: with m = 6033 tests take

$$\alpha^{\star} = 1 - (1 - 0.05)^{1/6033} = 8.5 \times 10^{-6},$$

which is very close to the Bonferroni threshold.

Holm's procedure Holm (1979) offers a modest improvement over Bonferroni.

Let

$$p_{(1)} \leq p_{(2)} \leq \cdots \leq p_{(i)} \leq \cdots \leq p_{(m)},$$

with corresponding null hypotheses H_{0i} .

Then, proceed as follows:

1. Let i_0 be the smallest index *i* such that

$$p_{(i)} > \frac{\alpha}{m-i+1}$$

2. Reject all null hypotheses $N_{0(i)}$ for $i < i_0$ and accept all with $i \ge i_0$.

It can shown that Holm's procedure controls FWER at level α and is slightly less conservative than Bonferroni.

We describe an alternative criterion.

For i = 1, ..., m tests let B_i again be the 1/0 random variable representing whether the null was incorrectly rejected or not, so that $B = \bigcup_{i=1}^{m} B_i$.

The expected number of false discoveries (EFD), with significance level α for each test, is given by

$$\mathsf{EFD} = \mathsf{E}[B] = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \mathsf{E}[B_i] = m\alpha$$

if all nulls are true.


For m_0 true nulls: $E[B] = m_0 \alpha$, but m_0 is unknown, so all we can say is

 $\mathsf{EFD} = \mathsf{E}[B] \le m\alpha.$

- In a GWAS context suppose m = 6033 and α = 0.05; this gives EFD ≤ 302, so conventional levels not so useful.
- We can easily put an upper bound on the EFD.
- ► For example, if we set α = 1/m the expected number of false discoveries is bounded by 1.
- With α = 5/m the expected number of false discoveries is bounded by 5.
- Compare to Bonferroni which controls the FWER via α/m .

Prostate Cancer Example

- ▶ We begin by plotting,the observed *p*-values versus those expected under the null, i.e. i/(m+1) for i = 1, ..., m = 6033.
- Hard to tell what is going on here... even when we focus in on bottom left, which is the small *p*-value area of region of interest.



Prostate Cancer Example

- We stretch the scale in Figure 5 by taking - log₁₀, the area where the action is, is now top right.
- On this scale, a value of 2 corresponds to a *p*-value of 0.01, and a value of 3 corresponds to a *p*-value of 0.001.
- Bonferroni,

 $p = 0.05/m = 8.3 \times 10^{-6}$, or $-\log_{10}(p) = 5.1$, flags only 3 genes as worthy of attention – this is the consequence of such a conservative criteria of following a procedure in which the probability of making any type I errors is 0.05.

 Holm's procedure gives the same 3.




Figure 3: Observed versus expected p-values, on $-\log_{10}$ scale.

Prostate Cancer Example

- The EFD=1 gives a p-value threshold of 1/6033 = 0.00017, or - log₁₀(p) = 3.78 and gives 21 flagged genes - with an expected false discovery of 1.
- The EFD=5 gives a p-value threshold of 5/6033 = 0.00083, or - log₁₀(p) = 3.08 and gives 54 flagged genes.
- As always with frequentist procedures there is no way of knowing anything about the 21 (or 54) specifically, the EFD=1 or 5 is the average over repeated uses of this procedure.




Figure 4: Observed versus expected p-values, on $-\log_{10}$ scale.

False Discovery Rate

A very popular criterion is the false discovery rate (FDR).

	Non-Flagged	Flagged	
H_0 H_1	A	В	m_0
H_1	С	D	<i>m</i> ₁
	т – К	K	m

Define the false discovery proportion (FDP) as the proportion of incorrect rejections:

$$\mathsf{FDP} = \begin{cases} \frac{B}{K} & \text{if } K > 0\\ 0 & \text{if } K = 0 \end{cases}$$

Then the false discovery rate (FDR), the expected proportion of rejected nulls that are actually true nulls, is given by

FDR = E[FDP].

This is the usual frequentist thing – under hypothetical replication of the experiment and application of the procedure the proportion of flagged features which are actually null.

We describe an algorithm for controlling the FDR.

Consider the following procedure for independent *p*-values:

- 1. Let $P_{(1)} < \cdots < P_{(m)}$ denote the ordered *p*-values.
- 2. Define $l_i = i\alpha/m$ and $R = \max\{i : P_{(i)} < l_i\}$ where α is the value for which we would like FDR control.
- 3. Then define the *p*-value threshold as $P_T = P_{(R)}$.
- 4. Reject all H_{0i} for which $P_i \leq P_T$.

Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) show that if this procedure is applied, then regardless of how many nulls are true (m_0) and regardless of the distribution of the *p*-values when the null is false

$$\mathsf{FDR} \leq \frac{m_0}{m} \alpha < \alpha.$$

This is incredible!

If all the signals are null, then B = K (all rejections are false) and

$$\mathsf{FDR} = \mathsf{E}\left[\frac{B}{K}\right] = 1 \times \mathsf{Pr}(B \ge 1) = \mathsf{FWER}.$$

FDR in this form and with extensions, e.g. Storey and Tibshirani (2003) has been successfully used in the microarrays field, where the number of non-null associations is not small.

Unfortunately less successful in a GWAS, because the proportion of nulls is very close to 1.

Prostate Cancer Example

- With a 5% FDR, 21 signals are flagged (not shown on figure).
- With a 10% FDR, 59 signals are flagged.
- Again, we cannot say anything about specific signals but under repeated use of this procedure we are using 10% of the signals we flag as significant, will actually be null.
- We definitely can't say that for any of the signals we have flagged there is a 10% chance that the null is true.
- With a 20% FDR, 106 signals are flagged (not shown on figure).




Figure 5: Observed versus expected p-values, on $-\log_{10}$ scale.

The algorithm of Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) begins with a desired FDR and then provides the *p*-value threshold.

Storey (2002) proposed an alternative method by which, for any fixed rejection region, a criteria closely related to FDR, the positive false discovery rate

$$\mathsf{pFDR} = \mathsf{E}[B/K \mid K > 0],$$

may be estimated³.

We assume rejection regions of the form $T > t_{fix}$ and consider the pFDR associated with regions of this form, which we write as pFDR(t_{fix}).

³this handles the event K = 0 differently to the previously-defined FDR

We define, for i = 1, ..., m tests, the random variables $H_i = 0/1$ corresponding to null/alternative hypotheses and test statistics T_i .

Then, with $\pi_0 = \Pr(H = 0)$ and $\pi_1 = 1 - \pi_0$ independently for all tests:

$$\mathsf{pFDR}(t_{\text{fix}}) = \frac{\mathsf{Pr}(T > t_{\text{fix}} \mid H = 0) \times \pi_0}{\mathsf{Pr}(T > t_{\text{fix}} \mid H = 0) \times \pi_0 + \mathsf{Pr}(T > t_{\text{fix}} \mid H = 1) \times \pi_1}$$

Consideration of the false discovery odds:

$$\frac{\mathsf{pFDR}(\mathit{t}_{\text{fix}})}{1-\mathsf{pFDR}(\mathit{t}_{\text{fix}})} = \frac{\mathsf{Pr}(\mathit{T} > \mathit{t}_{\text{fix}} \mid \mathit{H} = 0)}{\mathsf{Pr}(\mathit{T} > \mathit{t}_{\text{fix}} \mid \mathit{H} = 1)} \times \frac{\pi_0}{\pi_1}$$

explicitly shows the weighted trade-off of type I and type II errors, with weights determined by the prior on the null/alternative.

q-values

Storey (2003) rigorously shows that,

$$\mathsf{pFDR}(t_{\mathsf{fix}}) = \mathsf{Pr}(H = 0 \mid T > t_{\mathsf{fix}}),$$

giving a Bayesian interpretation.

In terms of *p*-values, the rejection region corresponding to $T > t_{\text{fix}}$ is of the form $[0, \gamma]$.

Let *P* be the random *p*-value resulting from a test.

Under the null, $P \sim U(0, 1)$, and so

$$pFDR(\gamma) = \frac{\Pr(P \le \gamma \mid H = 0) \times \pi_0}{\Pr(P \le \gamma)}$$
$$= \frac{\gamma \times \pi_0}{\Pr(P \le \gamma)}.$$
(2)

From this expression, the crucial role of π_0 is evident.

q-values

 Storey (2002) estimates (2), using uniformity of *p*-values under the null, to produce the estimates

$$\widehat{\pi}_{0} = \frac{\#\{p_{i} > \lambda\}}{m(1-\lambda)} \quad (3)$$

$$\widehat{\Pr}(P \le \gamma) = \frac{\#\{p_{i} \le \gamma\}}{m} \quad (4)$$

with λ chosen via the bootstrap to minimize the mean-squared error for prediction of the pFDR.

The expression (3) calculates the empirical proportion of *p*-values to the right of λ, and then inflates this to account for the proportion of null *p*-values in [0, λ].




Figure 6: Histogram of *p*-values for prostate cancer example.

- π₀ is estimated as 0.854 for the prostate cancer data.
- 71 genes flagged at 10% FDR level.

This method highlights the benefits of allowing the totality of *p*-values to estimate fundamental quantities of interest such as π_0 .

The *q*-value is the minimum FDR that can be attained when a particular test is called significant.

We give a derivation of the *q*-value, following Storey (2002).

To make the argument simpler, suppose we have a test statistic T that is χ_1^2 under the null.

Then define a set of nested rejection regions $\{\Gamma\}$ where these sets could be of the form

$$\Gamma = [t,\infty)$$

where $-\infty \leq t \leq \infty$.

q-values

Then,

$$p$$
-value $(t) = \inf_{\{\Gamma: t \in \Gamma\}} \Pr(T \in \Gamma \mid H = 0)$

is the *p*-value corresponding to an observed statistic *t*.

For example, *p*-values of 0.05 and 0.10 correspond to $\Gamma = [3.84, \infty)$ and $\Gamma = [2.71, \infty)$, respectively.

The *q*-value is defined as

$$q\text{-value}(t) = \inf_{\{\Gamma: t \in \Gamma\}} \Pr(H = 0 \mid T \in \Gamma)$$
(5)

Therefore, for each observed statistic t_i there is an associated q-value.

The *q*-value is the minimum pFDR that can be attained when calling that feature significant.

For example, if a particular feature has a q-value of 0.17, then if we call this feature significant, the expected proportion of false positives incurred is 17%.

Recall,


$$\mathsf{pFDR}(\gamma) = \frac{\gamma \times \pi_0}{\mathsf{Pr}(\boldsymbol{P} \leq \gamma)}$$

- ► As we have noted, a common mistake is to say that the *p*-value is the probability a feature is a false positive, i.e., to equate with Pr(H₀| data).
- We stress that the q-value is also not the probability that the feature is a false positive.
- ► The *q*-values can be estimated from the *p*-values via,

$$\widehat{q}(p) = \inf_{\gamma \ge p} \mathsf{pFDR}(\gamma).$$

The interpretation of the q-value is the minimum FDR that can be attained when calling that feature significant.

- The order of the q-values is the same as the order of the p-values (as with Bonferroni and EFD).
- 71 genes are flagged with a 10% FDR using the q-value approach, recall that the Benjamini-Hochberg algorithm gave 59 genes at this level.



-log10(expected)

q-values and "Local" FDR

It can be shown that,

$$\Pr(H_0 \mid T > t_{obs}) < \Pr(H_0 \mid T = t_{obs})$$
(6)

- So the evidence for H₀ given the exact ordinate is always greater than that corresponding to the tail area.
- This fits in with the Sellke *et al.* (2001) result we saw earlier, see Figure 7.




Figure 7: Sellke *et al.* (2001) relationship between posterior probability of the null and the p-value.

When one decides upon a value of FDR (or pFDR) to use in practice, the sample size should again be taken into account, since for large sample size one would not want to tolerate as large an FDR as with a small sample size.

Again, we would prefer a procedure that was consistent.

However, as in the single test situation, there is no prescription for deciding how FDR should decrease with increasing sample size.

Prostate cancer: *q*-values




Figure 8: *q*-value plots for prostate cancer data.

Bayesian False Discoveries/Non-Discoveries

In a Bayesian approach, based on Bayes factors we have a rule to flag a single association as noteworthy if:

> Posterior Odds = Bayes Factor \times Prior Odds < R

where *R* is the ratio of costs of type II to type I errors.

- In a multiple testing situation in which *m* associations are being examined nothing, in principle, changes.
- ► We simply apply the same rule *m* times, perhaps changing the priors if we have different priors for different associations.
- The choice of threshold, R, and hence the procedure, does not depend on: the number of tests being carried out⁴.

⁴unless the prior on the null, or the ratio of costs of errors depends on the number of tests

Bayesian False Discoveries/Non-Discoveries

- As we have seen, the Bayes factor depends, crucially, on the sample size.
- In contrast, multiple testing based on *p*-values (e.g. Bonferroni/Sidak) does not depend on the sample size but, crucially, on the number of tests *m*.
- We have already noted that *p*-value calibration is very difficult, and we would like a procedure by which *p*-value thresholds decrease to zero with increasing sample size.
- The same would also be required of EFD or FDR based procedures.

To summarize in the case of normal test statistics:

The Bayesian decision is based on the *Z* score and on the sample size, *n*, but not on the number of tests, *m*.

In contrast:

The Bonferroni decision is based on the *Z* score and on the number of tests, *m*, but not on the sample size, *n*.

In a Bayesian context, for a single test:

- ► If we call a hypothesis noteworthy then Pr(H₀| data) is the probability of a false discovery.
- ► If we call a hypothesis not rejected then Pr(H₁ | data) is the probability of a false non-discovery.

Key Point: A Bayesian analysis of a single SNP alone, or the same SNP from multiple SNPs will produce the same decision (assuming the prior is the same).

In a multiple-hypothesis testing situation (and assuming ordered so the first K are rejected), we have

Expected number of false discoveries = $\sum_{i=1}^{n} \Pr(H_{0i} | \text{data}_i)$ Proportion of false discoveries = $\frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \Pr(H_{0i} | \text{data}_i)$ Expected number of false non-discoveries = $\sum_{i=1}^{m} \Pr(H_{1i} | \text{data}_i)$ Proportion of false non-discoveries = $\frac{1}{m-K} \sum_{i=m+1}^{m} \Pr(H_{1i} | \text{data}_i).$

- In the frequentist approaches, the expected FDR is with respect to infinite hypothetical identical situations; the above Bayesian approach we have posterior summaries so they are conditional on the data (and are also dependent on the model).
- ► Another important difference is that the Benjamini Hochberg FDR was defined with respect to a tail-area, whereas these Bayesian measures condition on Y = y.

The local FDR corresponding to a test statistic z_0 is defined as

$$FDR(z_0) = Pr(gene \ i \text{ is null}|z_i = z_0).$$

Note: The local bit just refers to conditioning on a particular value, rather than a tail area.

We have

$$\mathsf{FDR}(z) = rac{\pi_0 f_0(z)}{f(z)}.$$

In practice f(z) is replaced by $\hat{f}(z)$.

Empirical Bayes method

Efron's local FDR (Efron et al., 2001) uses a two-groups model to estimates the proportion of null/signal genes as a function of Z_i.




Figure 9: Local FDR.

Estimating the 'null' component from the middle of the data, subtracting it from an overall density estimate, we can estimate local FDR, denoted FDR(Z).

Prostate cancer example




Figure 10: Local FDR for prostate cancer data. Blue dashed curve is distribution if all null. The green solid line is the spline-based estimate of the mixture density *f*. Pink are non-null signals. $\hat{\pi}_0 = 0.932$.

We find 25 genes with $\widehat{\text{FDR}}(Z_i) < 0.1$.

Stephens (2017) has recently proposed an approach building on previous ideas and with a number of benefits:

- Assumes effect sizes are drawn from a unimodal distribution which allows more accurate inference (lower variance), provided the assumption holds, and convenient computation.
- The method requires two inputs for each feature, estimate and uncertainty, in contrast to p- and q-values, so accounts for the power of the test/experiment.
- It provides an estimate of the effect size, along with uncertainty (i.e., the posterior distribution).

Empirical Bayes (EB) is used for estimation, as its computationally simpler – this adaptive shrinkage method is referred to as ash.

The approach takes as input an estimate $\hat{\beta}_i$ and standard error s_i for the *i*-th signal and then (also) builds a hierarchical mixture model.

The posterior for β is

$$p(\beta_i|\widehat{\beta}_i, s_i) \propto p(\widehat{\beta}_i|\beta_i, s_i) \times p(\beta_i),$$

and the prior for $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ is assumed to be independent from a unimodal pdf with

$$\boldsymbol{p}(\beta_i) = \pi_0 \delta_0(\beta_i) + \sum_{k=1}^K \pi_k \mathsf{N}(\beta_i | \mathbf{0}, \sigma_k^2),$$

where $\delta_0(\cdot)$ is a point mass at 0, and the mixing proportions π_k are to be estimated, as are the mixture variances σ_k^2 .

Local false sign rates: Specific details

- Estimation would focus on the posterior distribution $p(\beta_i | \hat{\beta}, \boldsymbol{s}, \hat{\pi})$.
- To gauge significance of observation *i*, we can examine the local FDR (Efron, 2008):

$$\mathsf{LFDR}_i = \mathsf{Pr}(\beta_i = \mathsf{0}|\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}, \boldsymbol{s}, \widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}})$$

This is the probability of being incorrect if we were to declare significance when actually null.

- This measures reflects the classic focus on whether an effect is exactly zero, and Stephens (2017) prefers the local false sign rate (LFSR).
- The LFSR is the probability that we would make an error in the sign if we were forced to declare it either positive or negative, a Type S error.
- Formally,

$$\mathsf{LFSR}_{i} = \min\left[\mathsf{Pr}(\beta_{i} \geq 0 | \widehat{\beta}, \boldsymbol{s}, \widehat{\pi}), \mathsf{Pr}(\beta_{i} \leq 0 | \widehat{\beta}, \boldsymbol{s}, \widehat{\pi})\right].$$

Example: Suppose that

$$\begin{aligned} &\mathsf{Pr}(\beta_i < 0 | \widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\beta}, \boldsymbol{s}) &= 0.95 \\ &\mathsf{Pr}(\beta_i = 0 | \widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\beta}, \boldsymbol{s}) &= 0.03 \\ &\mathsf{Pr}(\beta_i > 0 | \widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\beta}, \boldsymbol{s}) &= 0.02 \end{aligned}$$

Then, $LFSR_i = min(0.05, 0.98) = 0.05$.

This LFSR corresponds to the fact that, given these results, we would guess that β_i is negative, with probability 0.05 of being wrong.

The LFDR_{*i*} is 0.03 in this example.

Small values of LFDR_{*i*} indicate we can be confident that $\beta_i \neq 0$, while small values of LFSR_{*i*} indicate we can be confident in the sign of β_i .

We have $LFSR_i \ge LFDR_i$, which makes sense, since being confident in the sign of an effect implies we are confident it is non-zero.

In this sense, LFSR is a more conservative measure of significance than LFDR.

Average error rates can be obtained: Let $S \in \{1, ..., m\}$ denote a subset of the observations. Then the average FSR can be estimated as,

$$\widehat{\mathsf{FSR}}(S) = \frac{1}{|S|} \sum_{i \in S} \mathsf{LFSR}_i.$$

This is an estimate of the total proportion of errors we made if we were to estimate the sign of all effects in *S*.

The *s*-value is defined as

$$s_i = \widehat{\mathsf{FSR}}(\{k : \mathsf{LFSR}_k \leq \mathsf{LFSR}_i\})$$

is an analogous measure to the *q*-value.

For the prostate cancer data, $\hat{\pi}_0 = 0.84$.

head(out\$result[,1:5],5)									
	betahat	sebetahat	NegativeProb	PositiveProb	lfsr				
1	0.394234285	0.2656347	0.029291126	0.15911902	0.8408810				
2	0.703227359	0.1900733	0.001392831	0.90157430	0.0984257				
3	-0.006046081	0.2173035	0.056465210	0.05461837	0.9435348				
4	-0.239860003	0.2106722	0.122247036	0.02933164	0.8777530				
5	-0.033913878	0.2412444	0.063317423	0.05393860	0.9366826				

head(out\$result[,6:10],5)										
	svalue	lfdr	qvalue	PosteriorMean	PosteriorSD					
1	0.67579181	0.81158985	0.65031517	0.0350449209	0.10830331					
2	0.04354673	0.09703287	0.04299731	0.4186750962	0.20706512					
3	0.86172602	0.88891642	0.80947053	-0.0003780271	0.05434714					
4	0.74093749	0.84842132	0.71902507	-0.0211092735	0.08025763					
5	0.85043901	0.88274398	0.79390938	-0.0020380021	0.05940802					

LFSR: Illustration of shrinkage




Figure 11: Posterior mean versus summary point estimates.

LFSR: comparison with LFDR




Figure 12: LFSR versus LFDR.

Conclusions

- Bayesian analysis is attractive in a multiple testing context, but the results are very sensitive to the prior on the proportion of nulls, π₀.
- ► Fast methods are required for large *m* (e.g. in a GWAS context) of tests, which is still a drawback for many Bayesian approaches.
- Such priors can have a major impact on rankings and posterior probabilities.
- Stephens and Efron estimate the distribution of the alternative component of the Z statistics, while Storey estimates the alternative component of the p-value distribution.

What to do with multiple comparisons is a difficult problem:

- Apart from doing nothing, the only truly 'default' method is Bonferroni, which may not be the best approach, since it is so conservative.
- If we use estimation (for example, via a hierarchical model) we can avoid multiple comparison problems (though care in the model specification needed).
- There are many summaries of techniques, see for example Efron and Hastie (2016).
- Stephens (2017) is a very good discussion of modern techniques.

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Appendix

There is a prior that results in a Bayesian Bonferroni-type correction⁵.

If the prior probabilities of each of the nulls are independent with $\pi_{0i} = \pi_0$ for i = 1, ..., m.

Then the prior probability that all nulls are true is

$$\Pi_0 = \Pr(H_1 = 0, \dots, H_m = 0) = \pi_0^m$$

which we refer to as prior P_1 , and let $\alpha_{i,B}$ be the posterior probability of the null under this prior for gene *i*.

Example if $\pi_0 = 0.5$ and m = 10, $\Pi_0 = 0.00098$, which may not reflect the required prior belief.

⁵The following describes a very idealized setting where the data model and prior are both normal

Suppose instead that we wish to fix the prior probability that all of the nulls are true at Π_0 .

A simple way of achieving this is to take $\pi_{0i} = \Pi_0^{1/m}$, a specification we call prior P_2 .

Westfall et al. (1995) show that for independent tests

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \alpha^{\star}_{i,\mathsf{B}} &=& \mathsf{Pr}(\mathcal{H}_i = 0 \mid \boldsymbol{y}_i, \boldsymbol{P_2}) \\ &\approx& m \times \mathsf{Pr}(\mathcal{H}_i = 0 \mid \boldsymbol{y}_i, \boldsymbol{P_1}) \\ &=& m \times \alpha_{i,\mathsf{B}}. \end{array}$$

So a Bayesian version of a Bonferroni-like result is recovered.

As we have seen before, the posterior probability on the null, is strongly dependent on the prior on the null.

Efron's $\widehat{FDR}(z)$ is an 'empirical Bayes' method – it 'borrows strength' from the collection z_i , i = 1, ..., m, to say what happens at specific z.

Hierarchical models also do this, using prior assumptions of exchangeability to motivate borrowing strength across subgroups.

As shown by Gelman *et al.* (2012)⁶, this is not the same as, for example, Bonferroni.

They also discuss Type S errors, which are sign errors, i.e., saying an association is positive when it is truly negative.

 $^{^{\}rm 6}$ In a paper entitled, 'Why We (Usually) Don't Have to Worry About Multiple Comparisons'

Multiple testing: Does Bayes help?




Figure 13: Point and 95% intervals, reproduction of Figure 1 from Gelman *et al.* (2012).

Compared to simpler methods, multilevel approaches do allow better inference on vectors of parameters – generally by trading some bias for reduced variance.

We consider the mixture model described in Chapter 4 of Wakefield (2013).

The sampling model is $Y_i | \mu_i \sim N(\mu_i, \sigma_i^2)$, where the σ_i^2 are assumed known.

We specify a mixture model for the collection $[\mu_1, ..., \mu_m]$, with

$$\mu_{i} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{with probability } \pi_{0} \\ \sim \mathsf{N}(\delta, \tau^{2}) & \text{with probability } \pi_{1} = 1 - \pi_{0} \end{cases}$$

We use mixture component indicators $H_i = 0/1$ to denote the zero/normal membership model for transcript *i*.

Collapsing over μ_i gives the three stage model:

Stage One:

$$Y_i \mid H_i, \delta, \tau, \pi_0 \sim_{ind} \begin{cases} \mathsf{N}(0, \sigma_i^2) & \text{if } H_i = 0\\ \mathsf{N}(\delta, \sigma_i^2 + \tau^2) & \text{if } H_i = 1. \end{cases}$$

Stage Two: $H_i \mid \pi_1 \sim_{iid} \text{Bernoulli}(\pi_1), i = 1, ..., m.$

Stage Three: Independent priors on the common parameters:

$$p(\delta, \tau, \pi_0) = p(\delta)p(\tau)p(\pi_0).$$

We illustrate the use of this model with

$$\begin{array}{ll} p(\delta) & \propto 1, \\ p(\tau) & \propto 1/\tau \\ p(\pi_0) & = 1, \end{array}$$

so that we have improper priors for δ and τ^2 .

The latter choice still produces a proper posterior, because we have fixed variances at the first stage of the model.

Implementation is via a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm; Exercise 4.4 of Wakefield (2013) derives details of the algorithm.

Bayes Mixture Model

For transcript *i*, we may evaluate the posterior probabilities of the alternative

$$Pr(H_{i} = 1 | y_{i}) = E[H_{i} | \mathbf{y}]$$

$$= E_{\delta, \tau^{2}, \pi_{0} | \mathbf{y}} \left[E(H_{i} | \mathbf{y}, \delta, \tau^{2}, \pi_{0}) \right]$$

$$= E_{\delta, \tau^{2}, \pi_{0} | \mathbf{y}} \left[Pr(H_{i} = 1 | \mathbf{y}, \delta, \tau^{2}, \pi_{0}) \right]$$

$$= E_{\delta, \tau^{2}, \pi_{0} | \mathbf{y}} \left[\frac{p(\mathbf{y} | H_{i} = 1, \delta, \tau^{2}) \times \pi_{1}}{p(\mathbf{y} | H_{i} = 1, \delta, \tau^{2}) \times \pi_{1} + p(\mathbf{y} | H_{i} = 0) \times \pi_{0}} \right]$$
(7)

where

$$p(\mathbf{y} \mid H_i = 1, \delta, \tau^2, \pi_0) = [2\pi(\sigma_i^2 + \tau^2)]^{-1/2} \exp\left[-\frac{(y_i - \delta)^2}{2(\sigma_i^2 + \tau^2)}\right]$$
$$p(\mathbf{y} \mid H_i = 0, \delta, \tau^2, \pi_0) = [2\pi\sigma_i^2]^{-1/2} \exp\left[-\frac{y_i^2}{2\sigma_i^2}\right].$$

Bayes Mixture Model

Expression (7) averages $Pr(H_i = 1 | \boldsymbol{y}, \delta, \tau^2, \pi_0)$ with respect to the posterior $p(\delta, \tau^2, \pi_0 | \boldsymbol{y})$, and may be simply evaluated via

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{\rho(\mathbf{y} \mid H_i = 1, \delta^{(t)}, \tau^{2(t)}) \pi_1^{(t)}}{\rho(\mathbf{y} \mid H_i = 1, \delta^{(t)}, \tau^{2(t)}, \pi_0^{(t)}) \pi_1^{(t)} + \rho(\mathbf{y} \mid H_i = 0) \pi_0^{(t)}}$$

given samples $\delta^{(t)}, \tau^{2(t)}, \pi_0^{(t)}, t = 1, ..., T$, from the Markov chain.




Figure 14: Posterior probability of alternative for prostate cancer.