Model Questions: Tragedy and benefits of Commons

Hardin

1. In order to illustrate the "tragedy of the Commons", Hardin gives a scenario of herders who graze animals on common pasture lands. These pasture lands are "open to all." Hardin draws the conclusion that states that each commonor is "compelled" to overgraze without limit, to put individual well-being above collective well-being. What is the underlying "logic" that warrants this conclusion? That is, what are the assumptions about individual and social behavior that make this conclusion "sensible"?
2. Harding discusses that technological solutions (e.g. better fences) are not in general going to solve tragedies of commons. One of the key solutions that he does offer is to privatize the commons. In what ways do private property rights make sense? That is, why might they work?
3. Harding claims that norm-based appeals, i.e. appeals to conscience are not only misguided but actually a very bad thing. Yet intuitively, it seems to make sense that we would want to raise people with a social consciousness that would restrain their acting only in their short-run individual self-interest. To take a real-world example, some people in the US intentionally choose not to drive their cars to work and walk or take public transportation. Some people decide to pay more money for food that is "sustainably grown." What is Hardin's argument for why such conscience-driven action might be a very bad thing? What is the logic underneath this conclusion?

Berkes et al.

1. One of the key points that Berkes et al make in refuting Hardin's argument is to distinguish kind of resources from different property rights regimes. In particular, they indicate that some resources are by their nature common pool resources (difficult to exclude and highly subtractible), and that these might be governed by one of four basic regimes: open access, private, communal, and state. Why is this distinction between kind of resource and kind of property right important? That is, how do Berkes et al make use of it in refuting Hardin et al?
2. One of Hardin's key points is that state control (using threats of coersion) is only one of two possible policy options for avoiding the tragedy of the commons. Berkes et al attempt to refute this by stating that "nationalization has often converted traditional communal property into de jure state property but de facto open-access." What does this mean, and in what way does this weaken Hardin's argument?
3. In these two papers, the authors are making claims about individual and social behavior. For example, Hardin claims that individuals are compelled to act only in their own short-term interests, leading inevitably to ruin unless commons or privatized or subjected to state control. At the same time, Berkes et al claim that some communities sustainably govern their shared common pool resources. What sorts of evidence do each marshall in support of their claims, and how does the kind of evidence marshalled strengthen or weaken the conclusion that each makes?