James W. Harrington, Jr.
University of Washington
Prepared for the Pacific Northwest Regional Economic Conference,
Olympia WA, 7-9 May 1998.
Making sense of the new era
· ICT
· improved transportation logistics, based largely on ICT for
ordering, tracking, and transferring goods
· ever-increasing rates of change in products, processes, markets,
and competitors
· reduced latitude of national or sub-national governments to
intervene via monetary or fiscal policy, even as national governments (esp.
in the U.S.) devolve public-service and taxation responsibilities to lower
levels of government
What is the reality behind “globalization”?
Part ideology:
Governments, workers, and small companies are led to understand
that anonymous “global” forces are running the show, making it impossible
to develop local or even national solutions or policies.
Part reality:
ICT and transportation make differences among places more, not
less important, making global markets in factors and products.
The analogy is the creation of national, continental markets
in the late-nineteenth century, courtesy of the railroad, telegraph, multi-divisional
corporation, and mass production. This saw the advent of national
brands and robber barons, as economies of scale and collusive oligopolies
allowed a few companies to become very profitable and a few people
to become very rich.
At the end of the twentieth century, we have more and more international
markets, courtesy of multi-modal transport systems, computerized tracking
of sales and shipments, networks of corporations, and distributed mass
production (production of a variety of products through programmable equipment
and reliance on externalized networks of contractors). We’ve seen
the advent of international brands and very wealthy executives and owners,
as economies of scale and the power of technical standards allow quite
a number of companies to become very profitable and quite a few people
to become very rich.
Limits to globalization:
However, what this does not do is make every place like every
other, nor necessarily pit every worker against every other. (1)
For one thing, much production remains local or national, especially the
provision and delivery of services. (2) More importantly, even
“global” corporations and inter-corporate networks seek out, not just any
places, but the best places in the world for particular functions, based
on some combination of:
· transitory localized characteristics and
· long-term, hard-to-replicate localized characteristics.
The transitory characteristics are the simple cost factors of
low taxes, low regulation, low wages. These hardly anchor productive
activities, and unless they are matched with developmental policies of
infrastructure and educational investment, they represent a dead end of
competition for the lowest of the low, a competition that no U.S. state,
region, or locality is going to win. To add to the downward spiral,
the substantial proportion of local economic activity that is local, that
is not directly subject to international competition, suffers in direct
proportion to the reduction in real wages and public services.
The longer-term, hard-to-replicate characteristics are the supply
factors of communications and transport infrastructures, educated and innovative
workforces, and environmental amenities, and the demand factors of growing
household, commercial, and government markets for high-quality goods and
services. These characteristics are not only hard to replicate, and
thus earn high economic rents, but are hard to sustain, and require large
economic investments.
“Competitiveness” is a misnomer
There are two problems with the straightforward translation of
the concept of competition and competitiveness from the business world
or the world of neoclassical microeconomics to the world of international
trade or regional development:
· Unlike firms, territories don’t compete, merge, or go out
of business. The citizens and resources who make up territories don’t
shrivel up and die: rather, they must be employed in some productive
activities. The key is to find the most productive activities for
people and resources (the principle of comparative advantage), and to increase
the productivity of those people and resources, through private investment,
infrastructure, and technological change. We needn’t be so concerned
about characteristics relative to other places as about improving the productive
characteristics within a given place.
· Only the most unfortunate and stagnant firms face the kind
of perfect competition that we learned about in first-semester microeconomics.
Much of business management entails reducing competition by carving out
some basis for limited monopoly power: a tradename, reputation, location
relative to a market, proprietary technology, or long-term contracts.
Competition limits a business to normal profits; monopolistic advantage
allows a business to earn higher returns. Analogously, regions that
become wealthy benefit from some advantage, sometimes of their “making,”
as in an educated workforce or top-quality infrastructure, but often of
natural or corporate provenance.
Strategic economic development
A key task of strategic economic development is to sustain such
advantages, through the promotion of long-term regional characteristics:
· public and private infrastructure investment, through tax
revenues, user revenues, and careful regulation of infrastructure
· publicly supported general education and tax incentives for
private, job-specific training
· financial and regulatory support for entrepreneurship
· support for wage growth and the productivity growth that will
allow this
· stringent standards for public-sector procurement.
Another way of expressing the difference
between transitory and longer-term characteristics is to ask, “Given the
still-limited but clear tendency toward globalization, what remains local?”
The outlines of the answer are clear:
· certainly not financial capital
· certainly not large-scale, fixed, private capital, which can
be depreciated or sold quite rapidly
· some entrepreneurial resources — entrepreneurs have their
greatest contacts and base for operation in a localized area
· most labor resources — while managerial and top-level technical
workers are certainly mobile, most workers have a familial and financial
attachment to places
· those institutions and institutional relationships that develop
historically in the local area: labor practices, relationships among
small firms and with sources of finance, localized cultural groupings;
and
· the physical infrastructure of a place: the roads, fiber-optic
cabling, sewers, and the like.
It only makes sense to concentrate local or regional public investment,
expenditures, and tax expenditures on the resources that remain local or
regional, rather than on subsidies to financial capital or private facilities.
Taxes
The empirical evidence (econometric analysis of output growth)
suggests that exceptionally low tax rates are not effective attraction
for private investment and output. Rather, (1) it is important that
a locality’s overall tax burden be "in line" with other localities providing
similar levels of public services and agglomeration economies, and (2)
it is somewhat important that no one particular tax be egregiously higher
than neighboring localities or states, even if that high tax is offset
by some other low tax.
Routes to information development and diffusion: the
current question in regional-development research
Information — about process technology, market opportunities,
trustworthy suppliers — is of paramount importance to any productive activity,
private or public, large or small. Some information can be purchased,
as through the (a) acquisition of the equipment that embodies new technology,
(b) hiring of a market research firm, (c) subscription to an Internet-delivered
data service, or (d) sale of goods to an intermediary that concerns itself
with marketing.
However, if information or technology can be purchased in that
way by one organization, it can be purchased by others: it won’t
lift the firm out of the rut of “normal” profit or a rate of growth
average for the industry.
Because of the expense and uncertainty of generating new information
through R&D, internal market research, or internal supply sources,
most firms minimize expenditures on some of the very activities that could
potentially lead to above-normal profit and growth. This is a central
dilemma for managers, and a central problem for national and regional economies.
This is a motivation for the agglomeration of businesses around
highly skilled or specialized labor, or around “someone else’s” development
activity (a large firm, a government lab, a university), is to reap the
benefits of “someone else’s” investment in skilled workers, skilled managers,
new technology, or market knowledge.
Can public entities increase the level of information within a
local or regional area, sufficiently to increase localized growth and profits?
· Labor training?
· Management training?
· Promotion of entrepreneurship (through training, micro-finance,
tax subsidies for finance)?
· Public investment in information and technology development?
· Public investment in information and technology diffusion?
· Public incentives for information and technology development?
“New” models of growth
Economists have formalized these relationships into theoretically
powerful, “new” models of growth, which entail:
· increasing returns to scale in the use of new technology (i.e.,
a little new technology in a firm can be applied to a great deal of output),
but
· decreasing returns to scale in the development of new technology
(i.e., you can throw a lot of resources at a technical issue, but beyond
a certain point, you won’t speed up the development process, because of
knowledge and technical bottlenecks that take time to resolve), with the
additional recognition that
· not all the benefits of creating new technology can be held
within the innovating firm (there are technological spillovers).
This suggests that large, innovative firms have the resources and the
market power to devote resources to new technology (and we certainly see
evidence of that in the Puget Sound region), and that not all the resultant
information and technology can be appropriated by the innovating firm (and
we see evidence of that, as well).
Therefore, most firms may under-invest in technological development,
from a societal perspective, because (a) they’re not able to see the benefits
from large-scale output and (b) they’re not likely to appropriate all the
resultant technology.
Networks or strategic alliances among firms appear to be one way to
increase the (a) scale of use and (b) control over spillovers of information
generation and technological innovation.
What are the mechanisms through which technological spillovers occur?
· Labor mobility
· Managerial mobility
· Entrepreneurial spinoffs
· Reverse engineering
· Demonstration effects
· Gaps in IPR protection
The first three of these depend on inter-organizational movement of
people, and therefore benefit from localization. These become the
basis for localized, information-based development.
These mechanisms are relevant for non-metropolitan regions and non-"high-tech"
sectors as well as for the more commonly discussed examples. From
wooden furniture in Denmark to boat manufacturing on the Olympic Peninsula,
institutionalized practices of labor training and mobility, small- and
medium-scale entrepreneurship, and process innovation can create and sustain
relatively high-wage employment in medium-tech sectors in non-metro places.
How can public entities motivate increased investment in and use
of specialized information (e.g., marketing, organization) and technology?
· Labor training?
· Management training?
· Promotion of entrepreneurship (through training, micro-finance,
tax subsidies for finance)?
· Public investment in information and technology development?
· Public incentives for information and technology development?
Conclusion: variations on a theme:
· Public investment in region-specific assets
· Public incentives for labor training and innovative activity