INTRODUCTION

Athār al-Dīn al-Mufaddal ibn ʿUmar al-Abharī, the author of *Hidāyat al-Ḥikmah*, was an astronomer and philosopher of the seventh Islamic century. Information on his life is meagre. Ibn Khallikān (died 681/1282) in his *Wafayāt al-Aʿyān* mentions that he himself studied legal disputation (ʿilm al-khilāf) with al-Abharī when the latter moved from Mosul to Irbil in the year 625/1228. He also tells of the high regard in which al-Abharī held his teacher, Kamāl al-Dīn ibn Yūnūs (died 639/1242), one of the foremost mathematicians and astronomers of the period.\(^1\) In his geographical work, *Āthār al-Bilād wa-Akhbār al-ʿĪbād*, Zakariyāʾ ibn Muḥammad al-Qazwīnī (died 682/1283), who like Ibn Khallikān was one of al-Abharī’s students, relates that al-Abharī was presented with one of the many questions on medical, mathematical and philosophical topics which had been sent by the Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen to the Ayyūbid sultan al-Ḵāmil Muḥammad with the request that they be forwarded to Muslim scholars for their answers. The particular question asked of al-Abharī had to do with how one could construct a square whose area would be equal to that of a segment of a circle. The problem proved difficult for al-Abharī, however, and he passed it on to his teacher, Kamāl al-Dīn, who was able to provide an answer.\(^2\) In his *Tārīkh Mukhtar al-Duwal* Ibn al-ʿĪrābī (died 685/1286)\(^3\) mentions al-Abharī as being among a group of scholars all of whom had been students of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (died 606/1209)\(^4\) and who were now prominent in the fields of philosophy and logic.\(^5\) The modern scholar, Aydın Sayılı, includes al-Abharī among the astronomers employed at the observatory in Marāghah, which the Il-Khānid ruler Hūlagū had founded in 657/1259 and placed under the direction of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (died 672/1274), another of the students of Kamāl al-Dīn ibn Yūnūs.\(^6\) The date of al-Abharī’s death is uncertain. Hājjī Khalīfah, in three

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\(^2\) See *Āthār al-Bilād*, p. 310. Further information on the questions posed by Frederick II may be found in Suter, “Beiträge zu den Beziehungen Kaiser Friedrichs II. zu zeitgenössischen Gelehrten.”

\(^3\) See Brockelmann, *Geschichte*, I, 427, Supplement I, 591.

\(^4\) See Brockelmann, *Geschichte*, I, 666, Supplement I, 920.

\(^5\) See *Tārīkh Mukhtar al-Duwal*, p. 254.

\(^6\) See *The Observatory in Islam*, pp. 212, 215. Sayılı cites as his source a manu-
separate citations, mentions three different dates: around 660/1262, after 660/1262 and around 700/1301, but makes no attempt to reconcile them. However, if Ibn al-‘Ibr¯ı is correct in placing al-Abhar¯ı among the students of Fakhr al-D¯ın al-R¯az¯ı, he could hardly have lived until the year 700.

Although al-Abhar¯ı wrote a number of works on astronomical subjects, he is best known for his Īs¯a gh¯uj¯ı, on logic, and his Hid¯ ayat al-Ḥ ikmah, on philosophy. Both of these works are short abridgements or handbooks written for students. Such abridgements were popular at the time, but, as Ibn Khald¯un later observed, “the texts of such brief handbooks are found to be difficult and complicated (to understand). A good deal of time must be spent (on the attempt to) understand them.” It is not surprising, therefore, that such works received the attention of numerous commentators and glossators. Moreover, since most handbooks were restricted to the barest outlines of a subject, it was not unusual for these commentaries and glosses to contain more significant and original material than the handbooks on which they were written. This is certainly the case with the commentaries on al-Abhari’s Hid¯ ayat al-Ḥ ikmah.

Among the numerous commentaries written on Hid¯ ayat al-Ḥ ikmah are some which, if one can judge by the number of manuscript copies still extant and by the number of glosses and supercommentaries written on them, seem to have been held in high esteem. One of these was the commentary of M¯ır H . usayn ibn Mu‘¯ın al-D¯ın al-Maybud¯ı, often referred to as Q¯ad .¯ı M¯ır. As his nisbah indicates, he was a native of Maybud, a town to the northwest of Yazd in the province of Fars. In his youth


7 See Kashf al-Z . un¯un, I, 174, II, 6, 646; and Suter, Die Mathematiker, p. 219, note 75.
8 Brockelmann (Geschichte, Supplement I, 839) gives 19 Rabī’ al-Thañī 663/1265 as the date of al-Abhari’s death. According to Suter (Die Mathematiker, p. 219, note 75) this date was evidently taken from Casiri (Bibliotheca, I, 188) who says that he found the date in the Bibliotheca Philosopherum. This latter work is attributed by Casiri (Bibliotheca, II, 151) to a certain Abu Ali Algassan (Abū ‘Ali al-Ghassān?). Steinschneider (Die arabischen Übersetzungen, p. (25)) believes this latter work to have been an invention of Casiri’s.
9 A list of his works may be found in Brockelmann, Geschichte, I, 608-611; Supplement I, 839-844. See also Suter, Die Mathematiker, p. 145; al-Baghdādī, Hadīyat al-‘Arīfīn, II, 469; and Rescher, The Development of Arabic Logic, pp. 196-197. An English translation of al-Abhari’s Īsāqhvījī was done by Edwin E. Calverley and published in 1933 in The Macdonald Presentation Volume, pp. 75-85.
11 Other highly esteemed commentaries were those of Mīrak Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Mubārak Shāh al-Bukhārī (died circa 740/1339), Mawlānāzādah Aḥmad ibn Maḥmūd al-Harawī al-Kharaziyānī (eighth/fourteenth century), and Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Shūrāzī (died 1050/1640). See Brockelmann, Geschichte, I, 608, Supplement I, 839.
he traveled to Shīraz, where he studied under the noted philosopher and theologian, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī (died 907/1501). He subsequently became a qāḍī in Yazd where he wrote a number of works in both Arabic and Persian. Among his Arabic works was a commentary on al-Kātibī’s al-Risālah al-Shamsīyah, a handbook on logic, as well as a commentary on his Ḥikmat al-ʿAyn, a well-known handbook on philosophy similar to al-Abhari’s Hidayat al-Ḥikmah. Among his Persian works were Jām-i Gīlī-numā, a work on philosophy which was translated into both Arabic and Latin, and Sharḥ Dīwān Āmīr al-Muʿminīn, a commentary on the poetry attributed to ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭalib. He also wrote a commentary on a hadīth of al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī al-ʿAskarī, the eleventh Shiʿite imām. Although the latter two works are an indication of his esteem for ʿAlī and his descendents, al-Maybūdī seems nonetheless to have been a firm believer in Sunnī doctrine. For this reason, apparently, he incurred the wrath of the Ṣafavid ruler Shāh Ismāʿīl, who was then in the process of converting his subjects to Shiʿism, and in 909/1503, according to Aḥsan al-Tawārīḵh, he was arrested and subsequently executed by order of the Shāh.

As a handbook al-Abhari’s Hidayat al-Ḥikmah covers the entire field of philosophy as it was known in the medieval Islamic world. The work is divided into three main parts (aqsām)—logic (manṭiq), physics (ṭabīʿyāt), and metaphysics (ilāhiyyāt)—and concludes with a short epilogue (khātimah) on the after-life (al-
The part on metaphysics comprises three chapters (funūn). The first deals with the divisions of existence (taqāṣīm al-wujūd), the second, some sections of which are translated here with al-Maybūdī’s commentary, deals with the Creator and His attributes (al-Ṣāni‘ wa-ṣīfātuhi), and the third takes up the subject of angels (al-malā‘ikah) or abstracted intelligences (al-‘uqūl al-mujarradah) as they were called by the philosophers. Each of these chapters is further divided into sections (fuṣūl) as follows:

Chapter One on the Divisions of Existence

1. Universals and particulars (al-kullī wa-al-juz‘ī).
2. The one and the many (al-wāḥid wa-al-kathīr).
3. The prior and the posterior (al-mutaqaddim wa-al-muta‘akhkhīr).
4. The eternal and the temporal (al-qadīm wa-al-ḥādith).
7. Substance and accident (al-jawhar wa-al-‘arad).

Chapter Two on Knowledge of the Creator and His Attributes

1. The proof for the existence of the Necessarily [Existent] by virtue of Its essence (al-wājib li-dhāthī).
2. The Necessary Existent’s (wājib al-wujūd) existence (wujūd) is the same as Its reality (ḥaqiqah).
3. [Its] necessity of existence (wujūb al-wujūd) as well as Its individuation (ta‘ayyun) are identical with Its essence (dhāt).
4. The oneness (tawhīd) of the Necessary Existent.
5. The Necessarily [Existent] by virtue of Its essence is necessary in all of Its aspects (jihāt).
6. The Necessarily [Existent] by virtue of Its essence does not share Its existence with contingents.
10. The Necessary Existent is a willer (murīd) of things and is magnanimous (jawād).

Chapter Three on the Angels (al-malā‘ikah) or Abstracted Intelligences (al-‘uqūl al-mujarradah)

1. The proof for the [existence of] the intelligences.
2. The multiplicity (kathrah) of the intelligences.

only with the second and third parts of the work.
3. The pre-eternity (azaliyah) and everlastingness (abadiyah) of the intelligences.

4. How the intelligences serve as an intermediary between the Creator (al-Bārī) and the corporeal world (al-‘ālam al-jismānī).

To the best of my knowledge no scholarly edition of Hidāyat al-Ḥikmah or of al-Maybūdī’s commentary on it has been published. Commercial printings of al-Abhārī’s text with al-Maybūdī’s commentary are, however, plentiful, and the translation which follows has been based on three of them. These are: 1) the Istanbul printing of 1321, which contains only al-Abhārī’s text and al-Maybūdī’s commentary, 2) the Istanbul printing of 1325, which contains, in addition to al-Abhārī’s text and al-Maybūdī’s commentary, selections from various other glosses and commentaries printed in the margins, and 3) the Tehran lithograph of 1331, which also contains selections from various glosses and commentaries in the margins. No significant variations were found between any of the texts, although obvious misprints were common. For al-Abhārī’s text the 1313 Tehran lithograph of the commentary on it of Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī was also consulted.

The translation which follows comprises the first six sections of Chapter Two of al-Maybūdī’s commentary on Hidāyat al-Ḥikmah. These sections all have to do with issues pertaining to the Necessary Existent’s existence. The first section presents a proof for the existence of the Necessary Existent. The second and third sections deal with the question of whether the Necessary Existent’s existence (wujūd), necessity (wujūb) and individuation (ta‘ayyun) are identical with Its essence or additional to it. The fourth section takes up the question of whether there can be more than one necessary existent. The fifth section deals with the question of whether it is possible for a necessary being to change. And finally the sixth and last of the translated sections discusses the question of whether the existence of the Necessary Existent is of the same nature as the existence of contingent beings.

In the translation of the text, a boldface font has been used to distinguish al-Abhārī’s original text from al-Maybūdī’s commentary. A translation of al-Abhārī’s original text without the commentary is given in an appendix. Square brackets have been used to indicate words and phrases which do not correspond to anything in the original Arabic text but which were considered necessary for the clarity of the English translation. For readers who have some knowledge of Arabic certain philosophical and logical terms have been given in transliterated Arabic after the corresponding English translation of the term. These are printed in italics and placed within parentheses.
Chapter Two on Knowledge of the Creator (al-Ṣāni‘) and His Attributes: This chapter contains ten sections.


[1] The Necessarily [Existent] by virtue of Its essence, if considered as It is in Itself (min ḥayth huwa huwa), is that which does not accept non-existence (al-‘adam). In proof of this (burhānuhū)23 one may say that if there were not in existence an existent which was necessary by virtue of its essence, then an impossibility would result. This is because all existents would then constitute a totality (jumlaḥ) made up of individuals (āḥād) each one of which would be contingent by virtue of its essence (mumkin li-dhātihi). It follows that the totality would also be contingent because of its need for each of its contingent parts, since what is in need of what is contingent has all the more reason to be contingent. Therefore it, that is the totality, would need an external cause to bring it into existence (‘illah mujīdah khārij īyaḥ), that is, a cause external to the totality. And the knowledge of this is self-evident (bādiḥī), that is, necessary (darūrī) and intuitively inferred (fitrī al-qiyās).

[2] In confirmation of this (taqrīruhū)24 it may be said that the cause cannot be the totality itself, which is apparent, nor one of its parts, since the cause of the totality is also the cause of each one of its parts. The reason for this25 is that each part is contingent and in need of a cause. If the cause of the totality (al-majmū‘) were not also the cause of each of the parts, then some of them would be caused by another cause, and the first cause would not be the cause of the totality, but,

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22 That is, that being which exists necessarily by virtue of its own essence rather than by virtue of some cause external to its essence. The adjectival phrase wājīb al-wujūd li-dhātihi has been translated throughout as necessarily existent by virtue of its essence. Similarly, the nominal phrase al-wājīb li-dhātihi has been translated as the Necessarily [Existent] by virtue of Its essence, and the noun al-wājīb has been translated as the Necessary [Existent]. There are a number of words in Arabic which have the general meaning of essence. To avoid confusion dhāt has been translated as essence, māhiyyah as quiddity, ḥaqiqah as reality, and ṣabī‘ah as nature.

23 The proof which follows is essentially the same as the one given by Ibn Sīnā in both al-Najāh and al-Ishārāt wa-al-Tanbīḥāt. See p. 235 of al-Najāh, and Vol. III, pp. 20-28 of al-Ishārāt wa-al-Tanbīḥāt. An analysis of Ibn Sīnā’s proof is given by Herbert Davidson in his Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy, pp. 281-310.

24 That is, that the cause must be external to the totality.

25 That is, the reason the cause of the totality cannot be one of the parts of the totality.
on the contrary, of some it only. From this it follows that any part which was the cause of the totality would have to be the cause of itself.  

[3] Here there is room for further discussion (wa-hâhunâ baḥth), however, because the contingency of the totality does not imply its being in need of a cause which is individually one (wâhîdah bi-al-shâkhs). On the contrary, it is possible for the totality to be dependent on many causes which bring the individual parts (âḥâd) of the totality into existence, all of which causes together are the cause of the existence of the totality. It is also possible that the contingent [parts] constitute an infinite chain in which the second is the cause of the first, the third the cause of the second, and so on. Thus, the cause of the totality is that part of it which consists of all of those parts which are both causes and effects. The only [part] excluded is the [last part which is] purely an effect (al-ma‘lûl al-maḥîf).  

[4] The commentator on al-Mawâqif  said: The discussion concerns the cause which brings something into existence (al-‘îlîh al-mâjidah) and which is independent in effectiveness (al-ta’tîr) and in bringing-into-existence (al-ījâd). If what is before the last effect is a cause which brings the whole chain into existence and is truly independent in its effectiveness with respect to it, such a cause would definitely be a cause of itself.  

[5] It can be said in refutation of this remark (al-kalâm) that each one of the parts would then be in need of a cause external to the chain of contingents, for if it were not external then either a vicious circle (al-dawr) or an endless chain (al-tasalsul) would result. Moreover, to acknowledge the need for a cause after observing that something is contingent is [an inference that is] intuitive. It should be apparent to you that this [refutation] is not pertinent to the argument.  

In other words, if one part of the totality were the cause of the remaining parts of the totality, that part would not be the cause of the totality but only of the remaining parts. For that part to be the cause of the totality it would also have to be the cause of itself in addition to being the cause of the other parts. But if it were the cause of itself it would be necessarily existent rather than contingent. Since all the parts of the totality are by definition contingent, the cause of the totality, being necessarily existent, could not be one of its parts but, on the contrary, would have to be external to it.  

That is, unlike all the other parts, it is not also a cause.  


And therefore necessarily existent contrary to what had been assumed.  

That is, that it is possible for the totality to be dependent on many causes as proposed in paragraph 3.  

That is, infinite regress.  

According to ‘Abd al-Ḥâkîm, one of the glossators of al-Maybûdî’s text, the
Moreover, an existent which was external to all contingents would be necessary by virtue of its essence. Thus, the existence of what is necessarily existent (wājib al-wujūd) follows from the assumption of its non-existence, and that is impossible. Therefore, its non-existence is impossible, and its existence is necessary.

Section [Two] On [the Proof] that the Necessary Existent’s Existence is the Same as Its Reality (ḥaqīqah).

[1] The grades of existents in existence (marāṭib al-mawjūdat fī al-mawjūdiyyah) are, according to logical division (al-taqṣīm al-ʿaqlī), three: The lowest grade is what exists by virtue of another (al-mawjūd bi-al-ghayr), that is, what is brought into existence by something other than itself. Such an existent has an essence (dhāt) and an existence which is different from its essence, as well as a bringer-into-existence (mujīd) which is different from both. If the essence of such an existent is considered without consideration of its bringer-into-existence, it is possible in fact (fī nafs al-amr)34 for its existence to be separated from its essence, and without doubt it is also possible to conceive (al-tasawwur) of its existence as being separated from reason it is not pertinent is because it requires proofs for the impossibility of both the vicious circle and the endless chain, and al-Abharī’s intent was to prove the existence of the Necessary Existent without relying on such proofs. See the margin of p. 167 of the Tehran lithograph of 1331.

33 As stated in paragraph 1 above.

34 The literal meaning of fī nafs al-amr is in the matter itself or in the thing itself. Things can be said to exist in the external world of time and space (fī al-khārij), in the mind (fī al-dhihn), or in the thing itself (fī nafs al-amr), that is, in fact. In the introduction to his commentary al-Maybūdī makes the following statement: “The meaning of a thing’s being existent in the matter itself is that it is existent in itself. Matter (al-amr) is the same as thing (al-shay’). The upshot of this is that its existence is not dependent on anyone’s supposition (fard) or consideration (i’tibār). For example, the connection between the rising of the sun and the existence of daylight is [something that is] realized in itself regardless of whether or not anyone exists to suppose it, and regardless of whether or not anyone does suppose it. [Existence in] the thing itself (nafs al-amr) is more inclusive (a’amm) than [existence in] the external world (al-khārij), for every existent in the external world exists in the thing itself, with no universal converse being possible (bilā ‘aks kullī). Existence in the thing itself is also more inclusive than [existence in] the mind, but in only a certain respect, for it is possible to conceive of false propositions (kawādhīb), such as the evenness of the number five, which can exist in the mind but not in the thing itself. Such propositions are called hypothetical mental [propositions] (dhihnī fardī). The evenness of the number four, on the other hand, exists both in the thing itself as well as in the mind, and such propositions are called real mental [propositions] (dhihnī ḥaqīqī).” (See p. 5 of the Istanbul printing of 1321, p. 5 also in the Istanbul printing of 1325, and p. 10 in the Tehran lithograph of 1331.) In summary one may say that all things that exist in the
its essence, for both the conceiving and the thing conceived (al-mutasawwar) are possible. Such is the status of contingent quiddities (al-māhiyyāt al-mumkinah), as is well known.

[2] The middle grade is what exists by virtue of its essence (al-mawjūd bi-al-dhāt) with an existence which is other than its essence, that is, an existent whose essence completely necessitates its existence, such that it is impossible for its existence to be separated from its essence. Such an existent has an essence, and an existence which is different from its essence. Moreover, in view of its essence, it is impossible for its existence to be separated from its essence. Nevertheless, it is possible to conceive of this separation and, although the thing conceived is impossible, its conception is possible. This is the status of the Necessary Existent according to the position of the vast majority of the theologians (jumhūr al-mutakallimīn).

[3] The highest grade is what exists by virtue of its essence with an existence that is identical with it, that is, an existent whose existence is identical with its essence. Such an existent does not have an existence that differs from its essence, nor is it possible to conceive of the separation of its existence from it. Indeed, the separation and the conception of separation are both impossible. Such is the status of the Necessary Existent according to the position of the philosophers (al-ḥukamā’).

[4] If you desire further elucidation of what we have set forth, you may seek clarification of this matter in the following example. The grades of a luminous object (al-mudi’) insofar as it is luminous are also three. The first is what is luminous by virtue of another (al-mudi’ bi-al-ghayr), that is, what receives its luminosity (dāw’) from something else, like the surface of the earth which is illumined when it faces the sun. In this case there is a luminous object, a luminosity which is different from that object, and a third thing which produces the luminosity.

[5] The second grade is what is luminous by virtue of its essence (al-mudi’ bi-al-dhāt) through a luminosity that is other than it, that is, something whose essence necessitates its luminosity in such a way that it cannot fail to appear. This is like the body of the sun on the assumption that it necessitates its luminosity, for this luminous object has an essence and a luminosity that is different from it.

[6] The third grade is what is luminous by virtue of its essence through a luminosity that is identical with it, like the luminosity of the sun, for it is luminous by virtue of its essence, rather than by virtue of a luminosity additional to its essence. This is the most exalted and most potent luminous object conceivable.

external world also exist in the thing itself, that is, in fact. Some things that exist in the mind, such as real concepts and true propositions and theories, also exist in fact as well as in the mind. Imaginary concepts and false propositions, however, exist only in the mind and never in fact. Further discussion of this subject may be found in Al-Ḥamadnārī, Ẓustūr al-‘Ulamā’, III, 370-372 (under al-mawjūd), and al-Tahhānawi, Kashshāf, pp. 1403-1404 (under nafs al-amr), and pp. 1456-1461 (under al-wujūd).

35 For the position of the theologians see, for example, al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-Maqaṣīd, I, 48-50, and al-Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-Mawāqif, II, 156-169.
[7] Should it be asked: How can luminosity be described as being luminous, since the meaning of what is luminous, as initially understood, is something in which luminosity subsists? We should answer: That is the meaning with which the common people are familiar and for which the word luminous was coined in the [Arabic] language. Our discussion is not concerned with that meaning, however. When we say that luminosity is luminous by virtue of its essence (al-đaw’ muḍa’ bi-dhāthihi) we do not mean by that that another luminosity subsists in it and that it becomes luminous by virtue of that luminosity. On the contrary what we mean by that is what can be attributed both to something which is luminous by virtue of another and to something which is luminous by virtue of its own essence, although by means of a luminosity that is other than its essence, namely, visibility (al-zuhūr) to the eyes due to the luminosity, can also be attributed to luminosity [as it is] in itself in accordance with its own essence rather than through something additional to its essence. Indeed, visibility in the case of luminosity is stronger and closer to perfection, for luminosity is visible in its essence with no [trace of] invisibility (khafā’) at all. Luminosity, moreover, also makes visible what is other than itself in accordance with the capacity of that other [to become visible].

[8] This is because if Its existence were additional to Its reality (ḥaqī-qah), it would be inherent (‘ārid) in it. It has been said that this is because of the impossibility of Its division (al-juz’īyah) since such division would imply composition (tarkīb) in the essence of the Necessary Existent. This calls for further discussion, however, for the composition which is impossible in the Necessary Existent is external composition, since it implies being in need in the external world, and that, in turn, implies contingency. As for mental composition with respect to the Necessary Existent, we do not admit its impossibility, because such composition does not imply being in need in the external world, but only in the mind, and being in need in the mind does not imply contingency, since the contingent is what is in need of what is other than itself for its external existence.

[9] And if it were inherent in it, [Its] existence, as it is in itself (min ḥayth huwa huwa), would be in need of something other than itself, that is, in need of what it inheres in (al-ma’rūd). It would then be contingent by virtue of its essence and dependent upon a cause (‘illah). It would therefore require an effector (mu’aththir), and if that effector were identical with the reality [of the Necessary Existent], that effector would have to exist before [its own] existence, since the cause which brings a thing into existence must precede its effect in existence. Indeed, as long as the intellect

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36 Al-Abharī’s argument in this and the following paragraph is similar to the argument given by Ibn Sīnā in several of his works. See al-Şīfa’, al-Ilahiyyat, pp. 344-347; al-Ishārāt wa-al-Ṭanbihāt, III, 30-40; Dānishnāmah, Ilahiyyat, pp. 76-77 (Morewedge trans. pp. 55-56); and al-Risālah al-‘Arshiyyah, p. 4 (Arberry trans. pp. 27-28).
37 That is, the essence of the Necessary Existent would be composed of a reality and of a separate existence which inhered in the reality as an accident.
38 Namely, the reality of the Necessary Existent.
(al-‘aql) is not cognizant that a thing exists, it is impossible for it to be cognizant of it as a source (mabda’) and bestower (mufid) of existence. And thus that thing would have to exist before itself, and that is impossible. If, on the other hand, the effector were something other than the quiddity (māhiyāh) [of the Necessary Existent], then the Necessary Existent by virtue of Its essence would be in need of what is other than Itself for Its existence, and that is impossible.

[10] The verifiers (al-muhāqqiqūn)39 said: “Existence, while identical with the Necessary Existent, nevertheless has expanded over the forms (hayākil) of existents and has become manifest in them. Thus there is nothing at all that is without it. Indeed, it is their reality (haqīqah) and identity (‘ayn), for they have been distinguished from each other and made multiple through qualifications and individualizations that exist only in the mind (taqayyudūt wa-ta‘ayyunūt i‘tibāriyah).”

Section [Three] On [the Proof] that [Its] Necessity of Existence (wujūb al-wujūd)40 as well as Its Individuation (ta‘ayyun) are Identical with Its Essence.

[1] Should it be asked:41 “How can the attribute of a thing be conceived as being identical with its reality when both the attribute (al-ṣifah) and what it qualifies (al-mawsūf) testify to their being different from each other?” I should answer: The meaning of their saying that the attributes of the Necessary Existent are identical with Its essence is that “what results from the essence of the Necessary Existent [alone] is what [in other cases] results from an essence and an attribute combined.”

[2] To explain how the Necessary Existent can be identical with [Its] knowledge (‘ilm) and power (qudrah) they said: “Your own essence [for example] is not sufficient to reveal (inkishāf) things and make them apparent (zuhūr) to you, for in order for things to be revealed and made apparent to you, you must have the attribute of knowledge subsisting in you. It is different in the case of the essence of the Necessary Existent, however, for It is not in need of an attribute subsisting in It in order for things to be revealed and made apparent to It. On the contrary all concepts (maḥfūmah) are revealed to It by reason of Its essence [alone], and in this regard Its essence is the reality of knowledge (haqīqat al-‘ilm). Such is also the case with respect to the power [of the Necessary Existent], for Its essence is effective in

39 According to Mir Hāshim, one of the glossators of al-Maybūdī’s commentary, these are the Şūfis. See the Tehran lithograph of 1331, p. 169. The passage which follows is quoted from al-Jurjānī’s Hāshiyat Sharḥ al-Tajrīd, fol. 63b, and represents the doctrine of the wujūd, or unity of existence, school of Şūfism founded by Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ʿArabī (died 638/1240). See Brockelmann, Geschichte, I, 571, Supplement I, 790. Another passage from the same work is quoted in section 6, paragraphs 5-6.

40 That is, the necessity of the existence of the Necessary Existent.

41 Most of this paragraph and the next are quoted from al-Jurjānī’s Sharḥ al-Mawāṣif, VIII, 47.
itself (mu’aththirah bi-dhātihā) rather than by means of an attribute additional to it, as is the case with our own essences. When regarded in this way the essence of the Necessary Existent is the reality of power (ḥaqqat al-qudrah), and accordingly the essence and attributes of the Necessary Existent are really (fi al-ḥaqqah) united, although they differ from each other in accordance with the manner in which they are regarded and understood (bi-al-i’tibār wa-al-mafhūm). Upon investigation, this [unity of essence and attributes] is based on (marjī’ahu) the denial of the Necessary Existent’s attributes along with [the affirmation of] the occurrence (ḥusūl) of their effects and fruits by virtue of Its essence alone.”

[3] As for the first42 it is because the necessity of existence, if it were additional to Its reality, would be an effect of Its essence (ma’lūl li-dhātihi), in accordance with what was said above.43 As long as the existence of a cause is not necessary, its existence is not possible, and consequently it is impossible for its effect to exist. And since that necessity [which is under consideration] is necessity by virtue of the essence (al-wujūb bi-al-dhāt), that necessity of existence by virtue of the essence would exist, necessarily, before itself, and that is impossible.

[4] As for the second it is because Its individuation, if it were additional to Its reality, would be an effect of Its essence, and as long as a cause is not individuated it does not exist and so cannot bring into existence its effect. Therefore Its individuation would be existent (ḥāṣil) before itself, and that is impossible.

Section [Four] On [the Proof] for the Oneness (tawḥīd) of the Necessary Existent.45

[1] If we suppose two necessarily existent beings (mawjūdayn wājibay al-wujūd), both would have necessity of existence (wujūb al-wujūd) in common but would differ with respect to something else. That which served to distinguish them from each other would either be the entire reality (ḥaqqah) or not be [the entire reality]. The first [alternative] is impossible because if the distinction were with respect to the entire reality, then necessity of existence, because it is common to both, would have to be external to the reality of both. That is impossible because, as we have explained,46 necessity of existence is identical to the reality of the Necessary Existent.

42 That is, the necessity of Its existence.
43 In paragraphs 8 and 9 of section 2, which deal with the question of whether existence is additional to the essence of the Necessary Existent.
45 The argument that follows is similar to the argument of Ibn Sīnā in al-Shifā’, al-Ilāhiyat, pp. 43, 349-354; Dānishnāmah, Ilāhiyat, pp. 75-76 (Morewedge trans. pp. 54-55); and al-Risālah al-‘Arshīyah, p. 3 (Arberry trans. pp. 25-26); and al-Najāh, pp. 230-231.
46 In section 3, paragraph 2 above.
[2] I say: Further discussion is called for here, because the meaning of their assertion that necessity of existence is identical with the reality of the Necessary Existent is that the effect of the attribute of necessity of existence (\( \text{athar \, sifat \, wujūb \, al-wujūd} \)) becomes manifest from that very reality, not that that reality is identical with that attribute.\(^{47}\) Therefore, what is meant by two necessarily existent beings having necessity of existence in common is merely that the effect of the attribute of necessity \([\text{of existence}]\) becomes manifest from each of them. Thus there is no inconsistency \([\text{munāfīh}]\) between their having necessity of existence in common and their being distinguished from each other with respect to the entire reality.

[3] The second \([\text{alternative}]\) is also impossible, because each one of them would then be composed of what they had in common and what served to distinguish them from one another, and, since everything that is composed is in need of something other than itself, that is, its two parts, each would therefore be contingent by virtue of its essence, and that is contrary \([\text{hādhā \, khulf}]\) \([\text{to what was assumed}]\). Here there is also room for discussion, since it was previously mentioned\(^{48}\) that the composition which implies contingency is external composition \([\text{al-tarkīb \, al-khārijī}]\) not mental \([\text{al-dhihnī}]\) \([\text{composition}]\). It has been objected: Why is it not possible for the distinction \([\text{between the two}]\) to be made by means of an accidental entity \([\text{amr \, 'ārid}]\) rather than by a constituent \([\text{muqawwim}]\) \([\text{of the essence}]\), so that composition would not be implied \([\text{in the essence}]\)? The reply has been that that requires that the individuation \([\text{of the Necessary Existent}]\) be accidental, and that is contrary to what has been established by demonstration.\(^{49}\) I say: It is possible to amend \([\text{tawjīh}]\) the author’s argument\(^{50}\) so that that \([\text{objection}]\) cannot be directed against it by saying: If what served to distinguish them from one another were not the entire reality, then it would either be a part of the reality or an accident of it. In either case each of the two \([\text{necessary existents}]\) would have to be composed. In the first case they would be composed of genus \([\text{jins}]\) and difference \([\text{fasl}]\), and in the second of reality \([\text{haqīqah}]\) and individuation \([\text{ta‘ayyun}]\).

[4] One might argue that what we have shown to the effect that the individuation of the Necessary Existent is identical with Its reality\(^{51}\) is sufficient to prove Its unity, because whenever individuation is identical with a quiddity \([\text{māhiyah}]\), the species \([\text{naw‘}]\) of that quiddity is necessarily restricted to a \([\text{single}]\) individual \([\text{shakhs}]\). I should reply: This calls for further discussion \([\text{fihi \, nazār}]\), because what is intended by this proof is to show that the Necessary Existent is a single reality \([\text{haqīqah \, wāḥidah}]\) whose individuation is identical with it. From what has been mentioned previously, however, that proof is not conclusive \([\text{thābit}]\) \([\text{for this purpose}]\) because

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\(^{47}\) See the quotation from al-Jurjānī in section 3, paragraphs 1 and 2.

\(^{48}\) In section 2, paragraph 8.

\(^{49}\) Namely, that the individuation of the Necessary Existent is identical with Its essence. See section 3, paragraph 4 above.

\(^{50}\) As given at the beginning of this paragraph.

\(^{51}\) In section 3, paragraph 4.
of the possibility of there being [a number of] different necessarily existent realities each one of which has an individuation identical with it. It is therefore necessary to provide a [separate] proof for the unity [of the Necessary Existent].

Section [Five] On [the Proof] that the Necessarily [Existent] by Virtue of Its Essence is Necessary in All of Its Aspects (jihāt), that is, It has no anticipated state not yet actualized (ḥālah muntazarah ghayr ḥāsilah).

[1] This is because Its essence (dhāt) is sufficient with respect to the attributes it possesses, and It is therefore necessary in all of Its aspects. We say that Its essence is sufficient with respect to the attributes It possesses only because, were it not sufficient, then some of Its attributes would be [derived] from another [being] and the presence, that is, existence, of that other [being] would be a cause (ʿillah) in general (fi al-jumlah) of that attribute’s existence, and its absence, that is, its non-existence, would be a cause of the attribute’s non-existence. If such were the case, Its essence, considered as it is in itself (min ḵayth hiya hiya), and unconditioned by the presence or absence of that other [being], would not be necessarily existent.

[2] This is because [if It were] necessarily existent, it would be so either with the existence (wujūd) of that attribute or with its non-existence (ʿadam). If It were necessarily existent with the existence of that attribute, Its existence, that is, the existence of the attribute, would not be because of the presence of another [being], because the attribute’s existence would [already] be established in the essence of the Necessary [Existent] as it is in itself without consideration of the presence of another [being]. If, on the other hand, It were necessarily existent with the non-existence of that attribute, the non-existence of the attribute would not be because of the absence of another [being], because the attribute’s non-existence would [already] be established in the essence of the Necessary [Existent] as it is in itself without consideration of the absence of another [being]. Here there is room for further discussion (ḥāhung bāth), however, since the non-existence of something does not follow simply from its not being taken into consideration.

[3] Thus if it, that is, the essence of the Necessary [Existent], were not necessarily existent unconditionally (bilā shart), then the Necessarily [Existent] by virtue of Its essence would not be necessarily [existent] by virtue of Its essence, and that is absurd (ḥādhā khulf). This [argument] can be refuted, however, by [applying it to] the relations [of the Necessary Existent], since it is applicable to such relations also, even though the essence of the Necessary

52 Ibn Sinā’s arguments for this proposition may be found in Dānishnāmah, Ilāhī-yāt, p. 76 (Morewedge trans. pp. 55-56); al-Najāh, pp. 228-229; and al-Risālah al-ʿArshiyyah, p. 5 (Arberry trans. pp. 28-29).
53 Contrary to what was stated in paragraph 1 above.
54 Again, contrary to what was stated in paragraph 1 above.
55 As stated in the last sentence in paragraph 1 above.
[Existent] is not sufficient to bring them into existence, for they depend necessarily on matters which are separate and distinct from Its essence.

[4] It has been said that the best way of proving this point is to say: Everything which is possible \((\text{mumkin})\) for the Necessary [Existent] in the way of attributes is necessitated by Its essence \((\text{yuji} \text{b} \text{u} \text{h} \text{u} \text{d} \text{h} \text{a} \text{t} \text{u} \text{h} \text{u})\). Everything which is necessitated by Its essence is necessarily actualized \((\text{wajib al-\hsuul})\).\(^{56}\) As for the major premiss, it is obvious. As for the minor premiss, it is true because if it were not, then the necessity of existence of some of the attributes would be by virtue of something other than the essence. And if that other were necessary by virtue of its essence, what is necessarily existent would be more than one.

[5] On the other hand, if that other were contingent, either it would be necessitated by the essence, in which case the essence would be the necessitator of those attributes we had assumed it did not necessitate, since the necessitator of a necessitator is also a necessitator, or that other would not be [necessitated by the essence], in which case it would be necessitated by some second necessitator \((\text{mujib thani})\), and the argument would be transferred to it. Either the chain of necessitators would regress to infinity, or else it would end with a necessitator necessitated by the essence, and that would be in contradiction to what had been assumed. The gist of this \((\text{al-\hsa} \text{\s} \text{il})\) is that if the essence did not necessitate all of the attributes, then one of these impossibilities would result: either the multiplicity of the Necessary [Existent] \((\text{ta\textacute{a}ddud al-wajib})\),\(^{57}\) or an infinite regress \((\text{al-tasalsul})\), or the contradiction of what had been assumed \((\text{khilaf al-maf\r{u}d})\).\(^{58}\) Therefore the essence \([\text{of the Necessary Existent}]\) is the necessitator of all Its attributes, and the question is proven. I say: There is room here for further discussion, for if this were the case, then every contingent would exist from eternity \((\text{qadim\textacute{a}n})\) regardless of whether it was an attribute of the Necessary [Existent] or not.

Section [Six] on [the Proof] that the Necessarily [Existent] by Virtue of Its Essence does not Share Its Existence with Contingents. That is, absolute existence \((\text{al-wujud al-muflaq})\) is not a specific nature \((\text{\tib\textacute{a}h naw\textacute{a}yah})\) both for an existence which is identical with the Necessary [Existent] as well as for the existences of contingent beings \((\text{wujud\textacute{a}t al-mumkinat})\).\(^{59}\) On the contrary absolute existence is predicated accidentally \((\text{gawlan ara\textacute{d}yyan})\) of contingents by analogy \((\text{bi-al-tashkik})\).\(^{60}\)

[1] This is because if It shared Its existence with contingents in the way mentioned, then absolute existence as it is in itself would be either

\(^{56}\) And therefore, everything which is possible for the Necessary [Existent] is necessarily actualized.

\(^{57}\) As shown above in paragraph 4.

\(^{58}\) As shown above in the previous sentence.

\(^{59}\) That is, absolute existence is not a class which includes both the existence of the Necessary Existent as well as the individual existences of contingent beings.

\(^{60}\) Rather than univocally.
necessarily independent (al-tajarrud) of quiddities,\textsuperscript{61} or necessarily not independent (al-lā-tajarrud) [of quiddities],\textsuperscript{62} or neither the one nor the other, and all three are impossible.

[2] If it were necessarily independent, then the existence[s] of all contingents would have to be independent of, rather than inherent in, quiddities, because what is required by a specific nature (muqtadā al-tabi‘ah al-nawrīyah) does not differ [from one instance of the species to another]. This\textsuperscript{63} is impossible because we can conceive of a seven-sided figure (al-musabba‘)\textsuperscript{64} while doubting its external existence.\textsuperscript{65} It would be appropriate to drop this restriction [to external existence] since the discussion is concerned with absolute existence, which includes both mental (dhihnī) and external (khārijī) existence. Thus if its existence were the same as its reality (ḥaqiqah) or a part of it,\textsuperscript{66} then a single thing would at the same time (fī ḥālah wāḥidah) be both known and unknown,\textsuperscript{67} and that is impossible.

[3] It would be more appropriate to say: because we can conceive of a seven-sided figure and be unaware of its existence. Thus if its existence were the same as its reality or a part of it, then a single thing would at the same time be both known and unknown. Or one could say: because we can conceive of a seven-sided figure while doubting its existence. Thus if its existence were the same as its reality, doubt would not be possible, since it is evident (bayyin) that a thing can [always] be predicated of itself. The case would be similar if existence were an essential attribute (dhātī) of its reality, because it is evident that an essential attribute can [always] be predicated of that [reality] of which it is an essential attribute. You are aware, of course, that all of this can only be the case if the quiddity is conceived in its true essence (bi-al-kunh).

[4] If, on the other hand, absolute existence were necessarily not independent [of quiddities], then the existence of the Creator (wujūd al-Bārī) would not be independent (mujarrad) [of a quiddity], which is absurd (ḥādhā khulf). If it were neither necessarily independent nor necessar-

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\textsuperscript{61} Like the existence of the Necessary Existent, whose existence does not inhere in Its reality or quiddity but is the same as Its reality.

\textsuperscript{62} Like the existences of contingent beings, whose existences inhere in quiddities.

\textsuperscript{63} That is, that the existences of all contingents would have to be independent of quiddities.

\textsuperscript{64} According to the commentary of Şadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī what is meant is a solid figure enclosed by seven equal plane surfaces (al-jism al-muhāṭ bi-sab‘at sutūh mustasāwiyyah), i.e., a heptahedron. See p. 300 of his Sharḥ Ḥidāyat al-Hikmah.

\textsuperscript{65} And we can therefore infer that its existence inhere in its quiddity and is not independent of it.

\textsuperscript{66} That is, independent rather than inherent in its reality.

\textsuperscript{67} That is, if the quiddity of the seven-sided figure were the same as its existence, and the quiddity were known, but its existence were unknown, then a single thing (the quiddity and its existence) would be both known and unknown.
ily not independent, then it would be possible for it to be either one or the other, by virtue of a cause. In that case the Necessary Existent would be in need of what is other than Itself for Its independence, and Its essence (dhāt) would not be sufficient [in causing] what It has in the way of attributes. That is absurd (hādhā khulf). This is what people are currently saying on this topic.

[5] One of the verifiers (ba’ād al-muḥaqiqīn) has said:68 “Every concept (maḥhūm) which is other than existence, as, for example, the concept humanity, does not exist at all in fact (fi ṉafṣ al-amr)69 as long as existence has not been conjoined with it in some way. Moreover, as long as the mind has not observed that existence has been conjoined with it, it cannot make the judgement that it exists. Thus every concept other than existence is in need of what is other than itself, namely, existence, in order to exist in fact. And everything which is in need of what is other than itself in order to exist is contingent, for there is no meaning to contingent except that which is in need of what is other than itself in order to exist. Thus, every concept which is other than existence is contingent, and nothing that is contingent is necessary. It follows that no concepts which are other than existence are necessary.

[6] “It has been demonstrated, moreover, that the Necessary [Existent] exists. It cannot but be identical with that existence that exists by virtue of its own essence rather than by virtue of something that is other than its essence. Moreover, since it is necessary that the Necessary [Existent] be a real and self-subsistent particular (juz’ī ḥaqiqī qā’im bi-dhātihi) and that Its individuation (taʿayyun) be by virtue of Its essence not by virtue of something additional to Its essence, it is necessary that existence also be like that, since existence is identical with the Necessary Existent. Therefore, existence is not a universal concept (maḥhūm kulli) comprising individuals (afrād). On the contrary, it is in itself (fi ḥadd dhātihi) a real particular with no possibility of becoming multiple or of being divided. It is self-subsistent and free (munażzah) from being inherent in what is other than it. Therefore, the Necessary [Existent] is Absolute Existence (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq), that is, existence free (muʿarrā) of any limitation (taqqūd) by, or conjunction (indimām) with, what is other than It.

[7] “On the basis of the foregoing, one cannot conceive of existence as inhering in contingent quiddities (al-maḥīyah al-mumkinah). What is meant by a contingent quiddity’s being existent is merely that it has a special relation (nisbah makhsūṣah) to the Presence of the Self-Subsistent Existence (ḥadrat al-wujūd al-

68 This and the following two paragraphs are quoted from al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī’s Ḥāshiyat Sharḥ al-Taǧrīd, fols. 62b-63a. Like the passage quoted previously from al-Jurjānī in section 2, paragraph 10, this passage represents the doctrine of the waḥdat al-wujūd school of Sufism. The passage is quoted in a number of other works as well. See, for example, al-Qūshjī, Sharḥ al-Taǧrīd, p. 61; Rāghib Bāshā, al-Lumʿah, pp. 11-12; al-Āḥmadnagarī, Dustūr al-ʿUlamāʾ, III, 443-444 (under al-wujūd).
69 See note 34 above.
qā‘im bi-dhātihi). This relation has different aspects and various modes whose quiddities are difficult to detect. Thus what exists (al-mawjūd) is universal (kullī) even though existence (al-wujūd) is particular and real (już‘ī ḥaqiqī).” A certain learned man said: We used to hear him say that this was the doctrine of the verifying philosophers (al-ḥukamā’ al-muḥāqqiqīn), the earlier ones as well as the later.

APPENDIX

TRANSLATION OF AL-ABHARĪ’S ORIGINAL TEXT

Chapter Two on Knowledge of the Creator (al-Ṣā’īnī) and His Attributes: This chapter contains ten sections.


The Necessarily [Existent] by virtue of Its essence, if considered as It is in Itself (min ḥayth huwa huwa), is that which does not accept non-existence (al-‘adam). In proof of this (burhānuhu) one may say that if there were not in existence an existent which was necessary by virtue of its essence, then an impossibility would result. This is because all existents would then constitute a totality (jumlah) made up of individuals (ahād) each one of which would be contingent by virtue of its essence (mumkin li-dhātihi). Therefore it would need an external cause to bring it into existence (‘illah muṣjudah khārijāyah). And the knowledge of this is self-evident (badihi). Moreover, an existent which was external to all contingents would be necessary by virtue of its essence. Thus, the existence of what is necessarily existent (wājib al-wujūd) follows from the assumption of its non-existence, and that is impossible.

Section [Two] On [the Proof] that the Necessary Existent’s Existence is the Same as Its Reality (ḥaqiqah).

This is because if Its existence were additional to Its reality (ḥaqiqah), it would be inherent (‘ārid) in it. And if it were inherent in it, [Its] existence, as it is in itself (min ḥayth huwa huwa), would be in need of something other than itself. It would then be contingent by virtue of its essence and dependent upon a cause (‘illah). It would therefore require an effector (mu’aththir), and if that effector were identical with the reality [of the Necessary Existent], that effector would have to exist before [its own] existence, since the cause which brings a thing into existence must precede its effect in existence. And thus that thing would have to exist before itself, and that is impossible. If, on the other hand, the effector were something other than the quiddity (māḥīyah) [of the Necessary Existent], then the Necessary Existent by virtue of Its essence would be in need of what is other than Itself for Its existence, and that is impossible.

Section [Three] On [the Proof] that [Its] Necessity of Existence (wujūb al-wujūd) as well as Its Individuation (ta’ayyun) are Identical with Its Essence.

As for the first it is because the necessity of existence, if it were additional to Its reality, would be an effect of Its essence (ma‘lūd li-dhātihi). As long as the existence
of a cause is not necessary, it is impossible for its effect to exist. And since that necessity [which is under consideration] is necessity by virtue of the essence (al-wujūb bi-al-dhāt), that necessity of existence by virtue of the essence would exist before itself, and that is impossible. As for the second it is because Its individuation, if it were additional to Its reality, would be an effect of Its essence, and as long as a cause is not individuated it does not exist and so cannot bring into existence its effect. Therefore Its individuation would be existent (hāsil) before itself, and that is impossible.

Section [Four] On [the Proof] for the Oneness (tawḥīd) of the Necessary Existent.

If we suppose two necessarily existent beings (mawjūdayn wājibay al-wujūd), both would have necessity of existence (wujūb al-wujūd) in common but would differ with respect to something else. That which served to distinguish them from each other would either be the entire reality (ḥaqiqah) or not be [the entire reality]. The first [alternative] is impossible because if the distinction were with respect to the entire reality, then necessity of existence would have to be external to the reality of both. That is impossible because, as we have explained, necessity of existence is identical to the reality of the Necessary Existent. The second [alternative] is also impossible, because each one of them would then be composed of what they had in common and what served to distinguish them from one another, and, since everything that is composed is in need of something other than itself, each would therefore be contingent by virtue of its essence, and that is contrary (ḥāḍhā khulf) [to what was assumed].

Section [Five] On [the Proof] that the Necessarily [Existent] by Virtue of Its Essence is Necessary in All of Its Aspects (jihāt).

This is because Its essence (dhāt) is sufficient with respect to the attributes it possesses, and It is therefore necessary in all of Its aspects. We say that Its essence is sufficient with respect to the attributes It possesses only because, were it not sufficient, then some of Its attributes would be [derived] from another [being] and the presence of that other [being] would be a cause (ʿillah) in general (fī al-jumlah) of that attribute’s existence, and its absence would be a cause of the attribute’s non-existence. If such were the case, Its essence, considered as it is in itself (min ḥayth hiya hiya) would not be necessarily existent.

This is because [if It were] necessarily existent, it would be so either with the existence (wujūd) of that attribute or with its non-existence (ʿadam). If It were necessarily existent with the existence of that attribute, its existence would not be because of the presence of another [being]. If, on the other hand, It were necessarily existent with the non-existence of that attribute, the non-existence of the attribute would not be because of the absence of another [being]. Thus, if it were not necessarily existent unconditionally (bilā shart), then the Necessarily [Existent] by virtue of Its essence would not be necessarily [existent] by virtue of Its essence, and that is absurd (ḥāḍhā khulf).

Section [Six] on [the Proof] that the Necessarily [Existent] by Virtue of Its Essence does not Share Its Existence with Contingents.
This is because if It shared Its existence with contingents, then existence as it is in itself would be either necessarily independent (al-tajarrud) or necessarily not independent (al-l¯a-tajarrud) [of quiddities], or neither the one nor the other, and all three are impossible. If it were necessarily independent, then the existence[s] of all contingents would have to be independent of, rather than inherent in, quiddities. This is impossible because we can conceive of a seven-sided figure (al-musabba’) while doubting its external existence. Thus if its existence were the same as its reality (haqīqah) or a part of it, then a single thing would at the same time (fi ḥalāh wāhidah) be both known and unknown, and that is impossible.

If, on the other hand, absolute existence were necessarily not independent [of quiddities], then the existence of the Creator (wujūd al-B¯arı) would not be independent (mujarrad) [of a quiddity], which is absurd (ḥadhā khulf). If it were neither necessarily independent nor necessarily not independent, then it would be possible for it to be either one or the other, but by virtue of a cause. In that case the Necessary Existent would be in need of what is other than Itself for Its independence, and Its essence (dh¯at) would not be sufficient [in causing] what It has in the way of attributes. That is absurd (ḥadhā khulf).

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