

Reading Schedule: Philosophy 450 (Epistemology)

DATE	TOPIC	ASSIGNED READINGS
Mon. 1/5	The Analysis of Knowledge	1. Feldman, <i>Epistemology</i>, Chap. 1-2 2. Nagel, <i>Knowledge</i>, p. 48-62
Wed. 1/7	Gettier Problems	1. Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" 2. Clark, "Knowledge and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier's Paper" 3. Schaffner et al., <i>Introduction to the Philosophy of Science</i>, p. 10-12, §1.5 4. Harrell, <i>What Is the Argument?</i>, Chap. 2-3
Mon. 1/12	The Causal Theory	1. Ichikawa and Steup, <i>The Analysis of Knowledge</i>, Sections 3, 4, and 6 2. A. I. Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowing"
Wed. 1/14	Sensitivity Principle	1. Instructor's notes on logical terminology 2. Nozick, "Knowledge and Skepticism", p. 255-262 3. Dretske, "Epistemic operators", p. 1007-1010
Mon. 1/19	MLK Day	No Class
Wed. 1/21	Safety Condition	1. Pritchard, "Anti-luck epistemology" 2. Sosa, "How to Defeat Opposition to Moore"
Mon. 1/26	Reliabilism	1. A. Goldman and Beddor, "Reliabilist Epistemology" 2. Roush, <i>Tracking truth</i>, Chapter 2.
Wed. 1/28	Anti-Luck Statistics	1. Fletcher and Mayo-Wilson, "Evidence in Classical Statistics", 2. Fillmore-Patrick, "Reliabilism and Frequentist Hypothesis Testing" 3. Recommended: Mayo-Wilson, "Epistemic Closure in Science",
Mon.. 2/2	Inductive Skepticism 1	1. Hume, <i>An enquiry concerning human understanding</i>, p. 96-100, 108-118 2. Schaffner et al., <i>Introduction to the Philosophy of Science</i>, pp. 55-58.
Wed. 2/4	Inductive Skepticism 2	1. Feldman, <i>Epistemology</i>, Chap. 7, pp. 130-141 2. Weatherson, <i>Lecture Notes on Knowledge</i>, Chap. 4 & 9 3. Skyrms, <i>Choice and Chance</i>, Chap. 4

Mon. 2/9	Solutions 1	1. Feldman, <i>Epistemology</i> , Chap. 7, pp. 141-152 2. Douven, “Abduction”, §1-2
Wed. 2/11	Solutions 2	Cleve, “Reliability, justification, and the problem of induction”
Mon 2/16	President’s Day	No class
Wed. 2/18	Solutions 3	Okasha, “Does Hume’s Argument Against Induction Rest on a Quantifier-Shift Fallacy?”
Mon. 2/23	Mathematical Knowledge	Benacerraf, “Mathematical truth”
Wed. 2/25	Moral Knowledge	Street, “A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value”
Mon. 3/2	Reliability Challenges	Clarke-Doane, “What is the Benacerraf problem?”
Wed. 3/4	Moral Knowledge 2	McGrath, “Moral knowledge by perception”
Mon. 3/9	Moral Knowledge 3	McGrath, “Moral knowledge and experience”
Wed. 3/11	The Mathematics Morality Analogy	Clarke-Doane, “The ethics–mathematics analogy”

References

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- [3] J. Clarke-Doane. “What is the Benacerraf problem?” In: *Truth, objects, infinity*. Springer, 2016, pp. 17–43.
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- [16] J. J. Ichikawa and M. Steup. *The Analysis of Knowledge*. Ed. by E. N. Zalta. 2017. URL: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/knowledge-analysis/>.
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