

THE NATURE OF
PREJUDICE

UNABRIDGED

GORDON W. ALLPORT

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2. In the science of psychology the processes of "directed thinking" and "free thinking" have in the past been kept quite separate. The "experimentalists," traditionally so-called, have studied the former, and the "dynamic psychologists" (e.g., the Freudians) the latter. A readable book in the former tradition is GEORGE HUMPHREY, *Directed Thinking*, New York: Dodd, Mead, 1948; in the latter tradition, SIGMUND FREUD, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. New York: Macmillan, transl. 1914.

In recent years there is a tendency for "experimentalists" and "dynamicists" to draw together in their research and in their theory. (See Chapter 10 of this volume.) It is a good sign, for prejudiced thinking is not, after all, something abnormal and disordered. Directed thinking and wishful thinking fuse.

3. See G. W. ALLPORT, A psychological approach to love and hate. Chapter 5 in P. A. SOROKIN (Ed.), *Explorations in Altruistic Love and Behavior*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1950. Also, M. F. ASHLEY-MONTAGU, *On Being Human*. New York: Henry Schumann, 1950.

4. MERLE CURTI. The reputation of America overseas (1776-1860). *American Quarterly*, 1949, 1, 58-82.

5. Important relations between war and prejudice are discussed in H. CANTRIL (Ed.), *Tensions That Cause Wars*. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1950.

CHAPTER 3

FORMATION OF IN-GROUPS

WHAT IS AN IN-GROUP?—SEX AS AN IN-GROUP—THE SHIFTING NATURE OF IN-GROUPS—IN-GROUPS AND REFERENCE GROUPS—SOCIAL DISTANCE—THE GROUP-NORM THEORY OF PREJUDICE—CAN THERE BE AN IN-GROUP WITHOUT AN OUT-GROUP?—CAN HUMANITY CONSTITUTE AN IN-GROUP?

The proverb *familiarity breeds contempt* contains considerably less than a half-truth. While we sometimes do become bored with our daily routine of living and with some of our customary companions, yet the very values that sustain our lives depend for their force upon their familiarity. What is more, what is familiar tends to *become* a value. We come to like the style of cooking, the customs, the people, we have grown up with.

Psychologically, the crux of the matter is that the familiar provides the indispensable basis of our existence. Since existence is good, its accompanying groundwork seems good and desirable. A child's parents, neighborhood, region, nation are given to him—so too his religion, race, and social traditions. To him all these affiliations are taken for granted. Since he is part of them, and they are part of him, they are *good*.

As early as the age of five, a child is capable of understanding that he is a member of various groups. He is capable, for example, of a sense of ethnic identification. Until he is nine or ten he will not be able to understand just what his membership signifies—how, for example, Jews differ from gentiles, or Quakers from Methodists, but he does not wait for this understanding before he develops fierce in-group loyalties.

Some psychologists say that the child is "rewarded" by virtue of his memberships, and that this reward creates the loyalty. That is to say, his family feeds and cares for him, he obtains pleasure from the gifts and attentions received from neighbors and compatriots. Hence he learns to love them. His loyalties are acquired on the basis of such rewards. We may doubt that this explanation is sufficient. A colored child is seldom or never rewarded for being a Negro—usually just the opposite, and yet he normally grows up with a loyalty to his racial group. Thoughts of Indiana arouse a glow in the breast of a native Hoosier—not necessarily because he

passed a happy childhood there, but simply because he *came* from there. It is still, in part, the ground of his existence.

Rewards may, of course, help the process. A child who has plenty of fun at a family reunion may be more attached thereafter to his own clan because of the experience. But normally he would be attached to his clan anyway, simply because it is an inescapable part of his life.

Happiness (i.e., "reward") is not then the only reason for our loyalties. Few of our group memberships seem to be sustained by the pleasures they provide—an exception perhaps being our recreational memberships. And it takes a major unhappiness, a prolonged and bitter experience, to drive us away from loyalties once formed. And sometimes no amount of punishment can make us repudiate our loyalty.

This principle of the *ground* in human learning is important. We do not need to postulate a "gregarious instinct" to explain why people like to be with people: they have simply found people lock-stitched into the very fabric of their existence. Since they affirm their own existence as good, they will affirm social living as good. Nor do we need to postulate a "consciousness of kind" to explain why people adhere to their own families, clans, ethnic groups. The self could not be itself without them.

Scarcely anyone ever wants to be anybody else. However handicapped or unhappy he feels himself, he would not change places with other more fortunate mortals. He grumbles over his misfortunes and wants his lot improved; but it is *his* lot and *his* personality that he wants bettered. This attachment to one's own being is basic to human life. I may say that I envy *you*. But I do not want to *be* you; I only want to have for myself some of your attributes or possessions. And along with this beloved self go all of the person's basic memberships. Since he cannot alter his family stock, its traditions, his nationality, or his native language, he does well to accept them. Their accent dwells in the heart as well as on the tongue.

Oddly enough, it is not necessary for the individual to have direct acquaintance with all his in-groups. To be sure, he usually knows the members of his immediate family. (An orphan, however, may be passionately attached to parents he has never seen.) Some groups, such as clubs, schools, neighborhoods, are known through personal contacts. But others depend largely on symbols or hearsay. No one can have direct acquaintance with his race as a whole, nor with all his lodge brothers or co-religionists. The young child may sit enthralled while he hears of the exploits of the great-grandfather whose role as a sea-captain, a frontiersman, or nobleman sets

a tradition with which the child identifies himself. The words he hears provide him just as authentic a ground for his life as do his daily experiences. By symbols one learns family traditions, patriotism, and racial pride. Thus in-groups that are only verbally defined may be nonetheless firmly knit.

What Is an In-group?

In a static society it would be fairly easy to predict just what loyalties the individual will form—to what region, to what phratry, or to what social class. In such a static society kinship, status, even place of residence, may be rigidly prescribed.

In ancient China at one time residential arrangements actually coincided with social distance. Where one lived indicated all of one's memberships. The inner circle of a region was the Tribute Holding where government officials only were permitted to reside. A second circle contained the nobility. Beyond this an outer but defended area, known as the Peaceful Tenures, contained literary workers and other citizens of repute. Farther out lay the Prohibited territory divided between foreigners and transported convicts. Finally came the Unstrained territory, where only barbarians and ostracized felons were allowed to dwell.¹

In a more mobile, technological society such as ours no such rigidity exists.

There is one law—universal in all human societies—that assists us in making an important prediction. *In every society on earth the child is regarded as a member of his parents' groups.* He belongs to the same race, stock, family tradition, religion, caste, and occupational status. To be sure, in our society, he may when he grows older escape certain of these memberships, but not all. The child is ordinarily expected to acquire his parents' loyalties and prejudices; and if the parent because of his group-membership is an object of prejudice, the child too is automatically victimized.

Although this rule holds in our society, it is less infallible than in more "familistic" regions of the world. While the American child normally acquires a strong sense of family membership and a certain loyalty to his parents' country of origin, race, and religion, he has considerable latitude respecting his attachments. Each individual pattern will be somewhat different. An American child is free to accept some of his parents' memberships and to reject others.

It is difficult to define an in-group precisely. Perhaps the best that can be done is to say that members of an in-group all use the term *we* with the same essential significance. Members of a family do so, likewise schoolmates, members of a lodge, labor union, club.

city, state, nation. In a vaguer way members of international bodies may do the same. Some we-organizations are transitory (e.g., an evening party), some are permanent (e.g., a family or clan).

Sam, a middle-aged man of only average sociability, listed his own in-group memberships as follows:

- his paternal relatives
- his maternal relatives
- family of orientation (in which he grew up)
- family of procreation (his wife and children)
- his boyhood circle (now a dim memory)
- his grammar school (in memory only)
- his high school (in memory only)
- his college as a whole (sometimes revisited)
- his college class (reinforced by reunions)
- his present church membership (shifted when he was 20)
- his profession (strongly organized and firmly knit)
- his firm (but especially the department in which he works)
- a "bunch" (group of four couples who take a good deal of recreation together)
- surviving members of a World War I company of infantry (growing dim)
- state where he was born (a fairly trivial membership)
- town where he now lives (a lively civic spirit)
- New England (a regional loyalty)
- United States (an average amount of patriotism)
- United Nations (in principle firmly believed in but psychologically loose because he is not clear concerning the "we" in this case)
- Scotch-Irish stock (a vague feeling of kinship with others who have this lineage)
- Republican party (he registers Republican in the primaries but has little additional sense of belonging)

Sam's list is probably not complete—but from it we can reconstruct fairly well the membership ground on which he lives.

In his list Sam referred to a boyhood circle. He recalls that at one time this in-group was of desperate importance to him. When he moved to a new neighborhood at the age of 10 he had no one of his own age to pal with, and he much desired companionship. The other boys were curious and suspicious. Would they admit him? Was Sam's style compatible with the gang's style? There was the usual ordeal by fistfight, set in motion at some slight pretext. This ritual—as is customary in boys' gangs—is designed to

provide a swift and acceptable test of the stranger's manners and morale. Will he keep within the limits set by the gang, and show just enough boldness, toughness, and self-control to suit the other boys? Sam was fortunate in this ordeal, and was forthwith admitted to the coveted in-group. Probably he was lucky that he had no additional handicaps in terms of his racial, religious, or status memberships. Otherwise the probation would have been longer and the tests more exacting; and perhaps the gang would have excluded him forever.

Thus some in-group memberships have to be fought for. But many are conferred automatically by birth and by family tradition. In terms of modern social science the former memberships reflect *achieved* status; the latter, *ascribed* status.

Sex as an In-group

Sam did not mention his membership (ascribed status) in the male sex. Probably at one time it was consciously important to him—and may still be so.

The in-group of sex makes an interesting case study. A child of two normally makes no distinction in his companionships: a little girl or a little boy is all the same to him. Even in the first grade the awareness of sex-groups is relatively slight. Asked whom they would choose to play with, first-grade children on the average choose opposite-sexed children at least a quarter of the time. By the time the fourth grade is reached these cross-sexed choices virtually disappear: only two percent of the children want to play with someone of the opposite sex. When the eighth grade is reached friendships between boys and girls begin to re-emerge, but even then only eight percent extend their choices across the sex boundary.²

For some people—misogynists among them—the sex-grouping remains important throughout their lives. Women are viewed as a wholly different species from men, usually an inferior species. Such primary and secondary sex differences as exist are greatly exaggerated and are inflated into imaginary distinctions that justify discrimination. With half of mankind (his own sex) the male may feel an in-group solidarity, with the other half, an irreconcilable conflict.

Lord Chesterfield, who in his letters often admonished his son to guide his life by reason rather than by prejudice, nevertheless has this to say about women:

"Women, then, are only children of a larger growth; they have an entertaining tattle, and sometimes wit; but for solid reasoning, good sense, I never knew in my life one that had it, or who

reasoned or acted consequentially for four and twenty hours together. . . .

"A man of sense only trifles with them, plays with them, humors and flatters them, as he does a sprightly, forward child; but he neither consults them about, nor trusts them with serious matters; though he often makes them believe that he does both; which is the thing in the world that they are most proud of. . . ."³

"Women are much more like each other than men; they have in truth but two passions, vanity and love: these are their universal characteristics."⁴

Schopenhauer's views were much like Chesterfield's. Women, he wrote, are big children all their life long. A fundamental fault of the female character is that it has no sense of justice. This is mainly due to the fact, Schopenhauer insisted, that women are defective in the powers of reasoning and deliberation.⁵

Such antifeminism reflects the two basic ingredients of prejudice—denigration and gross overgeneralization. Neither of these famous men of intellect allows for individual differences among women, nor asks whether their alleged attributes are in fact more common in the female than in the male sex.

What is instructive about this antifeminism is the fact that it implies security and contentment with one's own sex-membership. To Chesterfield and to Schopenhauer the cleavage between male and female was a cleavage between accepted in-group and rejected out-group. But for many people this "war of the sexes" seems totally unreal. They do not find in it a ground for prejudice.

The Shifting Nature of In-groups

Although each individual has his own conception of in-groups important to himself, he is not unaffected by the temper of the times. During the past century, national and racial memberships have risen in importance, while family and religious memberships have declined (though they are still exceedingly prominent). The fierce loyalties and rivalries between Scottish clans is almost a thing of the past—but the conception of a "master race" has grown to threatening proportions. The fact that women in Western countries have assumed roles once reserved for men makes the antifeminism of Chesterfield and Schopenhauer seem old-fashioned indeed.

A change in the conception of the national in-group is seen in the shifting American attitude toward immigration. The native American nowadays seldom takes an idealistic view of immigration. He does not feel it a duty and privilege to offer a home to oppressed

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people—to include them in his in-group. The legend on the Statue of Liberty, engraved eighty years ago, already seems out of date:

Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, the tempest-tossed to me.
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.

The lamp was virtually extinguished by the anti-immigration laws passed in the period 1918-1924. The lingering sentiment was not strong enough to relax the bars appreciably following the Second World War when there were more homeless and tempest-tost than ever before crying for admission. From the standpoint of both economics and humanitarianism there were strong arguments for relaxing the restrictions; but people had grown fearful. Many conservatives feared the importation of radical ideas; many Protestants felt their own precarious majority might be further reduced; some Catholics dreaded the arrival of Communists; anti-Semites wanted no more Jews; some labor-union members feared that jobs would not be created to absorb the newcomers and that their own security would suffer.

During the 124 years for which data are available, approximately 40,000,000 immigrants came to America, as many as 1,000,000 in a single year. Of the total immigration 85 percent came from Europe. Until a generation ago, few objections were heard. But today nearly all applicants are refused admission, and few champions of "displaced persons" are heard. Times have changed, and whenever they change for the worse, as they have, in-group boundaries tend to tighten. The stranger is suspect and excluded.

Not only do the strength and definition of in-groups change over the years in a given culture, but a single individual, too, may have occasion at one time to affirm one group-loyalty and at a different time another. The following amusing passage from H. G. Wells's *A Modern Utopia* illustrates this elasticity. The passage depicts a snob—a person whose group loyalties are narrow. But even a snob, it appears, must have a certain flexibility, for he finds it convenient to identify himself sometimes with one in-group and sometimes with another.

The passage illustrates an important point: in-group memberships are not permanently fixed. For certain purposes an individual may affirm one category of membership, for other purposes a slightly larger category. It depends on his need for self-enhancement.

Wells is describing the loyalties of a certain botanist:

He has a strong feeling for systematic botanists as against plant physiologists, whom he regards as lewd and evil scoundrels in this relation; but he has a strong feeling for all botanists and indeed all biologists, as against physicists, and those who profess the exact sciences, all of whom he regards as dull, mechanical, ugly-minded scoundrels in this relation; but he has a strong feeling for all who profess what he calls Science, as against psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, and literary men, whom he regards as wild, foolish, immoral scoundrels in this relation; but he has a strong feeling for all educated men as against the working man, whom he regards as a cheating, lying, loafing, drunken, thievish, dirty scoundrel in this relation; but as soon as the working man is comprehended together with these others, as *Englishmen* . . . he holds them superior to all sorts of Europeans, whom he regards. . . .⁶

Thus the sense of belonging is a highly personal matter. Even two members of the same actual in-group may view its composition




FIG. 1. The national in-group as perceived by two Americans.

in widely divergent ways. Take, for instance, the definition that two Americans might give to their own national in-group.

The narrowed perception of Individual A is the product of an arbitrary categorization, one that he finds convenient (functionally significant) to hold. The larger range of perception on the part of Individual B creates a wholly different conception of the national in-group. It is misleading to say that both belong to the same in-group. Psychologically, they do not.

Each individual tends to see in his in-group the precise pattern of security that he himself requires. An instructive example comes from a recent resolution of the convention of the Democratic Party in South Carolina. To the gentlemen assembled the Party was an

important in-group. But the definition of Party (as stated in its national platform) was unacceptable. Hence in order to re-fence the in-group so that each member could feel secure, the category "Democrat" was redefined to "include those who believe in local self-government as against the idea of a strong centralized, paternalistic government; and exclude those whose ideas or leadership are inspired by foreign influences, Communism, Nazism, Fascism, statism, totalitarianism, or the Fair Employment Practices Commission."

Thus in-groups are often recreated to fit the needs of individuals, and when the needs are strongly aggressive—as in this case—the redefinition of the in-group may be primarily in terms of the hated out-groups.

In-groups and Reference Groups

We have broadly defined an in-group as any cluster of people who can use the term "we" with the same significance. But the reader has noted that individuals may hold all manner of views concerning their membership in in-groups. A first-generation American may regard his Italian background and culture as more important than do his children, who are second-generation Italian-Americans. Adolescents may view their neighborhood gang as a far more important in-group than their school. In some instances an individual may actively repudiate an in-group, even though he cannot escape membership in it.

In order to clarify this situation, modern social science has introduced the concept of reference group. Sherif and Sherif have defined reference groups as "those groups to which the individual relates himself as a part, or to which he aspires to relate himself psychologically."⁷ Thus a reference group is an in-group that is warmly accepted, or a group in which the individual wishes to be included.

Now usually an in-group is also a reference group, but not always. A Negro may wish to relate himself to the white majority in his community. He would like to partake of the privileges of this majority, and be considered one of its members. He may feel so intensely about the matter that he repudiates his own in-group. He develops a condition that Kurt Lewin has called "self-hate" (i.e., hatred for his own in-group). Yet the customs of the community force him to live with, work with, and be classified with the Negro group. In such a case his in-group membership is not the same as his reference group.

Or take the case of a clergyman of Armenian descent ministering in a small New England town. His name is foreign. Townsfolk classify him as an Armenian. Yet he himself seldom thinks of his

ancestry, though he does not actively reject his background. His reference groups (his main interests) are his church, his family, and the community in which he lives. Unfortunately for him, his fellow townsmen persist in regarding him as an Armenian; they regard this ethnic in-group as far more important than he himself does.

The Negro and the Armenian cleric occupy *marginal* roles in the community. They have difficulty relating themselves to their reference groups because the pressures of the community force them always to tie to in-groups of small psychological importance to them.

To a considerable degree all minority groups suffer from the same state of marginality, with its haunting consequences of insecurity, conflict, and irritation. Every minority group finds itself in a larger society where many customs, many values, many practices are prescribed. The minority group member is thus to some degree forced to make the dominant majority his reference group in respect to language, manners, morals, and law. He may be entirely loyal to his minority in-group, but he is at the same time always under the necessity of relating himself to the standards and expectations of the majority. The situation is particularly clear in the case of the Negro. Negro culture is almost entirely the same as white American culture. The Negro must relate himself to it. Yet whenever he tries to achieve this relatedness he is likely to suffer rebuff. Hence there is in his case an almost inevitable conflict between his biologically defined in-group and his culturally defined reference group. If we follow this line of thinking we see why all minority groups, to some degree, occupy a marginal position in society with its unhappy consequents of apprehension and resentment.

The concepts of in-group and reference group help us to distinguish two levels of belongingness. The former indicates the sheer fact of membership; the latter tells us whether the individual prizes that membership or whether he seeks to relate himself with another group. In many cases, as we have said, there is a virtual identity between in-groups and reference groups; but it is not always so. Some individuals, through necessity or by choice, continually compare themselves with groups which for them are not in-groups.

Social Distance

The distinction between in-group and reference group is well brought out in studies of social distance. This familiar technique, invented by E. S. Bogardus, asks respondents to indicate to which steps on the following scale they would admit members of various ethnic and national groups:

1. to close kinship by marriage
2. to my club as personal chums
3. to my street as neighbors
4. to employment in my occupation
5. to citizenship in my country
6. as visitors only to my country
7. would exclude from my country

Now the most striking finding from this procedure is that a similar pattern of preference is found across the country, varying little with income, region, education, occupation, or even with ethnic group. Most people, whoever they are, find the English and Canadians acceptable as citizens, as neighbors, as social equals, and as kinsmen. These ethnic stocks have the least social distance. At the other extreme come Hindus, Turks, Negroes. The ordering—with a few minor shifts—stays substantially constant.⁸

While members of the unfavored groups tend to put their own groups high in the list, yet in all other respects they choose the prevailing order of acceptability. In one study of Jewish children, for example, it was found that the standard pattern of social distance existed excepting only that most Jewish children place Jews high in acceptability.⁹ In similar investigations it turns out that on the average the Negro places the Jew at about the same distance as does the white gentile; and the Jew ordinarily places the Negro low on his list.

From such results we are forced to conclude that the member of an ethnic minority tends to fashion his attitudes as does the dominant majority. In other words, the dominant majority is for him a *reference group*. It exerts a strong pull upon him, forcing attitudinal conformity. The conformity, however, rarely extends to the point of repudiating his own in-group. A Negro, or Jew, or Mexican will ordinarily assert the acceptability of his own in-group, but in other respects he will decide as does his larger reference group. Thus, both in-group and reference group are important in the formation of attitudes.

The Group-Norm Theory of Prejudice

We are now in a position to understand and appreciate a major theory of prejudice. It holds that all groups (whether in-groups or reference groups) develop a way of living with characteristic codes and beliefs, standards and "enemies" to suit their own adaptive needs. The theory holds also that both gross and subtle pressures keep every individual member in line. The in-group's preferences

must be his preference, its enemies his enemies. The Sherifs, who advance this theory, write:

Ordinarily the factors leading individuals to form attitudes of prejudice are not piecemeal. Rather, their formation is functionally related to becoming a group member—to adopting the group and its values (norms) as the main anchorage in regulating experience and behavior.¹⁰

A strong argument in favor of this view is the relative ineffectiveness of attempts to change attitudes through influencing individuals. Suppose the child attends a lesson in intercultural education in the classroom. The chances are this lesson will be smothered by the more embracing norms of his family, gang, or neighborhood. To change the child's attitudes it would be necessary to alter the cultural equilibrium of these, to him, more important groups. It would be necessary for the family, the gang, or the neighborhood to sanction tolerance before he as an individual could practice it.

This line of thought has led to the dictum, "It is easier to change group attitudes than individual attitudes." Recent research lends some support to the view. In certain studies whole communities, whole housing projects, whole factories, or whole school systems have been made the target of change. By involving the leaders, the policies, the rank and file, new norms are created, and when this is accomplished, it is found that individual attitudes tend to conform to the new group norm.¹¹

While we cannot doubt the results, there is something unnecessarily "collectivistic" about the theory. Prejudice is by no means exclusively a mass phenomenon. Let the reader ask himself whether his own social attitudes do in fact conform closely to those of his family, social class, occupational group, or church associates. Perhaps the answer is yes; but more likely the reader may reply that the prevailing prejudices of his various reference groups are so contradictory that he cannot, and does not, "share" them all. He may also decide that his pattern of prejudice is unique, conforming to none of his membership groups.

Realizing this individual play of attitudes, the proponents of the theory speak of a "range of tolerable behavior," admitting thereby that only approximate conformity is demanded within any system of group norms. People may deviate in their attitudes to some extent, but not too much.

As soon as we allow, however, for a "range of tolerable behavior" we are moving toward a more individualistic point of view. We do not need to deny the existence of group norms and group pressure in order to insist that each person is uniquely organized. Some of us

are avid conformists to what we believe the group requirement to be. Others of us are passive conformists. Still others are nonconformists. Such conformism as we show is the product of individual learning, individual needs, and individual style of life.

In dealing with problems of attitude formation it is always difficult to strike a proper balance between the collective approach and the individual approach. This volume maintains that prejudice is ultimately a problem of personality formation and development; no two cases of prejudice are precisely the same. No individual would mirror his group's attitude unless he had a personal need, or personal habit, that leads him to do so. But it likewise maintains that one of the frequent sources, perhaps the most frequent source, of prejudice lies in the needs and habits that reflect the influence of in-group memberships upon the development of the individual personality. It is possible to hold the individualistic type of theory without denying that the major influences upon the individual may be collective.

Can there Be an In-group without an Out-group?

Every line, fence, or boundary marks off an inside from an outside. Therefore, in strict logic, an in-group always implies the existence of some corresponding out-group. But this logical statement by itself is of little significance. What we need to know is whether one's loyalty to the in-group automatically implies disloyalty, or hostility, or other forms of negativism, toward out-groups.

The French biologist, Felix le Dantec, insisted that every social unit from the family to the nation could exist only by virtue of having some "common enemy." The family unit fights many threatening forces that menace each person who belongs to the unit. The exclusive club, the American Legion, the nation itself, exists to defeat the common enemies of its members. In favor of Le Dantec's view is the well-known Machiavellian trick of creating a common enemy in order to cement an in-group. Hitler created the Jewish menace not so much to demolish the Jews as to cement the Nazi hold over Germany. At the turn of the century the Workingmen's Party in California whipped up an anti-Oriental sentiment to consolidate its own ranks which, without a common enemy, were indifferent and wavering. School spirit is never so strong as when the time for an athletic contest with the traditional "enemy" approaches. Instances are so numerous that one is tempted to accept the doctrine. Studying the effect of strangers entering a group of nursery school children, Susan Isaacs reports, "The existence of an outsider is in the beginning an essential condition of any warmth or togetherness within the group."¹²

So deeply was William James impressed by the fact that social cohesiveness seems to require a common enemy that he wrote a famous essay on the subject. In *The Moral Equivalent for War* he recognized the adventuresomeness, the aggression, and the competitiveness that marked human relationships, especially among young people of military age. In order that they themselves might live at peace he recommended that they find an enemy that would not violate man's growing sense of loyalty to humanity. His advice was: fight nature, fight disease, fight poverty.

Now there is no denying that the presence of a threatening common enemy will cement the in-group sense of any organized aggregate of people. A family (if it is not already badly disrupted) will grow cohesive in the face of adversity, and a nation is never so unified as in time of war. But the psychological emphasis must be placed primarily on the desire for security, not on hostility itself.

One's own family is an in-group; and by definition all other families on the street are out-groups; but seldom do they clash. A hundred ethnic groups compose America, and while serious conflict occasionally occurs, the majority rub along in peace. One knows that one's lodge has distinctive characteristics that mark it off from all others, but one does not necessarily despise the others.

The situation, it seems, can best be stated as follows: although we could not perceive our own in-groups excepting as they contrast to out-groups, still the in-groups are psychologically primary. We live in them, by them, and, sometimes, for them. Hostility toward out-groups helps strengthen our sense of belonging, but it is not required.

Because of their basic importance to our own survival and self-esteem we tend to develop a partisanship and ethnocentrism in respect to our in-groups. Seven-year-old children in one town were asked, "Which are better, the children in this town or in Smithfield (a neighboring town)?" Almost all replied, "The children in this town." When asked why, the children usually replied, "I don't know the kids in Smithfield." This incident puts the initial in-group and out-group situation in perspective. The familiar is *preferred*. What is alien is regarded as somehow inferior, less "good," but there is not necessarily hostility against it.

Thus while a certain amount of predilection is inevitable in all in-group memberships, the reciprocal attitude toward out-groups may range widely. At one extreme they may be viewed as a common enemy to be defeated in order to protect the in-group and strengthen its inner loyalties. At the other extreme the out-group may be appreciated, tolerated, even liked for its diversity. Commenting on this matter in his Encyclical entitled *Unity of the*

People, Pope Pius XII recognized value in the existing variety of cultural groups. Let this diversity remain, he urged, but let it not be marked by hostility. The unity of people, he said, is a unity of attitude—of tolerance and love—not a unity of uniformity.

Can Humanity Constitute an In-group?

One's family ordinarily constitutes the smallest and the firmest of one's in-groups. It is probably for this reason that we usually think of in-groups growing weaker and weaker the larger their circle of inclusion. Figure 2 expresses the common feeling that the potency of the membership becomes less as the distance from personal contact grows larger. Only a few sample memberships are included in the diagram in order not to complicate the point at issue.




FIG. 2. Hypothetical lessening of in-group potency as membership becomes more inclusive.

Such an image implies that a world-loyalty is the most difficult to achieve. In part the implication is correct. There seems to be special difficulty in fashioning an in-group out of an entity as embracing as mankind. Even the ardent believer in One World has trouble. Suppose a diplomat is dealing at a conference table with representatives of other countries whose language, manners, and ideology differ from his own. Even if this diplomat believes ardently in One World, still he cannot escape a sense of strangeness in his encounters. His own model of propriety and rightness is his own culture. Other languages and customs inevitably seem outlandish and, if not inferior, at least slightly absurd and unnecessary.

Suppose the delegate is so broadminded that he can see many defects in his own nation, and suppose he sincerely wants to build an ideal society, where the good features of many cultures are

blended. Even such an extreme idealism is likely to wring from him only minor concessions. With utmost sincerity he finds himself fighting for his own language, religion, ideology, law, forms of etiquette. After all, his nation's way of life is *his* way of life—and he cannot lightly abrogate the ground of his whole existence.

Such almost reflex preference for the familiar grips us all. To be sure, a well-traveled person, or one who is endowed with cosmopolitan tastes, is relatively more hospitable to other nations. He can see that differences in culture do not necessarily mean inferiority. But for persons neither imaginative nor well-traveled artificial props are needed. They require *symbols*—today almost lacking—in order to make the human in-group seem real. Nations have flags, parks, schools, capitol buildings, currency, newspapers, holidays, armies, historical documents. Only gradually and with small publicity are a few of these symbols of unity evolving on an international scale. They are greatly needed in order to provide mental anchorage points around which the idea of world-loyalty may develop.

There is no intrinsic reason why the outermost circle of membership needs to be the weakest. In fact, race itself has become the dominant loyalty among many people, especially among fanatic advocates of "Aryanism" and among certain members of oppressed races. It seems today that the clash between the idea of race and of One World (the two outermost circles) is shaping into an issue that may well be the most decisive in human history. The important question is, Can a loyalty to mankind be fashioned before inter-racial warfare breaks out?

Theoretically it can, for there is a saving psychological principle that may be invoked if we can learn how to do so in time. The principle states that *concentric loyalties need not clash*. To be devoted to a large circle does not imply the destruction of one's attachment to a smaller circle.¹³ *The loyalties that clash are almost invariably those of identical scope*. A bigamist who has founded two families of procreation is in fatal trouble with himself and with society. A traitor who serves two nations (one nominally and one actually) is mentally a mess and socially a felon. Few people can acknowledge more than one alma mater, one religion, or one fraternity. On the other hand, a world-federalist can be a devoted family man, an ardent alumnus, and a sincere patriot. The fact that some fanatic nationalists would challenge the compatibility of world-loyalty with patriotism does not change the psychological law. Wendell Willkie and Franklin Roosevelt were no less patriots because they envisioned a United Nations in One World.

Concentric loyalties take time to develop, and often, of course,

they fail completely to do so. In an interesting study of Swiss children Piaget and Weil discovered the resistance of young children to the idea that one loyalty can be included within another. The following record of a seven-year-old is typical of that age:

Have you heard of Switzerland? *Yes*. What is it? *A canton*. And what is Geneva? *A town*. Where is Geneva? *In Switzerland*. (But the child draws two circles side by side.) Are you Swiss? *No, I'm Genevuese*.

At a later stage (eight to ten) children grasp the idea that Geneva is enclosed spatially in Switzerland and draw their relationship as one circle enclosing the other. But the idea of concentric loyalty is still elusive.

What is your nationality? *I'm Swiss*. How is that? *Because I live in Switzerland*. You're Genevuese too? *No, I can't be*. Why not? *I'm Swiss now and can't be Genevuese as well*.

By the age of ten or eleven the child can straighten the matter out.

What is your nationality? *I'm Swiss*. How is that? *Because my parents are Swiss*. Are you Genevuese as well? *Naturally, because Geneva is in Switzerland*.

Likewise by the age of ten or eleven the child has an emotional evaluation of his national circle.

I like Switzerland because it's a free country.

I like Switzerland because it's the Red Cross country.

In Switzerland our neutrality makes us charitable.

It is evident that these emotional valuations are learned from teachers and parents, and are adopted ready-made. The mode of teaching ordinarily stops the process of enlargement at this point. Beyond the borders of the native land there is only the domain of "foreigners"—not of fellow men. Michel, aged nine and one-half, answered the interviewer as follows:

Have you ever heard of such people as foreigners? *Yes, the French, the Americans, the Russians, the English*. Quite right. Are there differences between all these people? *Oh yes, they don't speak the same language*. And what else? Try to tell me as much as possible. *The French are not very serious, they don't worry about anything, and it's dirty there*. And what do you think of the Americans? *They're ever so rich and clever*. They've discovered the atom bomb. And what do you think of the Russians? *They're bad, they're always wanting to make*

war. Now look, how did you come to know all you've told me? I don't know . . . I've heard it . . . that's what people say.

Most children never enlarge their sense of belonging beyond the ties of family, city, nation. The reason seems to be that those with whom the child lives, and whose judgment he mirrors, do not do so. Piaget and Weil write, "Everything suggests that, on discovering the values accepted in his immediate circle, the child feels bound to accept the circle's opinions of all other national groups."¹⁴

While the national orbit is the largest circle of loyalty that most children learn, there is no necessity for the process to stop there. In some children of twelve and thirteen years of age these investigators found a high sense of "reciprocity," i.e., a willingness to admit that all peoples have equal value and merit, although each prefers its own mode of life. When such a sense of reciprocity is firmly established, the way is prepared for the integrated conception of larger and larger units of mankind, to all of which the young person can be loyal without losing his earlier attachments. Until he learns this attitude of reciprocity, he is unlikely to accept other countries as lying within the orbit of his loyalty.

In summary, in-group memberships are vitally important to individual survival. These memberships constitute a web of habits. When we encounter an outsider who follows different customs we unconsciously say, "He breaks my habits." Habit-breaking is unpleasant. We prefer the familiar. We cannot help but feel a bit on guard when other people seem to threaten or even question our habits. Attitudes partial to the in-group, or to the reference group, do not necessarily require that attitudes toward other groups be antagonistic—even though hostility often helps to intensify the in-group cohesion. Narrow circles can, without conflict, be supplemented by larger circles of loyalty. This happy condition is not often achieved, but it remains from the psychological point of view a hopeful possibility.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. W. G. OLD. *The Shu King, or the Chinese Historical Classic*. New York: J. Lane, 1904, 50-51. See also J. LEGGE (Transl.), *Texts of Confucianism*, in *The Sacred Books of the East*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879, Vol. III, 75-76.
2. J. L. MORENO. *Who shall survive?* Washington: Nervous & Mental Disease Pub. Co., 1934, 24. These data are somewhat old. At the present time there are grounds for believing that the sex boundary is not so important among children as formerly.

3. C. STRACHEY (ED.). *The Letters of the Earl of Chesterfield to his Son*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1925, Vol. I, 261.
4. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, 5.
5. E. B. BAX (ED.). *Selected Essays of Schopenhauer*. London: G. Bell & Sons, 1914, 340.
6. Reprinted by permission of Chapman & Hall, Ltd., from *A Modern Utopia*. London, 1905, 322.
7. M. AND CAROLYN W. SHERIF. *Groups in Harmony and Tension*. New York: Harper, 1953, 161.
8. The order found by Bogardus in 1928 (E. S. BOGARDUS, *Immigration and Race Attitudes*, Boston: D. C. HEATH, 1928) was found essentially unchanged by HARTLEY in 1946, and again by SPOERL in 1951. (Cf. E. L. HARTLEY, *Problems in Prejudice*, New York: Kings Crown Press, 1946; and DOROTHY T. SPOERL, Some aspects of prejudice as affected by religion and education, *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1951, 33, 69-76).
9. ROSE ZELIGS. Racial attitudes of Jewish children. *Jewish Education*, 1937, 9, 148-152.
10. M. AND CAROLYN W. SHERIF. *Op. cit.*, 218.
11. Among the studies of this type we may refer especially to: A. MORROW AND J. FRENCH, Changing a stereotype in industry, *Journal of Social Issues*, 1945, 1, 33-37; R. LIPPITT, *Training in Community Relations*, New York: Harper, 1949; MARGOT H. WORMSER AND CLAIRE SELTZ, *How to Conduct a Community Self-survey of Civil Rights*, New York: Association Press, 1951; K. LEWIN, Group decision and social change in T. M. NEWCOMB AND E. L. HARTLEY (EDS.), *Readings in Social Psychology*, New York: Holt, 1947.
12. SUSAN ISAACS. *Social Development in Young Children*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1933, 250.
13. This spatial metaphor has its limitations. The reader may ask, What really is the innermost circle of loyalty? It is by no means always the family, as Fig. 2 implies. May not the core be the primordial self-love we discussed in Chapter 2? If we regard self as the central circle, then the broadening loyalties are, psychologically speaking, simply extensions of the self. But as the self widens, it may also re-center itself, so that what is at first an outer circle may become psychologically the focus. Thus a religious person, for example, may believe that man is made in God's image: therefore his own love of God and man may, for him, lie in the innermost circle. Both loyalties and prejudices are features of personality organization, and in the last analysis each organization is unique. While this criticism is entirely valid, still for our present purposes Fig. 2 can stand as an approximate representation of the fact that for many people the larger the social system the less easily do they encompass it in their span of understanding and affection.
14. J. PIAGET AND ANNE-MARIE WEIL. The development in children of the idea of the homeland and of relations with other countries. *International Social Science Bulletin*, 1951, 3, 570.