RATIONAL AND TRADITIONAL PROOFS IN ISLAMIC THEOLOGY

	(A paper read at the 1967 annual meeting of the American Oriental
Society in New Haven, Connecticut, and updated in December 2006)


	In the sections on nazar or speculation in later Ash'arite theological
works, such as the Sharh al-Maqasid of al-Taftazani and the Sharh al-Mawaqif
of al-Jurjani, a careful distinction is made between two types of proof which
can be used to demonstrate theological doctrines. One of these is the rational
proof or dalil 'aqli, by which is meant a proof based ultimately on premisses
which are known to be true through reason or sense perception. The other is
the traditional proof or dalil naqli, whose premisses are taken from
tradition, that is, from the Qur'an or the sunnah of the Prophet.(1)

	A rational proof results in certain knowledge if it is based on
premisses known intuitively or necessarily to be true.  Six varieties of
necessary premisses are usually listed although al-Jurjani following al-Iji in
al-Mawaqif and al-Amidi in his Abkar al-Afkar list seven. The six usually
given are the following:

	1. Awwaliyat, first principles or axioms, such as the statement that
the whole is greater than any of its parts.

	2. Qadaya qiyasatuha ma'aha, which are propositions containing their
own syllogisms, such as the statement that four is an even number.

	3. Mushahadat, or sense perceptions, such as the statement that this
fire burns.

	4. Mutawatirat, which are historical or geographical facts known
through tawatur transmission, that is, facts transmitted by a sufficient
number of witnesses such that it would be impossible to suppose that they were
all lying.

	5. Mujarrabat, or facts known through experimentation, such as the
statement that scammony is a laxative.

	6. Hadsiyat, or acute guesses, as for example, the statement that the
light of the moon is derived from that of the sun.

	The seventh variety sometimes included in this list are al-wahmiyat fi
al-mahsusat, or estimations or preconceptions with respect to objects of
sense, such as the proposition that every body can be pointed to and is in a
direction.(2)

	Rational proofs then, if based on any of these six varieties of
necessary premisses, result in certain knowledge. Traditional proofs, on the
other hand, since they are not based on any of these premisses which are known
necessarily to be true, cannot result in any knowledge at all unless tradition
itself, from which the premisses of traditional proofs are taken, can be
demonstrated to be true. This, of course, must be done by means of rational
proofs. Thus all traditional proofs are ultimately based on the rational
proofs required to prove the truth of tradition.  In other words, in order to
use premisses taken from tradition in proofs of theological doctrines,
tradition as a whole had to be demonstrated to be true by means of purely
rational proofs.

	Ash'arite theologians thus developed a series of rational proofs which
culminated in a proof for the truthfulness of the Prophet; for if the Prophet
is telling the truth, then statements contained in the Qur'an and Sunnah are
true statements and can consequently be used as premisses in traditional
proofs for various religious doctrines.

	This series of rational proofs culminating in the proof for the
truthfulness of the Prophet usually included proofs for the following
propositions or doctrines:


1. The universe is originated.

2. The universe has an originator or creator.

3. The creator of the universe is knowing, powerful and willing.

4. Prophecy is possible.

5. Miracles are possible.

6. Miracles indicate the truthfulness of one who claims to be a prophet.

7. Muhammad claimed to be a prophet and performed miracles.(3)


	To summarize, one can say that any religious doctrine which is used in
the proof for the truthfulness of the Prophet must itself be based on a
rational proof, and that this proof must ultimately depend on premisses known
necessarily to be true. Other doctrines not required in the proof for the
truthfulness of the Prophet, such as God's unity, His having the attributes of
sight, hearing and speech, and doctrines concerning the last day and heaven
and hell, can all be based on traditional proofs.

	As has been mentioned, rational proofs, if based on premisses known
necessarily to be true, result in certain knowledge.  The question can be
raised, however, as to whether or not traditional proofs also result in
certain knowledge even if the truthfulness of the prophet is established. The
answer is "yes" if the particular traditional proofs in question can satisfy
three conditions.

	The first of these is that the language of all traditional statements
used in a proof must be known through tawatur.  By language is meant not only
the morphology and syntax of the language but also the definitions of words as
used and accepted at the time of the Prophet.

	The second condition is that the meaning intended by the Prophet in
making a statement must be known. Is a particular statement, for example, to
be understood literally or metaphorically?  This question cannot be answered
by means of mutawatir tradition but only through the use of qara'in, that is,
contextual evidence or other circumstantial evidence which, if available, can
be used to determine the meaning intended by the Prophet in any particular
statement.

	The last condition is the absence of a rational counter argument or
mu`arid `aqli, that is, any valid rational proof for a statement that
contradicts any of the premisses or the conclusion of the traditional proof in
question.  If such a rational counter argument exists it must be accepted and
the traditional argument either rejected or else interpreted allegorically so
as to be in accord with what is known through reason.  To reject the rational
argument in favor of the traditional argument is impossible, for to do so
would not only invalidate reason as a source of certain knowledge but also
tradition, since tradition can only be proven true through the use of rational
arguments.

	A further problem, however, is involved in this last condition that
there be no rational counter argument, and that is that in the case of any
particular traditional proof one can never know for certain that a rational
counter argument does not in fact exist, since it may be the case that no one
has yet discovered one. It was therefore argued by some that no traditional
proof could result in certain knowledge since there always remained the
possibility that a rational counter argument did in fact exist which would
necessitate the allegorical interpretation of the statements involved in the
traditional proof.  On the other hand, since the Ash'arite theologians did not
consider legal precepts to be subject to rational counter arguments, this
third condition did not apply to Islamic law.(4)



                                END NOTES

1. See al-Taftazani, Sharh al-Maqasid, I, 39-40; al-Jurjani, Sharh al-Mawaqif,
II, 48-51; al-Isfahani, Matali` al-Anzar, pp. 25-26. 

2. See al-Razi, Qutb al-Din, Sharh al-Risalah al-Shamsiyah, II, 240;
al-Isfahani, Mata1i` al-Anzar pp. 26-7; al-Taftazani, Sharh al-Maqasid, I, 19;
al-Jurjani, Sharh al- Mawaqif, I, 123, II, 36; al-Amidi, Abkar al-Afkar, fols.
17b-18a.  It should be noted that these six premisses are derived from Ibn
Sina.  See his al-Isharat wa-al-Tanbihat, I, 213-219; al-Shifa', al-Mantiq,
al-Burhan, pp. 63-64; and al-Najah, pp. 61-66.

3. See al-Taftazani, Sharh al-Maqasid, I, 39-40; al-Jurjani, Sharh al-Mawaqif,
II, 50-51; al-Qushji, Sharh al-Tajrid, pp. 462 ff.

4. See al-Jurjani, Sharh al-Mawaqif, II, 51-58; al-Taftazani, Sharh
a1-Maqasid, I, 40-41; al-Isfahani, Matali` al-Anzar, p. 28


                           LIST OF WORKS CITED

al-Amidi, Sayf al-Din `Ali ibn Abi `Ali, Abkar al-Afkar.  MS Petermann I 233,
Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin.

(al-Baydawi, `Abd Allah ibn `Umar, Tawali` al-Anwar min Matali` al-Anzar,
Cairo 1323.) 

Ibn Sina, Abu `Ali al-Husayn ibn `Abd Allah, al-Isharat wa-al-Tanbihat.  With
the commentaries of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and Qutb al-Din al-Razi.  Three
volumes.  Tehran 1377-1379.

Ibn Sina, Abu `Ali al-Husayn ibn `Abd Allah, al-Najah fi al-Hikmah al-
Mantiqiyah wa-al-Tabi`iyah wa-al-Ilahiyah.  Cairo 1357/1938.

Ibn Sina, Abu `Ali al-Husayn ibn `Abd Allah, al-Shifa', al-Mantiq, al-Burhan.
Edited by Abu al-`Ala `Afifi.  Cairo 1375/1956.

al-Isfahani, Shams al-Din Mahmud ibn `Abd al-Rahman, Matali` al-Anzar fi Sharh
Tawali` al-Anwar.  Cairo 1323.  (A commentary on Tawali` al-Anwar min Matali`
al-Anzar of `Abd Allah ibn `Umar al-Baydawi)

al-Jurjani, al-Sayyid al-Sharif `Ali ibn Muhammad, Sharh al-Mawaqif.  Eight
volumes.  Cairo 1325/1907.  (A commentary on al-Mawaqif fi `Ilm al-Kalam of
`Adud al-Din al-Iji)

(al-Katibi, Najm al-Din `Umar ibn `Ali al-Qazwini al-Katibi, al-Risalah
al-Shamsiyah.  Edited and translated by Alois Sprenger.  Bibliotheca Indica:
Calcutta 1854.)

al-Qushji, `Ala' al-Din `Ali ibn Muhammad, Sharh al-Tajrid. Tabriz(?) 1307. 
(A commentary on Tajrid al-`Aqa'id of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi)

al-Razi, Qutb al-Din Mahmud ibn Muhammad, Sharh al-Risalah al-Shamsiyah.  Two
volumes. Cairo 1323-1327.  (A commentary on Najm al-Din al-Katibi's al-Risalah
al-Shamsiyah)

al-Taftazani, Sa`d al-Din Mas`ud ibn `Umar, Sharh al-Maqasid.  Two volumes. 
Istanbul 1277.  (al-Taftazani's own commentary on his al-Maqasid fi `Ilm
al-Kalam)


					Nicholas Heer
					heer@u.washington.edu