April 7, 2009
Class Facilitation Questions
1. In Kollock's article, he quotes Ostrom's proposition
of a third route away from the tragedy of the commons, “the local regulation of
access to and use of common property by those who actually use and have local
knowledge of the resource. How might the localization of resources/economies
affect the global power structure?
2. Berkes et al suggests
communal ownership and regulation as a third possible solution to the TOC, as
well. Such regulation calls for excluding non-members of the given community.
Group identity appears to have profound effects on the actors' cooperation
level in motivational, strategic, and structural solutions to social dilemmas.
Identifying one's self as a member can turn a game from Prisoner's Dilemma
(out-group) to an Assurance game (in-group). Intergroup competition can
increase cooperation amongst members of a group, but poses an increased threat
of negative intergroup interactions. What are the dangers of Berkes solution?
What solutions might there be to prevent or reduce increased competition from
in-group/out-group mentality?
3. Hardin states that “no good has ever come from feeling
guilty, neither intelligence, policy, nor compassion. The guilty do not pay attention
to the object but only to themselves, and not even to their own interests,
which might make sense, but to their anxieties.” On the other hand, Kollock
states that group identity incites members to exercise morality in judgment.
Does anxiety merely elicit a conditioned behavior, or does guilt actually
increase a person's sense of morality?
4. In Kollock's article, he proposes a scenario in which
an agricultural community decides to elect a leader to manage the harvesting of
the commons. Hardin assumes that authorities can be trusted to remain free of
corruption and to resist the influence of special interest groups. How is
Kollock’s system of checks and balances sufficient given the knowledge that so
many governmental systems have historically become corrupt?
5. As quoted in Kollock’s article, Ostrom states that “Experimental studies have shown that cooperation is more
likely if individuals have the ability to punish defectors. In essence, out for
tat or tit for tat defection is a method of punishment. She also goes on to
state that “The presence of a monitoring and sanctioning system run by the
community members themselves (as opposed to an external authority) was one of
the design features found in each of the successful communities studied.” How can we prevent a recrimination schedule from forming
in a society in which the community members have the authority to monitor and
sanction one another?
6. Kollock gives an example of actors
giving some weight to their partner's outcome. "As Dawes (1980, p. 176)
commented, 'Few of us would accept $500 with nothing for our friend in lieu of
$495 for each of us.'" There must be a threshold for how much a person is
willing to give up for the sake of mutual gain. What factors influence the
percentage of loss or disadvantage a person is willing to take before they
dismiss their partner's outcome in lieu of their own?