Study Questions for RELIG 428, Winter 2000

1. In Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, H. Richard Niebuhr contrasts monotheism with henotheism, and he associates the former with what he calls "radical faith." What are the characteristics of this type of faith, and how does it both resemble and differ from the type of faith that expresses itself in henotheism and polytheism?
2. Niebuhr speaks of revelation as "moments in which ultimate reality made itself known as faithful self." He also speaks of it as "those events in which radical faith was elicited." What does he mean by this and what implications does he draw from this idea for the possibility of developing authentic selfhood in the person of faith. Why does he speak in this connection of "reasoning faith"?
3. Of the authors we have read this quarter, the two who talk about the relation between religion and science are Niebuhr and Tracy. Both think that religion, when it is conceived at its best according to their theologies, is not only not in conflict with science but even gives expression to something that science itself needs for its own fulfillment. How do they approach this topic? In what ways do they think religion can complement science?
4. Tracy divides theology into three principal categories: fundamental, systematic, and practical. What are the characteristics of each? What audiences do they primarily address? What types of language do they primarily use? Why do they use these languages. What does he mean by dialectical language, and why is that the language of systematic theology? What does the dialectical character of systematic theology demand in the way of hermeneutical styles?
5. Tracy distinguishes within systematic theology between three subtypes: theologies of manifestation, of proclamation (or "the word"), and of historical action. What characterizes each of these? How do they relate to one another?
6. Teilhard says that "nothing here below is profane for one who knows how to see." Bultmann says, with clear approval, "Luther has taught us that there are no holy places in the world, that the world as a whole is indeed a profane place." These statements seems to conflict. But is that the whole story? Is there a larger perspective in which both might be seen to express some core meaning of the Christian faith? How would you relate Teilhard and Bultmann to Tracy’s schema of types of theology? How does this statement of Teilhard’s relate to the central ideas of his theology about creation, incarnation, and redemption?
7. Teilhard seems rather optimistic as Christian thinkers go, but he also has a theology of the cross, and although he says that an exaggerated idea of original sin leads to pessimism, he also has ideas of his own about original sin and takes sin seriously. What does he think sin is, and where does he think it comes from? What does the cross represent in his thought, and how does it relate to our "divinization"?
8. Tracy associates eschatology with the style of theology that focuses on historical action. What is the connection between them in his thought? How would you relate the eschatological aspect of some of the other theologians we have read to that classification of Tracy’s. Are there ways that other theologians who talk about eschatology do so in ways that might fit better into one of his other types (and what are those)?
9. When we began the course we saw Borg talking about "supernatural theism" and "panentheism" as two fundamental options in theology. How would you relate the thinkers we have read since the mid-term to that classification scheme? We also saw how Teilhard was very careful to make clear that he was not a pantheist (even if he might be a panentheist)? Where in Tracy do you find him addressing the same issue, even if in rather different language (such as the language of participation)?
10. We talked repeatedly about the ways in which Tracy draws on Lonergan’s cognitional theory. Go back over the selections from Lonergan and make sure you understand clearly how that theory works and what its implications are not only for cognition but also for the fourth level of intentionality. In what ways could Lonergan be said to be not only a theorist of cognition but also an existential thinker who would have something in common with an existentialist theologian like Bultmann? How does Tracy’s thought relate to the existential element in Lonergan? What are the various ways in which the basic structure of his thought correlates with the structure of intentional consciousness as analyzed by Lonergan.