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Urban Stud 2010 47: 277 originally published online 20 November 2009
DOI: 10.1177/0042098009353622

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A Tale of Two Cities: A Comparative Analysis of Quality of Life Initiatives in New York and Bogotá

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[Paper first received, May 2008; in final form, October 2008]

Abstract

In the 1990s, city officials made a concerted effort to enhance security and civility in two large cities long associated with fear and danger: New York City and Bogotá, Colombia. In this article, a comparison is made of how ‘quality of life’ and ‘civility’ were conceptualised and pursued in New York City and Bogotá in the 1990s. The findings suggest that there were some similarities in the conceptualisation and operationalisation of these ideals, and that both cities became markedly safer in the period under investigation. Yet there were also important differences in the quality of life campaigns undertaken in the two settings. Specifically, measures to protect rights, enhance social services and expand the use of public spaces, particularly in poor communities, were a key component of Bogotá’s quality of life campaign. The Bogotá example shows that it is possible to take crime and civility seriously without criminalising minor offences and by coupling security measures with broader initiatives to strengthen democratic inclusion.

Introduction

In the 1990s, city officials made a concerted effort to enhance security and civility in two large cities long associated with fear and danger: New York City and Bogotá, Colombia. In both cases, newly elected mayors promised to enhance residents’ quality of life by promoting civility, reclaiming public spaces and reducing fear, crime and violence. Towards these ends, a number of new policies and programmes were enacted, and both cities enjoyed dramatic reductions in crime and violence. Since that time, both mayors have converted these experiences into platforms for presidential campaigns. Moreover, the policies and practices...
implemented in Bogotá and, to a far greater extent, in New York City have been promoted as examples for other cities around the globe.

In this article, we compare how civility and quality of life were conceptualised and pursued in New York City and Bogotá in the 1990s. The decline in lethal violence was as dramatic in Bogotá as it was in New York, which at a minimum suggests that it is not necessary to implement the ‘zero tolerance’ approach made famous in New York in order dramatically to reduce violence. Yet our primary purpose is not to intervene in the debate about what caused the crime drop in either city. Rather, our purpose is to challenge what has become conventional wisdom: the notion that a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to disorder and minor crime is the only viable way to impact serious crime, and therefore that its negative effects are a sort of ‘collateral damage’ that must be accepted as an inevitable by-product of the implementation of effective anti-crime policies.

We argue here that the Bogotá example shows that it is possible to take crime and disorder and the fear they generate, seriously, and to enjoy reductions in serious crime, yet to couple policing and other security measures with broader initiatives to strengthen democratic inclusion, extend and deepen citizenship, and shore up the rule of law. Indeed, in the comparatively broad conception of civility, quality of life and security that prevailed in Bogotá, efforts to expand access to public places, to enhance the provision of social and health services, and prevent the criminalisation of minor norm violations are themselves key security measures. Such an approach, we contend, reaps dividends for democracy that extend beyond falling crime rates. As Fyfe et al. write

We need to look beyond the short-term success or failure of interventions designed to eradicate the manifestation and experience of incivility to the longer-term impact of such initiatives on the... quality of social relations (Fyfe et al., 2006, p. 860).

Before developing this argument, however, we briefly discuss the meaning of the term ‘civility’ and its relationship to ‘quality of life’ issues in many urban settings.

The Political Construction of ‘Civility’

While concerns about the tenor and quality of everyday interactions among residents of cities are hardly new, recent transformations have triggered renewed reflection about the connection between the observance of norms and urban residents’ quality of life. Yet as many scholars have noted, ‘civility’ is an ambiguous concept, one that may be defined in a number of ways (Boyd, 2006; Fyfe et al., 2006). More narrow constructions of the term tend to reduce civility to mannerliness, while broader conceptualisations highlight the importance of generating and supporting formal and informal practices that communicate and support moral equality across diverse groups (Boyd, 2006). As scholars such as Richard Boyd (2006) and Ash Amin (2006) argue, civility may be thought of not only a means of reducing conflicts between citizens, but also as a means of fostering the pluralism and equality necessary for democracies to work.

This broader conception of ‘civility’ is comparatively unlikely to be invoked (either implicitly or explicitly) in the quite politicised debates about crime and disorder underway in cities across the globe. As Fyfe et al. (2006) note, these debates were sparked by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling’s ‘broken windows’ thesis: the argument that the failure to address minor manifestations of disorder reveals a lack of informal social control and enhances resident fear, thus inviting serious criminals into the neighbourhood (Kelling and Coles, 1996; Skogan, 1990; Wilson and Kelling, 1982). The New York City experience under Mayor Giuliani is the most widely known attempt
to apply (one version of) this theory; its policies and practices have been exported to cities around the globe by a growing number of consulting agencies and experts, many of whom were part of New York’s quality of life campaign (Bratton and Kelling, 2006; de Palma, 2002; Lifsher, 2001; Mitchell and Beckett, 2008; Mountz and Curran, n.d.; Parenti, 1999; Sahm, 2005; Schneider and Amar, 2003; Smith, 2001; Wacquant, 2006; Webb-Vidal, 2001). Firms such as Giuliani Partners and The Bratton Group L.L.C. and think-tanks such as the Manhattan Institute seek to influence regional and municipal policing practices and crime policies. Largely as a result of these efforts, the “broken window thesis asserting a causal link between incivilities, fear, disorder and crime, has become a taken-for-granted assumption” (Crawford, 2006, p. 958). Yet initiatives grounded in similar ideals, placing civility at the core of security, have been associated with very different kinds of policies and practices in Bogotá. Although also seeking to enhance civility, quality of life and security, officials in Bogotá drew upon a broader conception of civility, one that highlights the need for policies that support social development and minimise the use of coercion in addressing crime and disorder.

In what follows, we briefly describe the two cities in which our research was conducted and the methodology and data upon which our conclusions are based. We then compare the ways in which security and quality of life were conceptualised and operationalised in Bogotá and New York City. Our analysis concentrates on three key areas: policing and related anti-crime initiatives; fiscal policy and priorities; and public parks, recreation and transport. Although some of these policy arenas are not typically included in discussions of crime policy, we do so precisely because they were understood by officials in Bogotá to be essential to efforts to enhance security and ‘quality of life’. We begin with a brief description of our methodology, data and research settings.

**Methodology and Research Settings**

In the 1990s, mayoral administrations in New York City and Bogotá promoted a dramatically new way of imagining and governing their cities, with civility at the centre. Both administrations invoked the concept of broken windows policing, and both were characterised by an emphasis on the need to enhance urban residents’ quality of life, the importance of reclaiming public spaces and the necessity of restoring respect for law where it was weak. Despite these similarities, ‘civility’ was imagined and pursued in very different ways in New York City and Bogotá in the 1990s. We use a comparative case study method here to analyse the similarities and differences that characterise the two cases.

We focus on the case of New York City because it is the best-known example of a municipal effort to reduce crime and disorder, and because the dramatic crime drop that occurred there is widely promoted as ‘proof’ that an aggressive version of broken windows policing ‘works’. We focus on Bogotá because the discourse around and practices aimed at enhancing civility and security were notably different there, and yet lethal violence also declined dramatically in that context. Certainly many factors differentiate the two cities and render difficult any attempt to draw strong causal claims about the impact of municipal practices on falling crime rates. Moreover, crime rates are affected not only by policy initiatives, but also by a host of social, demographic and cultural processes.

We therefore use this comparative case study to accomplish a more modest but nonetheless important goal: comparing the ways that quality of life and security were conceptualised and pursued in two cities, both of which experienced tremendous improvements in public safety. Although we do not draw firm conclusions about the efficacy of the policies adopted in each setting, the comparison we
provide here suggests that, even if Giuliani’s anti-crime effort was responsible for the crime drop in the Big Apple—a contention that is widely contested—the Bogotá case indicates that the adoption of this approach is not necessary in order to enjoy dramatic reductions in crime and violence. Moreover, familiarity with the Bogotá case allows for a more comprehensive assessment of the costs and benefits of alternative approaches to urban quality of life that now circulate on the international security market.

Our analysis of the two cases is based on a number of data sources, including archival materials, budget documents, transcripts of speeches, background interviews with academics and others familiar with policy developments, newspaper articles and secondary analyses. In the case of Bogotá, we also draw upon interviews with several past and present members of city government. In the absence of systematic archival materials, these interviews are used to shed light on the philosophy and articulated goals associated with the quality of life initiative undertaken in Bogotá. The archival research was conducted over the 2006–07 academic year; the field work was conducted in the winter of 2007 in both Bogotá and New York City. These research settings are briefly described next.

**New York City**

With a population of just over 8 million in 2007, New York City is the largest city in the United States. New York City is home to immigrants from around the world; indeed, over one-third of New York City’s population is foreign born. Long an industrial centre and transport hub, New York City has become increasingly important as a centre of global finance and as a tourist destination. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, New York City was plagued by some of the highest crime rates in the US (Karmen, 2000) as well as significant fiscal difficulties (Weikert, 2001). The recent decline in crime rates was key to New York City’s financial recovery and has been the subject of a great deal of attention. Insofar as the anti-crime effort was predicated on the notion that too many New Yorkers were behaving in an uncivil manner and that these norm violations were fuelling crime and fear of crime, the notion of ‘civility’ was central to these discussion.

**Bogotá, Colombia**

Bogotá is the financial and political centre of Colombia, and is the fourth-largest city in South America. In 2006, its population was estimated at 8 million, making it equivalent in size to New York City. In recent decades, Colombia has been mired in Latin America’s longest-running armed conflict, fuelled by the intersection of political conflict with drug trafficking and other forms of organised crime. While the city of Bogotá has largely escaped the rural massacres and violent battles that characterise rural areas, it has unquestionably been affected by the broader conflict. The clearest indication of this impact is the massive migration of internally displaced people, which has contributed to Bogotá’s phenomenal population growth in recent years.

If ever there was an unlikely candidate for urban revitalisation, it was Bogotá in the 1990s. Plagued by kidnappings, terrorist attacks and a homicide rate among the highest in the world, Bogotá was known for the chaos caused by unprecedented and ill-organised population growth, driven largely by waves of internally displaced people arriving in the city after their homelands were rendered uninhabitable by war, organised crime or both. The transport system was notoriously inefficient; social services were strained and ineffective. As one reporter put it, “Bogotá was a basket case” (Forero, 2001). Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, in a 1995 survey, 75 per cent of Bogotanos reported that Bogotá was not a good place to live (López Borbón, 2003).

Miraculously, change came to Bogotá. While the city’s reinvention is most identified with
the leadership of Mayor Antanas Mockus (1994–97, 1 2000–03) and Mayor Enrique Peñalosa (1997–2000), the fundamental underpinnings of change trace back to broader processes. First, beginning in 1988, mayors were elected rather than appointed by the President. This change opened the way for an unusual degree of political independence on the part of Bogotá’s mayors and increased their accountability to the local electorate. Similarly, in 1991, the country’s Constitution was modified to improve rights guarantees and enhance municipal mayors’ responsibilities and autonomy. Significantly, the Colombian Constitution incorporates *acciones de tutela*, whereby anyone can bring a case for the violation of their constitutional rights. Against the backdrop of these reforms, Mayors Mockus and Peñalosa crafted innovative city policies that prioritised security without divorcing it from other social policy aims. This integral approach to security made possible its success and sustainability as a component of a broader social justice platform. It is also what most clearly distinguishes Bogotá’s vision of ‘quality of life’ from that put into practice in New York City. In what follows, we compare how these core ideas were conceptualised and operationalised in New York City and Bogotá.

Defining Civility

Rudolph W. Giuliani was elected mayor of New York City in 1993 and re-elected in 1997 (Weikert, 2001). Throughout his campaign and tenure in office, Giuliani stressed the capacity of municipal leadership to bring about change.

Time brings all things to pass, and with the start of my Administration New York City is poised for dramatic change. The era of fear has had a long enough reign. The period of doubt has run its course (Giuliani, 1994).

Towards this end, Giuliani promoted a ‘new urban agenda’, one that promised to enhance civility and urban residents’ ‘quality of life’ by reducing crime and disorder. For Giuliani, the core of the problem was social and legal laxity and reluctance to sanction norm violations, both large and small. In his inaugural address, for example, Giuliani pledged to place “much greater emphasis on stricter enforcement of the law to reverse the growing trend of ever increasing tolerance for lawless behavior” (Giuliani, 1994).

Giuliani’s aggressive approach to crime and those he dubbed ‘disorderly’ was also based on a particular interpretation of broken windows policing, one that emphasised the need to crack down on disorder in order to discourage serious crime. Proponents of broken windows policing argue that neighbourhoods that fail to fix broken windows or address other manifestations of ‘disorder’ display a lack of informal social control and enhance resident fear, thus inviting serious criminals into the neighbourhood (Kelling and Coles, 1996; Skogan, 1990; Wilson and Kelling, 1982). In New York, proponents of a ‘zero tolerance’ approach also argued that many of those who committed minor offences, like washing windows for tips, were in fact very dangerous individuals.

Squeegers were not merely a troubled population. They were capable of considerable mayhem (Kelling and Coles, 1996, p. 142).

Moreover, advocates of aggressive policing argued that, by shaking enough of these petty criminals down, real criminals would be located.

Just as every fare beater was not a felon, not every petty criminal is a serious criminal; yet enough are, or have information about others who are, that contact with petty offenders alerts all criminals to the vigilance of the police and gives police legitimate access to information about more serious problems (Kelling and Coles, 1996, p. 146).

Drawing on these ideas, Mayor Giuliani called for a fundamental reorientation of policing. In particular, the police were encouraged to consider misdemeanour offences such as public drunkenness and panhandling as...
very serious matters. For example, in Police Strategy No. 5, “Reclaiming the public spaces of New York”, Giuliani and his first Police Commissioner, William Bratton, stressed the need to ‘define deviancy up’ by focusing on ‘quality of life’ offences such as fare-beating, window washing, public consumption of alcohol, possession of marijuana, sleeping outdoors, begging and public urination (Giuliani and Bratton, 1994). The NYPD were also encouraged to ‘stop and frisk’ those deemed suspicious, a practice that has been widely implemented and highly controversial (Fagan and Davies, 2000). Adam Crawford identifies this as the “paradox of imposing civility through coercion, or at least the threat of it” (Crawford, 2006, p. 957).

Giuliani also sought to improve New Yorkers’ quality of life by reducing government employment, spending and taxation. This fiscal agenda was based to a large extent on the work of the Manhattan Institute, an increasingly influential, conservative think-tank located in New York City, and reflected Giuliani’s assessment that the public sector—the police force excepted—needed trimming.

The City economy that I inherited in January 1994 presented a significant imbalance between a bloated government and a diminished private sector (City of New York, 1995, p. 2).

Indeed, Giuliani claimed that his fiscal goals represented

more than a change in direction: it is a change in vision to get government out of the way of the economy, and support the policies and programs that stabilize and expand the private sector (City of New York, 1995, p. 2; see also Weikert, 2001).

In this vision, government involvement in the economy reduces ‘quality of life.’ Giuliani therefore endeavoured to shrink the tax-base and reduce government expenditures, particularly on programmes that served the poor. As the following discussion makes evident, this emphasis on privatisation was not shared in Bogotá.

Conceptualising Civility in Bogotá

Although similarly concerned to shore up civility and security, municipal leaders in Bogotá conceptualised and pursued these ideals quite differently. Mayor Mockus’ notion of cultura ciudadana, a ‘culture of citizenship’ was the cornerstone of his anti-crime platform. Defined as the main priority for his administration, the idea derived from Mockus’ own academic explorations and drew on theorists as far-ranging as Emile Durkheim, Douglass North and Jon Elster. Like Giuliani, Mockus maintained that Colombian society tolerated disrespect for not only the law itself, but also disrespect for the kinds of interpersonal behaviour which are necessary to build trust and lay the foundations for peaceful co-existence. Public policy, he argued, should tackle these patterns of behaviour as part of an integral approach to creating quality of life for all city inhabitants (see also Ordóñez, 2005).

Mayor Enrique Peñalosa incorporated Mockus’ focus on citizenship culture, but also placed a new emphasis on public space and order. It was under Peñalosa that broken windows theory was explicitly invoked for the first time. Peñalosa paid particular attention to the city’s parks, public transport system and roads. But the way in which these elements of infrastructure were understood—and the way in which the sometimes controversial inhabitants of those public space, including the homeless, drug users, recyclers, vendors and sex workers, were discussed—reinforced the inclusive conception of civility that formed the backbone of Mockus’ citizenship culture. In this approach, these marginalised groups were to be the target of inclusive social policies rather than exclusionary and punitive ones.

Moreover, under both Mockus and Peñalosa, although a combination of carrots and sticks were employed, the emphasis was on the former. The city’s crime-fighting did
become more aggressive during this period, taking measures both to increase its efficacy and extend its reach, as detailed later. Yet these measures were part-and-parcel of a broader re-envisioning of the city itself as an inclusive, respectful and beautiful community; they were accompanied by massive public investments in transport, education and other social services. As Hugo Acero, security adviser to both Mockus and Peñalosa, explained, crime-fighting cannot be divorced from other social investments; it would be foolish not to consider the construction of schools and libraries in poor neighbourhoods as related to questions of security.6 Similarly, Mayor Peñalosa called for taking discussions of city life out of the topic of potholes and crime, that we might be conscious that we can construct anything that we might imagine ... a city that today seems a utopia, tree-filled, with bicycle paths, full of parks, with clean and almost navigable rivers, with lakes, libraries, clean, egalitarian (Montezuma, n.d., p. 189).

In Bogotá, ‘broken windows’ were understood as a call for investing in that which is public. Advocates of this approach assert that having a world-class library in your neighbourhood not only encourages literacy; it also increases a sense of civic pride, responsibility and solidarity, and thus enhances security. In this vision, while the authorities have an important role to play in upholding the law, security itself is (re)produced daily by citizens themselves. Authorities should therefore primarily devote resources and attention to buttressing and encouraging these efforts. As Mayor Mockus succinctly put it in an August 1994 speech, “Citizen solidarity is better than repression” (Alcaldía Mayor, 1998, 119).

Conceptualising Civility: A Comparative Assessment

In sum, mayoral regimes in Bogotá and New York City in the 1990s both sought to enhance civility and improve quality of life, in large part by reducing crime and disorder. Yet the assumptions that guided these efforts were quite different. In Giuliani’s conception, incivility and crime were the result of the social and legal tolerance of incivility and the resulting failure to impose penalties for minor infractions; the solution therefore lay in raising the costs associated with crime (defined broadly) and in aggressively searching out any and all law-breakers. By contrast, municipal leaders in Bogotá emphasised the responsibility of the state to build and support an infrastructure and society that encouraged the development of citizen solidarity, which was in turn thought to discourage criminal behaviour. This broadened definition of security—which focuses less on finding and punishing minor offenders and more on forming healthy and engaged citizens—was key to the approach to crime and disorder undertaken in Bogotá and fundamentally differentiates that city’s approach from that of New York.

Pursuing Civility and Security

In what follows, we compare how these philosophical and political orientations were operationalised in New York and Bogotá. Our discussion focuses on three key arenas: policing; fiscal policy and priorities; and parks, recreation and transport.

Policing

In New York City, Mayor Giuliani endeavoured to reduce crime largely by enhancing law enforcement efforts and, in particular, by encouraging the police to concentrate their attention on even minor offenders. Under his leadership, the police department budget nearly doubled from $1.7 billion in 1993 to $3.1 billion in 2001. At the same time, the number of uniformed police officers increased from 36,340 in 1993 to 40,710 in 2001, an increase of 12 per cent. These increases built upon the already-significant augmentation of the number of uniformed officers that occurred under his predecessor,
Mayor David Dinkins, making New York City one of the most heavily policed cities in the US (Greene, 1999).

In addition, Giuliani and police officials restructured the police bureaucracy such that precinct commanders were held accountable for developments in their jurisdiction, and a new information technology system—Compstat—was implemented. Compstat, which stands simply for computer statistics, allowed the police department to map the spatial distribution of criminal events in order to develop particular strategies for dealing with those problems (Karmen, 2000; Silverman, 1999). Its introduction was also linked to an increased emphasis on accountability: police commanders were increasingly responsible for knowing about, and responding to, developments occurring within their jurisdiction.

Under Mayor Giuliani, the police were encouraged to stop as many people as possible, to consider no violation too minor to warrant police intervention and to make arrests wherever possible. The goal, ostensibly, was to reduce the number of firearms in circulation. Yet as a result of the more aggressive approach to minor violations, the number of misdemeanour arrests increased by about 80 per cent, from 129,403 in 1993 to 224,668 in 2000 (New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, n.d.). Similarly, the number of New York City drug arrests more than doubled, from 66,744 in 1993 to 140,122 in 2000 (New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, n.d.). Of these, a growing percentage involved only marijuana: New York City pot arrests rose from under 10,000 a year in 1993 to over 60,000 in 2001 (Golub et al., 2007; Levine and Small, 2008).

Critics have argued that the intensified enforcement of the laws prohibiting quality of life crimes had a pronounced impact on the city’s homeless population (McArdle and Erzen, 2001; Barr, 2001; Barta, 1999; Bumiller, 1999; Greene, 1999; Harcourt, 2001). In 1999, Police Commissioner Howard Saffir announced that homeless people sleeping outside would be summoned or arrested for doing so. At the same time, Giuliani tried to change city rules to require that homeless people who did not comply with welfare-to-work requirements, treatment protocols and other rules would be barred from the entire city shelter system for at least 30 days (Barr, 2001). These anti-homeless initiatives had a particularly pronounced impact on the mentally ill, an estimated 12,000 of whom lived in the streets of New York City. These practices also affected the composition of the jail population. On an average day in the year 2000, there were nearly 3000 mentally ill people on Rikers Island, making the jail the largest psychiatric facility in the state (Barr, 2001).

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the NYPD’s new zero tolerance approach was its increased reliance upon the ‘stop and frisk’ as a proactive tool for reducing crime and locating firearms.

Under the tactical shift to order-maintenance policing in New York City, patrol was reinvented to include proactive interdiction of persons suspected of both minor and serious crimes (Fagan and Davies, 2000, p. 463; see also Harcourt, 2001; Karmen, 2000; OAG, 1999).

Indeed, the tactic was used quite frequently. Studies of NYPD stop and frisks indicate that Blacks and Latinos were much more likely than Whites to be stopped and that stops of people of colour were less likely to be legally justified and to lead to an arrest than were stops of White people (Fagan and Davies, 2000). Perhaps not surprisingly, claims against the police for abusive conduct increased by 75 per cent in the first four years of the Giuliani administration (Greene, 1999). Similarly, damages paid by the city to victims of police misconduct increased from $24 million in 1994 to $97 million in 1997 (Schneider and Amar, 2003).

Giuliani’s tough approach to squeegee men, the homeless and youth of colour reflects a
general philosophical and orientation: his preferred methods for dealing with a wide range of social problems and issues related to poverty involved more sticks rather than carrots. Not surprisingly, New York residents’ responses to the NYPD’s tactics during this time were mixed. Undoubtedly, all New Yorkers appreciated the fact that the city became markedly safer during this period and a majority (61 per cent) approved of the job that the NYPD was doing in the year 2000. Yet a smaller share of Blacks (42 per cent) and Hispanics (56 per cent) approved of the NYPD’s performance than Whites (70 per cent). Moreover, 62 per cent of all New Yorkers believed that the police department engaged in racial profiling; 67 per cent believed that it had a problem with police brutality. As a result, 42 per cent of Blacks and 36 per cent of Hispanics felt fearful if approached by the police. Perhaps most surprisingly, most of those polled (57 per cent) reported that they did not feel any safer than they had before Mayor Giuliani took office. In sum, although a majority of New Yorkers approved of the NYPD’s performance, approval ratings were higher among White and presumably more-affluent residents. For New York residents of colour, falling crime rates appear to have been offset by intensified fear of the police themselves.

**Policing in Bogotá**

In the realm of policing, several parallel developments characterise the two cities. Like the Giuliani administration, officials in Bogotá emphasised the need to improve policing efforts. By the second Mockus administration, the police budget had increased approximately 300 per cent (Acero, 2002, pp. 20–21; Llorente and Rivas, 2004, p. 325). In 2001, in partnership with the private sector, the city also designated 12 quadrants of the city of high commercial interest as ‘secure zones’. With support from the Chamber of Commerce, a constant police presence was provided in these areas, a development that has obvious similarities to the spread of BIDs in New York City. Moreover, Bogotá adopted an ‘epidemiological approach’ to understanding and policing violence: the use of specialised, spatially targeted data to design specific interventions by district, a development that parallels the use of Compstat in New York City. As in New York City, city leaders emphasised the need to hold local supervisors accountable for crime reduction in their area. Targets of 10 per cent reduction in homicides were established, based explicitly on the New York model (Llorente and Rivas, 2004).

As in New York City, officials in Bogotá emphasised the need for disarmament. However, city officials in Bogotá sought to elicit the participation of citizens in this campaign and public pedagogy and inventive outreach efforts were used to encourage this voluntary submission of guns. By 2001, Bogotá residents had voluntarily surrendered some 6500 firearms, which were subsequently melted by city officials. Over time, however, the city also increased the seizure of firearms through searches. In 1995, 6000 weapons were seized in such a manner; by 2003, the number had climbed to 16 000 (Llorente and Rivas, 2004). In Bogotá, disarmament was paired with efforts to curtail the sale of alcohol through a mandatory 1:00 a.m. closing time, unprecedented in a city famous for its nightlife. This attempt to control the availability of these two key environmental factors—guns and alcohol—was a central part of Mayor Mockus’ public awareness campaign ‘Life is sacred’, which prioritised violence over other types of crime.

Mockus’ prioritisation of violent crime shifted somewhat under Mayor Peñalosa, whose focus on order extended beyond life-threatening violence to include some non-violent offenders. Before 1999, the Bogotá police were frequently unable to detain those suspected of minor crimes due to severe overcrowding in the city’s jails (Llorente and Rivas, 2004, p. 327). To remedy this, Mayor Peñalosa
created the Unidades Permanentes de Justicia (UPJ), decentralised detention facilities. While these facilities were created to increase the effectiveness of crime-fighting across the board, they did make it possible to detain those suspected of less serious violations.

There are, then, important similarities between the policies and practices undertaken in Bogotá and New York City. In particular, officials in both cities significantly enhanced the police budget; improved crime data collection and analysis techniques; emphasised police accountability for reducing crime; supplemented public policing with public–private partnerships in some commercial areas; and endeavoured to reduce the number of firearms in circulation. Yet there were also important differences in the area of law enforcement.

First, as noted previously, disarmament was initially pursued in Bogotá by encouraging people to disarm voluntarily rather than through involuntary searches. Secondly, although officials in Bogotá strove to enhance police visibility, this was achieved by eliminating administrative posts and shifting officers to patrol rather than by adding new officers. In 1994, Bogotá had 10,500 police officers; by 2003, the number had declined slightly to 10,320 (Acero, n.d., Los Gobiernos Locales, p. 22). The size of Bogotá’s Metropolitan Police was thus dwarfed by the NYPD, which boasted 40,710 officers in 2001 serving a similarly sized population. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, crime was and continues to be defined far more narrowly in Bogotá than is the case in New York City. In Bogotá, many of the behaviours defined in New York as quality of life offences, such as urinating in public, prostitution and sleeping in public spaces, are not crimes. Similarly, under Colombian law, possession of small amounts of marijuana, cocaine and heroin is not a crime (Youngers and Walsh, 2009).

In addition, despite the construction of new detention facilities, the incarceration of minor offenders was discouraged in Bogotá. Indeed, the number of arrests for minor offences in New York City appears to have far exceeded those in Bogotá. The available data indicate that there were approximately 37,500 detentions of individuals suspected of violating the police code in Bogotá in the first half of 2002, for an estimated yearly total of 75,000 (Acero, 2002, p. 49). By contrast, in New York City, there were 189,707 misdemeanour arrests in 2002 (New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, n.d.). Thus, in New York City, there were roughly 2.5 times as many misdemeanour arrests as there were detentions for violations of the police code (i.e. minor offences) in Bogotá.

The orientation of Bogotá’s police force towards the poor and marginalised reveals additional differences in police philosophy and practice. Much of Bogotá’s enhanced police budget was devoted to improving police training, including extended instruction in human rights and international humanitarian law. City officials also introduced community policing and encouraged police officers to enhance prevention through supportive work within communities.

Some critics have noted that the community policing programmes were poorly articulated with the overall police institution (Llorente and Rivas, 2004, p. 326). However, a study conducted after its first year of operation found very high levels of citizen support (96 per cent) for such programmes in the areas where they operated, most of which were low-income neighbourhoods (Informe de Consultoría de la Universidad Javeriana, cited in Acero, 2002, p. 22). These favourable evaluations contrast with the less favourable evaluations of New Yorkers of colour described previously. Moreover, as part of the community policing initiative, significant funds were spent on complementary programmes aimed outside the police institution itself, such as training and support for community-based security groups aimed at “combating fear, apathy, indifference and
the lack of solidarity in the face of actions by criminals” (Acero, 2002, p. 22). This emphasis on police–community relations appears to have been successful. In 1991, only 17 per cent of citizens expressed confidence in the police; in recent years, 60 per cent of those polled have expressed such confidence (Acero and Baracaldo, n.d., p. 1).

While police reform was a significant part of the anti-crime effort undertaken in both cities, leaders in Bogotá implemented a number of other anti-crime policies that have no parallel in New York City. Misión Bogotá, a Peñalosa invention inspired by his reading of the ‘broken windows’ theory, exemplifies this well. Misión Bogotá was based on the recognition that the presence of certain populations in public space—the homeless, recyclers and sex workers—often contributed to other citizens’ feelings of insecurity. In response, Misión Bogotá hired members of these same populations as civic guides, trained to promote citizenship culture and encourage respect for norms of civility and co-existence. Over time, the programme evolved from targeting the specific populations named earlier to a broader category of low-income city residents, but it has retained its goal of providing job training and employment to members of marginal populations. Thus, in contrast to New York’s approach, where the homeless, drug users and ‘squeegee guys’ found their actions criminalised, significant numbers of such populations were made partners in the city’s effort to make space hospitable in Bogotá.

A number of other creative anti-crime programmes were implemented during this period. During the three years of his first term, Mockus allocated some US$130 million, or 3.7 per cent of the city’s total expenditures, to programmes aimed at promoting citizenship culture. These programmes were organised around four central objectives: to increase compliance with specific peaceful co-existence norms; to build capacity for peaceful conflict resolution among citizens; and to enhance citizens’ capacity for communication and expression through arts, culture, recreation and sports (Mockus, 1995). These ideas took concrete form in several inventive projects, each one a relatively short-lived adaptation of the same basic principles. In 1995, for example, when cars blocked crosswalks at certain strategic city intersections, mimes were deployed to attempt to persuade drivers to back out of the pedestrian passageway. Later, the mime project was expanded to include some 400 youths, stationed at diverse points throughout the city and again trained to use art and humour to encourage citizens to behave like good citizens, to escort elderly pedestrians across the street, to discourage littering and to promote respect for crosswalks (see also Caballero 2004).

Under Mockus’ leadership in 2001, the city also pioneered an initiative called ‘The Night for Women’ (La Noche de las Mujeres), in which men across Bogotá were asked to stay home one particular evening and women were encouraged to go out on the town. An estimated 700,000 women participated in the first evening in this series, during which the city sponsored cultural events honouring women’s contributions. Men who refused to stay home were required to carry with them a safe-conduct pass to be shown to the authorities. The safe-conduct pass was a readily obtainable form filled out by the men themselves; its purpose was to provoke reflection on the unequal liberties enjoyed by men and women in everyday life. According to Mockus, the purpose of the event was both to encourage women to embrace their city and to feel safe enjoying it and also to encourage men to reflect on their role in the city and to stay home and bond with their children.

Our purpose in discussing these programmes is not to argue that they are directly responsible for Bogotá’s crime drop. Rather, our point is that Bogotá’s policies reflected a
more multifaceted approach to the problem of urban violence and its relationship to incivility. While officials in both cities modified police practices and attempted to enhance police efficiency, police authority remained relatively constrained in Bogotá, particularly vis à vis drug possession and the ‘disorderly’ behaviours that were criminalised in New York City. Moreover, whereas Giuliani relied almost exclusively on law enforcement to reduce crime, leaders in Bogotá combined police reform with creative efforts to raise awareness of, support for and involvement in the creation of a safer, more egalitarian and more beautiful city. These differences are also made evident by consideration of the fiscal and social policies undertaken in the two cities.

Fiscal Policies and Priorities
Throughout his tenure in office, Mayor Giuliani sought to reduce taxes, especially property and corporate taxes; to cut government and government expenditures; and to decrease welfare benefits and caseloads. He was, however, unable to achieve all of these fiscal goals. In particular, the large and unionised municipal labour force was able to protect government jobs, as well as salaries and outlays for K-12 education (Weikert, 2001). As a result, Giuliani’s proposed expenditure reductions were limited to selected agencies, especially social services and municipal hospitals that served the poor ... Historically, low income people are poorly organized and a low voter constituency (Weikert, 2001, p. 367).

Indeed, many branches of municipal government that provided services for the poor were dramatically cut under Mayor Giuliani (see Table 1). For example, the share of the city budget allocated to the Department of Social Services declined from 23.8 per cent in 1993 to

<table>
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<th>Table 1. Change in New York City budget allocations, 1993–2001</th>
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<tr>
<td>Budget expenditures ($000s) Proportion of budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Social Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Homeless Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City University</td>
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<td>Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of Parks and Recreation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police Department</td>
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<td>Total budget</td>
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Sources: The City of New York Executive Budget Fiscal Year 1994 (David Dinkins, Mayor) and The City of New York Executive Budget Fiscal Year 2002 (Rudolph Giuliani, Mayor).
13.4 per cent in 2001, a drop of 43.8 per cent.18 In May 1998, for example, Mayor Giuliani announced that he was firing half of the staff in the Department of Homeless Services, with the long-term aim of closing the agency and privatising remaining services. Although he did not entirely achieve this objective, the agency was significantly reduced during his tenure in office.19 Conversely, the proportion of the budget allocated to the Police Department increased from 5.7 per cent to 7.8 per cent of the city budget.

At the same time that Mayor Giuliani reduced many social services for the poor, he encouraged the involvement of both non-profit and for-profit institutions’ involvement in the provision of services. In particular, Giuliani sought to increase the involvement of profit-making firms in the provision of transport facilities, city property management, residential care for the elderly and sick, prison health care and homeless services (Weikert, 2001).20 Giuliani’s efforts to shrink government by reducing taxes were also largely successful. During his two terms as mayor, the average personal income tax rate declined by 21 per cent; the top rate declined from 4.5 per cent to 3.5 per cent (Executive Budget 2002). Overall, Giuliani reduced more than 10 types of taxes, for a cost to the city of approximately $2 billion (Weikert, 2001).21

In sum, Giuliani significantly reduced government expenditures on services for the poor and promoted privatisation in several key areas, including public assistance, services for the homeless, parks and recreation, and higher education. These budgetary shifts adversely impacted poor people and people of colour. For example, the number of people receiving public assistance declined by almost half under Giuliani, from 1,112,490 in 1993 to 518,823 in March 2001. Food stamp participation decreased by 26 per cent between January 1996 and March 1999 (New York City Bar Association, n.d.). Although changes in state policy also contributed to these reductions, local policies and practices were key.22 While the percentage of New Yorkers living in poverty did decline from a high of 25 per cent in 1993 to 21 per cent at the end of Giuliani’s term, the number of homeless people actually rose during this period of economic recovery (Levitan 2003). In short, some forms of inequality were exacerbated under Mayor Giuliani (Parrott et al., 1999).

By contrast, officials in Bogotá redoubled their efforts to expand the tax-base and enhance public services to the poor, placing its trajectory in diametric opposition to that undertaken in New York City. Hundreds of squatter settlements were legalised, granting their residents access to basic services by right. Between 1993 and 2004, access to potable water increased from 78.7 per cent of the city’s population to 100 per cent, access to sewers from 70.8 per cent to 96.0 per cent (Gilbert, 2006, p. 396). The proportion of the population whose basic needs were unmet dropped from roughly 20 per cent in the early 1990s to 14 per cent in 2002 (Llorente and Rivas, 2004, p. 312). Similarly, the number of citizens receiving subsidised health care increased from 577,729 in 1996 to 1,369,970 in 2003 (Alcaldía de Bogotá, 2003, p. 102).

Rather than envisioning a reduced role for government, then, officials in Bogotá foresaw an expanded one. Indeed, in Bogotá, local government spending nearly quadrupled between 1990 and 2004 (Hernández, 2005, cited in Gilbert, 2006). Between 1990 and 2003, Bogotá tripled its tax income, thanks to a combination of increased taxes, improved efforts to collect from tax evaders, voluntary enhanced tax contributions and public education aimed at eliminating abuse of public benefits (Montezuma, n.d., p. 182).23 In Bogotá, city officials understood these government efforts to ameliorate poverty, reduce inequality and enhance public services as a key component of the effort to enhance residents’ security and quality of life.
Parks, Public Spaces and Transport

Policies pertaining to the funding and maintenance of public spaces, especially public parks, also reveal important differences in the conceptions of quality of life operating in the two settings. The funding and management of New York City parks under Giuliani was consistent with his general effort to reduce public expenditures and promote privatisation. As shown in Table 1, the parks operating budget was particularly hard hit and the number of parks staff declined by about half (Schwartz, 2001). At the end of Giuliani’s second term, the proportion of the city budget allocated to operating the parks—about 0.4 per cent—was the lowest of all large US cities (Trust for Public Land, n.d.).

These reductions in government spending on parks were, some argued, offset by the enhanced role of the private sector in park conservation and management. For example, the Central Park Conservancy, founded in 1980, raised enough money to cover about half of that park’s operating and capital expenses (Zukin, 1995). A few New York City parks—most notably Bryant Park and Central Park—were significantly improved as a result of the infusion of private money (Schwartz, 2001; Zukin, 1995). City-wide, however, the enhanced role of the private sector in parks funding and management did not much benefit the public, as the infusion of private money legitimated the on-going withdrawal of public funds, causing a net loss in investment in shared open spaces.

In particular, parks and recreational opportunities for children in poorer areas of the city deteriorated (Schwartz, 2001; Trust for Public Land, n.d.). Indeed, city spending on recreation programmes was also cut by 65 per cent, further depriving New York’s poor youth of badly needed recreational opportunities (Schwartz, 2001).

In 1998, Giuliani’s quality of life initiative expanded to include measures to improve traffic safety. These efforts were characterised by intensified law enforcement and enhanced sanctions. In fact, the main tool used to improve traffic safety was “increased enforcement of laws prohibiting jay-walking, speeding, running stoplights and signs, speeding, and reckless bicycling” (New York Police Department, 1998). The NYPD also installed checkpoints and radar devices to aid in the enforcement of traffic laws. Giuliani’s traffic safety improvement efforts focused on cab-drivers in particular, and included efforts to raise taxi-drivers’ insurance costs, make drug tests mandatory and impose higher fines on cab-drivers than other drivers for similar violations (New York Police Department, 1998). No other significant transport improvement projects were undertaken by Giuliani.

By contrast, the municipal government in Bogotá enhanced public investment in parks, recreation and transport in order to ‘reclaim’ those spaces for the public. In 1995, the use of parks or plazas for public theatre or events was almost unheard of, in large part because of security concerns (López Borbón, 2003). Under Mockus, free concerts in city parks, such as ‘Rock in the Park’ (followed by salsa, jazz, poetry and opera), were offered in a variety of parks in an attempt to increase their use. Mayor Peñalosa’s administration also focused on reclaiming public space by refurbishing 1034 parks, planting 70 000 trees and recovering some 836 143 square metres of public land, to the tune of approximately US$100 million (Montezuma, n.d., pp. 191–192). In Bogotá, this effort to reclaim public spaces involved the recapture of territory that had been ceded to private motor vehicles. The city’s sidewalks, for example, were often occupied by car owners who parked their vehicles on the sidewalks, and had long since ceased to be usable by pedestrians. In order to restore pedestrian access to sidewalks, the Mayor’s office placed concrete barriers to impede the access of cars and created 300 km of bicycle routes, making Bogotá’s network...
of cycle paths the largest in Latin America (Montezuma, n.d., p. 192).

Under Mayor Peñalosa, some public space initiatives inspired by ‘broken windows’ did include coercion and force. In the neighbourhood of El Cartucho, a sector in central Bogotá known as a centre for criminal activity of all sorts, for example, the city relocated all inhabitants and razed the entire area. While not all residents moved voluntarily, all received economic compensation packages and social services such as job training, rehabilitation for chemical dependency and health services. In its stead, the city constructed a new park, Parque Tercer Milenio, which has subsequently won several international awards. The rehabilitation of this sector, financed entirely with public funds, cost approximately US$79,000 and has been hailed as a ‘best practice’ model in urban rehabilitation (Silva, 2002).

Concerns about traffic safety and efficiency also fuelled Peñalosa’s efforts to improve public transport in Bogotá. Under his leadership, Bogotá constructed a new bus system with fixed stations, designated traffic lanes and subway-like platforms called Transmilenio. Inaugurated in 2001, it was estimated that by the end of 2007, the system would transport 1.55 million passengers per day (Transmilenio, 2005, cited in Gilbert, 2006). While the construction of the Transmilenio has not resolved all of Bogotá’s transport challenges, it has helped to create a more reliable, efficient and secure form of transport for residents. Furthermore, its penetration into poor neighbourhoods has been shown to reduce crime rates along bus lines (Moreno, 2005).

Pursuing Civility and Security: A Comparative Assessment

In sum, although leaders in both Bogotá and New York City sought to enhance the quality of life and improve security, there were very important differences in how these ideas were pursued. A broader conception of security, less reliance upon coercive force and a greater commitment to using public revenues to enhance the quality of life for all urban residents meant that the benefits of policy innovation were more broadly and evenly distributed in Bogotá. In what follows, we briefly describe the magnitude of the decline in crime and violence that occurred in both cities while these quite different anti-crime initiatives were implemented, and outline some of the main contours of the debate surrounding those declines.

Crime and Public Safety in New York and Bogotá

As is now well-known, crime rates plummeted in New York City over the course of the 1990s. The homicide rate dropped precipitously, from a high of 30 per 100,000 residents in 1990 to a low of 8.5 per 100,000 in 1998 (Karmen, 2000, p. 826), a drop of nearly 72 per cent. Giuliani and others in his administration quickly attributed these declines to NYPD’s zero tolerance policing. As Bratton (1998, p. 310) confidently put it, “we had developed a method to reduce crime and disorder that would work in any city in America”.

Assessing whether the policing strategies adopted under Giuliani caused the massive crime drop in New York City is a difficult and complex undertaking. Researchers have attempted to do so in a few different ways. One approach assesses broken windows theory, which posits a positive and causal connection between disorder and serious crime, and therefore an inverse relationship between efforts to eradicate disorder (such as misdemeanour arrests) and serious crime. Yet studies investigating these hypotheses have failed to turn up much empirical support for them (Eck and Maguire, 2000; Harcourt, 2001; Harcourt and Ludwig, 2006; Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999). Moreover, although there was a significant correlation between (increasing) misdemeanour arrests and
(decreasing) violent crime rates in New York City in the 1990s (Kelling and Sousa, 2001), misdemeanour arrests are often positively correlated with violent crime (Bowling, 1999; Eck and Maguire, 2000; Harcourt and Ludwig, 2006; Karmen, 2000). Thus the empirical evidence does not support the idea that misdemeanour arrests necessarily reduce serious crime.

Nor does it appear that the introduction of Compstat is responsible for the crime crash in New York City. Insofar as some police researchers have found that targeted patrol efforts that focus on specific places and specific behaviours can reduce crime in those areas (see Sherman, 1997), it is conceivable that the introduction of Compstat allowed the NYPD to be more efficient in locating and policing these ‘hot spots’. Yet the decline of violent crime in New York began in 1990, four years prior to the introduction of Compstat, and the rate of this decline did not become any steeper after its introduction in 1994 (Karmen, 2000; Langan and Durose, 2004).

Similarly, while the increased number of uniformed officers did coincide with massive crime drops in New York City in the 1990s, the correlation between the number of uniformed police officers and crime rates is not consistent across place and time (Eck and Maguire, 2000; Karmen, 2000).27 For example, in the 1990s, San Diego experienced a drop in its crime rate that was nearly identical in magnitude to that experienced by New York City, but the size of its police force did not change in a meaningful way during that time-period (Eck and Maguire, 2000, p. 209; see also Greene, 1999). Similarly, as noted previously, the size of Bogotá’s police force remained constant and was dwarfed by the size of the NYPD. Nonetheless, rates of serious violence dropped precipitously in Bogotá over the course of the 1990s.

Another notable feature of the NYPD’s approach to crime under Giuliani was its increased emphasis on the policing of outdoor drug markets. It is conceivable that this focus enabled the NYPD to deter some would-be drug dealers and/or push others to indoor locations that were less lucrative and therefore less conducive to violence. Yet it is not clear whether the transformation of many New York drug markets was the result of changes in police practices. As Johnson and his colleagues (2000) note, there was a significant cultural change taking place during this time among inner-city New Yorkers born in the 1970s and coming of age in the 1990s (see also Curtis, 1998). This ‘blunt generation’ (so-named for its affection for marijuana blunts) was also notable for its rejection of hard drugs and clearly did not want to emulate their parents, older siblings, close relatives, or acquaintances who were ensnared by crack or heroin (Johnson et al., 2000, p. 185).

More generally, there is evidence that the association between the crack market and systemic violence in the 1980s and early 1990s was a function of the novelty of the drug and the resulting instability of the crack market (Blumstein, 1995; NIJ, 1999; Taylor and Brownstein, 2003). As the crack market stabilised, crime rates plummeted (Bowling, 1999; NIJ, 1999).28

Comparisons of New York City with other US cities also cast doubt on claims that the new policing practices were responsible for the city’s crime drop. As has been noted, many US cities that did not employ the practices made famous in New York City enjoyed steep declines in violence and crime throughout the 1990s. Indeed, “the New York trend was almost indistinguishable from cities in the middle of the chart” (Eck and Maguire, 2000, p. 233). US cities were characterised by quite diverse anti-crime strategies, but similar declines in the crack market, demographic shifts and economic improvements (see Bowling, 1999; Greene, 1999; Macallair, 2002).

In short, most studies find little evidence to support the claim that the policing strategies
adopted by the NYPD were responsible for New York’s City’s remarkable crime drop. Although some policing changes may have contributed to that trend, the evidence overwhelmingly indicates that a number of social, economic and cultural shifts interacted to produce a remarkable decline in crime and violence in cities across the US, including New York.

The fact that crime rates also plummeted in Bogotá in the same time-period is less well known. In fact, the rate of decline was similar to that of New York City. Between 1993 and 2002, the homicide rate dropped from 80 to 22 per 100,000 (Llorente and Rivas, 2004), a decline of 72.5 per cent. Rates of property crime also dropped in Bogotá during the same period, as did the number of deaths in traffic accidents (Acero, 2002; Montezuma, n.d.; Llorente and Rivas, 2004). While the homicide rate did decline in Cali and Medellín during the same period, Colombia’s homicide rate remains high by historical and comparative standards.

There is significant debate about whether the anti-crime measures adopted by city leaders are responsible for the decline in crime; Colombia’s famous ‘violentologists’ have reached mixed conclusions on this point. Some studies find support for the hypothesis that restrictions on gun ownership in particular lowered homicide rates (see Villavecce et al., 2000). By contrast, other scholars argue that in Bogotá, most violence is linked to the operations of organised criminal entities and is therefore unlikely to be affected by municipal crime policies (see for example, Llorente et al., 2000; Llorente et al., 2002; Rubio, 2000). However, these contentions are in tension with previous studies, which concluded that most homicides in Bogotá are unrelated to the armed conflict and drug trade that fuelled violence outside the capital (see Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2001).

The case of Bogotá has been studied far less extensively than that of New York and it is difficult given data limitations to draw firm conclusions about the effect of municipal policy initiatives on crime rates. Nonetheless, the evidence supports two key points. First, the decline in violence was as dramatic in Bogotá as it was in New York, which at a minimum suggests that, even if efficacious, the New York model need not be adopted in order to enjoy dramatic reductions in crime and violence. Secondly, although reductions in violence are of incredible value to all urban residents, particularly those living in poor neighbourhoods, the New York model imposed many other costs borne disproportionately by those same communities. By contrast, many aspects of Bogotanos’ quality of life, including but not only reductions in crime and violence, were significantly improved as a result of the city’s ‘quality of life’ campaign.

Conclusion

Advocates and opponents of the ‘zero tolerance’ approach to crime and disorder made famous in New York City agree on at least one thing: the New York model is often portrayed as a model for cities across the US and, indeed, around the globe (Bratton and Kelling, 2006; de Palma, 2002; Lifsher, 2001; Mitchell and Beckett, 2008; Mountz and Curran, n.d.; Parenti, 1999; Sahm, 2005; Schneider and Amar, 2003; Smith, 2001; Wacquant, 2006; Webb Vidal, 2001). Giuliani, having been credited with making New York the safest big city in America, has become “the international face of zero tolerance policing” (Mountz and Curran, n.d., p. 10). Many European leaders, as well as officials from Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, have visited NYPD headquarters and incorporated much of the rhetoric, if not the practice, of zero tolerance (Smith, 2001; Wacquant, 2005). As a result of on-going efforts by consulting organisations and associated think-tanks to promote the New York model, zero tolerance policing has had a particular impact on debates over
policing in Latin America (de Palma, 2002; Sahm, 2005; Wacquant, 2003, 2005). Bogotá’s efforts to improve security and enhance quality of life have received comparatively little attention.

Our analysis suggests that there were some similarities in the two cases. Specifically, officials in both Bogotá and New York City emphasised the need to improve security and enhance quality of life; police expenditures were increased; crime data collection and analysis techniques were improved; police accountability for reducing crime was increased; a significant number of weapons were removed from citizenry; and the formation of public–private security partnerships were encouraged. Yet there are crucial differences in how city officials conceptualised and pursued security in the two settings. In New York, Mayor Giuliani sought to improve the quality of urban life primarily by intensifying law enforcement efforts, particularly against minor offenders, and by downsizing government, especially government agencies that served the poor. A number of new ‘sticks’ were introduced to ensure compliance with Giuliani’s vision of an orderly and secure city, and the vast majority of these sticks were wielded against the city’s most vulnerable residents.

By contrast, in Bogotá, security was understood to require far more than just law enforcement. Efforts to enhance civility involved encouraging the engagement of diverse actors in public spaces. Bogotá’s security measures were predicated on the need to enhance and extend social services for the poor, and to increase the attractiveness and accessibility of public spaces, particularly those in low-income neighbourhoods. Whereas Giuliani relied almost exclusively on law enforcement to enhance citizen security, leaders in Bogotá combined police reform with creative efforts to raise awareness of, support for and involvement in the creation of a safer, more egalitarian and more beautiful city.

Although efforts to enhance security in Bogotá also involved increased policing, including the use of coercion, law’s violence was much more narrowly targeted at serious crime problems. Even as police stepped up crime-fighting efforts, police authority remained relatively constrained, and definitions of crime comparatively narrow, in Bogotá. Although considerable attention was given to altering citizens’ behaviour to produce a ‘culture of citizenship’ based on civility and tolerance, violations of these everyday norms were not criminalised. The case of Bogotá thus illustrates that the fear and anxiety triggered by ‘disorderly’ behaviour can be taken seriously without resorting to the criminalisation of poverty and ‘disorder’. There were, of course, many particularities which made these accomplishments possible; further research is clearly required before conclusions can be drawn about the effectiveness of the specific tactics used in Bogotá to reduce crime. Nonetheless, the case of Bogotá highlights the possibility that conceptions of civility and security may be usefully broadened in ways that encourage more creative and democratic modes of urban governance across the Americas.

Notes

1. During the final year of Mockus’ first term, he retired from office in order to launch a campaign for the presidency; the mayorship passed to Paul Bromberg. It is therefore most accurate to refer to this administration as the Mockus/Bromberg administration. For the sake of simplicity, however, and because the vision for the administration was not changed during Bromberg’s tenure, we refer to both the 1994–97 and 2000–03 administrations as having been led by Mayor Mockus.

2. Although Mockus and Peñalosa took different approaches to some issues, there was a high degree of policy continuity between them regarding the security and the social
policies discussed here. For example, Hugo Acero served as head security adviser under all three administrations and, of the 40 secretaries working under Penalosa in 1997–2000, 33 were retained by Mockus for his second term. For the purposes of this article, we have grouped them together for ease of analysis. At the same time, the administrations should not be understood as interchangeable. Although he was elected Mayor as an independent, Peñalosa is affiliated with the political party of current President Alvaro Uribe, whose approach to security (at the national scale) differs dramatically from that advocated by Mockus. Similarly, an important element of Mockus’ leadership strategy was his insistence on independence from existing political parties, as an attempt to eradicate clientelism; this distinguished him from his successor in important ways.

3. These actions are frequently used to hold public officials accountable for rights violations, including the failure to uphold positive rights (Cifuentes, 1997).

4. During this same period, New York City hosted a less well-known innovation: the Manhattan Midtown Community Court, which served as a forerunner in the effort to establish ‘problem-solving’ courts across the country. The court was not only to process misdemeanor offences, but also to produce more meaningful outcomes, largely by having offenders perform community service in lieu of incarceration (Sviridoff et al., 2000). Insofar as it also recognised the need to identify and address the ‘underlying causes’ of ‘disorderly’ behaviour, the court departed from Giuliani’s insistence that these causes were irrelevant. However, the development of this and other problem-solving courts was largely the work of court reformers who acted autonomously from the Giuliani Administration. Moreover, critics of such courts emphasise that they do nothing to challenge broad definitions of crime and little in the way of new resources to address underlying structural causes such as homelessness (see Nolan, 2003).


7. This aggressive approach to minor violations marked a significant break from past practice. In previous years, summonses (sometimes referred to as DATs, or desk appearance tickets) for minor violations were given as an alternative to arrest. Under Giuliani, however, this practice was modified in two ways. First, if ignored, summonses triggered the issuance of a warrant for arrest. Secondly, those receiving summonses were taken into the police station if they did not have identification (McArdle and Erzen, 2001).

8. According to this study, 9.5 Blacks were stopped for every arrest involving a Black person; 7.9 White people were stopped for every arrest involving a White person. Stops involving Blacks were also less likely to meet legal standards of reasonable suspicion (Fagan and Davies, 2000). These figures are very likely to underestimate the problem, however, because only a small percentage of stops were recorded by the police (OAG, 1999).

9. These data are taken from a public opinion poll commissioned by the New York City Council and conducted by McGuire Research Services L.L.C. The written report is available on-line at http://www.nyccouncil.info/pdf_files/reports/survnypd.pdf.

10. Policing in Colombia is controlled at the national level, under the authority of the Ministry of Defence. The Municipal Police operating in Bogotá are a branch of the National Police, which itself underwent significant reform in the 1990s. While the specific reforms discussed in this article are those implemented by the city of Bogotá rather than the national government, their success may also be attributable to broader changes occurring throughout the institution.


12. Per Article 147 of Bogotá’s police code, for example, subjects can only be subjected to administrative detention in the UPJ under one of two sets of circumstances. First, subjects may be detained for up to 36 hours if caught committing a violation in flagrante. Alternatively, subjects may be detained, for a maximum of 24 hours, if “in a state of serious excitement which might pose a danger
for their physical integrity or that of others” and only when the person in question refuses to give his or her home address. The text in Spanish reads

En caso de estado de indefensión o de grave excitación con peligro para su integridad o la de otras personas, si quien va a ser conducido se niega a dar la dirección de su domicilio, como medida de protección, podrá ser conducido a la Unidad Permanente de Justicia, donde podrá permanecer hasta veinticuatro (24) horas, bajo la responsabilidad y cuidado estricto de la autoridad encargada de dicha unidad (Código de Policía, 2003, Artículo 147).

13. Bogotá’s Police Code, created under Mockus’ leadership, stipulates norms for peaceful co-existence and sanctions for their violation: “The object of the Police Code are those norms whose transgression does not constitute a crime, but rather a contravention (contravención)” (Secretaría de Gobierno de Bogotá DC, 2003). While this category of offences does not exactly correspond to misdemeanour crimes in the US context, it does reflect a range of minor offences. More serious offences, roughly equivalent to those defined as felonies in the US, are violations of the Penal Code rather than the Police Code.

14. It should be noted that these two categories are not exact equivalents. In general, cross-country comparisons are made difficult by the fact while many data are available to examine in the case of New York, in Bogotá data are harder to come by and compiled in different categories.

15. According to the Latin American public opinion survey Latinobarómetro, Colombia’s police force is among the most respected police forces in the region, after Chile’s Carabineros (Acero and Baracaldo, n.d., p. 1).

16. These mimes were also used in conjunction with police officers, both real and dummies, to insist on respect for the laws of transit (Mockus, 1995, p. 15). For a time, screens were stationed at key intersections, painted on both sides to simulate the presence of a police officer.


18. Giuliani also reduced expenditures for municipal hospitals (which serve the poor and uninsured) by 8.8 per cent within the first six years (Weikert, 2001).

19. Giuliani’s efforts to alter the policy response to the city’s large homeless population were generally constrained by the litigation efforts of the Coalition of the Homeless and other advocacy groups. In the course of this litigation, the Appellate Division of New York State Supreme Court ruled that, under the state Constitution, all homeless people have a right to shelter (see Kirchheimer, 1989–90).

20. For example, whereas seven of the cities’ homeless shelters were private in 1993, 75 of 82 shelters had been privatised by 2000 (Weikert, 2001). Giuliani also attempted but failed to terminate the city’s rent control laws (Smith, 1998) and sought but failed to sell three municipal hospitals to private companies (Weikert, 2001).

21. Ironically, Giuliani’s success in cutting taxes and only mixed success in reducing expenditures fuelled concerns about budget deficits. For example, Martin Arrick, a director at the Standard and Poor bond rating agency, criticised the mayor’s perpetuation of budget gaps, while The Economist opined that the mayor’s union agreements would hurt the city’s economy in the years to come (see Weikert, 2001, p. 366). Indeed, like so many mayors before him, Giuliani left his successor with a significant ($1 billion) budget deficit.

22. According to the New York City Bar Association State welfare policy gives local governments great discretion in assigning welfare recipients to work program activities. Under the Giuliani administration, HRA has placed the highest priority on assigning recipients to the Work Experience Program (WEP) and imposing stringent sanctions on those who fail to comply. WEP requires recipients to ‘work off’ their cash and food stamp benefits at a government or non-profit site, with the hours of work based on the minimum wage rather than the prevailing wage for the activity performed ... While an unprecedented upsurge in the economy reduced the need for assistance, the caseload reduction far exceeded the reduction in poverty (NewYork City Bar Association, n.d., p. 1).
23. In a budgetary shortfall in 2002, however, the City Council repeatedly refused Mockus' proposals to increase taxes. In response, the Mayor passed Decree 040, by which he invited citizens to pay voluntarily 110 per cent of the taxes they owed by law. This was promoted through a massive publicity campaign, featuring advertisements on buses, television spots and other means, by which the city's administration explained what the extra money would be used for. A total of 63,493 citizens made voluntary contributions above their total tax bill in 2002 and 48,800 had done so by the end of November 2003 (Alcaldía de Bogotá, 2003, pp. 31–32 and 253).

24. These staff cuts were partially offset by the employment of non-unionised welfare recipients who were increasingly required to work in order to receive benefits.

25. In addition to the loss of public funds for public spaces, the increased importance of private capital in the management of public parks raises questions about democratic governance. New York City parks are, increasingly, public spaces that are no longer controlled by public agencies, but by the private sector (Zukin, 1995).

26. As deputy director of the Parks Council argued

All that private money coming in is only a fraction of what the mayor has cut out of the city’s parks operating budget. For every dollar of private money brought into the system, more than a dollar of public money is pulled out. We’re losing ground (quoted in Schwartz, 2001).

27. As the authors of a meta-analysis of the literature on this topic conclude

Even when we examine the most rigorous studies, we could not find consistent evidence that increases in police strength produce decreases in violent crime (Eck and Maguire, 2000, p. 217).

28. This study found no association between levels of cocaine use and violent crime rates, but a strong association between alcohol use and violent crime in US cities over a 10-year period.

29. In particular, it is possible that NYPD policing practices deterred some people from carrying firearms and contributed to the general sense that participating in the market for hard drugs was a losing strategy. Neither of these propositions has, to our knowledge, been empirically evaluated.

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