

The declaimers, both the students and the professionals, play at the greatest role in Roman society. They are a Cato or a Cicero defending the state from tyranny, repairing the divided family, winning father back to a more benevolent persona. Declamation is not political in the sense of urging a particular policy or of communicating an ideology (republicanism) alternate to the reality of the rule of the Caesars. Declamation is political in the sense that it imagines the present as the direct and legitimate descendant of traditional Roman values and roles. The orator and the military hero are united in this imaginary scenario, where the son, who represents both, pleads for the approval of his community. Of course, declamation takes place in a ludic space – it is not real, it carries no threat, it trumpets its own fantasy. Above all, declamation indulges in the trope of impersonation (on the rhetorical figure of *fictio personae* see Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.29–37, also 3.8.51; Bloomer 1997c: 57–78). The speaker speaks as a son who in turn may speak as an advocate for his mother. He also takes up a father's and an uncle's perspective, or explores how a freedman, slave, or girl might feel beneath the weight of some injury or calumny. The imagination of other roles, gender, and status serves the imagination of his coming adult role as speaker and advocate.

FURTHER READING

For the Latin texts of our extant declamatory material, see Winterbottom (1974, 1984) and Sussman (1987, 1994a). Fairweather (1981) provides a useful discussion of the elder Seneca and his work. Bonner (1949) has been the fundamental study in English of Roman declamation for over half a century and still provides the best starting point. On ancient criticisms of declamation and its role in the supposed decline of oratory during the imperial period, see Caplan (1944) and Cousin (1967: 127–9), in French. More recent studies, however, offer fresh insights into the social, literary, and educational aspects of declamation; see, for example, Beard (1993), Bloomer (1997a: 212–14, 1997b, 1997c), Kaster (2001), Gunderson (2003), and chapter 6 in this volume. For a thorough account of the relationship between Roman law and declamation, see Dingel (1988), in German. On Hermagoras, see Nadeau (1959) and Barwick (1964), in German. Russell (1983) provides an introduction to Greek declamation.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

Quintilian as Rhetorician and Teacher

Jorge Fernández López

If we had to choose only two authors to provide us with as complete a picture of Roman rhetoric as possible, they would undoubtedly be Cicero and Quintilian. Cicero is often portrayed as the incarnation of Roman eloquence, both as an accomplished orator and as a theorist and historian of rhetoric. Quintilian, on the other hand, provides us with the largest handbook on rhetoric that has survived from antiquity: the *Institutio Oratoria*. The fact that Quintilian's work deals with the entire spectrum of rhetoric's technical aspects in a thorough and systematic way as well as with rhetoric's wider moral, social, and educational contexts makes it still more relevant. He is, moreover, able to make critical judgments on the oratory of the Ciceronian period from a historical perspective; his assessments may well be biased but they nevertheless offer us some fascinating insights. All this makes the *Institutio* a privileged window onto the panorama of ancient rhetoric, an invaluable witness to the ancient perception of ancient literature, and an excellent source for several related issues such as education in the Roman world and the practice of advocacy.

Nevertheless, Quintilian and his *Institutio* have been surprisingly neglected by modern scholarship, and the attention that they have received tends to focus on just a few specific areas: his discussion of pedagogy in book 1, the review of ancient literature in book 10, and his portrait of the ideal orator in book 12 (see Adamietz 1986: 2226). There are two main reasons for this: the sheer length of the *Institutio*, which goes far beyond that of most handbooks (a feature that also led to its limited readership in the Middle Ages; see Ward 1995b), and the post-Romantic discrediting of rhetoric as a discipline that generated the more mechanical and empty ornamental traits of imperial literature. Quintilian's work was viewed within the history of Roman culture mainly as an ardent defense of Ciceronian style against innovations represented by Seneca. It was also regarded as a symptom of the rhetorical excesses that affected literature, as if rhetoric and literature were clearly distinguishable from each other in antiquity.

Biographical Outline

Quintilian (Marcus Fabius Quintilianus) was born in Calagurris (modern Calahorra, Spain) in the Tarraconensis province within a family of rhetoricians around the year 35 CE. He received his education at Rome, where he met famous teachers of the time such as Domitius Afer and Remmius Palaemon. At some point shortly after his formative training Quintilian returned to his native land, where he taught rhetoric probably at Tarraco. From 68 CE Quintilian spent his entire life as a teacher and occasional practitioner of rhetoric in Rome. His professional career was very successful: outstanding members of the Roman elite such as the younger Pliny (*Ep.* 2.14.9, 6.6.3) and the emperor Domitian's grandnephews were among his students (probably also Tacitus and Suetonius), and he was appointed the first public chair of rhetoric by the emperor Vespasian in 78.

Quintilian composed his major work, the *Institutio Oratoria*, after he retired in 88 CE. He devoted two to three years to its composition: it was begun in 93 and published probably in 95. Apart from the *Institutio Oratoria*, several works circulated in antiquity under the name of Quintilian. The first of them is the *De Causis Corruptae Eloquentiae* (*Inst.* 6 *praef.* 3, 8.3.58), which was written immediately before the *Institutio*, where Quintilian seems to have fought against the new anti-classical style represented above all by Seneca. (This work was identified with Tacitus' *Dialogus de Oratoribus* for centuries; see Brink 1994 and Dominik 1997b for ideological coincidences and differences between both works.) In addition, two books that summarized Quintilian's teaching were compiled by some students of his and were then issued without his permission (cf. *Inst.* 1 *praef.* 7). As we shall see below, Quintilian also pleaded occasionally in the courts, although none of his speeches are extant (see 7.2.24). Finally, two collections of declamations, the complete nineteen *Declamationes Maiores* and the fragmentary *Declamationes Minores* have been attributed to Quintilian over the centuries. While he was not the author of these declamations, some of the *minores* were probably linked in some way to his school.

Quintilian was educated by the best teachers in Rome and lived in close contact with individuals of the highest rank. It was to this elite that the *Institutio*, a compendium of his lifelong experience in rhetoric, was addressed, and it is not surprising to find him adopting in it decisive positions on almost every significant rhetorical issue.

The *Institutio Oratoria*: Meaning and Structure

The *Institutio Oratoria* is Quintilian's major work. Its declared goal is to outline the instruction required to produce an orator as close to perfection as possible, drawing on everything written in the field of rhetoric during the previous 500 years. The ideal orator envisioned by Quintilian, however, is not just someone who has mastered all the rhetorical devices but rather is a man who has also acquired a vast knowledge of culture both philosophical and literary, who is gifted with a high moral sense, and who puts this entire legacy to the service of his community through the successful practice of rhetoric in public life (see *Inst.* 12.1.26, where political leadership is mentioned as the ideal orator's supreme function). Quintilian brings new life to Cato the Censor's famous

formula of the *vir bonus dicendi peritus* ("good man skilled in the art of speaking," 12.1.1), but his ideal also has its roots in Isocrates, includes elements of Stoicism (see Walzer 2003), and is further influenced by Cicero's rhetorical writings, particularly the dialogue *De Oratore*, which is quoted over sixty times throughout the *Institutio*.

The *Institutio* was arranged by Quintilian in twelve books, each of which is divided into as many as 115 self-contained chapters; modern editions of the Latin text are about 700 pages long. At its most general structural level the *Institutio* can be divided into three parts. The first part covers issues prior to the teaching of rhetoric, mainly early education and the definition of rhetoric (1–3.5). The second section presents the system of rhetoric, which is presented in lengthy discussions organized according to the orator's five *officia* ("traditional tasks"), a scheme common in other Greek and Roman handbooks and traceable back to Aristotle; these *officia* are *inventio* (3.6–6.5), *dispositio* (7.1–10), *elocutio* (8.1–11.1), *memoria* (11.2) and *actio* (11.3). The third part discusses moral and other aspects concerning the practice of rhetoric in society (12.1–11).

Quintilian's bold and comprehensive vision for his work encompasses not just rhetoric and its related subjects but also human culture and society in general. Skill in public speaking was the main focus of ancient education; this means that all areas of ancient culture were rhetoricized to some degree. Rhetorical training should be regarded not just as acquisition of knowledge and technique but as a more complex and wide-ranging "process of acculturation" (cf. Habinek 2005: 60–78). Quintilian's *Institutio* provides modern readers with a sound guide to what he considers the proper process of acculturation that Roman members of the ruling class should undergo.

Such a broad conception obliges Quintilian to define explicitly and carefully what he understands as rhetoric and to place his discipline within the cultural context of his time. It is in book 2 where the issue of how rhetoric should be defined is addressed. Quintilian presents the different views available in the tradition from Plato onward (2.14–15) and aligns himself on the side of those who see in rhetoric something more than a mere art of persuasion. The wording of his definition, according to which rhetoric is *bene dicendi scientia* ("the discipline of speaking well," 2.15.34; cf. 3.3.12), underlines the moral dimension with which he wishes to endow the discipline and is closely linked with the more extensive treatment of rhetoric and morality to be found in book 12. During the discussion Quintilian explains (2.18) that rhetoric is a "practical" *techne*, that is, one whose essence is "action," even though it shares traits with two other Aristotelian kinds of *techne*, "theoretical" and "poetic"; he then upholds the position that the subject matter of rhetoric is everything that is submitted to it for speaking (*materiam esse rhetorices iudico omnes res quaecumque ei ad dicendum subiectae erunt*, 2.21.4). He ends book 2 by addressing the question whether rhetoric can also be considered a virtue (2.20). Although Quintilian admits the existence of "wrong" forms of rhetoric, that is, those that are artless, trivial, or morally reprehensible, he maintains that "real" rhetoric, the kind of rhetoric he has in mind, is a virtue – an idea that many even among the philosophers maintain (*sit, ut compluribus etiam philosophorum placet, virtus*, 2.20.1; cf. 8 *praef.* 6).

This conception of rhetoric, undetached from ethics and with its all-inclusive subject matter, cannot avoid the issue of its relationship with philosophy, the other discipline that also devoted itself to the broad fields of knowledge and morals. Here too Quintilian's conception of the desirable relationship between eloquence and

philosophy is explicitly linked to Cicero's ideal: both disciplines are naturally joined together (1 *praef.* 13) and only the course of history has opened a gap between them. Quintilian takes pains in the proem to book 1 to show that it is philosophers who are on the wrong side of this gap, for the mission he has in mind for his ideal orator (*regere consiliis urbes, fundare legibus, emendare iudiciis*, "to rule cities with his counsel, to give them a firm base with his laws, to correct them with his judgments," 1 *praef.* 10) conflicts with that usually assumed by philosophers. Quintilian is well aware that his battle to bestow cultural and educational hegemony upon rhetoric is a difficult one and he devotes much energy to discrediting philosophers in this crucial opening section of the work. Quintilian's attack is based predominately on two grounds: (1) the very matter of philosophy cannot be the object of a technical discipline since it is something of general interest and even the subject of common conversation (1 *praef.* 16); and (2) philosophers, as they are found now in society, cannot be considered as models of moral behavior no matter what illustrious ancestors they may claim to have (1 *praef.* 15).

Early Education: *Institutio Oratoria*, Book 1

The first book of the *Institutio*, together with the section in book 10 devoted to the readings recommended for the orator-to-be, is the part of Quintilian's work that has attracted a broader interest over the centuries (see Colson 1924). Book 1 does not deal with rhetoric proper but with the initial stages of education prior to the teaching of rhetoric. Here Quintilian has the opportunity to display his positive attitude toward students. From this attitude springs the image of him as a benevolent teacher devoted to his task with an almost sacred zeal (Schwabe 1909: 1859; see Kennedy 1962 for a balanced criticism of enthusiasm toward Quintilian's character).

Since Quintilian's ambitious program aims to leave no aspect of the formation of the perfect orator untouched, his advice starts literally from the cradle: parents must be conscious that their son will be an orator and must act accordingly immediately after birth (1.1.3); nurses, who will spend the most time with the newborn, should be as educated as possible (1.1.4–5); and if well-educated *paedagogi* cannot be found, then they should at least be conscious of their lack of education (1.1.8–9). Quintilian's views have rightly been considered open-minded and relatively innovative, a feature that largely explains his warm reception among modern readers. He advocates ideas and practices that seem to have run counter to long-established usage. Note, for example, what he considers the best way to optimize the early years of education, a period regarded as crucial for shaping many habits and character traits: he insists on the convenience of studying several subjects simultaneously (1.1.12–14), on the benefits of starting school at the earliest possible age and before the traditional age of seven (1.1.15–17), on the need for relaxation and even fun if learning is to be fruitful (1.3.8), on the advantages of good pedagogic material (1.1.24–6), and on the superiority of instruction in schools over private tuition (1.2.1–31). Quintilian also strongly rejects corporal punishment as pointlessly cruel (1.3.13–18) and warns against the possibility of physical abuse that such a frame of violence can foster (1.3.17).

The greater part of book 1 (1.4–9) is devoted to *grammatica* ("grammar"), the educational stage between elementary instruction and rhetorical schooling. This

consisted essentially of the detailed learning of linguistic correctness, both written and spoken, and the technical study of poetry, where Vergil was already established as the most important text. (On the whole grammatical curriculum, see Bonner 1977: 189–249; Fritz 1949 provides a balanced and accurate account of Quintilian's views and their wider context.) Quintilian is detailed in his exposition even to the point of prolixity; his lavish exemplification provides the modern reader with a wealth of information about many linguistic usages of the time and illustrates the extent to which Latin was not so fixed a language as literary texts suggest. Beyond the minuteness of particular issues Quintilian does articulate a theory of linguistic correctness that corresponds to modern views on the subject and is based on four criteria (1.6.1–3): *ratio*, *vetustas*, *auctoritas*, and *consuetudo*. Quintilian's preferences give clear preeminence to *consuetudo* – widespread linguistic usage – as the supreme discriminating criterion; this is followed by authority (usages to be found in the "right" writers). On the other hand, analogy, while defended by other critics, must be considered a secondary guide and is often misleading. Quintilian is conscious of the diverse linguistic registers available to a speaker, and the one he draws particular attention to is what we would call the "learned norm," which is why he defines *consuetudo* as *consensus eruditorum* ("the consensus of the educated," 1.6.45).

Quintilian finishes the first book of his *Institutio* with a consideration of the other disciplines that the future orator should also learn. Quintilian's broad conception of rhetoric implies that an orator must be well versed in almost every topic; hence he recommends the study of logic, music (1.10.9–33), and geometry (1.10.34–49). Given the importance of oratorical delivery, Quintilian also recommends the help of other teachers such as actors (1.11.1–15) and gymnastic trainers (1.11.15–19). Such a complete curriculum has much in common with the Greek ideal of the *enkyklios paideia*. Quintilian, however, puts all the emphasis on rhetoric: everything is learned for the sake of an expanded cultural, moral, and philosophical rhetoric that is to replace previous educational ideals. Instead of an all-encompassing *enkyklios paideia* we find a universal rhetoric to which all other disciplines are subordinate.

The System of Rhetoric in the *Institutio*

Preliminary issues: history and basic categories

When book 3 begins, Quintilian has already dealt with the issues prior to the system of rhetoric itself. After a short excursus on the origin and historical development of rhetoric, he delves into the core matter of his work by explaining in order the main categories upon which such a system is built. Quintilian's initial remarks at this point are typically modest and considerate. First, he warns the reader of the relatively dry nature of the exposition he is about to undertake (3.1.2), although he claims to have incorporated some stylistic embellishments into his prose in an attempt to move away from the approach taken by traditional handbooks (3.1.3). Secondly, he explicitly renounces any claim to doctrinal originality; his aim is to present a careful and balanced selection of material critically chosen from a variety of earlier authors (on Quintilian's sources see Cousin 1935; Russell 2001: 1.5–8). Quintilian notes, however, that on occasions he will set forth his own position on a particular topic (3.1.22).

After his introduction Quintilian briefly sketches the history of rhetoric (3.1.8–21) by referring to many of the traditional figures: Empedocles as the first writer on rhetoric (according to Aristotle), the quasi-mythical Tisias and Corax, and Gorgias as the “importer” of the discipline into Athens. Quintilian prefers not to linger on what he considers sterile controversies and closes the topic by saying that worrying about the origin of rhetoric need not delay us long (*nec diu nos moretur quaestio quae rhetorices origo sit*, 3.2.1). The issue has already been indirectly touched upon in book 2 (2.17.8), where Quintilian addresses a question that is the subject of modern controversy: is there some kind of rhetoric outside or prior to the traditional account of the discipline? His answer is a clear no: although the art of rhetoric results from a process of observation and gradual deduction of rules (3.2.3) and although persuasive communication is a human universal (3.2.4), as can be attested in Homer (2.17.8), rhetoric (a systematic *techne*) is not the same as oratory, which is a persuasive activity that can be pre-rhetorical or simply nonrhetorical.

After settling these historical matters, Quintilian proceeds to explain the essential sets of categories which comprise the system of rhetoric: the five divisions of rhetoric (3.3), the kinds of cause (3.4), and several others, among which stasis theory (3.6) receives the longest treatment because of its complexity and because here Quintilian makes his own original contribution (see Adamietz 1986: 2260–3; Montefusco 1986). Quintilian adheres to the traditional division in five parts, which recalls Cicero’s authority in the *Partitiones Oratoriae*, but he does mention rhetoricians such as Dio of Prusa, Theodorus of Gadara, and Hermagoras, whose different divisions he does not approve (3.3.8–9).

The *Institutio* as a whole is concerned primarily with forensic oratory. Epideictic and deliberative oratory are dealt with summarily (3.7–8); even though some allusions to these two genres can be found scattered through the work, from this point onward the *genus iudiciale, quod est praecipue multiplex* (“which is particularly complicated,” 3.9.1), constitutes the main concern of the technical part of the work. Accordingly the remainder of book 3 is devoted to other preliminary taxonomies that condition the general structure of a given forensic speech: the types of cause (three “types” not to be mistaken with the three *genera*), the question (*quaestio*), the line of defense (*ratio*), and several others (3.10–11). Quintilian explicitly follows Hermagoras here and also discusses some conceptual quarrels he considers irksome to the point of exclaiming: *verum haec adfectata subtilitas circa nomina rerum ambitiose laboret* (“but these minute affectations about terms for things are pretentious labours!”, 3.11.21); similar discomfort with excessive subtlety is already expressed in 1 *praef.* 24–5.

Quintilian usually adopts a conservative attitude: he generally aligns himself with the well-established and more widespread categories. Although he admits that there has been some progress in perfecting the system of rhetoric, he regrets that profitable innovations are often mixed with the subversion of established sound principles (3.1.8).

The core of the speech: invention and arrangement

Quintilian devotes over a third of the *Institutio* (more than four books) to the joint analysis of *inventio* (3.6–6.5) and *dispositio* (7.1–10). In his discussion he follows the “natural” order of the different parts of the speech, namely *exordium*, *narratio*,

argumentatio, and *peroratio*, and also considers some subdivisions of these main four as well as transitions between them (although he does in fact introduce some digressions now and then that do not fit neatly into such a scheme). The material is organized in this way for pedagogical reasons, but Quintilian also notes that invention and arrangement, together with *elocutio*, must be conceived as an interrelated whole (3.3.6).

Exordium (4.1) and *narratio* (4.2) are the first parts discussed. They are granted less space than *argumentatio*, which takes up all of book 5, and are presented in a highly conventional way (coincidences with previous sources such as Cicero and *Rhetorica ad Herennium* are especially evident here). Quintilian, however, expresses his own views on several matters, often as a reaction against widespread school practices and what he considers uncritically assumed orthodoxies and inertias. As in other places, Quintilian shows his dislike of excessive taxonomization and subdivision, this time with regard to both *narratio* (4.2.2–3) and *partitio* (4.5.24). He also disapproves of the generally recommended lack of emotional appeal in the *narratio* (4.2.111), since restrained use of pathos is a resource that an orator should always be ready to handle. The book also deals with different possible types of transition between *narratio* and *argumentatio*, namely *digressio* (4.3), *propositio* (4.4), and *partitio* (4.5).

Up to this point Quintilian has not progressed too far in his detailed explanation of the system of rhetoric. However, one of the main principles that determines his course of discussion and that will be pervasive throughout the remainder of the work has already appeared: Quintilian’s advice sets as its constant target successful practice in the courts and condemns many trends that, although widely followed, are rooted in the environment of the schools. Every rhetorical device regarded by Quintilian as too colorful, artful, twisted, or flashy is therefore criticized mainly on the basis of its limited ability to persuade. The more technical part of the *Institutio* is thus put implicitly to the service of Quintilian’s ideal of rhetoric, not to what is in vogue both at schools and as public entertainment. Quintilian also imparts a moral dimension to what he had declared to be essentially a dry exposition of rules and precepts: by showing that some of the rhetoric practiced by his contemporaries has it “wrong” or is even degenerate, he implies that other related aspects are to be condemned too. In this respect Quintilian displays a rather limited conception of rhetorical effectiveness, for the resources he disapproves of do in fact attain a measure of success within the audience that they target, even if this success is based on applause rather than persuasion.

The importance granted to forensic rhetoric can also be seen in the weight Quintilian gives to *argumentatio*, which fills the whole of book 5 and is one of the longest and most technical discussions in the work. The matter is treated under two main heads: (1) inartificial proofs (5.2–7), that is, external evidence (witnesses, documents, confession extracted through torture, etc.) that is not the result of rhetorical elaboration and is thus foreign to the art (hence *inartificialis*); and (2) artificial proofs (5.8–14) or arguments, which are built according to the rules of the art of rhetoric (and are therefore *artificialis*). Such a distinction can already be found in Aristotle (*Rh.* 1.13–14), but it does not receive much attention from Quintilian’s main point of reference, Cicero. The greater part of book 5, however, is devoted to proof within the system of rhetoric, which includes the study of “signs” (arguments

built upon external evidence, 5.9), argumentation through examples (including examples taken from history or poetry, 5.11), and arguments in the true sense of the term (5.10, 5.12, 5.13). Once again Quintilian delves into the doxographical tradition of terminology and, although he refers to the Greek distinction between enthymemes, epicheiremes, and demonstrations, he regards them all as falling within the general concept named in Latin by the term *argumentum* (5.1.1). The issue of *loci* receives detailed discussion in the book (5.10.20–94), but Quintilian uses the term not to designate stock arguments on general subjects but rather in the same sense as in Aristotle (*Rb.* 2.15–30), namely, as argumentative patterns suitable to admit any possible content. The book ends with a new call for practicality (5.14.28–9), at which point Quintilian renews his fight against philosophy (audiences cannot understand the dialectic subtleties of elaborate argumentation) and reminds the reader that there are two other forms of persuasion apart from logic: emotional appeal (*pathos*) and the orator's own personal qualities (*ethos*); these, he claims, are often more effective in the long run.

Having discussed the *exordium*, *narratio*, and *argumentatio*, Quintilian turns in book 6 to address the last of the parts of a speech, the *peroratio*. He has already established that one of rhetoric's aims is to sway the emotions (*movere animos*, 2.17.26), countering the traditional Stoic objection to this technique by claiming that the orator is a *vir bonus* who will never trespass the limits set by *decorum*. The place in a speech where appeals to the emotions can play a significant role is precisely the *peroratio*, and it is for this reason that a good part of book 6 deals with the issue of pathos; it is appropriate then that the preface to the book is a highly emotional text where Quintilian recalls the loss of his wife and his two children (see Leigh 2004). After the preface the book begins with the general characteristics of a *peroratio*, whose main functions are recapitulation and emotional appeal, especially to the judge, for the perspective of the forensic genre is always predominant. This description gives Quintilian the opportunity to insert here one of the parts of the *Institutio* that has drawn considerable attention from modern readers: his discussion of pathos in general (6.2) and of the role of humor and laughter in oratory (6.3). Both chapters largely follow Cicero's treatment of these subjects in *De Oratore* (2.178–290), although Quintilian elaborates in much more detail the issue of wit and humor, lavishly illustrating it with examples drawn primarily from Cicero (see chapter 16).

As with every other rhetorical device, however, Quintilian imposes limits on the use of humor, all of which have to do with one quality that must be safeguarded at all cost: the orator's dignity. That is why the humor used by the orator, like his language, must be that of the elite: he must speak in an elegant and sophisticated way (*dicere urbane*) and avoid obscene jokes (6.3.30). The dose must also be kept within some bounds: too much humor diminishes the orator's *auctoritas*, something that also happens when he makes fun of himself; for then, Quintilian warns, he behaves more like a jester than an orator (6.3.82).

Before ending the book and proceeding to deal with *dispositio*, Quintilian briefly touches on two subjects. First, the need of the orator to be well prepared for the debate (termed the *altercatio*) that will take place after the whole formal speech is delivered (6.4); this feature, he notes, is too frequently neglected in the schools as well as in the handbooks and yet it is fundamental for the outcome of real cases (6.4.6–15). Secondly, the importance of using *iudicium* ("discernment,"

"judgment") in all the first three parts of a speech (the idea was initially mentioned at the beginning of the treatment of *inventio* at 3.6.6).

With book 6 Quintilian ends the discussion of invention and related matters and proceeds to *dispositio*, the topic of book 7. As Russell (2001: 3.145) points out, book 7 must be understood as "a supplement to book 3" because it deals with the proper line of argument to be followed according to the theory of *staseis* ("issues") explained earlier. In what is the most technically complex book in the *Institutio*, Quintilian expounds in great detail the types and arrangement of arguments that are most convenient for each "issue," alluding frequently to their application in practical cases and to the difference between the court and school.

The question of style

One of Quintilian's main concerns in the *Institutio* is linguistic style. This concern appears in three different forms: (1) in his technical treatment of *elocutio*, the orator's third *officium* in the traditional system of rhetoric (8.1–11.1); (2) in his passing comments on the different linguistic styles employed both in the past and in his own time; and (3) in the style that he himself employs in the *Institutio*.

Of the five traditional tasks of the orator, *elocutio* has played perhaps the most important role in the history of rhetoric: it was the equation of rhetoric with *elocutio* alone that gave the discipline the bad name it has endured in recent centuries. The topic features prominently in many handbooks and Quintilian devotes to it three books out of the twelve (8, 9, 10). He consciously marks the transition from *dispositio* to *elocutio* with a long preface to book 8 which, after summarizing the main ideas expounded so far, introduces the arduous doctrine of *elocutio*, something that needs more effort and care (*plus exigunt laboris et curae quae secuntur*, 8 *praef.* 13) than the preceding *inventio* and *dispositio*. Quintilian's conception of rhetoric as something more than a mere craft, however, makes him warn his readers that content is more important than words, notwithstanding the difficulties of mastering *elocutio* (8 *praef.* 18–22).

Quintilian organizes his discussion along the lines of the four virtues every speech should display as far as style is concerned: *Latinitas*, *perspicuitas*, *ornatus*, and *decorum*. *Latinitas* ("linguistic correctness," 8.1) is granted little space because it has already been dealt with in book 1; *perspicuitas* ("clarity," 8.2) is defined mainly in negative terms: obscurity must be avoided, and from this clarity will automatically result; *ornatus* ("ornament") is developed at greatest length, taking up the remainder of book 8 and the whole of 9; and *decorum* ("appropriateness," 11.1) is dealt with very briefly but is one of the most important concepts in the work, as we will see below.

Quintilian's first chapters on *ornatus* provide a general approach to the issue: lexical choice (8.3.16–39), merits and faults of style (8.3.40–90), and procedures of amplification and attenuation (8.4) are reviewed. The core of ornament, however, is formed by the discussion of rhetorical figures: tropes (8.6), figures of thought (9.2), and figures of speech (9.3); book 9 ends with a chapter (9.4) devoted to *compositio*, that is to say, the regulation of the syntactical period, including *numerus* (prose rhythm). As usual, Quintilian does not avoid technical complexities and he provides the reader with full surveys and examples, with frequent reference to Vergil, who is second in the *Institutio* only to Cicero in the number of passages quoted from

his works; however, he advocates moderation in the application of taxonomy as well as in the actual use of figures (9.3.100–2).

Quintilian's insistence on the need for practical experience and training reappears here. After his long and detailed review of all the rhetorical figures and devices that *elocutio* requires, he begins book 10 with the affirmation that just knowing them is not enough: *sed haec eloquendi praecepta, sicut cognitioni sunt necessaria, ita non satis ad vim dicendi valent* ("but these rules of style, although they are necessary for theoretical knowledge, are not enough to ensure oratorical power," 10.1.1). The orator's natural abilities and technical knowledge must be complemented by constant exercise (see Montefusco 1996), and the student will gradually acquire mastery of style through imitation of the good authors. Quintilian is conscious, however, that slavish *imitatio* would impede the development of rhetoric – no innovation and no advancement of style would be possible – and that is why he adds the idea of *inventio* (in a general sense, not as the first phase of rhetoric) to *imitatio* (10.2). As Harsting (1998: 1329) points out, "imitation is only a means of acquiring a certain knowledge and certain skills in order to build up a *copia*, i.e., a basis for one's own invention." Invention would then be needed to create a tradition that is established as such by imitation, but that can only grow and survive by means of invention.

It is in this frame of mind that the most famous part of the *Institutio* is introduced by Quintilian (10.1.37–131): his short but complete review of Latin and Greek literature from the beginning to his own time (although living authors are deliberately excluded). Quintilian here is not outlining a canon of Greco-Roman literature from a literary perspective but from the point of view of the contribution that each author can make to the formation of the future orator's style (explicitly stated at 10.1.42). Although general aesthetic judgments do appear time and again, Quintilian's prime concern is always with their utility to the orator. The main idea behind book 10 is, therefore, as Leeman (1963: 311) rightly puts it, to familiarize the future orator with "style in action." Quintilian acknowledges that his canon is limited, for some authors worth reading will be unavoidably excluded (10.1.45), but his general attitude is comprehensive: every author of those who have stood the test of time will be at least of some use to anyone who uses his judgment (*paucos enim vel potius vix ullum ex iis qui vetustatem pertulerunt existimo posse reperiri quin iudicium adhibentibus allaturus sit utilitatis aliquid*, 10.1.40). Quintilian adheres mostly to traditional opinions, trusting often in the authority of Cicero and Horace. Homer (1.10.46–50) is the first author to be considered and receives the expected lavish praise; from there on the rest of Greek literature is discussed (first poetry, then drama, and last of all prose) and this then gives way to Quintilian's appraisal of Roman literature (10.1.85–131).

Quintilian's discussion of Roman prose ends with his well-known criticism of Seneca and his style. The faults that Quintilian finds in Seneca are essentially two: his lack of *iudicium* ("judgment") in what Quintilian calls his *corrupta elocutio* ("depraved style"); and his use of compressed phrases for effect (*minutissimae sententiae*, 10.1.129–30). Quintilian, however, was more worried about Seneca's influence on young imitators, who lacked his talent, than he was with making a direct attack on the philosopher's style. We cannot forget that Seneca appears as the last of the Roman authors considered and he is included as a conspicuous example of a fashionable style that advanced students should be at least acquainted with, not as a model to be imitated (see Laureys 1991).

Quintilian's review of Greek and Roman literature, as well as his treatment of the precepts for *elocutio*, is tightly linked to his own view of the style that was to be practiced in his time. Style is a question of taste, much more so than arrangement or invention. The strength of an argument or a speech's internal coherence creates a persuasive power that works on an essentially logical level. The use of figures and other stylistic features, by contrast, has a persuasive effect that depends much more on changeable tastes. Style is thus potentially a matter for more subjective debate and it generated much heated discussion during the Flavian period. The fact that so much interest was focused on matters of form (rather than content) has been interpreted since antiquity itself as a result of the political constraints imposed by the imperial regime: deliberative oratory was excluded at least to some extent from public space; and rhetorical energy, so to speak, was sublimated within the field of formal expression, of style. This concentration on form, together with the dangers that open discourse implies for dictatorial regimes, would have given rise (it has been argued) to stylistic trends that were complex, self-conscious, and even twisted. (See Rudich 1997 and his idea of a generally "rhetorized mentality" during the empire; also Dominik 1997b: 66.)

Quintilian's position in this respect has been characterized as a reaction against the new triumphant rhetorical styles: an archaizing tendency, on the one hand, and, on the other, the "modern" and affected style that was widespread in the schools and that took Seneca as its model. Quintilian's proposal (see 10.1.43–5, 12.16.58–66) was for a new classicism based largely but critically on the model of Cicero (Leeman 1963: 296–8). But his reaction against what he considered the stylistic vices and excesses of his time has often been overemphasized (see, e.g., Ryland 1911: 855–6, who regards the whole *Institutio* as a "long protest against the tastes of the age"). Nevertheless, Quintilian's attacks on what he considers to be "corrupt eloquence" are vehement enough, even though lamenting the decline of eloquence was a commonplace already by Petronius' time (J. Walker 2000: 94–101). The intensity of his condemnation of school practice, while sincere, can also be seen as part of his battle to replace the standard curriculum with his new vision based on the ideal of the *vir bonus*. There is therefore a clear link between Quintilian's preferred style and the ideal society where his ideal orator would have a place.

As for Quintilian's own style, it is the coherent result of these ideas, of the genre he is writing in, and of his time. The typical prose for a handbook on rhetoric is dry and expository; Quintilian, by contrast, explicitly claims (3.1.3) to have adopted a more refined, elaborate, and occasionally colorful style (even though he is not writing a dialogue or a philosophical work) that includes a moderate use of complex periods (instead of the usual parataxis) and rhetorical figures when the subject matter allows it. Although Cicero is his stylistic model, Quintilian's choice of vocabulary is conditioned by his own time; he is thus not slavishly subject to his model but rather applies his own *iudicium* about what is appropriate in each case.

A coda on style: decorum

The fourth of the virtues of style is, in Russell's (2001: 5.3) words, "the difficult (and almost untranslatable) concept of *decorum*." "Appropriateness" is the most common English rendering and Quintilian grants it the utmost importance since, among all four virtues of *elocutio*, appropriateness is *maxime necessaria* ("the most essential,"

11.1.1). The concept (dealt with in 11.1) bears nonetheless a more general sense than just appropriateness of style to the given circumstances, for it also means “appropriate” or “becoming” at the broadest moral level. Throughout the chapter Quintilian gives abundant examples of cases where *decorum* has been broken, but he eventually admits that *decorum* cannot be taught through precepts: *cuius rei observatio iudicio magis quodam sentiri quam praeceptis tradi potest: quantum satis sit et quantum recipiant aures non habet certam mensuram et quasi pondus...* (“observance of this principle is possible more from instinctive judgment than from taught rules; how much is enough and how much the listeners will accept does not have a precise measurement and weight...,” 11.1.91).

From style Quintilian proceeds to a more general level and presents the idea of *decorum* as the governing rule of all the orator’s actions. Quintilian’s moral concerns are not satisfied by the technical, systematic dimensions of rhetoric. Rhetoric as a system, however powerful, must be a part of a wider whole in order to have true sense and significance. Quintilian finds that sense in something that is outside the system and yet seems to be a part of it, something that can be learned through time but not taught systematically: the idea of *decorum*. This is once again a view that appeals to the aristocratic mentality (compare the definition of linguistic correctness as the *consensus eruditorum*, which is discussed above). Quintilian conceives of rhetoric as something that can be learned and even mastered in its technical aspects but which requires a certain natural talent that he probably regards as the preserve solely of those born within the elite. Moreover, Quintilian emphasizes the moral dimension, which is a matter of *decorum*, that is, of the orator conforming his style, bodily movement, and use of rhetorical devices to the expectations of those who are knowledgeable about these matters and who are good in a moral sense. The *iudicium* every orator is endowed with, as far as he is a *vir bonus*, will ensure his appreciation of what *decorum* prescribes on each occasion (11.1.35).

The Orator in Action

We have seen throughout his discussion of *inventio*, *dispositio*, and *elocutio* that Quintilian repeatedly insists on the relevance of his precepts to actual practice in the courts. It is logical then that he grants the utmost importance to the last of the five traditional rhetorical tasks: delivery (dealt with in 11.3; see too chapter 17). Quintilian adheres to the widespread assumption that mediocre speeches, if well delivered, will be far more effective than the best of speeches poorly performed (11.3.5), something he must have learned from direct experience since he did plead before the court on occasions (Crook 1995: 161–71; Quintilian explains features of his own argumentative practice in 7.1.23–39 and alludes to several cases in which he took part at 9.2.73, 4.1.19, 6.1.39). Quintilian’s most famous case was the defense of Queen Berenice, Titus’ mistress (the precise charge against her is unknown; see Young-Widmaier 2002), and he also admits to having published his speech for a Naevius Arpinus (7.2.24) in a youthful attempt to gain fame.

Quintilian’s great concern with delivery is evident in several parts of the *Institutio*. In book 1, for example, he recommends instruction in acting and gymnastic techniques (1.11.15–19) and in book 12 retirement is recommended precisely on the

grounds of the orator’s physical decline (12.11.2). In this area even more than others Quintilian’s account (11.3) is the fullest treatment of the subject we can read (Cicero dealt with the matter briefly and unsystematically in *De Or.* 3.213–27 and *Orat.* 55–60), and it is likely that he broke new ground in giving such detailed attention to an area that in other treatises was left to common sense and whose content had never been made fully explicit (see Hall 2004).

Quintilian thus gives detailed discussions of voice (11.3.15–30) and the general qualities of good delivery (11.3.30–65), then proceeds to gesture, where he deals one by one with the different parts of the body: head, face, neck, shoulders, and arms (11.3.65–84). Hands receive a good deal of Quintilian’s attention (11.3.85–121; see Maier-Eichhorn 1989), and a discussion of the orator’s dress as well as gestures featuring other parts of the body (11.3.137–49) closes the account. Quintilian insists here, as often, on the need for appropriateness and ends by warning: *huius quoque loci clausula sit eadem necesse est quae ceterorum est, regnare maxime modum* (“it is necessary for the conclusion of this topic to also be the same as that which applies to the others: moderation rules,” 11.3.181).

There has been some debate about how artificial the rhetorical system of gestures outlined by Quintilian actually was and to what extent it was based on the gestures commonly used in daily life. Some scholars, perhaps misled by the minute detail of Quintilian’s account and prescriptions, have claimed that such a system was quite separate from everyday gestural communication and that it could only be learned and mastered through arduous training in rhetorical schools. This view has been rightly contested (for full discussion see Hall 2004, where wide bibliographical reference is provided), and Quintilian’s precepts are best regarded as a conscious selection and stylization of everyday Roman nonverbal communication. Such a selection must be based, once again, on the orator’s sense of dignity, which implies the rejection of improper bodily movements and gestures, especially those that are conceived of as “effeminate” (11.3.32, 11.3.91). The range of issues for which rhetoric functions as a process of acculturation thus extends even to the orator’s awareness of his own “manly” body, a feature that has been fruitfully exploited by gender theorists (see Gunderson 2000: 59–86; also Connolly chapter 7).

The Orator and the Prince

If, as already noted, Quintilian’s character has met with general approval from modern readers, his apparent flattery of the emperor Domitian (3.7.9, 4 *praef.* 2–5, 10.1.91–2) has often generated criticism. In fact, his praise of the *princeps* has been interpreted in a variety of ways: some have viewed it as a sincere expression of support for Domitian’s regime (e.g., McDermott and Orentzel 1979: 15); others as a perfunctory, thoroughly conventional routine, one virtually unavoidable given the circles in which Quintilian moved (e.g., H. Butler 1920: viii; cf. Kennedy 1969: 110). A more complex picture of Quintilian’s relationship with the emperor should take into account several issues that point to a certain intimacy between the rhetor and the successive rulers of the empire.

The first of these issues is Vespasian’s attitude toward provincials: as the first Flavian emperor he showed a very active interest in promoting individuals from the western

provinces to high positions in the Roman administration. Vespasian, following Claudius' earlier policy, made a conscious effort to renew the ruling classes by turning to the more Romanized provinces (especially Hispania) for new blood. Moreover, from a narrower political point of view, Hispania (together with other provinces) had aligned itself with Vespasian while the outcome of the conflict between the Flavians and Vitellius was still uncertain (see Tac. *Hist.* 3.53.5, 3.70.5), a factor that no doubt reinforced Vespasian's favorable attitude.

Another affinity between Quintilian's ideas and the Flavians' policies involves philosophy. As has already been discussed, one of Quintilian's main concerns in the programmatic preface to book 1 of the *Institutio* is his battle with philosophers for hegemony over the intellectual and educational scene of the time, and it was Vespasian who took the extreme measure of banishing philosophers from Rome in 71 CE. It should be noted, however, that the philosophers Quintilian has in mind in his discussion were generally not concerned with political matters, while the ones hounded by Vespasian most probably belonged to the anti-tyrannical Stoic tradition and more or less actively opposed the imperial regime.

It should be remembered too that Domitian's despotic persecutions had almost exclusively as their target the senatorial rank, which traditionally opposed imperial absolutism, a group to which Quintilian did not belong. Moreover the Flavians' rule was characterized for decades by its administrative efficiency. Their success in this respect depended heavily on the selection of reliable collaborators from emergent groups, including a provincial like Quintilian. Finally, Domitian's rule had another positive side: the last Flavian emperor led a campaign of solid moral reform that aimed at correcting what was interpreted as present-day decadence and recovering a more or less vague glorious past. This was an idea that Quintilian was likely to approve of since it coincided with his conservative views on the moral situation of contemporary Rome and the aesthetic trends that derived from it.

Although Quintilian's flattering comments on Domitian are hyperbolic, especially the praise of the emperor's poetic skills at *Institutio* 10.1.91–2, and he was rewarded with the *ornamenta consularia*, he is far from servile: he did not dedicate the *Institutio* to the emperor and he limits his praise to the three passages cited above. Moreover, there is little sign of the emperor's influence on the *Institutio*'s general structure, scope, and content. At most Quintilian indulges in a certain political opportunism in his emphatic denunciation of philosophers and his invocation of the morality and literary style of the past.

Quintilian's Message: Rhetoric and Morals

Quintilian's announcement at the beginning of the *Institutio* that his work aims to depict an ideal is repeated at the end, and book 12 is devoted to a portrayal of the consummate orator. Quintilian's ideal has sometimes been the target of criticism on the grounds of anachronism. The imagined orator, even if he could come into existence, could not perform. The highest task expected of him in imperial Rome: active leadership in political life (e.g., Kennedy 1969: 130–2). But other scholars challenge this view and argue that political discourse, including that which took place in the senate, continued to form an essential part of oratory in Roman society

(see chapters 9, 24). In any case, it should be remembered that Quintilian is concerned with an ideal and ideals always bear programmatic implications. In this case the kind of rhetoric outlined in the *Institutio* is a conscious compromise between two conceptions in Quintilian's mind: the best possible rhetoric that could be practiced from a technical point of view (based on sound Ciceronian principles and lacking "modern" decadent elements); and an idealized form of rhetoric designed to assume its deserved hegemony over the educational curriculum and to give rise to a new kind of orator, *Romanus sapiens* ("a Roman wise Man," 12.2.7), who is suited to political leadership because of his moral superiority and unparalleled persuasive ability.

That Quintilian recognized the untimeliness of his proposal (at least partly) is implied by the very last words of the *Institutio*, where he states clearly that the main aim of the *Institutio* is a moral one: *haec erant . . . quibus praecepta dicendi pro virili parte adiuvare posse per nos videbantur, quorum cognitio studiosis iuvenibus si non magnam utilitatem adferet, at certe, quod magis petimus, bonam voluntatem* ("these were the precepts . . . through which it seemed that I might advance, as far as I could, the manly task of speaking; the knowledge of which, even if it does not give the young students much practical help, will at least – which I value more – give him good intentions," 12.11.31). In fact, many of the categories that govern Quintilian's message, even in the application of technical rhetoric, belong to the world of morals: *decorum, iudicium, consuetudo, vir bonus*. The content of such concepts, moreover, is never defined, a fact that opens the way for their use in justifying Quintilian's own more or less whimsical views on matters both great and small (Winterbottom 1998).

It is true, nonetheless, that the more enlightened and "encyclopedic" features of Quintilian's ideal have universal appeal and are linked both to his illustrious ancestors (e.g., Isocrates, Cicero) and offspring; yet part of this universality also derives from Quintilian's response to specific problems of his own time (Winterbottom 1967). His proposed innovative curriculum must be seen within the context of a fight against philosophy for cultural and educational hegemony (Cassin 1995), one that probably took advantage of Domitian's suspicion of the subject.

FURTHER READING

The standard critical text of the *Institutio Oratoria* is that of Winterbottom (1970), now reproduced with minor improvements in the five-volume set of the Loeb collection (Russell 2001), which provides a translation in modern English. Russell's short introductions to each book of the *Institutio* present informative critical summaries of the work's contents and consistently refer the reader to Quintilian's sources (on which Cousin 1935, in French, is still irreplaceable) and to relevant bibliography on each issue. The edition of Cousin (1975–80), in French, is especially helpful for its notes. There are valuable individual commentaries on books 1 (Colson 1924), 10 (Peterson 1891), and 12 (Austin 1948) plus a German edition on book 3 (Adamietz 1966). *Rhetorica* 13.2 and 13.3 (1995), the volumes of Albaladejo, del Río, and Caballero (1998), and Tellegen-Couperus (2003) are all devoted to Quintilian and the *Institutio* and comprise about 150 papers in all. These vary in their length, focus, and interest but together address the *Institutio* from almost every conceivable point of view and refer to a

wealth of bibliography. The chapters by Wuellner and Heath in Porter (1997: 51–119) present an overview of the evolution of arrangement and invention, against which Quintilian's views can be appropriately contextualized. Lausberg (1998) is a classic but much of his material is based explicitly on Quintilian, who often offers additional explanations that synthesize and clarify the material. The transmission of the text is dealt with in detail by Cousin (1975), in French, who can be complemented by Winterbottom (1967). The most comprehensive study of Quintilian's style is Zundel (1981), in German.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

Tacitus and Pliny on Oratory

William Dominik

The *Dialogus de Oratoribus* of Cornelius Tacitus constitutes one of the most important documents on rhetorical and literary criticism of the imperial age. This work has often been interpreted as a document that argues for, illustrates, or reflects a declining standard of oratory in the first century CE. The following discussion challenges the pessimistic outlook read into the *Dialogus* by examining the rhetorical, cultural, and literary context of the arguments presented by Marcus Aper in favor of contemporary oratory. The validation of Aper's defense of contemporary rhetorical practice extends the opportunity to reevaluate the common trope of oratory's decline in the imperial period. Further contemporary evidence may be brought to bear upon the issue of oratorical decline in the form of the published letters of Gaius Plinius Caecilius Secundus, the younger Pliny, who was a contemporary of Tacitus. In the *Epistles*, composed between 96 and 108 CE (cf. Sherwin-White 1966: 20–41), valuable countermeasures to the notion of rhetorical devolution are found in the highly successful and prestigious oratorical careers enjoyed by Pliny and other members of his circle, including Tacitus; in Pliny's own public reflections upon the state of rhetoric and the development of rhetorical style; and in his first-hand testimony for the status and flourishing of alternate avenues for rhetorical exposition that had come to the fore in the first century.

Tacitus' *Dialogus*

The *Dialogus de Oratoribus* was probably composed during the reign of Nerva (96–8 CE; cf. Murgia 1980; Barnes 1986: 244) or at least before 103 of Trajan's reign (cf. Brink 1994: 251–80). It supposedly constitutes a response to Tacitus' dedicatee Fabius Iustus, consul in 102, whose question about the reasons for the decline of contemporary oratory motivates Tacitus to narrate a debate on the topic he claims to have been witness to during his youth, probably in the mid seventies or earlier.