Locke claims that while we have direct access only to our ideas, those ideas are representations of things out in the material world. Our ideas are ABOUT things in the world.
Berkeley's objection to that view: section 8, p. 472-nothing can be like an idea but another idea.
Locke claims that while secondary qualities (as we experience them) exist only in our minds, primary qualities exist in the material world.
Berkeley's objection to that view: section 10, pp. 472-the primary qualities cannot be conceived without conceiving the secondary qualities.
Locke claims that the existence of material objects is independent of the fact of anyone conceiving of them.
Berkeley objects that the very idea of a sensible something existing unconceived is unintelligible. (Sections 22-24, p. 475)
Locke claims that our ideas are caused by material objects and their qualities.
Berkeley objects that only a spirit can be a cause, and so inert things cannot cause ideas (Section 25, p. 476) .
Evaluate the following argument expressing Berkeley's rejection of Locke's view.
1. If the world consists of material objects which exist independently of our minds, and we immediately perceive only our ideas in our minds, then we have no knowledge of the world.
2. But surely we have knowledge of the world.
So, the following two claims cannot both be true: 1) the world consists of material objects which exist independently of our minds, and 2) we immediately perceive only our ideas in our minds.
3. We certainly immediately perceive only our ideas in our minds.
So, it cannot be true that the world consists of material objects which exist independently of our minds.
What exactly is Berkeley's positive view? Does he think that common sense objects like tables and chairs are real? Can we have knowledge of our common sense world?
Berkeley's view as articulated in Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous.
(p. 416) Phil. This point then is agreed between us--that sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense.
. . . . . . .
Sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many sensible qualities or combinations of sensible qualities?
Suppose that primary qualities and secondary qualities are the only sensible qualities.
Suppose that Berkeley can show that secondary qualities exist only in our minds.
Suppose that Berkeley can show that primary qualities exist only in our minds.
What follows about the existence of sensible things?