by Jack Kinstlinger
May, 2002

Vuchic and Casello's article disputes the need for moving ahead with the Federal Maglev Deployment Program arguing that claims of higher speed, lower energy consumption and life cycle costs, greater passenger attraction, and greater comfort are questionable and that short distances proposed for the two projects considered in the United States, (the Baltimore-Washington Maglev project and the Pittsburgh project), are too short in distance to yield any significant time savings. In response to the argument that Maglev advantages are questionable, the only definitive way of establishing the advantages of Maglev relative to high speed rail is to construct and operate a Maglev demonstration project of sufficient length to allow it to achieve maximum operating speeds. With respect to the argument that the demonstration projects are too short to yield demonstrable time savings, it is pointed out that once the demonstration projects conclusively prove Maglev costs, operating advantages and market attract ability, they will be extended in the case of the Baltimore-Washington project 400 miles north to connect with New York and Boston and 525 miles to the south to connect with Richmond, Charlotte, and Atlanta. These longer distances will clearly yield time savings sufficient to divert significant travelers from the currently congested highways and airways of the eastern seaboard. This eastern seaboard, the corridor with the highest travel density in the United States as well as the greatest level of airway and highway congestion, will benefit more than any other corridor in the nation from the advantages of super high speed rail transportation. Transportation experts can prepare all kinds of analyses and feasibility studies, and academics like Professor Vuchic can question and challenge results of these studies without end but it is only through an actual demonstration project for the design, construction and operation of Maglev trains that the facts will be known and appropriate decisions can be made.

Shown below are a number of Vuchic and Casello's assertions in italics, followed by our response.

The authors question the statement that Maglev operating costs are low because of the absence of physical contact between vehicle and guideway. This is questioned because of the extreme precision the guideway must have to maintain the small clearance of 10 mm.

The fact that the guideway of the Transrapid has to be precise has nothing to do with its maintenance costs. Once the guideway is mounted it will stay in place due to the non-contact operation without any wear and tear. Looking at high-speed rail,, the situation is different: the precision has to be at least the same because there the levitation "gap"is zero. In addition, there is daily wear and tear, meaning the tracks have to be adjusted regularly and the rails and the ballast have to be replaced periodically.

A detailed study by the Southern California Council of Governments (SCAG) evaluated the relative construction and maintenance and operating (O&M) costs for an airport connector in the Los Angeles to Palmdale area. For three different scenarios, construction costs for a Maglev system was about the same per mile as for a high speed rail system, but O&M costs for the Maglev system averaged about 65% of the O&M costs for high speed rail.

Similarly, studies of the infrastructure costs of a Maglev system from Berlin to Hamburg, based on detailed engineering plans approved by the proposed operator Deutsche-Bahn compared to actual costs for constructing various ICE high speed rail systems in Germany revealed that the per-mile cost of Maglev to be equal or less than comparable ICE infrastructure costs. But again, the only definitive conclusion in relative costs and performance between Maglev and conventional high speed rail can be established by building and operating a Maglev demonstration project as proposed under the Federal Deployment Program.

The authors argue that Transrapid would have no significant difference in public feel or attraction as compared to conventional high-speed rail.

The remarkable drawing power of the test track in Emsland, Germany would argue to the contrary. A new visitor record was set during the World Expo 2000 held from June to October 2000. About 70,000 passengers from 25 countries rode the Transrapid 08 at speeds up to 400 km/h (250 mph) during the five-month Expo period. A distance of 40,000 km (24,860 miles) was achieved on the 31.5 km (19.6 miles) long track during the same period. The visitors were ready to pay $20 for a round trip - from nowhere to nowhere. To come to the test facility they had to spend one day in a bus and to pay the same amount again.

This brings the total number of passengers to approximately 330,000 who have ridden the Transrapid since visitor operations officially began in 1992. A total of approximately 750,000 km (470,000 miles) of running operation has been achieved since the facility opened in 1984.

Vuchic and Casello argue that high-speed rail has a major advantage over Maglev with respect to compatibility with extensive existing rail networks.

It is true that the Maglev train can operate only along a dedicated and specially designed Maglev guideway and thus cannot operate over existing rail tracks. This is not the disadvantage commonly assumed. The use of a dedicated guideway allows optimized Maglev operation - from design, operation, and maintenance aspects. True high-speed rail operation is only economically justifiable when dedicated rail lines are designed, built, and maintained. Upgrading of existing lines and mixing of traffic (high and medium speed passenger traffic and/or freight traffic) compromises operation (very different train speeds) and makes maintenance very expensive.

Using existing tracks combined with newly built high-speed lines is not necessarily a benefit, because already short sections on existing low speed tracks reduce the average speed significantly. In France, where most of the TGV service is done on new tracks, the average speed is in the range of 200 km/h. In Germany where the new tracks are rare, the average speed of the ICE is in the range of 150 km/h. It is really doubtful if it makes economic sense to let trains capable of 300 km/h run at these low speeds.

But given the scenario as proposed by Amtrak, in that the Eastern Seaboard would operate with three levels of rail service (Maglev connecting major center cities and adjacent airports, Amtrak connecting major and intermediate cites, and commuter rail connecting center cities with suburban locations) extensions from the Eastern Seaboard corridor to other locations could be provided by the second and third level services.  Ultimately, it is hoped that the nation will see the development of a broad and comprehensive Maglev network after service on the Eastern Seaboard Corridor has proven Maglev to be a successful technology and has effectively relieved congestion along the highways and airports serving this corridor.

Vuchic and Casello argue that most benefits listed in support of Maglev are also valid for any high-speed ground transportation, they are technology neutral. 

While this is true for many of the Maglev attributes, tests have shown that Maglev is capable of higher operating speeds, greater acceleration and deceleration rates, operation on higher grades and requires lower maintenance and operating costs.  In addition, the federally funded Maglev Deployment Program is specifically focused on demonstrating the benefits of Maglev. A comparison between Maglev and high-speed rail can be made through the operation of the Baltimore-Washington Project.

The authors fault the Federal Railroad Administration's High Speed Ground Transportation for America for concluding that intercity service along the Northeast Corridor has demonstrated cost effectiveness exceeding all ground transportation modes if served by Maglev.  The paper states that it is an unrealistic exaggeration to state that cost-effectiveness has been demonstrated by a system which has not yet been physically demonstrated to operate under real world conditions.

Precisely the reason that the Baltimore-Washington demonstration project is needed.

Vuchic and Casello argue that in the High Speed Ground Transportation for America report, values attributed to high-speed rail are service proven cost structure while the cost of Maglev are subject to hypothetical assumptions.

This is further argument that a demonstration project between Baltimore and Washington would be extremely useful in order to resolve this issue. The higher speed Maglev would not make a sufficient difference on the short distance to result in satisfactory social benefit.

The ultimate objective of Maglev is not connecting Baltimore and Washington, but to use this 40-mile segment to demonstrate the attractiveness, reliability, safety and marketability of the Maglev technology.  Baltimore to Washington is an ideal test bed for such a demonstration because of its 40 miles which is long enough to allow high operating speeds of 240+ mph to be achieved (as dictated by the law enacting the Maglev Deployment Program) and short enough to minimize investment costs.  In addition the project connects two major cities and an international airport where riders and revenue will make the demonstration project affordable.  It is believed that real social benefits commensurate with the investment will be achievable only when the Baltimore-Washington Maglev project is extended north and south along the Eastern Seaboard to connect major cities 75 to 125 miles apart and to allow Maglev to compete with commuter air service and major highway connections.

This response was submitted on May 3, 2002, to the Eno Foundation for possible publication in a forthcoming issue of the Transportation Quarterly, by Jack Kinstlinger of:

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Last modified: May 06, 2002