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| Key Soviet DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES |
| Suppress personal consumption | |
| Exceedingly low discount rate | |
| –>High rates of savings | |
| Structural disequilibrium between producer and consumer goods | |
| OVERALL: input infusion approach | |
| Òextensive growthÕ versus Òintensive growthÓ | |
| During 1960s growth rates (~7%/yr after WWII) starts to decline, still remains above 5% | |
| By end of 1970s into Gorbachev era, stagnates 2% down to 0% |
| Geographical Components of Soviet Industrialization Location Policy |
| Size, quality, and location of resource deposits place significant geographical constraint on Soviet industrial location policy | |
| Enormous physical size | |
| Harsh climate & Locational mismatch between people & resources | |
| Industrial location policy more flexible than agriculture |
| 3 major (spatial) investment questions |
| 1) allocation of income between consumption and investment | ||
| Marx says ÒmaximizeÓ investment | ||
| Strict political and command economy allows for this | ||
| 2) sectoral division | ||
| Marx - stresses industrial producer goods as opposed to consumer goods | ||
| 3) spatial allocation of investment funds | ||
| Nothing comparable to Western location theory | ||
| Location Policy under Stalin |
| Two periods 1920s to mid-1950s | |||
| Post-Stalin era | |||
| Under Stalin politics rather than economic calculations dominate | |||
| Under Stalin - general trends | |||
| Move labor eastward toward resources | |||
| Location resource processing at raw material sites reduced transport needs | |||
| Economic goal of regional self-sufficiency | |||
| Pre-Revolutionary pattern labeled as exploitative –> moving resources to population | |||
| Location at Raw material sites considered ideologically purer | |||
| Industrializing remote areas/minority areas –> give sense of pride and achievement and gain loyalty for Soviets | |||
| Strategic Òbeyond the UralsÓ locations - win-win military and resource locations | |||
| More dispersed pattern of industry, more secure militarily | |||
| 3 major Soviet Locational policy contradictions |
| 1) goals of regional autarky and regional specialization were in opposition | |
| 2) Soviet proclivity for large-scale enterprises conflicted with the goal of minimizing the use of transportation facilities | |
| 3) general geographic distribution of raw materials and energy on one hand and laborers and consumers on the other often produced a conflict between raw material sites and market-oriented locations for manufacturing industries | |
| (high priority on military) |
| Achievements of Ògoing eastÓ |
| Ural-Kuznets Combine (1900 km) rail trip | |
| Novokuznetsk in Kuzbas and Magnitogorsk in Urals (later Karaganda (Qaraghandy) | |
| German invasion in June 1941 –>Ex post facto rationalization for eastward push | |
| 1300 factories moved to Urals, Central Asia, and Siberia | |
| Industrial relocations results in 3x to 4x increase in industrial output in Siberia, Urals, Volga valley |
| More about the infamous ÒPLANSÓ |
| Rapid industrial progress in first two 5-year plans | |
| (1928-1932) (1933-1937) | |
| Favor large factories, economies of scale - ÓgigantomaniaÓ | |
| Places strain on transport | |
| Leads to regional specialization | |
| War disrupts 3rd 5-yr plan (1938-1942), but more emphasis on regional planning versus sectoral planning | |
| New stress on regional autarky - to minimize transport burden and threat of military defeat | |
| Fourth 5-yr plan (1946-1950) rapid, successful war reconstruction, 60% of industrial plant had been destroyed | |
| Issues of war reparations from East Germany, Poland, Manchuria |
| Attempts at Spatial Profitability (khozraschyot) |
| Growing awareness of opportunity costs | |
| Comparative advantage | |
| Revivial of cost consciousness in 1950s | |
| Post-Stalinist policy | |
| Minimize total production costs | |
| Goal of spatially uniform development takes back seat | |
| High labor and infrastructural costs in east leads to 2 decades to concentrate labor-intensive activities in west, and energy intensive activities in east | |
| Growth Poles - TPK - territorial production complexes | |
| Linkages - ferrous metallurgy/machine building, petrochemical | |
| Encounter Herschmann curve issue |
| Backward bending labor supply curves for Siberia |
| West-Soviet Locational policy differences |
| 1) tempo of development | |
| 2) sectoral priorities | |
| 3) human sacrifice | |
| 4) degree of political control over development | |
| Soviets retreat from spatially uniform development doctrine | |
| Soviets manipulated wages, prices, & infrastructure investment to reduce inherited regional inequalities in terms of real per capita income, education, and health care | |
| Strength of Siberia lobby |
| 5 of 11 TPKs selected for priority development during 11th 5-yr Plan (1981-1985) located in Siberia, 4 in Central Asia, only 2 in European part of USSR, ex.: | |
| BAM - Baykal-Amur Mainline rail project | |
| KMA - Kursk magnetic anomally | |
| Karatau-Dzhambul industrial chemicals, 8 TPK were energy projects, |