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Series Editors
Douglas J. Besharov
Neil Gilbert

United in Diversity?
Comparing Social Models in Europe and America
Edited by
Jens Alber and Neil Gilbert

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NEIL GILBERT
IMMIGRATION AND NATIVISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE: DEMOGRAPHY AND GLOBALIZATION VERSUS THE NATION-STATE

CHARLES HIRSCHMAN AND ANTHONY DANIEL PEREZ

In this chapter, we review the immigration history of the United States as an illustration of the tensions between national identity and international migration. At various points throughout American history, there have been efforts to limit immigration in order to retain the historical national identity of the country. But the volume and diversity of this effort eventually led to an assimilationist and subsequently to a pluralist definition of American identity.

The ideal of the nation-state, with every people (nation) having a homeland, is a modern concept that only began to take root in Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Moreover, the highly regulated borders between countries and the routine inspection of passports for international migration are modern phenomena (Torpey 2000: 7). Although nation-states create strong popular bonds of attachment and have almost unquestioned legitimacy in the modern world, the distribution of peoples is only imperfectly aligned with state boundaries. This creates an inevitable division between insiders—those to whom the state belongs—and outsiders—minorities who do not belong to the nation. Some minorities are indigenous with ancestral ties to the national territory, but their political and social status is typically marginalized by the official nationalist ideology. Other minorities are recent immigrants and the descendants of immigrants. In some nation-states, immigrants and their descendents are considered to be permanent outsiders or sojourners regardless of generations of residence. In other societies, the descendents of immigrants...
can become insiders, but only through acculturation and assimilation to the
dominant nation. A third alternative is pluralism, which allows for cultural
diversity within a framework of common citizenship and equal rights.

After a brief historical review of the political, economic, and demographic
forces that have shaped long distance migration to empires and nation-states,
we consider the evolution of national identity and immigration policies in the
United States. Although the contemporary United States is seen as a "nation
of immigrants," the eighteenth century founds identified the nation as pri-
marily those of English descent, or secondarily the peoples of Northwestern
European descent who adopted the English language and culture as their
own and professed a Protestant faith. Over the course of the last two centu-
ries, there has been a continuing struggle between the forces of inclusion and
nativism to define the American nation (Massey 2007). In spite of restrictive
immigration laws of the 1920s and the continuing nativist reaction against
undocumented migrants, there has been considerable progress in broadening
the definition of the American nation to be inclusive of peoples and cultures
from many other lands, as well as the descendants of indigenous Americans
and Spanish America and, most importantly, Americans of African origin.
This struggle is far from complete, but the American experience may be of
interest to other countries that are experiencing the conflicts between the
need for increasing numbers of immigrants and the historical identity of a
nation-state.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Nation-states are generally the successors of empires or other premodern poli-
ties that were composed of multiethnic populations and migrants from distant
lands. Empires were defined by their centers — the city from where the monarch
ruled. The boundaries of empires were, however, ill-defined and probably oscil-
lated with the power of the center to extract taxes and conscript labor from the
periphery. The cities of empires were invariably multiethnic and drew peoples
from a variety of distant locations.

The first imperative for the openness of cities to migrants was simply sur-
\vival or continuity. All premodern cities (with the exception of those in Japan)
were extremely unhealthy and demographic sinkholes — mortality exceeded
fertility by a wide margin (Wrigley 1969; McNeill 1976; Hanley 1987). Cities
required a continuous influx of labor from rural areas just to maintain their
population.

The second imperative that encouraged migration to premodern cities
was economic. Migrants from nearby rural areas may have been able to sup-
ply unskilled labor for construction, service, and defense, but skilled artisans
and merchants were often drawn from distant and culturally distinct peoples.
SOCIETY: CONDITIONS AND OUTCOMES

An inevitable by-product of nation-states is nationalism, which privileges a population defined by shared ancestry, language, or culture (including religion) as the preferred citizens of any state. The creation of nation-states, however, conflicts with the reality that different cultural groups often share the same geography, especially in cities, and that state boundaries often ignore cultural divisions. This has led to new problems of national integration, second-class citizenship, and contested national boundaries in many parts of the modern world. Those who do not belong to the nation in a nation-state have the limited options of voice, exit, or loyalty (Hirschman 1970). Loyalty means acceptance of second-class status as a minority or perhaps giving up one’s identity through assimilation to the dominant population. Exit may mean an exodus to the frontier or to another state where their ancestry matters less. A third possibility, “voice,” indicates political discontent at a minimum and perhaps the threat of a rebellion or a secessionist struggle to create a new nation-state.

Just as nationalism was taking hold in Europe in the nineteenth century and beginning to spread around the globe, there were other forces that were expanding the numbers of the potential migrants and the feasibility of large-scale long-distance population movements. The most important factors were the acceleration of population growth in many parts of the globe after 1750, opportunities for settlement in frontier societies, and the demand for labor in the emerging industrial economies. Population pressures, with growing numbers of people living at the margins of subsistence, were exacerbated with the commercialization of the agricultural economy and displacement of peasants from the land. In different countries, famines, persecution, and pogroms added to the reasons for exodus in the nineteenth century.

These pressures combined with the cheapening costs of long-distance travel increased the attractions of sparsely settled frontier areas, especially in the New World. All of these conditions led to massive waves of migrants crossing the Atlantic (and the Pacific) from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century (Hoerder 2002). With the depopulation of the indigenous peoples through conquest and the spread of Old World diseases, the New World became the demographic and economic frontier that attracted long-distance migrants from around the world, especially from Europe. The migration to the New World was monumental, both in its demographic size and the diversity of its origins. For the 75-year period from the mid-nineteenth century to the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century, almost 50 million Europeans came to the United States alone (Massey 1988). In spite of some frictions, immigrants were generally welcomed in the New World. Labor was scarce and the endless frontier needed to be settled. Land grants, subsidized passage, and labor recruitment were among the strategies used to induce migrants at various times during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Zolberg 2006).

IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

The Changing Scope and Structure of Immigration

All Americans with the exception of American Indians are the descendents of immigrants. But some Americans, particularly those of English origin whose ancestors arrived prior to the American Revolution, have considered themselves to be the “native stock” of the American population (Baltzell 1964). The American population has, however, always been much more diverse than the “Anglo-centric” image of the eighteenth century. The first American census in 1790, shortly after the formation of the United States, counted a bit less than 4 million people, of whom at least 20% were of African descent (Gibson and Jung 2002). The estimates of the non-English-origin population in 1790 range from 20% to 40% (Akenhead 1984; McDonald and McDonald 1980; Purvis 1984).

There are no official figures on the numbers of American Indians prior to the late nineteenth century, but they were the dominant population of the eighteenth century in most of the territories that eventually became the United States. Almost all African Americans are the descendents of seventeenth or eighteenth century settlers while the majority of white Americans are descendents of immigrants who arrived in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries (Gibson 1992: 165; Edmonston and Passell 1994: 61). Most Americans have acquired a sense of historical continuity from America’s founding, but this is primarily the result of socialization and education, not descent.

Each new wave of immigration to the United States has met with some degree of hostility. Old stock Americans generally fear that immigrants will not conform to the prevailing “American way of life” and lessen social cohesion. In 1751, Benjamin Franklin complained that the “Palatine Boors” were trying to Germanize the province of Pennsylvania and refused to learn English (Archdeacon 1983: 20).

Almost 70 million immigrants have arrived since the federal government began counting in 1820 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006: 8). Although some level of immigration has been continuous throughout American history, there have been two epochal periods: the 1880 to 1924 Age of Mass Migration, primarily from Southern and Eastern Europe, and the Post-1965 Wave of Immigration, primarily from Latin America and Asia (Min 2002; Portes and Rumbaut 1996). Each of these eras added more than 25 million immigrants, and the current wave is far from finished.

These historical trends and patterns are illustrated in Table 16-1, which shows the per cent foreign-born of the total population for each decennial census from 1850 and 1930 and from 1960 to 2000. For the same periods, Table 16-1 also shows the composition of immigrants by region of birth. These dates are selected to
show the two major epochs of immigration, but also reflect the availability of
data on place of birth were first collected in 1850.

In 1860, on the eve of the Civil War, and after two decades of mass migration
from Ireland and Germany, over 10% of the 31 million Americans were of for-
eign birth. Throughout the nineteenth century, Irish and German Americans,
especially Catholics, were not considered to be fully American in terms of cul-
ture or status by old stock Americans. In May 1844, there were three days of
rioting in Kensington, an Irish suburb of Philadelphia, which culminated in
the burning of two Catholic churches and other property (Archdeacon 1988: 81).
This case was one incident of many during the 1840s and 1850s when Catholic
churches and convents were destroyed and priests were attacked by Protestant

These antipathies crystallized in the "Know Nothing Party" (the internal
name was the "American" party), which in 1855 elected six governors and sent
a number of representatives to Congress (Jones 1992: 134). Their expressed phi-
losophy was simply that of "Americanism," which implicitly communicated
the fear of the un-Americanness of immigrants (Higham 1988: 4). Popular support
for the Know Nothing Party collapsed in the 1860s when immigrants played a
disproportionate role as soldiers for the Union Army.

Immigration increased during the last half of the nineteenth century. During
some of the peak years of immigration in the early 1900s, about 1 million immi-
grants arrived annually, which was more than 5% of the total U.S. population
at the time. As a percentage of the total population, the percent foreign-born
fluctuated from 13% to 14% during the Age of Mass Migration. If the children
of immigrants were counted, more than a quarter of the American population was
part of the immigrant community. Since immigrants were disproportionately
drawn to jobs in urban areas, the majority of the population in most American
cities, especially industrial cities in the Northeast and Midwest, were composed
of immigrants and their children during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.

With cutoff of immigration in the 1920s, the proportion foreign-born and
even the absolute numbers of immigrants declined precipitously in subsequent
decades. The 1960 and 1970 censuses counted less than 10 million immigrants—
less than one in twenty Americans. With a loosening of immigration restrictions
in the 1960s, there was a renewal of mass immigration in the last few decades of
the twentieth century. By the 2000 census, there were over 30 million foreign-
born persons in the United States—the highest level ever recorded. But with a
total U.S. population of almost 300 million, the relative impact is much lower
than in earlier times. The per cent foreign-born in 2000 was only a little over 1%.
The numbers of immigrants in the late twentieth century is only high relative to
the early post-World War II era when immigration was at its nadir. In com-
parison to most of the nineteenth century, and the early decades of the twenti-
heth century, however, contemporary immigration appears to be "normal"—very

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Foreign-born Total</th>
<th>Foreign-born Total Population</th>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>31,107,889</td>
<td>281,431,964</td>
<td>10,763,318</td>
<td>10,763,318</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
<td>2,633,193</td>
<td>2,633,193</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
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<td>2,633,193</td>
<td>2,633,193</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
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<td>2,633,193</td>
<td>2,633,193</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
<td>2,633,193</td>
<td>2,633,193</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
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<td>1950</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
<td>2,633,193</td>
<td>2,633,193</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
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Source: Census and long. 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930.
similar to the generally high level of immigration throughout most of American
history.
Table 16-1 shows that there has been a major change in the sources of immi-
grants in recent decades. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, upwards of 80% of immigrants came from Europe and most of the rest were
from Canada (Northern America). In recent decades, however, the European
and Canadian share has dropped below 20%. About half of recent immigrants
come from Latin America (broadly defined to include the Caribbean, Mexico,
Central and South America, and about one-fourth from Asia). This historical
comparison, however, is somewhat misleading.
There was considerable heterogeneity in the national origins of European
immigrants during the Age of Mass Migration. Many immigrants from
Southern and Eastern Europe were considered "nonwhite" according to the
widely accepted racial theories of the day (Higham 1988). For American nativ-
ists, the national identity of the United States was still rooted in "old stock" Americans of English Protestant descent. There has always been considerable
ambivalence about the magnitude and character of immigration to the United
States. There has been general recognition that more people were necessary to
settle the frontier, work in the factories, and play other necessary roles, but there
were also fears that immigrants might change the composition and character
of American society.

The Changing Regulation of Immigration
Some of the major landmarks of U.S. immigration legislation are listed
in Table 16-2. This list includes only a few of the major changes in laws and
agreements that have shaped American immigration policies. More compre-
hensive accounts of immigration policies are presented in Bernard (1981) and
Hutchinson (1981) and most recently in the comprehensive account and analysis
In the early years of the republic, Congress passed the 1790 Naturaliza-
tion Act that established the terms of eligibility of citizenship for "free white persons
of good moral character." Although race had not been directly mentioned in the
founding documents of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution,
the limitation of naturalized citizenship to whites reveals a narrow definition of
national identity that excludes American Indians as well as persons of African
and Asian origin. In the following decade, there were several revisions to the
terms of the naturalization procedures, including the infamous "Alien and
Sedition Act" of 1798 that (among other things) raised the residency require-
ment for naturalization to 14 years. A few years later, the residency for natural-
ization was reduced to 5 years.

Generally, the period prior to 1882 is considered to be an "open door era" for
a more nuanced interpretation. The 14th Amendment to the Constitution, one of
the three post-Civil War Amendments, contained a broad definition of American
citizenship that included the former slaves and all persons born in the United
States—"jus soli." This right, which is uncommon in most European and Asian
countries, has been of paramount importance in allowing the descendants of
immigrants to have equal rights with old stock Americans.

The first American effort to close the door to immigration was directed
against Chinese on the West Coast in the 1870s (Saxton 1971). By 1882, the
anti-Chinese coalition had become so strong that Congress passed, and
then President Chester A. Arthur signed, a bill that was popularly known as
the "Chinese Exclusion Act" (Hutchinson 1981: 77–84). Although the facts of
immigration restriction are clear, the motivations for it are still debated.
There is no doubt that the anti-Chinese sentiments were thoroughly infused
with racial ideology. Popular prejudices against Asians were openly expressed
in newspapers and by most political leaders (Saxton 1971; Daniels 1977). The
fact that a similar prohibition was enacted against Japanese immigrants (the
so-called "Gentleman's Agreement" of 1907) reveals that race was a primary
concern.

The question is whether racism was the primary reason or just a convenient
ideology for those who had genuine fears of economic competition with the
new immigrants. In her theory of the "split labor market," Edna Bonacich (1972,
1984) argued that much of the antagonism and discrimination against Asian
immigrants by working class whites, who led the movement for immigration
bars, was based on fears that Asian immigrants' willingness to work for very low wages undercut the incomes of white workers.

The movement to exclude Chinese (and other Asian) immigration to the United States was not a singular event. In his book, *The Great Wall as Built*, Charles Price (1974) describes how similar restrictive immigration laws were passed in Australia and Canada. Moreover, the restrictions on Asian immigration foreshadowed the movement to exclude immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe to the United States, which culminated with the "national origins" quotas in the 1920s.

The movement to restrict European migration to the United States was a complex phenomenon that played out over decades with a bewildering array of political, economic, and ethnic alliances. The standard economic account posits capital and labor as the main protagonists with business and employer groups advocating free immigration and workers arguing the opposite. There were, however, many other sides to the debate. Immigrant communities, particularly in big cities, were a strong political force against immigration restriction, while Congressional representatives from rural areas were generally opposed to open immigration.

Perhaps the most important force moving the United States toward limits on immigration was the rising tide of nativism—the fear of foreigners, which gradually became intertwined with racial ideology in the first two decades of the twentieth century. American nativism had deep roots in anti-Catholicism and a fear of foreign radicals, but the belief in the inherent superiority of the Anglo-Saxon "race" became the dominant element of the ideology in the late nineteenth century (Higham 1988: Chapter 1). These beliefs and the link to immigration restriction had widespread support among many well-educated elites. The Immigration Restriction League, founded by young Harvard-educated Boston Brahmins in 1894, advocated a literacy test to slow the tide of immigration (Bernard 1980: 492). It was thought that a literacy test would reduce immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, which was sending an "alarming number of illiterates, paupers, criminals, and madman who endangered American character and citizenship" (Higham 1988: 103).

For three decades, the battle over immigration restriction was waged in the courts of public opinion and in Congress. In 1910, the Dillingham Commission (a congressionally appointed commission named after Senator William P. Dillingham of Vermont) issued a 42-volume report, which assumed the racial inferiority of the new immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe relative to the old stock immigrants from Northwestern Europe (Bernard 1980: 492). Social Darwinism and scientific racism were in full flower with many leading scholars warning against allowing further immigration of "beaten members of beaten breeds" (Jones 1992: 228–230).

Immigration and Nativism in the U.S. and Europe

When the passage of a literacy test in 1917 did not have the intended impact of slowing immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, Congress passed the Emergency Quota Act in 1921 to limit the number of annual immigrants from each country to 3% of the foreign-born of that nationality in the 1900 Census (Bernard 1980: 493–495). These provisions were not strong enough for some restrictionists, who passed another immigration law in 1924 (the Johnson Reed Act) that pushed the quotas back to 2% of each nationality counted in the 1890 census, a date before the bulk of the new immigrants had arrived. The eventual policy was based on infamous "national origins quotas" (Higham 1988: 316–324; Anderson 1988: 140–149). There were no quotas allocated for Asian countries and no mention of any possible immigration from Africa.

Timmer and Williamson (1998) argue that the immigration restrictions that took hold in the United States and many other countries about the same time in the early decades of the twentieth century were primarily motivated by economic considerations and not by xenophobia or racism. There is some evidence that immigration from poorer areas might have slowed the economic gains of domestic workers (Hatton and Williamson 1996; however, see Carter and Sutch 1998), and that the political alliances that did finally lead to immigration restriction were shaped, at least in part, by fears of competition with immigrant workers (Goldin 1994). Although restrictive policies were clearly formulated to address the fears of wage competition of American workers, the conclusion that this was the only causal variable ignores the highly charged ideological climate of the era of immigration restriction.

Nationalism and racism were the reigning ideologies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although not every political outcome was determined by these ideologies, they shaped the immigration policy agenda in fundamental ways. In the United States, racial arguments were used by politicians, scholars, and the mass media to convince the American public and the government that the historically open door of immigration should be closed (Higham 1988). This was not an easy case to make in a country whose identity was that of a "nation of immigrants." It took several decades of overt anti-immigrant rhetoric and a broad political coalition before the U.S. Congress was able to pass restrictive immigration legislation that closed the door to mass immigration.

For most of the nineteenth century, immigration had been a necessity because of the high mortality in cities and a general shortage of labor to settle the frontier and to work in the factories of the new industrial age. With declining levels of mortality in the early twentieth century, most countries, including the United States, were generally able to meet their labor needs from natural increase. In such circumstances, the nationalist and racial impulses were, perhaps, given a freer hand to regulate immigration policies over the middle decades of the twentieth century.
THE IMMIGRATION DOOR BEGINS TO OPEN

The imposition of the national origins quotas in the 1920s, followed by the Great Depression and World War II, lowered immigration to its lowest levels since the early decades of the nineteenth century. The "racial" character of the national origins quotas was exemplified by the very limited numbers of Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Germany who were allowed to enter the United States while the quotas for Great Britain were not utilized. After World War II, U.S. immigration policies came into conflict with America's new leadership role in the international system. If American political ideals were to influence other countries, the discriminatory character of the national origins quotas could be upheld as an example of hypocrisy. In vetoing the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act of 1952 (which reaffirmed the national origins quota system), President Truman stated:

The quota system—always based upon assumptions at variance with our American ideals—is long since out of date. ... The greatest vice of the present system, however, is that it discriminates, deliberately and intentionally, against many of the peoples of the world. ... It is incredible to me that, in this year of 1952, we should be enacting into law such a slur on the patriotism, the capacity, and the decency of a large part of our citizenry (quoted in Keely 1979: 17-18).

Congress overrode Truman's veto, and the national origins quota remained the law of the land for another thirteen years. The domestic and international pressures for immigration reform continued to grow with each passing year. The dam finally broke with the landslide 1964 election, which brought a reform-minded Congress into office. Among the major pieces of Great Society legislation passed was the 1965 Immigration Act, which was championed by a number of senior members of Congress who were the children of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe.

The 1965 Hart-Cellar Immigration Act replaced the national origins quota system with a new preference system based on the principles of family reunification and skills. In the decades following the 1965 Immigration Act, there have been a series of new laws that have modified the numerical limits and procedures of immigration and the admission of refugees (Smith and Edmondston 1997: 22-30). In general, these reforms have liberalized immigration to expand the numbers and to create more possibilities for admission.

The sponsors of the 1965 Immigration Act were primarily interested in allowing a freer flow of immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, the countries hit hardest by the national origins quotas. The primary response, however, has been a major immigration flow from Asia. The first wave of Asian immigrants in the late 1960s and early 1970s were able to utilize the provisions allowing for those in skilled occupations of high demand (nurses, engineers, doctors, etc.) to enter. These early arrivals were then able to use the family reunification criterion to sponsor their relatives. At about the same time, there was a major new wave of immigration from Latin America, especially from Mexico and Cuba.

There have been a series of further changes in immigration laws and policies in the 1980s and 1990s in response to new developments and controversies. One of the most important was the Refugee Act of 1980 that created a regular avenue for refugee arrivals. Prior to 1980, there were ad hoc responses to refugee crises. The 1980 legislation also adopted the United Nations definition of a refugee as a person with a well-founded fear of persecution.

After many years of debate, Congress passed the 1986 Immigration and Control Act (IRCA) that attempted to balance several of the major immigration controversies. Illegal immigrants who had been in the United States for a long time were allowed to stay and were given a path toward citizenship. The other provisions of IRCA were to stop further illegal immigration by hardening the border (walls, fences, more guards) and by imposing sanctions against employers who knowingly employ illegal immigrants. In spite of the well-meaning intentions expressed in the IRCA legislation, the policy has been a colossal failure (Massey et al. 2002).

The movement to a less restrictive policy of immigration to the United States has been paralleled by comparable reforms in other countries. In the early 1970s, Australia ended its "White Australia" policy and allowed significant numbers of Asians to immigrate. In the early 1990s, the countries of the European Common Market loosened restrictions on interstate migration. Citizens of any country in the European Common Market can move to any other country and are free to seek employment or attend school on equal terms with natives of the country. The appearance of these common patterns in a number of countries and regions suggests that the nationalist impulse, which sought to limit and control international migration, was waning during the last few decades of the twentieth century.

Underlying the change in immigration policies were broad economic and demographic forces in advanced industrial countries. Population growth has slowed, and there is a shortage of native-born persons who are willing to work in low-paid positions in the economy, including seasonal agricultural labor. Population aging, the other major demographic trend, has also contributed a slowing rate of growth (an absolute decline in some countries) of population in the working ages. These domestic trends have been complemented with a virtually unlimited supply of potential immigrant labor, sometimes skilled and always highly motivated from developing countries.

The net result has been an increase in immigration in most industrial countries over the last few decades of the twentieth century. Distinctly different
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Underlying the change in immigration policies were broad economic and demographic forces in advanced industrial countries. Population growth has slowed, and there is a shortage of native-born persons who are willing to work in lowly paid positions in the economy, including seasonal agricultural labor. Population aging, the other major demographic trend, has also contributed a slowing rate of growth (an absolute decline in some countries) of population in the working ages. These domestic trends have been complemented with a virtually unlimited supply of potential immigrant labor, sometimes skilled and always highly motivated from developing countries.

The net result has been an increase in immigration in most industrial coun-
Table 16-3: Employment Status of the Civilian Population 16 Years and Over by Sex and Generation: 2004 (Numbers in thousands*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex and Employment Status</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>First Generation</th>
<th>Second Generation</th>
<th>Third-and-Higher Generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Civilian Labor Force</td>
<td>146,062</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>21,168</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>137,151</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>19,857</td>
<td>93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>8,910</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1,310</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Male Civilian Labor Force</td>
<td>77,860</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>12,716</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>72,739</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>12,001</td>
<td>94.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>5,121</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Female Civilian Labor Force</td>
<td>68,202</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>8,412</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>64,412</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>7,857</td>
<td>93.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>3,789</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Employment status refers to reference week of the survey.

The foreign-born are considered first generation. Natives with either parent born in a foreign country are considered second generation. Natives with neither parent born in a foreign country are considered third-and-higher generation.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2004).
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The contradictions between tightly regulated international borders and the modern world economy are becoming increasingly clear. Most immigration policies, of whatever type, are residues of the first half of the twentieth century, when regulated borders were a hallmark of modern statecraft. If the role of a state was to promote the welfare of the national population (a group defined by descent or membership), than a clear objective was to keep others (nonmembers of the nation) out, or to keep the numbers of immigrants to very modest levels. Policies of tightly regulated borders developed in nineteenth century nation-building states, initially in Europe and then spread around the globe in the twentieth century, including the traditional immigrant receiving societies in the New World and Oceania.

These policies “worked” because domestic population growth in most countries was sufficient to meet labor demand. Indeed, population growth reached record levels everywhere in the twentieth century. Although rapid population growth created immense pressures in many labor surplus countries, there were few places that needed additional labor or allowed open migration. Passport controls were expensive and inflexible to many, but they became accepted as normal features of modern states. Over the last few decades of the twentieth century, however, strains in the system of tight immigration policies were beginning to show.

The first sign was “labor demand” in industrial countries that could not be met by domestic supply, at least not at the wages offered. Employers found it more desirable to import labor from abroad than to raise wages or to mechanize production. If this pattern were found in only one country or in only a few sectors, then it might be possible to consider a fairly narrow explanation in terms of political cultures or market rigidities. The demand for “cheaper immigrant labor,” however, spans many sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, construction, repair services, restaurants, and child care) in most industrial countries, including a growing number of rapidly developing countries. The increasingly global international economy seems to create recurrent needs for labor greater than that available from domestic population growth.

The demand for immigrant labor is not restricted to unskilled manual labor. The United States and other industrial countries have encountered a shortage of scientific and engineering workers, particularly in the high-tech sector. This demand has been met, in part, by allowing many talented foreign students in American universities to convert their student visas to immigrant status. There has also been a gradual shift over the last few decades to more open immigration policies for a variety of reasons—refugees, agricultural workers, “illegal” immigrants with long residences in the country, peoples in countries that have too few American citizen relatives to sponsor them, and workers in high demand by U.S. employers.

These moves toward more liberal immigration policies in the United States are part of a broader international context with comparable patterns emerging in other countries. The policy of free movement of citizens in the European Common Market is the most striking example, but there are trends toward generous policies of admitting refugees and temporary workers in many parts of the world. There are even a few examples of more generous citizenship policies, but these are halting, often facing a domestic backlash from nationalist sentiments that have been weakened, but not disappeared (Lucassen 2005).

More liberal immigration policies appear to be highly functional in modern industrial and postindustrial societies. Standard economic theory posits that domestic migration is a functional response to wage differentials between areas. Migration allows for workers to benefit from higher wages in growing areas and stimulates the economy to operate more efficiently by creating larger and more porous labor and consumer markets. Indeed, the logic for lessening barriers to migration is similar to that of international free trade. Economic theory suggests that all countries benefit from the free flows of capital, goods, and technology across international borders. International migration is often excluded from discussions about expanding international trade (such as in the NAFTA debate), largely because of political considerations rather than economic theory (Massey et al. 2002).

Globalization is the most powerful trend in the world today. There are few places on Earth that are not exposed to the presence of the international forces of the mass media, multinational corporations, and Hollywood images. Every commodity from fresh food to electronic products moves around the globe in such profusion that most persons are unaware of the nationality of the producers of the goods (and services) they consume. Although international trade has always created competition between businesses and workers in different countries, the current era with instantaneous communication and cheap transportation has created a qualitatively new international community. In this setting, barriers to international labor mobility are an anachronism of the earlier era. Just as most countries, regardless of political ideology, have striven to make passport lines more efficient in recent times to encourage the very profitable tourism sector, it seems that most twenty-first century societies will ease immigration barriers in order to profit from the increasingly globalized world economy.

REFERENCES


SOCIETY: CONDITIONS AND OUTCOMES


SECTION IX

CONCLUSION

17

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSES: WHAT DO WE KNOW?

JENS ALBER AND NEIL GILBERT

The introduction to this volume ended with a quote from de Tocqueville, promising a high standard of objectivity, which strived to link ideas to facts rather than molding facts to fit ideas. In drawing to the close of this volume, we should note that although the many empirical data presented throughout the chapters lend a degree of objectivity to the discussion, subjective judgments based on assumptions and values (rational and well-reasoned as they may be) enter both the selection of the facts that are observed and their interpretation.

"Value premises," as Myrdal (1958: 254–55) explained, "are required not only to draw practical inferences from observations and economic analysis but... to direct our observations and carry out our analysis." Not only do subjective judgments enter the selection of operational measures and the facts to be observed, but they also allow different ideas and interpretations to be molded to the same set of facts—as also the two editors coming from different sides of the Atlantic experienced when preparing this volume. In comparing social