(Introduction)

Before taking up the subject of Islamic theology proper I should like, by way of introduction, to outline the basic religious beliefs which are more or less common to all Muslims.

As you may know, Islam was founded by the prophet Muhammad in the Arabian Peninsula in the first quarter of the seventh century. At the age of forty Muhammad began to receive certain revelations which he believed came from God. He was commanded by God to recite these revelations publicly and was told that God had chosen him as His messenger and prophet. The revelations which Muhammad received were collected and preserved as sacred scripture by his companions and followers and this collection of revelations is known as the Qur'an. I should like to stress here that the Qur'an is considered by Muslims to be literally the speech or word of God himself, rather than something composed or written by the prophet.

Now what the prophet Muhammad himself said, as opposed to what God said, was also preserved by his followers and later collected into books, and these sayings, which are known as traditions, or hadith, are as authoritative in religious matters as the Qur'an itself. Islam thus possesses two sources of revealed truth, the first being the Qur'an, which is the record of God's message to mankind, and then the hadith, or collected sayings and acts of the prophet Muhammad. And it is from these two sources that the basic religious beliefs of Muslims are derived.

Now what are these basic beliefs? First of all, Muslims believe that God is absolutely one and that Muhammad is His messenger or prophet. In fact, to become a Muslim it is sufficient to bear witness to the fact that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is His messenger. Muslims further believe that God created the universe, and that He has periodically revealed His word to a number of prophets and messengers, among whom are included Jesus and Moses, and the other prophets of the Hebrew Bible. They believe in angels, in the resurrection of the body, in a final Day of Judgment, and in a Heaven and a Hell where men will be rewarded or punished in accordance with their acts and beliefs in this world.

These basic beliefs are summed up in two very short creeds found in the Qur'an, which I should like to read to you:

1. "The messenger believeth in that which hath been revealed unto him from his Lord and (so do) the believers. Each one believeth in Allah and his angels and His scriptures and His messengers -- We make no distinction between any of His messengers -- and they say: We hear and we obey. (Grant us) Thy forgiveness, our Lord. Unto thee is the journeying." (Qur'an, II, 285).

2. "0 ye who believe! Believe in Allah and His messenger and the Scripture which He revealed aforetime. Whoso disbelieveth in Allah and His angels and His scriptures and His messengers and the Last Day, he verily hath wandered far astray." (Qur'an, IV, 136).

Then, of course, in addition to being the source for religious beliefs, the Qur'an and the hadith are also the primary sources for Islamic moral and ethical precepts as well as for Islamic law.

(Islamic Theology)

Let me now turn to Islamic theology. The Islamic theologians had two purposes in mind in developing their theological doctrines. The first was to give a rational basis to Islam by trying to prove that scripture, that is, the Qur'an and the hadith were true and the second was to deal with the contradictions that they found in those scriptures. Let me take up the problem of the contradictions first and then move on to the proofs for the truth of scripture.

(Contradictions in Scripture)

First of all, what specifically were some of these contradictions? Well one of the most important concerned God's attributes. Now all Muslims agree that God is absolutely one in every respect. They also agree that He is uncreated and that He is eternal, that is, that He has existed from all eternity before He created the universe and that He will never cease to exist. Since God created the universe, he must have existed before the universe existed and since He Himself was not created by anyone else, he must have always existed. Thus God is not only one, but also eternal.

Now the Qur'an also ascribes certain additional attributes to God. He is described as being Living, Knowing, Willing, Powerful, Seeing and Speaking. The Qur'an also uses nouns to indicate some of these attributes and speaks of God's knowledge, of His power, of His will and so forth. Now the ascription of these attributes to God leads one to ask what precisely is the relationship of these attributes to God Himself, that is, to God's essence. If the attributes are eternal, that is, if God has always been knowing, willing, powerful, and so on, then are they in some way distinct from God's essence or are they in reality the same as His essence? If they are distinct from His essence then God's unity is impaired because we then have more than one eternal being, namely, God's essence plus each one of His attributes. On the other hard if the attributes are really the same as His essence, then the attributes do not really exist and the Qur'an is ascribing to God nonexistent attributes. If, however, God's attributes are not eternal then God must have created them, but if He created them then they are part of His creation and cannot be attributes of Himself.

Now, not only does the Qur'an give these attributes to God, it also describes Him in many places in very anthropomorphic terms. God is described as having a face, hands, and eyes, as moving from place to place, and as seating Himself on His throne. If this description of God is true, then he must be a corporeal being -- a body in time and space. And since all bodies are divisible into parts, God's unity is again impaired.

On the other hand the Qur'an frequently states that there is nothing at all similar to Him or that there is nothing anything like Him. Thus, although God is frequently described in anthropomorphic terms, the Qur'an seems to be saying that we are not to understand this anthropomorphic description of God in the same way we would if we applied it to humans. God is not in anyway similar to His creation.

Now the other example of two contradictory doctrines in the Qur'an to which rationalists objected concerns the problem of free will and determination or, expressed in other terms, the relationship of human power and capability to Divine power.

The Qur'an describes God as having complete power over His creation. To what extent then do humans have the power to act themselves? Do they, for example have the power to obey God's commandments or even the power to believe in Islam? Certain verses of the Qur'an seem to indicate that they do not have this power. For example one verse states:

"And Whomsoever it is God's will to guide., He expandeth his bosom unto Islam, and whomsoever it is His will to send astray He maketh his bosom close and narrow." (Qur'an, VI, 126)

Another verse says:

"And though We should send down the angels unto them, and We should gather against them all things in array, they would not believe unless God so willed." (Qur'an, VI, 112)

And still another verse:

"Had God willed, they had not been idolatrous." (Qur'an, Vl, 108)

And another:

"If thy Lord so willed, all those in the land would believe in a body..... It is not for any person to believe except by the permission of God." (Qur'an, X, 99 ff.)

On the other hand, other verses indicate that man is free to believe or disbelieve as he wishes, and that God will reward him for his belief and good deeds, and punish him for disbelief and evil deeds. For example:

"And say: truth is from your Lord; so who wills let him believe and who wills let him disbelieve; verily We have prepared for the wrong doers a Fire.... But those who have believed and done the works of righteousness -- verily We do not allow to go lost the reward of any who do well in deed. For these are Gardens of Eden." (Qur'an, XVIII, 26-30).

And another example:

"Now today (that is, the Day of Judgment) no one will be wronged at all, nor will ye be recompensed except for what ye have been doing." (Qur'an, XXXVI, 54)

So here we have two contradictory doctrines: one that says that man's actions and beliefs are determined by God's will, and the other that man is free and will be rewarded if he obeys God and punished if he doesn't.

(Allegorical interpretation)

Now how did Muslims try to explain these contradictory doctrines found in the Qur'an? Basically they developed two positions. One was that of the speculative theologians and the other was that of what are sometimes called the traditionalists. Let me take up first the position of the speculative theologians. Now the speculative theologians saw their task as one of interpreting the doctrines of the Qur'an in such a way that they would be acceptable to reason, and they did this by accepting as true one of the contradictory doctrines and then explaining or interpreting allegorically the opposing doctrine in such a way as to make it agree with the doctrine they had chosen to accept.

Now the first group of theologians to interpret the Qur'an in this way were the Mu`tazilites. They were also known as the People of Unity and Justice because of the stress they placed on the unity and justice of God. Now the Mu`tazilites believed that the doctrine of God's unity was essential to Islam and that any statements in the Qur'an which seemed to compromise this unity had therefore to be interpreted in such a manner as not to impair in any way God's absolute unity. If God is knowing, they said, he cannot be knowing through knowledge because then we would have two eternal beings, namely God's being or essence plus His knowledge. They therefore said that God cannot know through knowledge but only through His own essence. Similarly, they claimed that He is powerful not through power but through His essence, and so on for the other attributes. Thus they denied that God had knowledge or power or other attributes in the sense that these attributes were superadded or additional to His essence. In reality all God's attributes were one and indistinguishable from His essence.

Now, in denying that God's attributes were distinct from His essence they went counter to certain verses of the Qur'an such as the following:

"In His knowledge hath He revealed it." (Qur'an, IV, 166)

where God's knowledge is treated as something distinct from His essence.

Following the Qur'an, the Mu`tazilites, furthermore, denied that there was any likeness at all between God and His creation. They were consequently obliged to use allegorical interpretation to explain away the many anthropomorphic descriptions of God which are found in the Qur'an. For example, in the verse which says:

"He it is who created the heavens and the earth; then He mounted the throne," (Qur'an, LXII, 4)

they interpreted the phrase "He mounted the throne" to mean "He gained mastery over." Similarly, the face of God, which is mentioned in a number of verses, they interpreted to mean God's essence.

In the same manner, when the Mu`tazilites took up the question of free will and determination, they decided in favor of free will, and attributed to creatures the power to carry out their own acts. They argued that if humans did not have the power to choose and create their own acts, there would be no point to the rewards and punishments promised to humans in the Qur'an. They claimed that God was a just God and that it was inconceivable that God would reward or punish humans for acts over which they had no power or control.

Now the Mu`tazilites justified this use of allegorical interpretation by quoting a certain passage of the Qur'an which they chose to read as follows:

"He it is who hath revealed unto thee the Scripture wherein are clear revelations, which are the substance of the book, and others which are allegorical. But those in whose hearts is doubt pursue that which is allegorical seeking dissension by seeking to explain it. None knoweth its explanation save God and those who are of sound instruction. They say: We believe therein; the whole is from our Lord; but only men of understanding really heed." (Qur'an, III, 7)

Now from this passage it is clear that the Qur'an itself admits that it contains allegorical verses which demand explanation, and this is, of course, exactly what the Mu`tazilites were attempting to do, namely, to explain these allegorical verses on the assumption, I suppose, that they were those who were described as being "of sound instruction" in the passage cited.

Now one of the lines in this same passage which I have just quoted is itself ambiguous. In Arabic the line which says:

"None knoweth its explanation save God and those who are of sound instruction"

can just as easily be understood to mean:

"None knoweth its explanation save God. (period) And those who are of sound instruction say: We believe therein: the whole is from our Lord."

In other words there is a question here as to where one sentence ends and the next begins. Now if we substitute the second way of reading this line for the first, the whole passage would then be read as follows:

"He it is who hath revealed unto thee the Scripture wherein are clear revelations which are the substance of the book, and others which are allegorical. But those in whose hearts is doubt pursue that which is allegorical seeking dissension by seeking to explain it. None knoweth its explanation save God. And those who are of sound instruction say: We believe therein: The whole is from our Lord; but only men of understanding really heed."

Now according to this reading, no one knows the meaning of the allegorical verses of the Qur'an except God, and it is therefore useless for any human to try to explain them. All one can do is simply to believe in them without knowing what their real meaning is since only God knows their real meaning.

(Traditionalists)

Now this reading of this passage was used to justify the other basic position which Muslims took with respect to the contradictory doctrines in the Qur'an. Those who took this position, that is, the position which rejected allegorical interpretation of the Qur'an, are usually called Traditionalists, and I should like to read to you here a statement made by one of the most famous of these traditionalists, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, which I think expresses this position very clearly.

Ahmad ibn Hanbal was questioned once about the anthropomorphic descriptions of God both in the Qur'an and in the Prophetic traditions and he answered as follows:

"We believe in them and accept them as true without rejecting any part of them...... God should not be described in excess of His own description of Himself, boundless and immeasurable: "There is nothing anything like him! He is the Hearing., the Seeing." Therefore, we say exactly what He has said, and describe Him as He has described Himself, without going beyond His description nor removing from Him any of His attributes merely for fear of some possible slander which might be levelled against us. We believe in these traditions, we acknowledge them, and we allow them to pass intact as they have come down to us, without being able to understand the "how" of them, nor to fathom their intended sense, except in accordance with His own description of Himself; and He is according to His own description the Hearing, the Seeing, boundless and immeasurable. His attributes proceed from Him and are His own. We do not go beyond the Qur'an or the traditions from the prophet and his companions; nor do we know the "how" of these, save by acknowledgement of the Apostle and the confirmation of the Qur'an."(1)

Now, the traditionalists not only abstained from using allegorical interpretation themselves, but severely criticized the rationalist theologians for making use of it.

Ibn Qudamah in a work called The Censure Of Speculative Theology(2) lists nine reasons why allegorical interpretation is wrong.

1) The first reason he gives is that the Qur'an itself prohibits allegorical interpretation, and this is evident from the passage I read to you earlier, particularly the line which reads:

"None knoweth its explanation save God."

2) The second reason is that the Prophet himself did not use interpretation in explaining the Qur'an, and if he saw no reason to use allegorical interpretation there is even less reason for anyone else to use it.

3) None of the early Muslims made any use of interpretation either, but merely accepted the Qur'an and the traditions as they received them.

4)Allegorical interpretation amounts to making judgments about God in matters about which the interpreter has no real knowledge. Ibn Qudamah says here, and I shall quote now:

"Allegorical interpretation is tantamount to the passing of judgment upon God regarding matters which the interpreter does not know, and the interpretation of His intent by that which the interpreter does not know that He intended. Now the most that the interpreter can claim is that a given expression admits a given meaning in the classical language. But it does not necessarily follow from the mere fact of the expression's admissibility of this meaning that this meaning is intended by it. For just as it may admit this meaning it may also admit others. It may even admit still other meanings with which the interpreter is not acquainted."

5) Allegorical interpretation is an innovation in religion and any innovations are automatically heretical. To prove his point here Ibn Qudamah quotes several traditions of the Prophet. One of those he quotes is the following: "The most evil of things are the innovated ones." Another is: "Beware of innovated things for every innovation is a heretical innovation, and every heretical innovation is an error."

6) Allegorical interpretation is unnecessary, for, Ibn Qudamah says, "we have no need to know the meaning which God intended by His attributes; no course of action is intended by them, nor is there any obligation attached to them except to believe in them, and it is possible to believe in them without the knowledge of their intended sense."

7) Allegorical interpretation cannot be incumbent upon the generality of mankind because they do not have sufficient knowledge to undertake it.

8) Allegorical interpretation amounts to private opinion concerning the Qur'an and the traditions, and anyone who interprets the Qur'an according to his private opinion commits an offense.

9) Allegorical interpretation includes the ascription to God of attributes which God did not ascribe to Himself. For example, when the interpreter says that the Qur'anic verses which state that God "mounted the throne" mean that He "gained mastery over," he is ascribing to God the attribute of "mastery" although God did not ascribe this attribute to Himself. He is furthermore denying to God the attribute of "mounting the throne" which God did ascribe to Himself.

In summary, then, the traditionalist position it that the Qur'an and the traditions are true and must be accepted and believed in as they are regardless of whether we can understand them or not. In fact, we should make no attempt to understand any Qur'anic verse or tradition the meaning of which is not immediately obvious to us, for we have no way of knowing whether our interpretation of it is correct or not. Contradictory doctrines in the Qur'an need not bother us since the unambiguous verses are all we need for the satisfactory performance of our religious duties. Notice that the traditionalists do not say that scripture is to be UNDERSTOOD literally. All they say is that it should be ACCEPTED as literally true whether we can understand it or not. As far as I know no major Muslim sect ever held that scripture must be understood in its literal meaning.

The traditionalist position has remained more or less the same throughout Islamic history up to the present day. The rationalist theologians, on the other hand, continued to develop their rationalist approach to Islamic doctrine. The Mu`tazilite school of theology, although ultimately rejected by most Sunni Muslims, continued to be favored by Shi`ite Muslims. Sunni Muslims adopted the Ash`arite school, which had been founded by Abu al-Hasan al-Ash`ari in an attempt to create a middle position between the position of the Mu`tazilites and that of the traditionalists.

(Ash`arites)

The Ash`arites like the Mu`tazilites still made extensive use of allegorical interpretation, but tried to construct a theology which was closer to the literal meaning of the Qur'an and therefore closer to the position of the traditionalists. They did not, for example, go as far as the Mu`tazilites in saying that God's attributes, being indistinguishable from His essence, had no real existence in themselves, but rather they described the attributes as being neither identical with God's essence nor other than it. Similarly, not wanting to reduce in anyway God's power over all events occurring in His Creation, but, on the other hand, wishing to maintain man's responsibility for his own acts, they devised the doctrine of acquisition whereby God creates all human acts but humans "acquire" them by choosing them and thus assume responsibility for them. Nevertheless, in spite of this earlier Ash`arite attempt to take a sort of middle position between the traditionalists and the Mu`tazilites, later Ash`arite theologians increasingly attempted to rationalize Islamic doctrine, so that we find such theologians as al-Taftazani and al-Jurjani taking the position that scripture, that is, the Qur'an and hadith, must be proven to be true by rational arguments before it can be accepted as the basis of the religion. In other words, they believed that it was not sufficient for an educated Muslim simply to believe in his religion and in the truth of its revelation on the basis of faith. On the contrary they believed that a Muslim must be convinced on the basis of rational arguments that his religion was true.

(Later Ash`arites: Proofs for the truth of scripture)

Now in order to prove the truth of scripture by completely rational means, the later Ash`arite theologians developed a series of rational proofs which culminated in a proof for the truthfulness of the prophet; for if the Prophet could be demonstrated to be telling the truth, then all statements contained in revelation, both in the Qur'an and in hadith, would be true statements and one could believe in them on the basis of reason rather than through mere faith.

This series of rational proofs developed by the Ash`arite theologians included proofs for the following doctrines or propositions:

1. The universe is originated.

2. The universe has an originator or creator.

3. The creator of the universe is knowing, powerful and willing.

4. Prophecy is possible.

5. Miracles are possible.

6. Miracles indicate the truthfulness of one who claims to be a prophet.

7. Muhammad claimed to be a prophet and performed miracles.(3)

According to the theologians themselves, each of these proofs had to be demonstrated by what they called a rational proof or dalil `aqli. They defined a rational proof as a proof based on premisses known intuitively or necessarily to be true through reason or sense perception, and which was consequently said to result in certain knowledge. Six varieties of necessary premisses upon which rational proofs could be based were commonly accepted by the theologians. These were:

1. Awwaliyat, first principles or axioms, such as the statement that the whole is greater than any of its parts.

2. Qadaya qiyasatuha ma`aha, which are propositions containing their own syllogisms, such as the statement that four is an even number.

3. Mushahadat, or sense perceptions, such as the statement that this fire burns.

4. Mutawatirat, which are historical or geographical facts reported by a sufficient number of witnesses such that it would be impossible to suppose that they were all lying.

5. Mujarrabat, or facts known through experimentation such as the statement that scammony is a laxative.

6. Hadsiyat, or acute guesses, as for example, the statement that the light of the moon is derived from the light of the sun.(4)

Distinguished from the rational proof was the scriptural proof or dalil naqli, which was defined as a proof containing one or more premisses taken from scripture. Scriptural proofs could not, of course, be used in the series of arguments used to establish the truth of scripture for that would involve a circular argument. However, once scripture had been rationally demonstrated to be true on the basis of rational premisses, scriptural proofs could be used in proving additional theological doctrines.

How successful, then, were these later Ash`arite theologians in establishing the truth of scripture by means of rational proofs? To their own satisfaction, at least, they were able to formulate proofs for all of the doctrines mentioned earlier except for the proposition stating that a miracle indicates the truthfulness of anyone claiming to be a prophet. Here they had to admit their inability to come up with any rational proof at all. Nevertheless in spite of their inability to prove this proposition rationally, they still believed that it was a true proposition. How could people be convinced, however, that it was a true proposition in the absence of any rational proof?

One solution to this problem was to resort to the following argument by analogy:

Suppose that a powerful king is sitting on his throne before an audience. A man rises and announces that he is the messenger, or spokesman, of this king to his people. He then turns to the king and says:

"Your Majesty if I am telling the truth with regard to my claim to be your messenger, then perform some act which is contrary to your usual custom." If the king then performs such an act all those present will know that the king performed that act only in order to confirm the truthfulness of the man claiming to be his messenger. In like manner God performs a miracle by the hand of the prophet and in so doing confirms the claim of the prophet to be telling the truth.

Realizing, however, that this argument by analogy fell short of being a really convincing argument, the theologians attempted another solution to this problem. This was to claim that the proposition that a miracle indicates the truthfulness of a prophet is known necessarily to be true in spite of the fact that it cannot be classed under any of the six varieties of necessary premisses previously mentioned which were commonly accepted by rational thinkers.

Nevertheless, the explanation of how such a proposition could be known necessarily to be true and why such a solution was acceptable to Ash`arite theologians, can be found in the Ash`arite doctrine of what can be called immediate causality as opposed to the Mu`tazilite doctrine of mediate causality or tawlid.

As is well known, God's power, according to Ash`arite doctrine, is limited only by logical impossibility. He is free to do anything except that which involves a logical contradiction. He cannot, for example, cause something to exist and not exist at the same time.

God is furthermore the immediate and only cause of everything that exists or occurs in the universe. All effects are caused directly by God rather than by the causes to which we commonly ascribe these effects. Thus, if someone moves his hand on which he is wearing a ring, God is the direct and immediate cause not only of the movement of the hand but also of the movement of the ring. The movement of the ring is not caused by the movement of the hand, nor the movement of the hand by the person who wills to move his hand.

Because God customarily acts in accordance with certain patterns and always, or almost always causes the ring to move at the same time he causes the hand to move, it appears that the movement of the hand is the cause of the movement of the ring. It is, however, entirely within God's power to cause the hand to move without simultaneously causing the ring to move.

Acts of God which are in accord with his customary pattern of acting are known as `adiyat. Acts which occur counter to His customary pattern are miracles or khawariq al-`adah, which literally means things which pierce or penetrate or go beyond the customary.

This doctrine of immediate causality is not only used to explain the occurrence of miracles but also to explain how knowledge is acquired. Like everything else, knowledge is something created directly by God. If we know that a first principle or axiom is true, is because God created this knowledge in our minds following our conception of both the subject and the predicate of the axiom. Similarly the knowledge that the conclusion of a syllogism is true is created by God after he has created in our minds the knowledge of the premisses.

This doctrine of God-caused knowledge thus explains how the proposition that a miracle indicates the truthfulness of the prophet can be known necessarily to be true; for when we witness a miracle and hear the words of the prophet, God creates in our minds the knowledge that the prophet is telling the truth.

However, since God is not under any compulsion to act according to his customary patterns and does, in fact, act counter to these patterns in the case of miracles, God can refrain from creating in our minds the knowledge of the truth of a proposition, even though that proposition might be true. Can God, however, create in our minds the knowledge of the truth of a proposition which in itself is false? Can He, for example, create in our minds the knowledge that a prophet is telling the truth when in reality the prophet is lying? The theologians answered this question in the negative on the grounds that such an act on the part of God would involve a logical contradiction in that the prophet would be both telling the truth and lying at the same time. God's power extends only to acts which are logically possible and He consequently cannot create in our minds knowledge of the truth of a proposition which in itself is false.(5)

1. See Ibn Qudamah, Tahrim al-Nazar, pp. 8-9

2. See Ibn Qudamah, Tahrim al-Nazar, pp. 20-23.

3. For these propositions see al-Taftazani, Sharh al-Maqasid I, 39-40; al-Jurjani, Sharh al-Mawaqif, II, 50-51; al-Qushji, Sharh al-Tajrid p. 462.

4. These premisses may be found in al-Razi, Qutb al-Din, Sharh al-Risalah al-Shamsiyah, II, 240; al-Isfahani, Matali` al-Anzar, 26-7; al-Taftazani, Sharh al-Maqasid, I, 19; al-Jurjani, Sharh al- Mawaqif, I, 123, II, 36; al-Amidi, Abkar al-Afkar, fols. 17b-18a; Ibn Sina, al-Isharat wa-al-Tanbihat, I, 213-219; Ibn Sina, al-Shifa', al-Mantiq, al-Burhan, pp. 63-64; Ibn Sina, al-Najah, pp. 61-66.

5. See al-Razi, Fakhr al-Din, al-Arba`in fi Usul al-Din, 316-324; al-Jurjani, Sharh al-Mawaqif, VIII 228-230, 236-240; al-Taftazani, Sharh al-Maqasid, II, 131-132; al-Amidi, Abkar al-Afkar, ff. 214b-215a, 217a-217b, 218a, 22la-221b)

al-Amidi, Sayf al-Din `Ali ibn Abi `Ali, Abkar al-Afkar. MS Petermann I 233, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin.

Ibn Qudamah, Muwaffaq al-Din `Abd Allah ibn Ahmad al-Maqdisi, Tahrim al-Nazar fi Kutub Ahl al-Kalam. Edited and translated by George Makdisi under the title Ibn Qudama's Censure of Speculative Theology. E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Series, New Series, XXIII, London 1962.

Ibn Sina, Abu `Ali al-Husayn ibn `Abd Allah, al-Isharat wa-al-Tanbihat. With the commentaries of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and Qutb al-Din al-Razi. Three volumes. Tehran 1377-1379.

Ibn Sina, Abu `Ali al-Husayn ibn `Abd Allah, al-Najah fi al-Hikmah al- Mantiqiyah wa-al-Tabi`iyah wa-al-Ilahiyah. Cairo 1357/1938.

Ibn Sina, Abu `Ali al-Husayn ibn `Abd Allah, al-Shifa', al-Mantiq, al-Burhan. Edited by Abu al-`Ala `Afifi. Cairo 1375/1956.

al-Jurjani, al-Sayyid al-Sharif `Ali ibn Muhammad, Sharh al-Mawaqif. Eight volumes. Cairo 1325/1907. (A commentary on al-Mawaqif fi `Ilm al-Kalam of `Adud al-Din al-Iji)

al-Qushji, `Ala' al-Din `Ali ibn Muhammad, Sharh al-Tajrid. Tabriz(?) 1307. (A commentary on Tajrid al-`Aqa'id of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi)

al-Razi, Fakhr al-Din Muhammad ibn `Umar, Kitab al-Arba`in fi Usul al-Din. Hyderabad 1353.

al-Razi, Qutb al-Din Mahmud ibn Muhammad, Sharh al-Risalah al-Shamsiyah. Two volumes. Cairo 1323-1327. (A commentary on Najm al-Din al-Katibi's al-Risalah al-Shamsiyah)

al-Taftazani, Sa`d al-Din Mas`ud ibn `Umar, Sharh al-Maqasid. Two volumes. Istanbul 1277. (al-Taftazani's own commentary on his al-Maqasid fi `Ilm al-Kalam)