University of
Washington
Geography 349
Regional Economic Integration:
NAFTA as an example
Refer to Peter Hakim & Robert
Litan, eds. 2002. The Future of North
American Integration: Beyond NAFTA. Washington DC: Brookings.
NAFTA took effect 1/1/94, to be phased in (especially the tariff
reductions) over 0, 1, 5, or 10 years, depending on the provision and
the product.
• Sectors likely
to see the greatest adjustment were to have tariffs reduced more
slowly.
• (Why would you expect the amount of adjustment
to vary across sectors?)
Given the pre-existing C-US FTA, tariffs were already very low or
nonexistent between the US and Canada – so the big adjustments were
between US and Mexico and Canada and Mexico.
NAFTA focused pretty specifically on trade, with environmental and
labor “side agreements.”
NAFTA also included services, and the right
of establishment (note the most obvious relationship among the
two; explain the principle of “national
treatment”).
• Mexican trucks
were to receive national treatment within the other two countries, but
have not – this has been one of many points of friction.
• However, “national treatment” is basically
about the free movement of capital investment – but trade agreements
(as opposed to full integration) do not allow labor movement. In
either case, or even without capital mobility, we’d expect factor-price
equalization, over a long time, across a trading bloc.
• And of course, even without special formal
agreements for labor movement beyond pre-existing immigration
regulations, “about 21 million persons of Mexican origin now reside in
the United States” [p. 5].
In the case of regional integration, rules
of origin are very important: how do you determine whether
a good is made in one of the signatory countries?
• Generally, the
proportion of an import’s value that originated within the bloc is used
as the measure.
• In the case of a large economic region like
N.Am. the goal was to encourage inward FDI to serve the market,
allowing some imported components.
Trade creation: increased
trade flows between two countries (or among the countries in a trading
bloc), based on increased specialization according comparative
advantage as trade barriers fall.
• Given the
labor-skill, labor-wage, resource, and climate complementarities among
the three countries, one might expect that removing trade barriers
would substantially increase trade – you’d expect that Canada and
Mexico would have dramatically different factor mixes and thus would
generate a lot of new trade; and that the US and Mexico would
have almost as different a set of factor mixes.
• What do Hakim and Litan say about the increase
in Canada-Mexico trade from 1991-2001? (up 5
times) US-Canada trade? (up 2.5 times)
Just how integrated are Canada and the US?
• 70% of
Canadian imports are from the US; imports account for 34% of the
Canadian economy (compared to 18% of the US economy); thus,
US imports are worth 24% -- nearly a quarter – of the Canadian economy.
• 85% of Canadian exports are to the US;
exports account for 38% of the Canadian economy (compared to 13% of the
US economy); thus, 32% -- essentially a third – of the Canadian
economy is directly exported to the US. Implications?
o The Canadian
economy is strongly tied to demand in the US, but Canadians have no
ability to affect US macroeconomic policy (or US regulatory policy, the
lack of which is one key reason for the current economic mess).
• Two-thirds of FDI-C is from the US.
Implications?
o Much more K
investment – and thus L productivity – than without USFDI-C
o Much corporate control outside the country.
o Truncated organizational structures:
executives must leave Canada to have a shot at the top spots; the
very highest-order corporate services tend to be purchased in NYC.
Trade diversion:
increased trade between countries within a bloc, upon reduction of
trade barriers, that replaces trade that had been occurring with
countries outside the bloc – because trade barriers are higher outside
the bloc than within.
• Given the
labor-skill, labor-wage, resource, and climate complementarities among
Canada, Mexico, and the US, one might expect that eliminating barriers
to trade among them might yield some intra-continental trade that
otherwise would occur between each country and some countries outside
the bloc.
Effects of NAFTA:
Substantial increase in economic integration, over a
short period: from one-third of the countries’ trade within the
bloc
to on-half.
Economic effects –
• On bilateral trade balances – likely
outweighed by fluctuations in exchange rates.
• On industrial outmigration from the US –
substantial investment
and importing from Mexico, perhaps mitigating investment in and imports
from, say, China – but note what large increases with China.
Effects of September 11, 2001?
• Massive restrictions on the logistics of
cross-border flows.
• Loss of US attention for immigration or further
integration.
What sorts of deeper integration are possible? (These are listed on p.
12)
• Customs union (common external
tariffs)
• Pastor (Ch. 4) notes the option of a common market (few or no
restrictions on movement of L as well as K)
• Formal
agreements on cross-border externalities (in this case, defined
as actions on one side of a border that have implications on the other
side – what one might call geographic externalities): migration
(among and into the countries of the bloc); energy;
water; security
• Relying not only on international agreements,
but on supranational institutions with delegated authority to regulate
some of these cross-border externalities – moving toward full integration among
still-sovereign countries.
copyright
James W. Harrington, Jr.
revised 27 October 2009