Kirill Aleksandrovich Kochegarov published a substantial monograph several years ago, which is one of the best recent works pertaining to foreign relations in Eastern Europe in the late 17th century: *Rech’ Pospolitaia i Rossiia v 1680-1686 godakh. Zakluchenie dogovora o vechnom mire* (Moskva: Indrik, 2008). His new, more modest volume is equally impressive for its careful use of primary sources, including much previously untapped archival material. While its scope may seem limited, in fact the subject touches on a lot of very interesting larger issues.

Hetman Ivan Samoilovych of the Zaporozhian Cossacks enjoyed an unusually long tenure of some 15 years before being deposed following the failure of the first Muscovite Crimean campaign in 1687 and ending his days in Siberian exile. In the contentious historiography regarding Moscovy’s relations with Ukraine following 1654, Samoilovych occupies a significant place. Kochegarov acknowledges at the outset the disputes over how we might interpret that larger political history, but makes clear that his focus here, while not pretending to overturn some of the conventional wisdom about the degree or desirability of Muscovite control over Ukrainian affairs is rather intended to show how in certain matters, important initiatives might come from both sides, and certain developments might reflect mutual agreement (and, as it turns out, even Muscovite acceptance of Ukrainian wishes).

The subject here is the way in which marital alliances might contribute to the strengthening of political ties, at the same time that, as Kochegarov argues, the results of those alliances might have ended up backfiring on their initiators. Samoilovych’s marital alliances have not been totally ignored (and not fully accurately reported) in the older literature — 19th-century historians such as Kostomarov, Bantysh-Kamenskii and Solov’ev all contributed material on one or another aspect of them. Citing with approval (via Russian translations) Paul Bushkovitch’s work on Russo-Ukrainian relations and on the elites of the Petrine era, Kochegarov indicates that indeed it is time to provide a full analysis of Samoilovych’s marriage politics, something that must be done largely from the as yet unpublished materials of the *Malorossiiskie dela* (RGADA, f. 124) and the documents of the *Malorossiiskii prikaz* (RGADA, f. 229). He also uses, of course, the older source publications and, of some interest, incorporates important evidence from Patrick Gordon’s diary, a part of which covers the years of concern here, when Gordon was stationed in Kiev.
While the fuller pattern of intermarriage and integration between Russian and Ukrainian elites would occur only in the 18th century, there were important developments earlier. Back in 1665, Hetman Ivan Martynovych Briukhovetskyi married a member of a Muscovite noble family, a stepdaughter of Prince D. A. Dolgorukii (p. 4). One of the daughters born of that union apparently married Samoilovich’s son Hrihorii. The son of an ordinary priest, Ivan Samoilovych seems to have been especially concerned to solidify his political position and prestige through contracting prestigious marriage alliances for his children. The central episode in this involved his plans for his daughter Praskov’ia. His strategy in part involved the threat (as it were) of a Polish marriage for her, which then helped him gain support in Moscow for a Muscovite marriage to Fedor Petrovich Sheremetev, son of Petr Borisovich Bol’shoi Sheremetev, head of one of the most distinguished old Russian noble clans. First to gain approval in Moscow for the marriage and then to ensure that the newlyweds would be properly positioned in society, Samoilovych engaged in a vigorous campaign of both official petitions and private communication with key members of Muscovite ruling circles, most prominently in the aftermath of the events of 1682, with Vasiliy Vasil’evich Golitsyn. Involved here are interesting issues about the ways in which the court politics in Moscow between the Naryshkins and the Miloslavskiis were carefully assessed and exploited. To consent to Samoilovych’s importunate demands was in the interests of Muscovite policy in Ukraine.

Even before the marriage took place in November 1682, Samoilovych was pressing for the elevation of the young Sheremetev (up to that point not distinguished in his career) in prestige and responsibilities. Part of the strategy was to have him appointed to a post in Moscow close to the court, rather than off in Ukraine. Samoilovych provided the young couple with funds to help purchase a house in Moscow and also successfully petitioned that he be granted a very substantial estate in one of the border regions between Muscovy and Ukraine. Overnight he thus became one of the richer members of the Muscovite elite. Since such land grants by the government involved often contentious issues of conflicting claims by the previous holders, Samoilovych pressed hard to have the Muscovite government support Sheremetev’s claims against other plaintiffs, among them Cossacks. Both in the initial dowry and then subsequently, Samoilovych showered costly gifts on his daughter. He then engineered the young Sheremetev’s appointment as the Muscovite military governor in Kiev, in the process stepping on the toes of the incumbent voevoda Aleksei Petrovich Saltykov, who was related by marriage to the late Tsar Fedor Alekseevich but who was unceremoniously removed.

The story does not leave us with the impression Samoilovych did any of this out of love for his daughter. When she died soon after the birth of her first child in March of 1685, on the day after her funeral, Ivan Mazepa and one of his brothers (both ostensibly trusted subordinates of Samoilovych’s) appeared on Sheremetev’s doorstep to demand the return of Praskov’ia’s dowry. The Sheremetev connection could no longer be of any value for the hetman, and he began to turn his attention to other options for concluding favorable marriages for his children. In particular, the marriage of his younger daughter Anastasiia to Iurii Andreevich Sviatopolch-Chertvertinskii, the nephew of the Metropolitan of Kiev, now came to the fore. An alliance with Sviatopolch-Chertvertinskii had earlier been considered for Praskov’ia, but rejected, since Iurii Andreevich at that time was still resident across the border in Poland and in any event would have to convert to Orthodoxy before the marriage to Anastasiia would be concluded.
In the long run, these marriage alliances seem to have failed in their intent of advancing Samoilovich’s political ambitions. In the wake of the disaster of the Crimean campaign, V. V. Golitsyn, at one time his strong supporter, seems to have been glad to back the Cossack coup against Samoilovych (who presumably was a scapegoat for the military catastrophe).

There is a lot more here in the details about Samoilovych’s demands, the way they were communicated, and the responses to them. The case study of the dispute over the lands granted F. P. Sheremetev offers interesting information about the problems that were arising more broadly in the government’s assignment of estates in the south. Kochegarov’s appendices include a few of the key documents regarding the negotiations and the land grant, as well as the inventories of the late Praskov’ia’s possessions which Samoilovych demanded be returned (notes conveniently provide the Russian equivalents for some of the descriptive terms). Detailed notes are at the end of each chapter (but, alas, there is no bibliography), there is an index of personal names, and the front end paper reproduces in color the map of Samoilovych’s estate village of Novoselka drawn in 1685.

I would note in conclusion that Kochegarov was one of the two reviewers (the other was D. V. Liseitsev, who has written extensively on the Posol’skii prikaz) for the publication of the diplomatic files about Muscovy and Brandenburg-Prussia, concerning which I posted a review notice a few days ago. Clearly he seems to be considered one of the most prominent experts now on Muscovite foreign relations, an assessment which both the book under review here and his earlier volume substantiate.