

ἐλπεί δια τὸ ἀστέγαστον καὶ αἱ νύκτες ἐπιγυγνόμεναι τού-
 νατίον μετοπωριαῖ καὶ ψυχραὶ τῇ μεταβολῇ ἐς ἀσβέειαν
 2 ἐνεωτέριζον, πάντα τε ποιούντων αὐτῶν διὰ στενοχωρίας
 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ προσέει τῶν νεκρῶν ὄμοσ' ἐπ' ἀλλήλοις
 ξυνηρημένων, οἳ ἐκ τε τῶν τραυμάτων καὶ διὰ τὴν μετα- 5
 βολὴν καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀπέθρησκον, καὶ ὁσμαι ἦσαν οὐκ
 ἀνεκτοί, καὶ λιμῷ ἅμα καὶ δίψῃ ἐπέζοντο (ἐδίδοσαν γὰρ
 αὐτῶν ἐκίστη ἐπὶ ὀκτῶ μηνῶν κοτύλην ὕδατος καὶ δύο
 κοτύλας σίτου), ἄλλα τε ὅσα εἰκὸς ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ χωρίῳ
 ἐμπεινωτάτας κακοπαθήσαι, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἐπεγένετο αὐτοῖς· 10
 3 καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν ἑβδομήκοντά τινες οὕτω διηγήθησαν ἀθροοί·
 ἔπειτα πλὴν Ἀθηναίων καὶ εἰ τινες Σικελιωτῶν ἢ Ἰταλιω-
 4 τῶν ξυνεστράτευσαν, τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπέδοντο. ἐλήφθησαν
 δὲ οἱ ξυμπαντες, ἀκριβεῖά μὲν χαλεπὸν ἐξεπέων, ὄμως δὲ
 5 οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἐπτακισχιλίων. ξυνέβη τε ἔργον τοῦτο 15
 [Ἑλληνικὸν] τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τότε μέγιστον γενέ-
 σθαι, δοκεῖ δ' ἔμοιγε καὶ ὧν ἀκοῇ Ἑλληνικῶν ἴσμεν, καὶ
 τοῖς τε κρατήσασιν λαμπρότατον καὶ τοῖς διαφθαρείσι δυστυ-
 6 χέστατον· κατὰ πάντα γὰρ πάντως νικηθέντες καὶ οὐδὲν
 ὀλίγον ἐς οὐδὲν κακοπαθήσαντες παρωλεθρία δὴ τὸ λεγόν- 20
 μενον καὶ πεζὸς καὶ νῆες καὶ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπώλετο, καὶ
 ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐπ' οἴκου ἀπενόστησαν. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ
 περὶ Σικελίαν γενόμενα.

2 ἐπ' ἀσθενείᾳ B 5 ξυνηρηγμένων B M 7 δίψῃ recs. :
 δίψῃ codd. 9 τῶ B : om. ceti. 14 post δε add. καὶ B
 εἰσείν B 16 Ἑλληνικὸν secl. Krüger

COMMENTARY

JULY-SEPTEMBER 414

1-3. Arrival of Gylippos

At the end of Book VI Gylippos the Spartan and Pythen the Corinthian, on their way to Syracuse with four ships, are at Taras, repairing their ships after the storm which thwarted their first attempt to reach Sicily.

1. ἰ. ἐς Λοκροῦς τοὺς Ἐπιεφύριους: Lokroi, like Taras, was consistently hostile to the Athenians.

κατὰ τὰς Ἐπιπολάς: The plateau overlooking Syracuse from the north and north-west.

ἑαυτοῦς τε ἐκείνους: 'Himera itself.'

2. καὶ τῶν Ἄρτικῶν . . . ἀπέστειλαν: Nikias did not attach any importance to the presence of Gylippos' tiny force at Taras; ὄμως glances back at vi. 104. 3. 'Nikias . . . did not as yet take any precautions'. (The division of the story of the Sicilian Expedition into two at vi. 105. 3/vii. 1. 1 does not go back to Thucydides himself and is not even the only division current in Hellenistic times.)

διὰ τοῦ πορθμοῦ: The Straits of Messina.

ἐς Ἡμέραν: Himera had rebuffed Athenian overtures in 415.

3. τοὺς τε Ἱεραίους: This τε is co-ordinated with καὶ τοὺς Σελινούτους at the end of the section.

καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν νέων . . . παρασχέιν: Since their four ships would have a total of crew of c. 800, and we find (in § 5) 700 of these serving as infantry, it seems that the advice which Alkibiades gave the Spartans, to send 'men who would row themselves and serve as hoplites immediately on arrival' (vi. 91. 4), had been carried out.

παντοπρατῆ: If this request was made, it was certainly not granted, for Selinus sent 'some light-armed troops and cavalry' (§ 5); the alternative reading σπαρατῆ is therefore preferable.

4. Ἀρχωνίδου: This man was the ruler of Herbita, c. 70 km. east-south-east of Himera. In the 440's he had collaborated with Duketios, the champion of the Sikels against Syracuse, and was thus predisposed to friendship with Athens.

5. καὶ ἐπιβοτῶν: The complement of a trireme normally included

a small number of men armed as hoplites. 'Those of his sailors and ἐπιβήται who were armed' means 'His ἐπιβήται and those of his sailors (cf. § 3) who were armed'.

2. 1. οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς Λευκάδος Κορίνθιοι: Thirteen ships in all.

περὶ ἀπαλλαγῆς . . . ἐκκλησιάσασιν: After the capture and destruction of both the counterwalls which they had built earlier in the summer the Syracusans had abandoned hope of preventing the Athenians from completing a siege-wall (vi. 103. 3 f.).

2. ἐξήλων: To the north of the Athenian 'Circle', across the line which the northward Athenian wall was intended to follow; but they are not likely to have taken the risk of leaving the plateau and finding on their return that the whole Athenian force was drawn up for battle between them and the city.

3. Ἴκρας: The name is restored from a fragment of Philistos (cf. Cicero's mention [*Verr.* 3. 103] of the people called *Ietini*); its location is not known.

καρὰ τὸν Εὐρύπυλον: The 'waist' of the plateau, where it can be most easily ascended from north, south, or west, 6-7 km. from the city.

ἦσαν . . . τὸ πρῶτον: In the spring of 414 (vi. 97. 2).

ἐχέουσι . . . τὸν Ἀθηναίων: From the east or north east, with the Winter Wall (see map) behind him, as becomes clear from 3. 3; this is not the only passage in this book which becomes intelligible only in the light of something which is said later.

4. ἐπὶ μὲν ἢ δεξιῶ σταδίων: 'Stade' is a somewhat subjective term in the Greek historians (rather like 'block' in America), and passages in which Thucydides states in stades a distance which can be checked today require values varying between 130 and 170 metres.

ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα: The Athenians began their siege-works in 414 by building the 'Circle' on the plateau; they then started to build northwards from the Circle, but broke off and built southwards towards the Great Harbour.

διπλοὺν τεῖχος: i.e. two walls a good distance apart, enclosing an area with the Circle at its top end and the sea at the bottom.

τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου: It is clear from vi. 98. 2 and vi. 101. 1 that the κύκλος (which I translate for ease of reference as 'Circle', though it was not necessarily circular) was a fortified position, and that the word does *not* mean the whole of the wall by which the Athenians hoped to cut off Syracuse from all its landward approaches. This passage is therefore corrupt, and is best emended by deleting τοῦ κύκλου as an interpolation, understanding τεῖχος with τῷ ἄλλῳ. In any case, Thucydides' Greek for 'the rest of the circle' would be τῷ ἄλλῳ κύκλῳ.

πρὸς τὸν Τρωγίλον: Trogilos was the ravine which runs down to the sea at the cove of Santa Panagia.

3. 1. θέμενος τὰ ὄπλα ἐγγύς: 'Taking up his position' (πρὸ 'laying down his arms') 'not far from them'.

ἐπίμοις: Thucydides not infrequently passes from oblique cases into the nominative when the sense justifies it, even if grammatical rules do not (cf. *Intr.* I. 3. 18); the subject of ἐβῶα is that of προσηύμασε, namely Gylippos.

3. ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν μάλλον: i.e. northwards and north-westwards, to have more room for manœuvre on his right.

ἐπὶ τὴν ἄκραν . . . καλουμένην: The sanctuary of Apollo Temenites lay on the south edge of the plateau, immediately adjoining the Theatre. ἄκρα Τεμενίτης was probably the top of the long low spur running south-eastwards from just east of the Theatre.

4. τὸ Λιβάδαλον: This lay on the northern edge of the plateau—we do not know exactly where—and the construction of a fort there was one of the first Athenian actions in 414.

5. τῷ λιμένι: In certain passages (e.g. 22. 1 f.) Thucydides distinguishes between 'the Great Harbour', i.e. the bay of which the gap between Ortygia and Plennyria is the mouth, and 'the Lesser Harbour', the modern Porto Piccolo, lying between Ortygia and Santa Lucia and facing east. In many passages the context shows that by 'the harbour' he means the Great Harbour. Yet in 4. 4 'the harbour of the Syracusans' must mean the Lesser Harbour, and that is probably the meaning of 'the harbour' here; the variant reading of B, τῷ μεγάλῳ λιμένι, is therefore to be rejected. The Athenian fleet was stationed in the Great Harbour, so that an isolated Athenian ship watching the Lesser Harbour would be far from help if it were cut off by an enterprising Syracusan attack.

4-7. The Third Syracusan Counterwall

Earlier in the summer the Syracusans had built, first, a counterwall just below the southern edge of the plateau, and, second, a palisade and trench further south still, through the marshy area. Both these in turn had been captured and destroyed by the Athenians.

4. 1-4. 3. *The Beginning of the Counterwall*

4. 1. ἀνω: On the plateau, beginning from the northern half of the Winter Wall and heading due west.

πρὸς τὸ ἑγκέριστον: 'At right angles', sc. to the line of the Athenian wall.

2. ἦν γὰρ τι . . . ἀσθενές: Whether on the plateau (south of the Circle) or between the plateau and the sea, we do not know.

3. ἔξω ἀυλιζόμενοι: Not all of them—which would be an eccentric way to defend a wall the purpose of which is to defend oneself—but with pickets far enough advanced to give the alarm to the main force. αὐτοὶ μὲν ταύτην ἐφύλασσον: They did not necessarily doubt the loyalty of their allies as a whole, but it does not need many traitors to betray a fortification at night.

4. 4-4. 7. *Nikias Occupies Fleemyrion*

4. 4. πρὸς τὸ λιμένι τῶν Συρακοσίων: The Lesser Harbour, cf. 3. 5 n. ἦν τι ναυτικὴ κινῶνται: 'If they (= the Syracusans) made any move', lit., 'with a naval element', i.e. 'at sea'. Cf. X. Cyr. i. 4. 20 ἦν ἐπι σὲ κινῶνται, 'if they make any move against you'.

ἄρῶν . . . ἀνελαπιστότερα ὄντα: The news of Gylippos' approach was enough to sweep away talk of surrender in Syracuse; and his actual arrival seems to have had an equally dramatic effect, but in the opposite sense, upon Nikias. Cf. the pessimistic tone of Nikias' letter, II ff.

5. στρατιῶν καὶ τὰς ναῦς: There was now no direct and safe communication by land between the army and the fleet.

6. τῷ τε γὰρ ὕδατι . . . οἱ ναῦται: lit., 'for using the water scarce and not from near, and also whenever the sailors went out to collect firewood . . .', i.e. 'whenever the sailors went out, (as they had to) because their water-supply was inadequate and not close at hand, and also to collect firewood, . . .'

ἐπι τῇ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπίειῳ πολεῖν: The Olympieion, i.e. the sanctuary of Zeus Olympios, lay on a ridge 1.3 km. inland from the (modern) coastline in the very centre of the Great Harbour. The inhabited locality of which it formed a part was fortified by the Syracusans in the winter of 415/14 (vi. 75, 1).

ἐτερώχοντο: The third-person-plural endings -οντο and -οντο in the middle/passive perfect fell into disuse after the fifth century and were replaced by periphrastic forms (e.g. τετραγμένον ἦσαν).

7. καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς . . . ναῦς: 2. I.

5-6. *Continuation of the Counterwall: Defeat of the Athenians*

5. I. πρὸ τοῦ τευχ(σματος): The Syracusans, facing south or south-west,

had the Winter Wall on their left and the completed portion of the counterwall behind them.

3. οὐκ ἔφη . . . γενέσθαι: Spartan commanders dealing with allied troops were not always diplomatic—or even bearable—but the best of them had an instinctive awareness of what was needed to attract loyalty.

τῇ τάξει: This goes in sense with τὴν ὠφέλειαν; understand αὐτῆν (i.e. τὴν τάξιν) as object of ποιήσας.

4. Πελοποννησιοὶ τε ὄντες καὶ Δωριῆς: The Dorians traditionally despised all other branches of the Greek race as less martial than themselves. Syracuse, Selinus, Gela, and Kamarina were all Doric-speaking and of Dorian origin, while there was a Dorian element in Himera.

'Ἴωνες': 'Ionians' in its most general sense includes the Athenians. καὶ νησιῶν: The Aegean islands constituted a large part of the Athenian Empire, and the part which was most familiar to the Athenians and the mainland Greeks in general.

6. I. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα: On the following day, as we are told in II. 2.

καὶ μηδὲ μάχεσθαι: μηδὲ is here 'not . . . at all' rather than 'not even'.

ἀνετηρῶσιν οὖν: Unlike English 'therefore', οὖν is not commonly used to introduce a main clause after a subordinate or participial clause; but Thucydides so uses it on several occasions when the subordinate clause is unusually long and complex.

2. ἔξω . . . ἢ πρότερον: i.e. further to the west, so that his right wing did not have the completed portion of the counterwall behind it.

4. εἰ καὶ κρατοῖεν: sc. in a pitched battle in the field; clearly, if they could capture the counterwall and destroy it they could proceed with their own siege-wall.

7. I. *Arrival of the Corinthian Ships*

7. I. λαθοῦσαι . . . φυλακῆν: Failure to prevent the arrival of Gongylos in a single fast ship (2. 1) was forgivable, but failure on the part of twenty Athenian ships (4. 7) to stop the main Corinthian force was less so.

[μέχρι] τοῦ ἑγκαρσίου τεύχους: 'As far as the wall at right angles' is senseless; it is the ἑγκάρσιον τεύχος which they are building. Either (i) Thucydides named a place after μέχρη, but this has been accidentally omitted; or (ii) μέχρη is the remnant of a gloss based on a guess or information from another historical source; or (iii) Thucydides

himself left a blank after μέγιστοι, intending to fill it in when he knew the answer. Ignore μέγιστοι and translate: '... and helped the Syracusans to complete the rest of the wall at right angles.'

7. 2-7. 4. *Syracusan Preparations*

7. 3. τρόπος ὃν . . . προχωρή: As it stands, this clause is not Greek, and ὅπως ἂν should be deleted as an intrusive variant on τρόπος ὃν ἂν. ἐν ὁλοκάσιν ἢ πλοίοις: Thucydides commonly draws this distinction; πλοίων appears to be a much more general word, and ὁλοκάς is probably confined to merchant ships above a certain size. Despite its etymological relationship to ἄλλων, ὁλοκάς cannot normally denote a towed barge, for it is mentioned in estimates of time and distance, e.g. vi. 1. 2: 'it takes a ὁλοκάς not much less than eight days to circumnavigate Sicily.'

8. Nikias Writes a Letter

8. 1. καθ' ἕκαστα τῶν γιννομένων: 'The details of what happened'; the phrase καθ' ἕκαστα is sometimes used = ἕκαστα.

2. μήμητις: ACEFM have γνώμητις; but the messengers were not required to express any 'judgement' of their own, and although it is a trivial matter to memorize in the tranquillity of a study all the points made in Nikias' letter—as presented in 11-15 infra—Nikias was no doubt aware that nothing is easier than to forget important points when faced with a critical audience. Moreover, although there is no reason whatever to doubt that Nikias really did write a letter, he did not write exactly what Thucydides, in his own unmistakable idiom, offers us, and the real letter may have contained many more detailed facts and figures.

τά ὄντα: 'The facts', 'the truth'.

ἔγραψεν ἑπιστολήν: Since the letter begins (11. 1) 'You have been informed of earlier proceedings in many other ἐπιστολαί', it is evident that ἐπιστολή means 'message' or 'report' (in Hdt. iv. 10. 1 it refers to verbal instructions) and that the emphasis lies on ἔγραψεν: not 'he wrote a letter', but 'he put a report into writing'. It is equally evident that this was an unusual procedure in 414, though not unprecedented; Eupolis fr. 308 indicates that Kleon wrote a somewhat arrogant letter to the Council and Assembly after capturing the Spartiates at Sphakteria.

τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην: 'His personal opinion', as the position of αὐτοῦ shows, not simply 'his opinion'.

περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας: 'About the true facts of the situation'; cf. Antiphon (passim) ἢ ἀλήθεια τῶν πραγμάτων.

3. φέροντες . . . καὶ ὅσα κτλ.: 'Bearing the letter and (bearing in mind) what they were to say'—additional data and answers to likely questions and criticisms (cf. 10).

τὰ κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον . . . ἐπεμύλετο: In ii. 81. 4 δὴ φολακῆς ἔχων is intransitive, but phrases of this type are commonly transitive; ἐπεμύλεσθαι normally takes a genitive, but may also take a neuter plural as internal accusative; thus τὰ κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον may well be regarded as the object both of ἔχων and of ἐπεμύλετο.

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 414

9. Operations in Thrace

9. Εὐερίων: Nothing else is known for certain about this man.

Περδικεύου: When we last heard of Perdikkas, the king of Macedonia (early in 415, vi. 7. 3 f.), his territory was under Athenian attack. It is never a surprise to find that he has changed sides, but a little surprising that Thucydides does not tell us in this case why or when he did so.

ἐπ' Ἀμφίπολι: Amphipolis, an Athenian colony at the mouth of the Strymon, was detached from allegiance to Athens by a Spartan force in 424.

Θραξὶ πωλλοῖς: This does not mean that the king of the Odrvrsian Thracians, or any other Thracian potentate, was in formal alliance with Athens; Thracians commonly fought for Athens as mercenaries (cf. 27. 1).

ἐξ Ἱμεραίου: This place never appears in the Athenian tribute lists, and its exact location is unknown.

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 414

10-15. Nikias' Letter is Read at Athens

The tone of this letter is one of hopelessness, for which we are not fully prepared even by the Syracusan successes described in the previous few chapters or by the description (8. 1) of Nikias' apprehensiveness. Nikias apparently envisages no action of his own by which he might recover the initiative or even arrest the deterioration of his own position; he can only wait for reinforcement, recall, or retreat (14. 3; he does not at this stage envisage disaster). In Greek wars, as in Greek battles, the tide often turns very suddenly. Possibly there was already widespread sickness among the Athenians (cf. 47. 2), but the fundamental cause of their troubles was that by the time that Gylippos had been added to the one side Lamachos had been subtracted from the

other. Nikias, left to himself, had too little confidence in the practicability of defeating Syracuse, he had a chronic illness (15. 1), and he was temperamentally inclined to blame anyone but himself (13. 2, 14. 2, 14. 4, 15. 1 f.). Nothing can destroy an army's morale more rapidly than the knowledge that its experienced and trusted commander accepts failure as inevitable.

10. **ὁ δὲ γραμματεὺς ὁ τῆς πόλεως**: The business of this official, who is called 'secretary to the People' in fourth-century inscriptions, was simply to read documents aloud; the far more important secretary who prepared and recorded business for the Council and the Assembly was called 'secretary to the Council' in the fifth century and 'secretary *κατὰ προτέρεαν*' in the fourth.

11. **1. ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς ἐπιστολαῖς ἴσται**: lit., 'you know . . . in many other reports', i.e. 'you have been informed . . .' or 'I have told you . . .'. Cf. 'learn now . . .' = 'I will now tell you . . .'

2. **ἐφ' οὓς ἐπέμψθησαν**: In the original instructions given to the generals in 415 (vi. 8. 2) the real purpose of the expedition, the defeat of Syracuse, was circumspcctly expressed: 'help Segesta against Selinus, assist in the refoundation of Leontinoi, and carry out the other operations required in Sicily in such manner as they (= the generals) judge in the best interests of Athens.' When the three generals first arrived at Rhegion and held a conference, Nikias, who did not want to attack Syracuse at all, proposed (vi. 47) that they should simply sail to Selinus, **ἐφ' ὅσπερ μάλιστα ἐπέμψθησαν**. Now, speaking not to his colleagues in conference but to the Assembly itself, he is compelled to recognize the truth.

3. **οὐδὲ γὰρ ξυμπύσθη κτλ.**: οὐδέ here rebuts an imagined criticism: 'for it is not as if we were able to use our whole army together.'

4. **οὐδέ γὰρ τῆς χώρας κτλ.**: The point of οὐδέ is: 'our attempted siege-wall has come to nothing, and we do not have control of the open country *either*.'

12. 2. **ὡς ἐνὸς πυθάνουμα**: Not only by inference from their training (§ 5, cf. 7. 4); as we learn later (48. 2), Nikias was in communication with treacherous elements inside Syracuse.

3. **ἄνευ κάκεινοι πυθάνουμαι**: The Syracusans too were not wholly dependent on observation and deduction; the rate of desertion described in 13. 2 would have ensured that they were well informed on conditions in the Athenian camp.

διάρροχοι: 'Saturated', and so heavier in the water and slower in manoeuvre. Triremes were normally hauled on shore and 'aired' when the situation permitted; cf. § 4.

4. **ἀντιτάλους τῷ πληθεῖ**: There was no good reason yet for Nikias to say that the Syracusan navy was the equal of the Athenian in *quality*, though he hints at this in 13. 2-14. 1. **τῷ τε πληθεῖ** in B may indicate an original **τῷ γε πληθεῖ** (conj. Boddin); if that is right, Nikias is drawing attention to the difference between quantity and quality. **καὶ εἰ πλείους**: 'Or even more'; καὶ normally = English 'or' in such expressions.

5. **καὶ αἱ ἐπιχειρήσεις . . . ἔξουσία**: lit., 'the attacks (are) in their power'—i.e. 'the initiative lies with them'—and (there is for them) freedom more to dry out their own <ships>; i.e. 'they have more opportunity than we to dry out their ships'.

13. 1. **τοῦτο**: Attacking at times and places of their own choice, and drying off ships in turn.

καὶ νῦν: 'Even now', implying 'it will be worse if we relax our guard'.
2. **τῶν ναυτῶν [τῶν] μὲν κτλ.**: With the MSS. text, **θεράποντες** are a subdivision of **ναυτῶν**; there is no grammatical objection to the transition from a participial **μὲν**-clause to a finite **δέ**-clause (cf. Intr. I. 3. 15f). But the historical objection is considerable. The use of slaves as rowers is not attested at Athens before 406/5 (X. *HG* i. 6. 24), and the enfranchisement of the slaves who fought in that year suggests that the measure was exceptional; when the Athenians needed extra crews in 428 they found them by enrolling hoplites and metics (iii. 16. 1), not slaves. Poppo's deletion of the second **τῶν** is therefore desirable; for the transition from genitive absolute to finite verb cf. 15. 2, **τῶν πολέμων κτλ.** The casualties incurred by the sailors and the rate of desertion among the slaves are two different aspects or causes of deterioration in the manning and servicing of ships. We should then punctuate strongly after **ἀντρολοῦσθαι**, so that **καὶ οἱ ξένοι** makes a fresh point; of course foreign sailors would be killed by Syracusan cavalry just as much as Athenian sailors were, but Thucydides is concerned with the special causes of loss in each category.

ἀναγκαστοὶ: Not 'press-ganged' as individuals, but supplied as contingents by subject-allies.

εὐθὺς: 'As soon as they can'; 'without more ado'; cf. X. *Hiero* 2. 8, 'for private individuals can go **εὐθὺς** (= without more ado) wherever they like . . . but tyrants go everywhere as if through enemy territory'.

κατὰ τὰς πόλεις: sc. of Sicily.

ἐν αὐτοπολίαις προφάσαι: No wholly satisfactory explanation of

these words has yet been offered. *πρόφασις* often means '(true) reason' (or 'motive') for an action, or 'cause' suggested in explanation of an event; but in (*ἐπι*) (. . .) *πρόφασις* it means 'alleged (but subordinate or false) reason', i.e. 'pretext'; cf. vi. 78. 1 τῆ ἐπιπρόφασις, 'using me as a pretext', iv. 80. 2 ἐπιπρόφασις, 'on some pretext' (in order to conceal the real intention). Hence, apparently, 'giving desertion as their pretext'; but obviously the foreign sailors did not *pretend* to be deserting to the enemy while actually going for some other reason. It is possible that the phrase may mean no more than ἐπ' ἀτροματίε, and that Thucydides has expressed misleadingly what could have been put better as οὐ μὲν ἐπ' ἀτροματίε ἀπέρχονταί, οὐ δ' ἐπ' ἡνιω ἀνπρόφασις ἐκαστοῦ δύνωνται. Of many emendations, the two most attractive are *αὐτροματίας* (Passow), 'giving as their justification the fact that they are not our subjects' (sc. and therefore cannot be kept against their will), and *αὐτροπρίας* (Schwartz), . . . that they have to cultivate their own land' (sc. and therefore cannot be away from home so long).

Ἰκαρικὰ: Hykkara, a non-Greek town on the north coast of Sicily, an enemy of Athens' ally Segesta, was captured at the end of 415 (vi. 62. 3 f.) and its inhabitants were enslaved.
ἀριβίαν: 'High quality'; cf. vi. 18. 6 τὸ φασίλον . . . καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἀριβίης, 'the mediocre . . . and the really first-rate'.

14. 1. *βραχεία ἀκμή πληρώματος*: 'A crew's period of maximum efficiency is short.' Nikias' sequence of argument is: (i) at first our fleet was highly efficient (*ἤκμαζε* 12. 3), (ii) but our ships are saturated, (iii) and we have lost many sailors, (iv) therefore our efficiency has deteriorated (this consequence of the loss of men in general is attached to the type of loss last specified, the substitution of Hykkaran slaves for Athenian sailors), (v) and you know that (sc. in any case) (a) a crew is not at its peak of efficiency for very long, and we have been at Syracuse a long time, and (b) few sailors are really skilful (sc. therefore everything has accelerated a process which in any case is hard to avoid). Some editors have translated 'the efficient *element* in a crew is small'; but this introduces a high degree of tautology into Nikias' argument, and conflicts with viii. 46. 5 'by keeping on saying that the Phoenician ships were going to arrive . . . he took away the *ἀκμή* of their fleet, which had been powerful (*ισχυρά*) and with Plutarch's imitation (Caes. 40. 2), 'he said that they should wear down the *ἀκμή* of the enemy, which was *βραχεία*'.

ξυλόχορες τὴν εἰσορίαν: 'Rowing in time', the one thing upon which the efficient movement of any oared vessel depends.

2. *χαλεπαὶ γὰρ . . . ἄρξαι*: This has little bearing on the difficulties of the situation as Nikias has described them, but it is a theme

prominent in his mind (cf. § 4 infra and 48. 4), and it may have been his habit to suggest that he could have dealt with all difficulties if only his troops had not let him down. Greek troops were by modern standards temperamental and recalcitrant, but the Athenians were not necessarily worse than others (cf. 72. 4).

ἄλλ' ἀνάγκη κτλ.: lit., 'but it is necessary that both what we have and what is expended comes from what we had with us when we came', i.e. 'what we have is what we brought with us, and what is lost is necessarily all lost from that'. Given *ἐπιπληρωσόμεθα* and the fact (§ 3) that supplies were replenished from Italy, the reference must be to *crews*, despite the neuter; presumably Thucydides has *πληρωμάματα* in mind.

3. *τὰ τρέφοντα ἡμάς χωρία τῆς Ἰταλίας*: Save for the mention of ships and shipbuilding timber in 25. 1 f. Thucydides tells us nothing specific about supplies from Italy; vi. 103. 2 is a highly general reference.

4. *ἴδω μὲν ἂν . . . ἐπιστέλλειν*: 'I could have sent you a different report, which would have been more welcome'; Nikias does not mean that he *could have had* better news which he refrained from sending, but that he *would have been able* to send a more agreeable but misleading or evasive report. The contrast between telling an audience the disagreeable truth and telling it what it likes to hear is a rhetorical commonplace.

ἦν τι ἴμιν . . . ἐπιβίη: 'If you find that anything after that' (the welcome but false report) 'turns out different.'
ἀσφαλτέστερον: Not 'safer' for himself, but 'conducive to a right decision'; the Greeks were aware of the etymology of *ἀσφάλτης*.

15. 1. *ὡς . . . γεγεννημένον, οὕτω τὴν γνώμην ἔχετε*: lit., 'as . . . having been not open to criticism, thus have your judgement', i.e. 'I can assure you that . . . have not failed you'. Cf. X. An. i. 3. 6 *ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐδ' ἴσθως ἐστὶν ἂν καὶ ὀλεῖς, οὕτω τὴν γνώμην ἔχετε* = 'I can assure you that I shall go wherever you do'.

ἐπ' ἃ μὲν ἤλθομεν τὸ πῶρόν: They have failed to achieve the *objects for which* they were sent, and have failed to conquer the *enemy against whom* they were sent; therefore (lit.) 'on to which we came' must mean '(in respect of) the situation with which we were sent to deal', by contrast with 'but now that all Sicily is uniting . . .'

μηδὲ τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀνταρκεύοντων: 'Unable to cope even with the existing difficulties'; cf. vi. 89. 4 *τοῖς παροῦσιν ἐρεσθαί* = 'fall in with the existing trend'.

2. *ὄτι δὲ μέλλετε*: 'What you intend to do.'

ὡς τῶν πολέμιων . . . φήσονται: With σχολαίτερον understand *πιστεύεται* (on the type of *μείδιέ* construction, cf. 13. 2 n.), and with *λήσανται* and *θήσανται* understand *ποριζόμενοι*. Nikias' criticism of the Athenians, referring especially to their failure to prevent the assembly of Gylippos' little fleet at Leukas, is unfair, in view of his own failure to prevent Gylippos' crossing from Rhegion to Messene (1. 2) or the subsequent arrival of the Corinthian ships (7. 1).

DECEMBER 414–FEBRUARY 413

16–17. Measures to Reinforce the Expedition

16. 1. *Μένανδρον καὶ Εὐθύδημον*: If the annual election of generals was held in the fifth century, as it was in the fourth, after Prytany VI (i.e. in February or March), the appointment of Menandros and Euthydemos cannot have been made at an ordinary election, for it was not yet the winter solstice (§ 2); but this creates no real difficulty. The Athenians could give temporary and local military command to anybody at any time, without deposing any of the ten 'full' generals of the year. After the arrival of Demosthenes and Eurymedon in Sicily, there were three 'full' generals there, and the association of Menandros and Euthydemos with them in command seems to have been a matter for their discretion. In the night attack on Epipolai Menandros commanded the attacking force with Demosthenes and Eurymedon (43. 2) but there is no mention of Euthydemos. Neither seems to have been asked for his opinion in the debate which followed the failure on Epipolai (47 ff., esp. 49. 3 f.). In the last battle in the harbour, Eurymedon being by then dead, Demosthenes and Menandros and Euthydemos went on board the ships as generals' (69. 4).

Euthydemos is likely to be the man of that name who was among the takers of the oath of peace in 421 (v. 19. 2) and also the 'Euthydemos son of Eudemos' who was a general in 418/17 (*IG* 1² 302); we hear nothing of him on the retreat from Syracuse or afterwards, and he may have been killed in the last battle in the harbour. Menandros is probably the general of 405/4 (X. *HG* ii. 1. 16); it is not known what happened to him after that.

ἐκ καταλόγου: The board of generals had a single list which contained the names of all those required, by virtue of their capital and age, to serve as hoplites; in vi. 43 there is an antithesis between hoplites ἐκ καταλόγου and hoplites who were θῆτες (i.e. below the hoplite property-rating and therefore needing to be armed at the state's expense).

2. Δημοσθένη τε . . . καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντα: The choice was a wise one. Demosthenes, who last held a command (so far as we know) in 418/17,

MEASURES TO REINFORCE THE EXPEDITION 13

appears in Thucydides as a quick and energetic general, aggressive, ingenious, with a good tactical eye, and capable of learning from experience (cf. especially iii. 95 ff., iv. 3 ff., 29 f.). He had won the good opinion of Athens' allies in the north-west (cf. 57. 10). On his arrival in Sicily (42. 3 ff.) he acts and argues briskly and forcefully, and his solutions are drastic; but once the situation has become desperate he has little positive contribution to make, and in the final retreat he acquits himself less well than Nikias.

Eurymedon had experience of Sicily, though he was fined on his return thence in 424 (iv. 65. 3) for not accomplishing what Athens had hoped, and he may have been out of favour since then. This last point has some bearing on the question whether Demosthenes and Eurymedon were already generals for 414/13 and were now appointed to Sicily on the assumption that only some flagrant inadequacy on their part could stand in the way of their re-election for 413/12, or pre-elected for 413/12 and given immediate authority to assemble the forces voted; and it tells somewhat in favour of the second alternative. In that case the generals at the end of December 414 comprised (i) nine generals—including Nikias—elected for 414/13, (ii) possibly a tenth, a general-suffect, elected after the death of Lamachos, (iii) Menandros and Euthydemos, given 'local' rank, (iv) Demosthenes and Eurymedon as generals-elect.

καὶ ἑκατόν: These words are in H and are implied by Valla; they are not to be found anywhere else. Probability is in their favour; so is Diod. xiii. 8. 7, who says '140 talents'.

17. 2. εἰκοσι ναῦς: Naupaktos was their destination, and Konon their commander; cf. § 4. 19. 5, 31. 4. It follows from this—and from the fact that when Corinthian ships destined for Syracuse assembled at Leukas in the autumn of 414 (vi. 104. 1) they do not seem to have worried about Athenian interception—that the Athenians were not at this time maintaining a standing force at Naupaktos.

3. παρσεκευάζοντο . . . ἀποστρέλουντες . . . πέμψοντες: παρασκευάσθαι is commonly used with ὥς and a future participle; Thucydides sometimes omits the ὥς, as in vi. 54. 4 παρσεκευάζετο προπρηλακίων αὐτόν.

4. πρὸς τὴν . . . φυλακὴν: The twenty ships referred to in § 2. τῶν τριηράν: With ἀντίραξιν; lit., 'against their own opposing array of the triremes'.

ὅπως . . . ἀποπειράσασθαι . . . καὶ . . . καλύσειν: There is no distinction of 'vividness' or 'remoteness' between the subjunctive and optative; the co-ordination of the two is an instance of Thucydides' tendency to deliberate variation (cf. *Intr.* 1. 3. 16), and occurs also (in reverse order) in vi. 96. 3.

18. Spartan Preparations

18. 1. ὡσαύτῃ τε . . . ἐναγόντων: 'In accordance with their previous decision and at the instigation of the Syracusans and Corinthians.' According to vi. 93. 2, the Spartans 'turned their attention' at the beginning of 414 to the establishment of a fort at Dekeleia. §§ 2 f. explain why they did not establish it at once.

ὅπως δὴ . . . διακαλωσθή: The total number of Athenian hoplites sent to Sicily was not large, and the Athenians could afford to send away many more without making the fortified area of Athens, Peiraeus, and the Long Walls vulnerable to a Peloponnesian assault. From that point of view, an invasion of Attica would do no more to curtail Athenian reinforcement of Nikias than the invasions of the Archidamian War did (e.g.) to save Mytilene; δὴ implies that the author doubts the validity of the reasoning which he is reporting. But the absence of Athenian ships was not unimportant; it meant that the Athenians' ability to inflict reprisals on the Peloponnesians for the damage they suffered in Attica would be limited.

καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης . . . τὸν πόλεμον: It was Alkibiades who, having fled to Sparta at the end of 415 when threatened with trial and execution for impieties, urged the Spartans to establish a fort at Dekeleia.

2. τὰς σπονδὰς: The peace treaty of 421.

σφίτερον . . . γενέσθαι: The Theban attack on Plataiai in 431, the first fighting of the Peloponnesian War, was not initiated by Sparta or by any decision of the Peloponnesian League, but by having Thebes as an ally Sparta shared her guilt.

ἐν ταῖς πρότερον συνθήκαις: The Thirty Years Peace of 445. ἐπέλασι: sc. any state alleged to have offended against the terms of the peace.

αὐτοὶ οὐχ ὑπήκουον: Sparta did indeed send envoys to Athens at the end of 432, ἐγγλήματα ποιούμενοι (i. 126. 1); but in Thucydides' view this was done not in order to open the way to arbitration, but after the decision to fight had been taken by Sparta and her allies, and it was done in such a way as to provoke refusal and to gain an ostensible moral advantage from that refusal.

εἰκότα: δυστυχεῖν τε: The belief that the gods punished the breaking of oaths was one of the oldest and firmest in Greek theology. The parties to an interstate agreement swore oaths that they would keep it; if they broke it, they expected divine punishment. Since Thucydides himself was unconventional in theology, and may well have been an atheist, his matter-of-fact statements about the religious motivation of states must be taken seriously. The Spartans were not the only people to interpret misfortune as a sign of divine displeasure; in 421 the

Athenians restored to Delos the population which they had previously removed, 'reflecting on their own military setbacks, and at the behest of the god at Delphi' (v. 32. 1).

τὴν τε περὶ Πύλον συμφορὰν: Their loss of Pylos in 425 and the capture of the Spartiates on Sphakteria.

3. ταῖς τριάκοντα ναυσίν: This attack on Lakonian territory was made in the summer of 414, in co-operation with Argos (vi. 105).

Ἐπιδάουρου γέ τι: Epidaurus Limera, in Lakonia, as vi. 105 shows, not the better-known Epidaurus which lay on the east coast of the Argolid.

ἐλθόντων: sc. the Spartans, although the subject of ἐδηύσαν and ᾗθ' ἄλλοι is the Athenians.

τῶν κατὰ τὰς σπονδὰς ἀποσβηθρομένων: Some of the provisions of the Peace of Nikias—notably the return of Pylos to the Spartans and of the Thracian cities to allegiance to Athens—were not carried out. ἐς δίκας . . . τῶν Ἀκαταμαυονίων: We are told nothing else about this.

4. σιδήρον τε: For the clamps and dowels which would hold the masonry of the fort.

NINETEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR

MARCH 413

19–20. Activity in Greece

19. 1–19. 2. Peloponnesian Invasion of Attica

19. 2. ἀπέχει δέ . . . καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Βουραϊᾶς: Dekeleia is 18 km. from Athens by the shortest route, so that 150 m. is the value of the stade implied here (cf. 2. 4 n.) On the other hand, from Dekeleia across Parmes to the edge of the Boeotian plain is less, 9–10 km. Thucydides is presumably speaking of the main route via Oropos, not of the isolated traveller, much less of the crow's flight.

ἐπι δὲ τῷ πείθει . . . τὸ τεύχος: The point of ἐπι is a little more than a purely locative 'overlooking'; a punning translation 'with . . . in view' would be appropriate.

19. 3–19. 5. Peloponnesian Reinforcements Sail for Syracuse

19. 3. τῶν τε Εἰλωτῶν: A force composed entirely of Helots, armed as hoplites, had been sent to Brasidas in 424 (iv. 80. 5).

καὶ τῶν νεοδημοσδῶν: This category of the Spartan population appears from v. 34. 1 to have been of much the same status as freed Helots, but not identical with them.

4. τοὺς δέ . . . Ἀρκάδων: Thus there were Arkadians on both sides, as mercenaries; cf. 57-9.

5. αἱ τοῦ Χειμῶνος πληρωθεῖσαι: 17. 4.

20. *Departure of Demosthenes*

20. 1. καὶ Χαρκιλέα: It is plausible, though not inevitable, to identify him with the notorious Charicles who later became so powerful a member of the Thirty Tyrants.

κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικόν: The alliance in force at this time between Athens and Argos dated from the summer of 417 (v. 82. 5).

2. καὶ πέντε Χίαις: After the suppression of the revolt of Mytilene, Chios and Methymna were the only states in the Athenian Empire left with fleets of their own; cf. 57. 4.

ἐκ καταλόγου: cf. 16. 1 n.

εἴ ποθεν τι εἶχον . . . ξυμπορίσωντες: Despite the neuter gender, the reference can hardly be to anything except specialized categories of troops, e.g. archers and singers.

MARCH-MAY 413

21-25. The Fall of Plemmyrion

21. 1-21. 4. *Syracusan Decision to Fight at Sea*

21. 3. τοῦ τοῖς ναυσί . . . ἐπιχειρήσαι: τοῦ μή with the infinitive is not uncommon in a final sense; hence, apparently, 'in order that they should not despair of attacking the Athenians at sea'. But we would expect that τοῦ κατὰ would specify the *content* rather than the *purpose* of ἐπιχειρήσει, and this may in fact be the sense; cf. Lys. viii. 17, 'I thought that I was a special friend of yours, τοῦ μὴδὲν ἀκοῦσαι κακόν, for precisely the reason that you slandered others to me', i.e. 'of such a kind as not to be slandered by you'.

ἀλλ' ἡπειρώτας . . . γενέσθαι: The second part of this allegation is untrue, since the Athenians had, and used, a fleet of respectable size even before their great naval expansion in the 480's; and the first part is at least questionable, since we have no evidence for any Syracusan naval activity before the fifth century.

χαλεπωτέρους ἂν [αὐτοῖς] φαίνεσθαι: If πρὸς ἄδρας τολμηροῦς is taken with τοὺς ἀπτολμηώτερας, αὐτοῖς with χαλεπωτέρους ἂν φαίνεσθαι is neither ungrammatical nor tautological.

καὶ σφῆς ἂν . . . ὑποσχεῖν: τὸ αὐτῶ refers to 'that by which the Athenians frighten their enemies', which is explained as 'attacking

with boldness' (LSJ s.v. ὑπέειπεν I. 2 is badly astray). θάρσος τοῖς ἐπιπλοῦς ὑποσχεῖν, lit. 'hold daring under the enemy', would mean 'show a bold face to the enemy', 'confront the enemy with boldness'. There is no exact parallel, and ὑπέειπεν, the reading of H, deserves consideration; the word can denote being the aggressor or taking the initiative, e.g. Pl. *Grig.* 456 E ἀνομιόμενος, μὴ ὑπέειπεν; and since it is used in the passive with a neuter pronoun as subject as early as Antiphon v. 58, there is no decisive objection to its use in the active with a neuter pronoun object.

4. καὶ Συρακοσίοις . . . βλαψήοντες: The subject of εἰδέαι is 'he', ἀντιστήναι depends on τολμηῖσαι, and τὸ τοιοῦτον refers to τῶ τολμηῖσαι κατὰ; 'the advantage gained by the Syracusans . . . would be greater than any harm which the Athenians could inflict . . .'

21. 5-24. *Syracusan Capture of Plemmyrion*

21. 5. καὶ εἰ του ἔλλου: εἰ τις ἄλλος can be treated syntactically as a pronoun, not as a clause, and declined accordingly.

22. 1. ἀγών . . . τὴν πρῆν: Crossing Epipolai from east to west, descending at Euryelos, doubling back south-eastwards, and crossing the river; all this in the dark, and apparently without any interference from the Athenians.

ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου λιμένος . . . ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάσσονος: cf. 3. 5 n. [καὶ] περιέρπειον: If καὶ is adverbial, it is unobjectionable.

23. 1. ὄμο τῆ ἔφ: The movement of the ships must therefore have begun before it was fully light.

2. ὑπὸ τριήρους μῆς καὶ εὐ πλεούσης: (i) 'By one ship, which was a trireme and fast'; or (ii) 'By one fast trireme'; cf. the familiar πολλά καὶ ἀγαθά; or (iii) 'By one very fast trireme', cf. adverbial καὶ in καὶ μάλα δεῦ; or (iv) 'By a trireme which was by itself' (sc. and thus favourably placed for pursuit) 'and fast'. None of these solutions is altogether easy, and it is probable that a phrase such as 'separate from the others' or 'ahead of the others' is lost after μῆς.

4. πλὴν ὄσον: ὄσον merely reinforces πλήν.

24. 2. καὶ χρήματα πολλά: 'Stores', and in 25. 1 'cargo'; these meanings were concurrent with the meaning 'money' even in the fourth century. καὶ ἱερία . . . τριήρων: The main sails were, if possible, stored on land when action was expected, and the Athenian triremes at Syracuse had to be ready for action continuously.

καὶ τριήρεις . . . τρεῖς: On the beach below the forts. The Athenians may well have had more ships than crews at this time; cf. 12. 3-14. 1.

3. ἦδη: 'From then onwards.'

25. 1-25. 4. *Expedition of Agatharchos*

25. 1. ὅσπερ . . . φέροσσαν: ὅσπερ (rather than ὅτινες) is abnormal in a clause of this type; note that B has ὅπως, and the original hands of all the MSS. have φέροσσαν and ἐσπέρησσαν.

γίνεσθαι: An unusually clear instance of γίνεσθαι serving as the passive of ποιεῖν.

χημαῖων: cf. 24. 2 n.

2. ἐν τῇ Καυλωνιάδι: Nothing is known of the politics of Kaulonia at this time.

3. τῶν ὀλεσδῶν: 19. 3 ff.

25. 5-25. 8. *Fighting round the Old Docks*

25. 5. πρὸ τῶν παλαιῶν νεώσοικων: Since 'the dockyard' was in the Little Harbour (22. 1), we should expect 'the old docks' to be at the northern end of the Great Harbour, where the Syracusan ships would naturally need more elaborate protection against Athenian attack.

6. ναῦν μυριοφόρον: Technical terms are rarely self-explanatory, and though a μυριοφόρος ship clearly held 10,000 units of some commodity, we do not know what units, or of what. If the unit was a talent, this ship was much bigger than any others of which we happen to hear from classical sources, but our evidence on all these matters is extremely scanty.

ἐκ τῶν ἀκάτων . . . τοὺς σταυρούς: If we had no other clue to the meaning of ἀκάτοι, we should certainly infer from this passage that they were some part of a big ship; but in Hdt. vii. 186. 1-191. 1 ἀκάτοι = ἀκάδες, and in 59. 3 infra it appears to mean 'small boat'. Now, 'having brought up a big ship . . . they winched up the stakes from the boats' approaches a *non sequitur*. Was the big ship solely for the housing of archers to protect the boats? And why winch up stakes from small boats (a peculiarly difficult operation) when a big one is available? These considerations suggested to Breusing that Thucydides wrote ἀκατέων, sc. ἰστών, 'foremasts', and HJK actually have ἀκατέων. The practicability of winching up stakes by cables which passed from the winch on deck over a pulley near the top of a foremast satisfied Breusing, who had an intimate acquaintance with sailing ships.

25. 9. *Syracusan Envoys*

25. 9. Κορινθίων . . . καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων: These words go with πρότερος,

not with πρότερος, for the envoys went to the west and south of Sicily (32. 1).
ἐπ' αὐτοῖς: 'Against the Athenians'; cf. iv. 25. 9 βρομβοῦντες ἐπὶ τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις.

ὡς καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων . . . σπαταῖ: lit., 'as the Athenians being expected with another force', i.e. 'on the grounds that the arrival of Athenian reinforcements was expected'.

MAY-JUNE 413

26. Demosthenes' Voyage round the Peloponnese

26. 1. εἰς τὴν Χαριεῖν . . . τῶν Ἀθηναίων: 20. 1.

τῶν Ἀργείων: These Argives were to co-operate only in the attack on Lakonia, and would not be taken on to Sicily; cf. § 3.

2. τῆς Ἐπιδάουρου τῆς Λυσιπᾶς: cf. 18. 3 n.

ἐς τὰ κατεντικερὺ Κυθήρων: Kythera itself was occupied by the Athenians in 424 (iv. 54. 4). Its evacuation was required by the peace treaty, but since Κυθήριοι were present in the Athenian force at Syracuse (57. 6) it had evidently not been evacuated by 413. Demosthenes and Charikles will have landed somewhere in the bay of Boiai; the sanctuary of Apollo which Thucydides mentions has not been identified.

ἰσθηδῆς τὴν χυθραῖν: The most conspicuous place of this kind 'opposite Kythera' is a rocky peninsula which projects from the south-east coast of the island of Onugnathos, which was not an island in classical times. The Athenian fort was abandoned in the winter of 413/12 (viii. 4).

ἵνα δῆ of τῶν Ἐπλωρῶν . . . αὐτομολῶσι: Helots had deserted to Pylos when it was in Athenian hands, and except for the period between the autumn of 421 and the end of 419 Messenians and Helots constituted its garrison. The area of Boiai was a long way from Sparta, but that was an advantage; the fact that Boiai and Pylos were in opposite directions made them more troublesome to the Spartans, and both were accessible by sea to the Athenians.

ὅσπερ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου: The Helots brought back to Pylos by Athens in 419/18 and later reinforced by Athenians had done a lot of damage by raids on Spartan territory.

27-30. The Thracian Mercenaries

27. 1-2. *The Decision on the Mercenaries*

27. 1. τοῦ Διακοῦ γένους: In ii. 96. 2 Thucydides gives the name Dioi to the 'mountain Thracians' who inhabited the Rhodope range and were

αὐτόνομοι (i.e. not controlled by the king of the Odrysians) and *μαχαροφόροι*.

οὐδὲ ἴδαι . . . ξυμπλέειν: 'Who were supposed to sail . . .'

2. τὸ γὰρ ἔχεν . . . ἐφαίνετο: 'For keeping them seemed an extravagance in view of the offensive based on Dekeleia.'

27. 3-28. Digression: the Effects of Dekeleia

The framework is:

27. 2. The Athenians decided it was too expensive to keep the Thracians.

27. 3-28. 2. For the occupation of Dekeleia inflicted severe losses on them.

28. 3. And they were fighting a war on two fronts.

28. 4. Therefore they were bankrupt.

29. 1. Therefore they sent the Thracians home.

The date of the dispatch of the Thracians cannot be determined with exactitude, but it can hardly have been later than the beginning of July, and it may have been substantially earlier. The enemy fort at Dekeleia had been built in March (19. 1), so that the Athenians had certainly begun to feel its effects, and may have felt them severely for three months, by the time they decided to send the Thracians away. We naturally expect that 27. 3-28 will describe the situation as it was in the summer of 413; but (i) 'first built in this summer by the whole army and subsequently occupied by a succession of garrisons' (27. 3) . . . 'sometimes with the enemy continuously at their door and at other times [with a garrison of varying size] ravaging their territory' (28. 4) seems to look rather further ahead, and (ii) 'they suffered in summer and winter alike' (28. 2) plainly looks beyond the summer of 413. On the other hand, 28. 3, referring to the Athenians' two wars, amplifies this reference by specifying Dekeleia and the sending of reinforcements to Sicily, which decisively brings us back to the summer of 413. 28. 3 is so linked to 28. 2 (*μάλακτα δ' αὐτοὺς ἐπέτελε*) that we cannot say that in 27. 3-28. 2 Thucydides is deliberately and consistently describing the situation as it was when the occupation of Dekeleia had lasted a full year. He means to describe it as it was in June/July 413; but since the processes which had by then become established—the continuous relief of the enemy in Dekeleia and the continuous vigilance of the Athenians—lasted for several years thereafter, he uses at certain points language appropriate to a description of that whole period.

27. 3. τὸ μὲν πρότερον . . . *τελιχθεῖσα ὑστερον* δέ . . . ἐφαίνετο: The 'co-ordination' of a participial clause with a finite verb by *μὲν/δέ* is extremely rare.

χημαίων: 'Property', not confined to money; cf. 24. 2.

4. βραχεία: The invasion of 430, which lasted forty days, was the longest.
τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον: 'The rest of the time', i.e. when the enemy was not actually in Attica.

ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῆς ἰσῆς φρουρᾶς κτλ.: lit., 'from necessity the equal garrison overrunning the country . . .'; but 'the equal garrison' does not mean 'the regular' (or 'normal') 'garrison', and to say that it overran Attica 'from necessity' involves a curious temporary shift from the Athenian to the Peloponnesian standpoint. No wholly satisfactory interpretation or emendation of this passage has yet been offered, but possibly Thucydides wrote τῆς ἐξ ἀνάγκης φρουρᾶς κτλ., with ἐξ ἀνάγκης = ἀνεγκατα, 'minimum', 'bare'.

5. καὶ ἀδοσιπρόδον ὑποβολήκεσαν: The specification of a number with the plural perfect tense shows that Thucydides must have a particular date in mind, and this can only be (v. supra), roughly, the date at which the decision was taken to send the Thracians home.
χειροτέχνα: 'Craftsmen', 'specialists'. Many of the slaves listed in the confiscated property of the men condemned for impieties in 415 are designated, e.g., as 'cobbler', 'gold-worker', 'table-maker', &c. There is no justification for supposing that the majority of the 20,000 slaves who deserted were mineworkers from Laureion, though no doubt a high proportion of the mineworkers were included in the 20,000. Although Alkibiades, in urging the Spartans to occupy Dekeleia, attached importance to stopping the Athenians from working the mines at Laureion (vi. 91. 7), we are never told that Agis made the mines a special objective.

28. 1. ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας: In 431 the Athenians transferred all their livestock to Euboea (ii. 14. 1), and though much must have been brought back after the Peace of Nicias Euboea remained of supreme importance; its loss in 411 was a very grave blow (viii. 96. 2).

πολυτελής: At least in the fourth century, sea transport was less expensive than land transport; but the transport of animals raises special problems, and our knowledge of the fifth-century economy is not detailed enough to justify challenging Thucydides on this point.

2. πρὸς γὰρ τῇ ἐράλξει: *ἐράλξει*, literally, is the parapet on a fortification-wall, but *πρὸς ἐράλξει* in ii. 13. 6 means 'on duty in defence of the walls', and *πρὸς τῇ ἐράλξει* here must also be general, including both those posted on the walls and the reserves held at various points.
οὐ μὲν ἐφ' ὀπλοῖς τρωσόμενοι†: This makes no sense, but *πρὸς (β)* does: 'some under arms somewhere', i.e. stationed with their arms in

one part or another of the area enclosed by the walls. Possibly Thucydides wrote *ποι* (having *πεγαμένοι* or some such word in mind), the indivisible variant *ποι* (cf. 73. 1) was conflated with it, giving *ποιων*, and *ποιόμενοι* was an attempt to make sense of that.

3. *καὶ ἐς φλοικίαν καθέστασαν*: To the Greek way of thinking *φλοικία* is not so much something which one embraces by an act of will, but something to which one falls victim, like love, fear, and grief. The *φλοικία* of the Athenians, like the fact itself that they were fighting two wars at once, was something which oppressed (*ἐπίεζε*) them.

τὸ γὰρ αὐτοῦς . . . ἐκ Πελοποννήσου: The fact, I mean, that they . . . This vast complex is appositional in character, stating the nature and content of the Athenians' incredible *φλοικία*; *γὰρ*, as not uncommonly, means 'that is', 'namely', or 'I mean'.

καὶ τὸν παράλογον τοσούτον . . . ὄσον . . . ἐνόμιζον . . . ὥστε . . . ἦλθον: *παράλογος* means 'unexpectedness' or 'surprise' (cf. 55. 1), not 'miscalculation'. *τοσούτον* and *ὥστε* must be correlative, giving the sense 'they displayed to the Greek world such unexpected resources and boldness . . . that they attacked Sicily . . . the *ὄσον*-clause being parenthetical. We cannot make *τοσούτων* and *ὄσον* correlative without depriving *ὥστε* of any intelligible meaning; but it would be fair to say that the choice of *ὄσον* to denote 'in so far as' or 'considering that' is influenced by the presence of *τοσούτων*.

οἱ δὲ τριῶν γ' ἐτῶν οὐδέεις: 'And of the rest' (sc. although some thought that they would last three years) 'no one thought that they would last more than three years'. *τῶν δέ . . . οὐδέεις* would have been normal syntax, but Thucydides tends to avoid the juxtaposition of genitives with different reference, and *τῶν δέ τριῶν γ' ἐτῶν* would be misleading. *τριῶν δ' ἐτῶν οὐδέεις* would be unobjectionable linguistically, but *γ'* is wanted for the sense, and *δέ γ' ἐ* in Thucydides is an adversative, so that *τριῶν δέ γ' ἐτῶν* would, again, be misleading. Altogether it is hard to see how Thucydides could have expressed what he meant except by writing what the MSS. give us.

ἦδη . . . τετραχόμενοι: This is strikingly at variance with what Thucydides tells us in vi. 26. 2 about Athens' recovery, by 415, from the ravages of the Archidamian War; but here he is looking at Athens from the (erroneous) point of view of the rest of the Greek world, which, according to the words he attributed to Alkibiades in vi. 16. 2, did regard Athens in 416 as 'exhausted by war'.

4. *δὲ καὶ τότε κτλ.*: *ᾧ* looks back to the beginning of § 3; *τότε* refers to the summer of 413, by contrast with 415, which is the subject of the end of § 3.

καὶ τὴν εἰκοσὴν . . . ἐποίησαν: If the procedure adopted in the Archidamian War was still followed, a quadrennial reassessment of tribute was due in the autumn of 414. This would be a natural time at which to impose a 5 per cent. tax in place of tribute, and there is no great difficulty in 'about this time'. The next sentence, however, includes among the Athenians' reasons for the change 'their revenues were dwindling', and this was not in the least true until Dekeleia was occupied (there was, indeed, no reason for *tribute* to dwindle until 412). It must therefore have been in the summer of 413 that the tax was substituted for the tribute.

πλείω . . . προσέναί: Such data as we have for tribute in the quadrennium 418/17-415/14 suggest that it amounted annually to c. 900 talents. It follows that the Athenians estimated that the annual value of the seaborne traffic on which they could hope to collect a 5 per cent. tax exceeded 18,000 talents.

29-30. The Thracians at Mykalessos

29. 1. *Διερρέφει*: Probably the man of this name who was appointed to a command in the Thracian area in 411 and was active in the oligarchic cause (viii. 64. 2).

2. *ἔς τε τὴν Τάναγραν*: i.e. into the territory of Tanagra; the city itself lay well inland.

ἐπὶ Μυκαλήσσον: The modern Ritsona, north-west of Tanagra.

ἄπροσδοκίους: 'Not expecting', followed here by an accusative and infinitive as if it were a participle.

τοῦ τοίχους . . . φειδομητέων: Boeotia was a federation of states dominated by Thebes, and possibly Thebes did not encourage the other states to fortify themselves; in 423 she even demolished the city-walls of the Thespians, having grounds for suspecting their loyalty.

4. *ὄμοια . . . φονικώτατόν ἐστιν*: *τοῦ βαρβαρικοῦ* is that part of the human race which does not speak Greek; *ὄμοια* = *ὁμοίως*, and the superlative is tautologous; hence lit., . . . is most murderous, on a level with the most <murderous races> of the barbarian world'. One wonders what Thucydides would have thought of the Romans, who, on occasion, extinguished all life in a town (Polybius x. 15. 5).

5. *καὶ συμφορὰ . . . καὶ δεινὴ*: lit., 'this, <being> a disaster second to none for the whole city, fell upon <it> <as> unexpected and terrible more than another', i.e. 'this disaster which fell upon the whole city in an exceptionally unexpected and terrible form was as great as any which it ever suffered'. *οὐδέμιας ἦσαν* makes the primary point that Mykalessos had never suffered a greater disaster, *μᾶλλον ἐρέας κτλ.* the secondary point that this disaster was peculiarly horrible.

30. 1. ἐπὶ τὸν Εὐρῆπον καὶ τὴν Θάλασσαν: 'To the sea at the Euripos.'
2. τοὺς πλείους: i.e. the majority of the 250 who were killed (§ 3),
not the majority of the whole force of 1,300.

προσθέντες τε καὶ ἑστρεφόμενοι: This not very illuminating description probably means that the main body, as it moved towards the Euripos, would send out detachments to the flanks to keep the pursuers at bay and would continuously relieve these detachments at high speed.

3. τὸν βοιωτάρχον: The βοιωτάρχαι were the annually elected generals of the Boeotian federation; there were eleven of them, of whom four were Thebans.

ὡς ἐπὶ μεγέθει: lit. 'as in consideration of size', i.e. 'relatively speaking'; other states suffered heavier losses than Mykalessos, but none lost so high a proportion of its population at one tragic and horrible blow. Thucydides makes a very similar remark about the losses suffered by Ambrakia at the battle of Idomene in 426/5 (iii. 113. 6): 'no greater disaster than this fell upon any one Greek city, in a comparably brief period, in the course of this war; and I have not given the number of the dead, because the number reported to have perished, in proportion to the size of the city, is hard to believe.' Possibly he wrote those words before 413; but he stresses the tragic character (δολοφάρσθα ἐξίτη) of the fate of Mykalessos, where every kind of living being was slaughtered, and deals more coolly with the death of the fighting-men of Ambrakia.

οὐδένος . . . ἀλόφρασθα δέτη: The massacre at Mykalessos must have aroused much bitterness among the enemies of Athens, especially when linked to rumours—which existed from time to time (cf. ii. 101. 4. vi. 90. 3)—of Athens' willingness to employ barbarians against Greeks. Parallels are to be found in the feelings aroused by the use of Red Indians by British, French, and Americans in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. No firm inference on Thucydides' values can be drawn from the fact that he expresses a sympathy for Mykalessos which he denies to Melos; his emotions are rather more in evidence in Book VII than elsewhere, and the Melians had, after all, the opportunity to avert the fate which they had done something to provoke.

JUNE 413

31. Demosthenes and Eurymedon at Naupaktos

31. 1. ἐκ τῆς Λακωνικῆς: When what would logically be expressed by ἐν + dat. occurs in a sentence which describes movement in space or sequence in time, ἐν + dat. may be replaced by ἐκ + gen. or ἐς + acc.

ἐν Φειῇ τῇ Ἠλείων: Phela lay on the west side of the root of the promontory which has the modern harbour of Katakolon on its east side. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War Elis belonged to the Peloponnesian League. After the Peace of Nikias she joined the anti-Spartan alliance of Argos and Mantinea; this alliance was broken up by the Spartan victory at Mantinea in 418, and we have no accurate information on the relations between Elis and Sparta between that time and the outbreak of war between them in 402.

2. ἐς τὴν Ζάκυνθον καὶ Κεφαλληνίαν: These two islands had been Athenian allies since the beginning of the war.

τὸν Μεσσηνίαν: The people of Naupaktos were Messenians who had been allowed to leave Messenia, under Athenian protection, at the end of the Helot Revolt against Sparta c. 460.

ἐς Ἀλύζιον τε καὶ Ἀνακτόριον: Alyzia is the modern Kandyla, and Anaktorion lay at the south-east corner of the bay between Actium and the modern Vonitsa. Anaktorion was originally a Corinthian colony, but was captured by the Athenians and Akarnanians together in 425 and was thereafter occupied by Akarnanians; hence 'which (the Athenians) themselves held'.

3. τότε τοῦ χειμῶνος: 16. 2. Eurymedon had taken the best part of six months to sail from Athens to Syracuse and back to Kerkyra. He can hardly have been sheltering from storms most of that time; presumably he took part in the fighting at Syracuse, or busied himself in diplomatic or logistic activity in Italy, or both, until he judged that Demosthenes was on the way.

4. καὶ Κόνων: This is the first appearance of the famous general in history and his only appearance in Thucydides.

οὔτε καταλύουσι τὸν πόλεμον: This can hardly mean 'so far from going home without a fight' or 'so far from abandoning their hostile attitude', and Madvig was right to delete τὸν πόλεμον; intransitive καταλύειν = 'cease hostilities' (cf. its common meaning 'stay', 'put up', 'end one's journey') in v. 23. 1.

οὐχ ἰκανός: Sixteen years earlier Phormion, based on Naupaktos, had confidently attacked and defeated 47 Peloponnesian ships with 20 Athenian. Now Konon will not pit 18 against 25; no doubt when the needs of the force in Sicily had been met Konon and other commanders of small detachments were left with inferior ships and crews, while every year of training and experience saw an improvement in the Peloponnesian fleets.

5. *καὶ πέντε . . . καταλεγόμενος*: Since 427 Kerkyra had been a full ally of Athens.
ἔντηξεν γὰρ: The point lies in *ἔντ*, not in *-ήντξ*; the fleet now had the joint command assigned to it the previous winter.

32-33. 2. Sikeliot Help for Syracuse

32. 1. τότε: 25. 9.

Κεντροπέδες τε καὶ Ἀλικιαῖοι καὶ ἄλλοι: The name of the Kentoripes survives in the modern town Centorbi, some 40 km. north-west of Katane. Halikyai is located by later writers in the west of Sicily, inland from Selinus. If the force set out from Selinus already knowing of the Akragantines' refusal (*infra*) to allow passage through their territory, it might well strike north-eastwards into the interior; this would encourage the Halikyaioi (we do not know how far eastwards their territory extended) to follow it until an attack could be concerted with the Kentoripes 'and others'.

Ἀκράγαντινοι γὰρ . . . ἴδον: Akragas was presumably among 'all the Dorian states except Kamarina' (iii. 86. 2) which supported Syracuse against Leontinoi in 428/7, but it welcomed Phaiax's mission in 422/1 (v. 4. 6). Cf. 33. 2 *infra*. The reversion to the finite tense *ἑπέδωσαν* after the infinitive *πειράσσειν* shows that this is a comment by Thucydides, not part of Nikias' message.

33. 1. *καὶ οἱ Καμαρινῆες*: In the winter of 415/14 Kamarina, allied to both Syracuse and Athens, was still prevaricating; but now news of the capture of Plemmyrion has achieved what persuasive arguments could not.

2. *πόσα ἢ Σικελία*: Thucydides is referring only to the Greek cities, ignoring Sikels, Sikans, and Carthaginians.
οἱ δ' ἄλλοι: *δέ* is not a connective here, but the text is sound; cf. *IG* 1² 39 (*GHI* 42). 52 ff. *τοὺς δὲ ξέτους . . . ὅσοι οἰκόντες μὴ τελευτᾶν ἄθνηαίε* . . . *τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους τελευτᾶν ἐς Χαλκίδα*, 'all the foreigners living in Chalkis, except those who pay taxes to Athens, are to pay taxes to Chalkis'.

οἱ πρότερον περιεργόμενοι: In fact, out of eight possible cities, only four (Selinus, Gela, Kamarina, and Himera) fought on the side of Syracuse; Akragas was neutral, Naxos and Katane helped Athens, and Messene, though unfriendly to Athens, is not mentioned in 58. 1-2 among the allies of Syracuse. 'Almost the whole of Sicily except Akragas' is therefore a striking rhetorical exaggeration.

33. 3-6. Demosthenes and Eurymedon Reach Thurioi

33. 3. *ἐν ἄρα τῷ Ἰσπυρίῳ*: The tip of the 'heel' of Italy.

4. *ἐς τὰς Χοιράδας νήσους*: These must be the small islands lying off the harbour of Taras.

τοῦ Μεσσαρίου ἔθους: A closer specification of the generic *Ἰσπυρίων*, *καὶ τῷ Ἄρα* . . . *φύλιν*: The origin of this relationship is unknown; it may be pre-war, or it may be one of the details which Thucydides warns us (iii. 90. 1) he has omitted in his account of the operations in Sicily in 427-424. *παλαιῶν* does not imply very long duration; Leontinoi in 427 considered herself an Athenian ally *κατὰ παλαιῶν συμμάχων* (iii. 86. 3), but the alliance was not in fact of more than twenty years' standing.

ἐς Μετσανόντιον τῆς Ἰταλίας: *Ἰταλία* is used here in the restricted sense 'Bruttium and Lucania'; Taras is in 'Iapygia', Kyme in 'Opikia'. This accords with common fifth-century usage, though elsewhere Thucydides uses *Ἰταλία* in its later, wider sense.

5. *κατὰ τὸ ἑμμεχικόν*: The origin of this alliance too is unknown. *τοὺς τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἐναγίους*: Thurioi rebuffed Gylippos in 414. This is the first we have heard of a significant anti-Athenian faction.

6. *τοὺς αὐτοὺς . . . νομίζων*: This type of 'full' alliance, according to which A and B promise to help one another if either of them chooses to attack a third state, differs from a defensive alliance (*ἐπιμαχία*), in which A and B promise to help one another only if one of them is attacked by a third state.

34. Naval Battle at Naupaktos

34. 1. *οἱ ἐν ταῖς πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι ναυσίν*: 17. 4, 19. 5, 31. 4. *κατὰ Ἐρινεὸν . . . ἐν τῇ Πυρριῆϊ*: Erineos was the bay which lies below the modern village of Kamáres, 29 km. east of Patras and 94 km. west of Aligton. Rhyphes, already uninhabited by the beginning of the Christian era, lay somewhere in this region.

2. *μνησοδοῦς ὄντος*: The coastline runs south-east and east, and a line of ships anchored in it *ἐπιπέλασσαί* would have to wheel through a right angle to meet an enemy sailing into the Gulf from Naupaktos. The purpose of the Corinthian ships was to prevent the Athenians from interfering with the departure of troopships from Elis. They could achieve this purpose by lying well to the east of the narrows, for the Athenians would be unwilling (as is shown by their taking their initiative in attack) to search westwards for the troopships so long as the

Corinthians could sail out of the Gulf behind them and attack Naupaktos.

3. **τριάκοντα** . . . **Διήλιος**: Since Konon had 18 ships, Demosthenes had added 10 to these (31. 4 f.), and Konon would have needed one ship for his journey home, Diphilos must have brought 6 with him. The natural explanation of this relief is that Konon was one of the generals of 414/13, Diphilos one of those of 413/12, and that Diphilos arrived at Naupaktos in the middle of July.

5. **κατέβη μὲν οὐδέμια ἀπλῶς**: 'Not one could be described as "sunk"'. **καὶ ἀνεπαγγέλτοια . . . τὸς ἐπιπίδους ἔχουσῶν**: *ἐπιπίδους* were anchor-blocks fixed one each side of the bows, the ears (*ἄρα*), as it were, of a trirème. *παρῆξερασία* was the 'balcony' running along each side of the ship and housing the *θρανίαι*, the uppermost and outermost line of oarsmen. The strengthened anchor-blocks of the Corinthian ships tore into the *παρῆξερασία* on one side of the enemy ship, taking with it some unfortunate *θρανίαι* and no doubt much of the attached superstructure. One such blow would not render a ship totally un navigable, but would make it an easy victim for further attacks; yet so long as it was not rammed on the waterline it would stay afloat.

6. **καὶ ὡς αὐρούς . . . νεῶν**: 'And to such effect that each side claimed itself to be victorious.'

7. **οἱ τε γὰρ Κορινθιοὶ . . . ἐνίκων**: These attitudes were the product of overwhelming Athenian naval superiority in the Archidamian War.

8. **ὡς νεκίονες**: Greek verbal aspect has not yet been investigated with sufficient rigour to provide an objective explanation of the difference between *ὡς νεκίονες* here and *ὡς νεκίονες* in § 7.

35. Demosthenes and Eurymedon Reach Rhegion

35. 1. **ἐπὶ τῷ Συβάρει ποταμῷ**: Thurioi was founded close to the site of the earlier city Sybaris, which was destroyed in 510. The river Sybaris was the southern of the two rivers flowing on parallel courses through the territory.

2. **ἐπὶ τῷ Ὑλίῳ ποταμῷ**: This is mentioned nowhere else, and we do not know the limits of the territory of Kroton.

πλήν Λοκρῶν: cf. 1. 2 n.

ἐπὶ Πέτραν τῆς Ῥηγίνης: Petra, otherwise unknown, may be another name for 'Leukopetra', a name given in later times to two different promontories on the 'toe' of Italy: (a) Punta di Pellaro, which projects westwards towards Sicily, and (b) Capo delle Armi,

which is conspicuously light-coloured and projects southwards. As we hear no more of Demosthenes and Eurymedon until they arrive at Syracuse (42. 1), it seems that they crossed to Sicily from 'Petra' and did not go to Rhegion itself.

36-41. Battles at Syracuse

36. *Syracusan Preparations*

36. 2. **ὡς ἐκ τῆς προτέρας . . . σχήσονται**: 'In the manner in which they saw from the previous naval battle they would gain some advantage.'

καὶ τὰς ἐπιπίδους . . . παγείας: cf. 34. 5 n.

καὶ ἀντιπίδους . . . καὶ ἔξωθεν: Since the axis of each anchor-block was at right angles to the bows, a head-on collision would tend to force it backwards and break it off from its base. To prevent that, a heavy strut was inserted behind it to take the strain of collision. As these struts are described as being 'about six cubits long *inside and outside*' they must have extended from the anchor-blocks not only *to (πρὸς)* the sides of the ship but also *through* the sides, bearing at the rear on a main transverse beam.

3. **ἢ ἐκ περιπλοῦ**: The Athenians normally exploited their superior speed and training by 'sailing round' their adversaries, choosing a point from which to ram in the side or stern.

οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ . . . ὄσαν: *οὐκ* negatives only *πολλῷ*: 'a battle with many ships in a restricted space.'

4. **ὄτρε δέκπλουν**: 'Sailing through and out'—and then turning, more quickly than the enemy, to ram him—was practicable only if there was enough space between the enemy ships. On the open sea close array, a protection against *δέκπλους*, would invite *περίπλους*; but in a restricted space this danger was removed.

5. **τὸ ἀντίπαρον ξυγκρούσαι**: *τό*, which is in a papyrus text of this passage, is probably sound; cf. 67. 1 *τῆς δοκίσεως* . . . *τὸ κραιοτέρους εἶναι* where the content of the *δοκίσεως* is expressed by *τό* with the infinitive and not by a strictly concordant apposition.

ἐξῴθειμένους: 'When they were forced out of the battle.'

37. 1-38. 1. *First Day*

37. 1. **πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθῶν . . . δύναμιν**: *πρὸς* here = 'to suit', 'in conformity with'.

2. **καθ' ὅσον . . . ἐώρα**: Although *ὅσον* . . . *αὐτοῦ* is the subject of *ἐώρα*, the clause *ὅσον . . . ἐώρα* as a whole is also treated as a substantive

in the accusative governed by *κατά*. The possibility of giving the neuter gender this dual role always exists formally, but its exploitation is rare.

3. *πύρρα* καὶ ἐββομήκοντα ναῦς: Cf. 22. 2 n.

38. 2-38. 3. *Second Day*

38. 2. ἐλπίδων: 'Expecting', almost 'fearing'.

πρὸ τοῦ σφαιτέρου στρατοπέδου: Whether this was semicircular, or a pair of converging lines of stakes, or three sides of a rectangle, it must have had several substantial exits, for a single narrow exit into the waters of the harbour would have caused impossibly difficult and dangerous delays in putting to sea against a Syracusan attack, and would have rendered the barrier of merchant ships now described unnecessary. It is even possible that the *στρατοπέδα* was simply a pair of parallel breakwaters, one each side of the beach occupied by the Athenians, but this depends on the interpretation of 41. 2, q.v.

3. ἄσπον δύο πλέθρα: Hdt. ii. 149. 3 reckons six πλέθρα to a stade; hence two πλέθρα = between 45 and 65 metres (cf. 2. 4 n.).

κατάφραξις ἀσφαλῆς: Why this should be so is explained in 41. 2.

39-41. *Third Day*

39. 2. τὴν ἀγορὰν τῶν πωλουμένων: lit., 'the market of things (sc. normally) sold', clearly distinguished from (lit.) 'whatever edibles one has', which would be the private stores of individuals, not normally for sale.

ἄσπας αὐτοῖς κτλ.: αὐτοῖς refers to all the people who would then be selling food.

εὐθὺς παρὰ τὰς ναῦς: 'Just by the ships', 'immediately next to the ships'.

40. 5. οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων αὐτοῖς: 'The men on their decks'. The Athenians were soon compelled (62. 2 f., 67. 2) to imitate this feature of Syracusan tactics, peculiarly suited to fighting in a restricted space.

ἔς τε τοὺς ταρασοὺς ὑποπίπτοντες: In fourth-century naval documents ταρασοίς is a collective noun, 'oars', and in Hellenistic writers 'bank of oars'; so too Hdt. viii. 12. 1, where τοὺς ταρασοὺς τῶν κωπηέων ἐτάρασαν means 'they threw the banks of oars into confusion', i.e. prevented the oars from moving in ordered unison. It is doubtful whether the Syracusan boats could really be rowed *beneath* the banks of oars of the Athenian triremes, for a trireme was low in the water, but they could certainly have been rowed into contact with the oars

nearest the bows or nearest the stern. ὑποπίπτειν here serves (cf. other compounds of πίπτειν) as the passive of ὑποβάλλειν.

καὶ ἐς τὰ πλάγια παραπλήοντες: There is no part of a ship called τὰ πλάγια; the expression means 'on the flank', as in iv. 35. 4.

ἐξ αὐτῶν: sc. τῶν λεπτῶν πλοίων.

41. 2. αἱ ἐσπῆσαι . . . ἐπέλωον: These were spars from each of which a 'dolphin', i.e. a fish-shaped weight of iron, was suspended; when an enemy ship came close, the spar was swung round over it and the iron weight dropped, with the intention that it should fall straight through the bottom of the ship. This odd but effective device is twice referred to in Comedy. In saying (38. 3) that the merchant ships were two plethra apart Thucydides probably does not mean that an expanse of that size was protected by the dolphins of two ships, for that would imply spars of remarkable size and strength, but that the passages (ἐσπῆλαι) through the line of stakes, each passage being protected by a merchant ship carrying one or more dolphins, were two plethra apart. Each dolphin ship naturally constituted its own protection against ramming.

3. καὶ ἡ ἑτέρα αὐτοῖς ἀνδρόσπον ἔλαλε: 'And one of them was captured' (presumably in a sinking condition) 'complete with its crew.'

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42. 1-5. Arrival of Demosthenes and Eurymedon

42. 1. τρεῖς καὶ ἐββομήκοντα μάλισσα: Demosthenes started with 65 (20. 2), ordered 15 from Kerkyra (31. 5), and gave 10 to Konon (ibid.); Eurymedon sailed to Sicily with 10 (16. 2), and when he returned to meet Demosthenes at Kerkyra must have left 9 of these 10 in Sicily. On the voyage along the Italian coast they collected 2 from Metapontion. If μάλισσα (which B omits) is right, it means not quite 'about' but 'I calculate (sc. assuming the correctness of all the individual data)'.

ξὺν ταῖς ξενικαῖς: ξὺν here = 'including', not 'plus'.

καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων: cf. 17. 1, 26. 1, 26. 3, 31. 2, and 31. 5.

ἀκοντιστάς τε βραβείρους: cf. 33. 4 f.

2. κατὰλῆξις . . . οὐκ ὀλίγη: The control of entrance to the harbour, which the capture of Plemmyrion helped the Syracusans to achieve (36. 6), did not extend to the exclusion of Demosthenes' powerful fleet, which, according to Plu. *Nic.* 21. 1, sailed in with impressive flamboyance.

εἰ πέρας μὲδὲν ἔσται κτλ.: εἰ = '(as they wondered) whether.' For πέρας . . . τοῦ ἀπαλλαγῆναι cf. D. xl. 40 τὸ ἄν ἦν πέρας ἡμῶν τοῦ διαλυθῆναι;

ἴσον καὶ παραπλήσιον: 'as large, or approximately as large, as . . .'; cf. i. 22. 4, τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αἰθῆς . . . τοιούτων καὶ παραπλήσιον εἶσαται, ' . . . in the same, or similar, form'.
 ψύχη: Psychological rather than material; cf. 18. 2.

3. ἴσον . . . ἐκπλήξει: The formal resemblance of this sentence to the description of the generals' motives in vi. 64. 1—γυγνώσκοντες . . . (τοῖς γὰρ ἂν φιλοῦς . . .), τοιούδε τι οὖν . . . μηχανώμενται—is less important than its formal difference; there, the whole parenthesis is expressed in the accusative and infinitive of reported thought (cf. 51. 1 infra), whereas here it is expressed in finite tenses and includes (ἦν οὐδ' ἂν μετέρεμψαν κτλ.) a statement about what might have happened in certain circumstances. We must therefore regard the parenthesis as expressing Thucydides' own judgement, not merely his report of Demosthenes' judgement, though the two may largely have coincided.
 ii. 13 provides the clearest example of parenthetic γὰρ-clauses 'glossing' a report of another's speech (note especially ii. 13. 7, which by its nature cannot be part of what Perikles told the Athenians in 431: 'for that was the number which at first guarded the walls whenever the enemy invaded Attica'); and ii. 94. 1, iii. 113. 6, viii. 87. 4, 96. 4, are examples of Thucydides' hypothetical judgements on the past. 6. 1 supra is intermediate in character—σομίζοντες . . . (ἦν γὰρ . . .), ἀντεπίσταν οὖν κτλ.—since the first part of its parenthesis is a statement of objective fact, while the second part (εἰ πρόελθοι, ταυρὸν ἦν ἐνοίει κτλ.) is a judgement in which Thucydides necessarily concurs with those whose thought he is reporting.

Thucydides, then, blames Nikias primarily for spending the winter at Katane and not 'laying siege to Syracuse at once', and secondarily, by implication, for allowing Gylippos to reach Sicily. If we had lost Book VI and knew only that the Athenian expedition arrived in Sicily during the summer of 415, we should infer from this passage that there was no attack on Syracuse until the spring of 414; but that would be wrong, for they landed in the Great Harbour, won a battle by the Helorine road, and then sailed away, late in 415 (vi. 64–71). As it is, two interpretations of the passage are open to us:

(i) Thucydides is condemning the failure of Nikias—and of Lamachos, who was not killed until the summer of 414—to press the advantage they gained by their surprise landing and victory by the Helorine road in the autumn of 415. This interpretation makes the clearest contrast with 'spent the winter at Katane'. It necessitates reference of ἀφαιρέσθαι to the landing in the harbour, not to the Athenians' arrival in Sicily.

(ii) He is condemning the adoption by the three generals of Alkibiades' plan instead of Lamachos' at the conference held when they

first arrived in the West (vi. 49). This interpretation accords well with ἀφαιρέσθαι . . . φεβερῶς and with the representation of Demosthenes' insistence on the importance of seizing the initiative while the enemy's morale is still affected by his arrival, for Lamachos' original plan laid great emphasis on the moral advantage to be gained by speed and aggressive action, whereas Alkibiades' plan was for negotiations with potential allies. Again, if Thucydides has the Athenians' first arrival in Sicily in mind, ἐπεφύθη accords well with his description (vi. 63. 2) of how the Syracusans' courage revived *before* the landing in the harbour. But it would mean that 'spent the winter in Katane' is a compressed and misleading way of saying 'established a summer base at Katane with the intention of returning there for the winter'.

Neither interpretation is in tune with vi. 71, where we are given the impression that the Athenians would indeed have established themselves at Syracuse after their victory if only the enemy cavalry had not proved so formidable; there, Thucydides makes no comment at all on the generals' decision to withdraw. Neither interpretation, again, absolves Thucydides from a charge of rhetorical distortion (both are unjust to Nikias, in so far as they ignore the responsibility of his colleagues, but this injustice is determined by the context, where the issue is essentially between Demosthenes and Nikias). The distortion is much less gross in interpretation (i). To say that the Syracusans 'would have thought that they were a match for Nikias, and by the time they discovered that they were not they would have been walled off' is fair, since Syracusan morale was broken not (vi. 72 f., 75) by their defeat at the Helorine road but by the Athenian victories and siege-walls in 414 (vi. 103. 3, cf. Plu. *Niz.* 17. 1 ff.), and they were saved from capitulation by the arrival of Gongylos in the nick of time (2. 1), just as they were saved from circumvallation by Gylippos (2. 4).

The tone of the whole passage suggests that Thucydides believed that Lamachos was right in his initial plan, and, therefore, that Alkibiades was wrong. Yet this conclusion has to be reconciled with ii. 65. 11, where the failure of the expedition is (a little obliquely) attributed to the exile of Alkibiades. Reconciliation may be achieved by the hypothesis that Thucydides changed his mind, vii. 42. 3 representing his opinion at the time he wrote Book VII, ii. 65. 11 his opinion after the end of the war, under the influence of the activities of Alkibiades in 411–407, so highly praised in vi. 15. 3 f. (a passage which on this hypothesis would be a later insertion into the narrative of Book VI). A fundamental change of opinion, however, is not a necessary hypothesis; it is rather a matter of two different strands of opinion. It was quite possible for Thucydides to believe simultaneously that (a) Lamachos put forward the best plan at the start of the campaign, (b) even though the wrong plan—Alkibiades' plan—was adopted, victory was

still possible, as his own narrative of the events of 414 makes plain, (c) if Alkibiades had been present at the victory by the Helorine road, he would have persuaded his colleagues to press on with the siege at once and not be deterred by the Syracusan cavalry, and (d) even if he had failed to do that, he would at least have accelerated operations after the death of Lamachos and would have taken effective steps to prevent the arrival of Gylippos in Sicily. It would be correct, however, to speak at least of a change of emphasis; considerations (a) and (b) seem to have been prominent in Thucydides' mind at the time of writing vii. 42. 3, while (c) and (d) were uppermost at the time of writing vi. 15. 3 f.

οὐχ οἶόν τε εἶναι διαρριπτεῖν οὐδὲ παθεῖν κτλ.: 'Not possible to waste time and (thereby) to incur the difficulties which Nikias had incurred' (cf. 6r. 2), rather than 'not possible to waste time *without incurring* (sc. as a consequence of wasting time) . . .'

ἀφιέμενος γὰρ . . . φοβηρός, ὡς . . . ὑπερόψθη κτλ.: Not 'for when Nikias arrived he first inspired fear', sc. *ἦν*, for that would require *ὡς δέ* to follow, and there is no *δέ*. *φοβηρός* goes closely with *ἀφαιέμενος*, *τὸ πρῶτον* being pleonastic, as in vi. 46. 2 *πρῶτον ἠβέητο*; hence lit., 'for Nikias, having arrived formidable at first, when he did not press . . . was despised', i.e. 'for when Nikias, whose first arrival inspired fear, did not at once . . .'

ἔτι: οὐκέτι often means 'not, after all' or 'not thereafter', and the sense here is lit., 'so that not even if they had sent for it would it have helped them thereafter similarly', i.e. 'so that even if they had sent for it it would not have helped them thereafter as in fact it did'.

μάλαστα: This word is, strictly speaking, tautologous, but the intensification is progressive: 'at that moment, on the first day, more than at any other time, most formidable.'

τῇ προπόσει τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐκλήξαι: 'The consternation caused (sc. in Syracuse) at this moment by his force.'

4. **τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου:** 'The force stationed on it', of which we hear more in 43. 4.

5. **καὶ οἱ ξυνηγορήσαντες ἡγήετο διαπολιέμενοι:** lit., 'and he thought (it) most concise completion of the war for him', i.e. 'and he thought it was his quickest way of finishing the campaign'. *οἱ* is absent from ACEFM, but it makes sense, and it is hard to imagine that a noun little enough used in classical prose and never in Hellenistic Greek should be an interpolation in B. For Thucydides' use of it cf. 49. 3.

Throughout this sentence Thucydides speaks as if Demosthenes had come not to act as a colleague of Nikias but to supersede him in supreme command; this was not so, but it is characteristic of the Greek

historians to speak of a member of a collegiate office who is at any given time morally dominant as if he were also constitutionally superior.
ἀνδρῶν: sc. from Sicily.

42. 6-45. The Night Attack on Epipolai

42. 6. **τὴν τε γῆν . . . ἔρεμον:** West and south-west of the lower half of the Athenian fortifications.

ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπιτίου: cf. 37. 2 f.

43. 1. **μηχαναῖς . . . ἀποπερδοῦσαι κτλ.:** These attacks must have been based on the Circle and made against the southern face of the counter-wall. Had the Athenians been able to deploy forces against the northern face of the counterwall by day, there would have been no need for the night attack which Thucydides now goes on to describe. The *μηχαναῖς* are battering-rams, as used by the Peloponnesians against Plataiai in 429 (ii. 77. 4).

καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυνάροντας: Menandros, Euthydemos, and Eury-medon; cf. 16. 1 n.

τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν: cf. 4. 1 n. on the limitation of the term 'Epipolai' to the more westerly parts of the plateau which lies above Syracuse.

2. **τοξομαχῶν:** Elsewhere in Thucydides, 'arrows' (e.g. iv. 34. 1), but here it covers also the archers who use them, just as 'the guns' or 'the tanks' in English covers the men who man them. Cf. Hdt. v. 112. 2 *οὐτε ἵππου* (= 'cavalry') *ὄπισθοχώρησεν οὐτε τοξομαχῶν*.

πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς: Going north-westwards from the lower Athenian fortifications.

3. **κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον:** cf. 2. 3 n.

4. **τὰ στρατόπεδα:** The *προτειχίσματα* in which these forces were stationed cannot have lain west of the end of the counterwall, for, as we see in § 5, the Athenians made contact with the counterwall *before* they could be met by the enemy coming from the *προτειχίσματα*. They must therefore have projected from the southern face of the counter-wall, where, given the existence of the Circle, the Syracusans naturally had most reason to fear attack. They cannot have been *separated* from the wall; for if they had been, the Syracusans would have had to come round the western end of the wall in order to make contact with the Athenians, and would have taken the leading Athenian units in the rear; but it is clear from the narrative that this did not happen. Therefore the troops coming out of the *προτειχίσματα* emerged on the northern side of the wall; cf. the map.

τοὺς ἔξακκοῖσιν: This body of 600 picked men was constituted in 414 (vi. 96. 3); it suffered very heavily in its first encounter with the Athenians (vi. 97. 4).

5. αὐτοὶ μὲν: The force with Demosthenes, which now presses on eastwards, north of the counterwall, while the following contingent (ἀλλοὶ δέ) begins to demolish the counterwall.

δῶς τῆ παρούσῃ ὀρμῇ . . . γένωνται: If the text is sound, βραδείς is constructed with a genitive on the analogy of ἰστέρος, ἰστέρεθ, and ἐλαττός: 'so that they might not be slow, with the impetus of the moment, in the accomplishment of the purpose for which they had come.' *περάσεισθαι* is always passive (though there is a middle *διεπεράσεισθαι*). It is possible that δῶς and μὴ βραδείς γένωνται are inter-polated, and that Thucydides used the infinitive of purpose.

ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης: cf. ἀπὸ πρώτης = 'to begin with', 'at the start', in i. 77. 3; hence 'they began *straight away* to take possession of the counterwall . . . and pull off its battlements', instead of attending to the more important matter of defeating the enemy's troops.

6. τοὺς τολμήματός: The Athenians'.

7. ἐν ἀραξίαι: So far, all has gone well—too well; the Athenians lose formation as some press on faster than others, and the advantage now lies with the first solid enemy formation that encounters them.

οἱ Βουωτοί: The 300 hoplites mentioned in 19. 3.

44. 1. ἦν οὐδὲ τυθέσθαι . . . ξυνηέχθη: ἐπιβόμην τῆν παραχῆν δὴν ῥόσω ξυνηέχθη, with 'anticipatory' accusative, would be straight-forward Greek; the relative ἦν is an accusative of this kind, but the 'anticipation' is subtly varied by a shift from 'confusion' to 'the various events' (ἔκαστα) which were all part of the confusion.

οὐδ' ἀφ' ἐτέρων: = ἀπ' οὐδετέρων. Thucydides tells us in v. 26. 5 that because of his exile from Athens he spent time 'on both sides'. So many nationalities fought at Syracuse—some of them from temporary and uncertain loyalties—that Thucydides' words here do not require us to believe either that he himself had been to Sicily before writing Book VII or that he had to wait until the end of his exile before he could get any information from the Athenian side.

ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἡμέρᾳ . . . οἶδεν: lit., 'for (in a battle) by day (one knows) more clearly (what happened), but nevertheless not even these (do) those who were present (know) completely, except each man knows with difficulty what happened in his own part of the field'. We expect *ἴσασιν* at the end of the sentence, taking *πλήν* . . . *μόλις* as

a parenthesis and *understanding* οἶδεν; but the verb is accommodated to the nearer *ἴσασιν* when logically it should agree with the further *οἱ παραγενόμενοι*. Cf. vi. 65. 2 ὅσοι Σικελῶν αὐτοῖς ἢ ἄλλος τις προσεληλύθει.

Thucydides complains in his Introduction (i. 22. 3) of the uncertain memory and partiality of eyewitnesses, but very seldom refers in his narrative to any difficulty in discovering the facts; v. 68. 2 has something in common with the present passage.

ἐν δὲ νυκτομασίᾳ, ἢ κτλ.: i.e. 'and in a night battle—and this one . . .'

ἐν γε ῥάδε τῷ πολέμῳ: From 431 to the time of writing; night battles were not common, and the point that this was the only one in the Sicilian campaign would not have been worth making.

2. ἔργων δὲ . . . ἀποσπεύσθαι: lit., 'and they saw one another in the way in which it is to be expected in moonlight that one should see beforehand' (i.e. before coming to close quarters) 'the sight of the body but that the recognition of one's own should be doubted', i.e. ' . . . as naturally happens in moonlight; one can see the form of a man in time, but cannot be sure that it is a friend'.

ἐν στενοχωρίᾳ: The area between the counterwall and the northern edge of the plateau; hardly a 'restricted space', one would have thought, even for much larger forces, but the wall was a real barrier to free movement on one side, and the Athenians' fear of being forced off the northern edge of the plateau would naturally restrict their movement on the other side far more in the dark than would have been justified in daylight.

3. ἀήσθητοι: (sc. so far) unbeaten', not (as the words sometimes means) 'invincible'.

τὰ πρόσωθεν: 'Their forward troops.'

4. σπηῆνας: 'Give an order', as commonly (cf. 50. 3).

τοῦ ξυνηέχματος: 'The password'; passwords were commonly used for recognition in battle even in daylight (e.g. X. An. i. 8. 16).

5. τὸ δ' ἐκείνων . . . διεφθέρισοντο: lit. 'but the Syracusan password they (Ath.) did not get to know in the same way, because of the fact that they (Syr.), as they were winning and not scattered, were less unknown'—i.e. the failure of one body of Syracusans to recognize another was less frequent—'so that if they (Ath.), in superior strength, encountered a body of the enemy, they (Syr.) escaped them (Ath.) inasmuch as they (Syr.) knew their (Ath.) password, but if they (Ath.) themselves did not answer'—i.e. when challenged for the Syracusan password by Syracusans—'they (Ath.) were killed'.

6. **ὁ παιανισμός**: The singing of the paian as a prayer before a battle or as a hymn of thanks after a victory was a universal Greek custom; but in Thucydides the paian as a warcry in battle or as a signal to attack occurs only in connexion with the Dorian peoples or Boeotians, never Athenians or Ionians.

καὶ ἄσπον Δωρικόων . . . ἦν: Including Cretans, Rhodians, Messenians from Naupaktos, and Megarian exiles (57. 6-9).

παρείχε: The singular verb implies that 'whenever the Argives . . . is subject.

8. **καρὰ τε τῶν κρημνῶν**: There are no towering cliffs at the edge of the plateau, but many places where a man in the dark could break his legs or even his neck.

[οἱ] πολλοί: If *οἱ* is sound, the reference must be to 'the majority' of those who became casualties, not to the majority of the whole Athenian force.

πίπτοντες ἑαυρούς: Not in suicidal despair, but in the hope of landing on their feet.

καὶ ὄσοι ἦσαν: *καὶ* is 'appositional': 'the majority, those who belonged to the original force', contrasted with 'those who came later'.

45. 2. **ἔτι πλείω ἢ καρὰ τοὺς νεκρούς**: 'even more than in accordance with the corpses' = 'quite out of proportion to the number of dead'. **ψυχαὶ [ἀνευ τῶν ἀσπίδων]**: Since *ψυχαὶ* in 78. 3 = 'without hoplite armour', it naturally means here 'having discarded their arms', and **ἀνευ τῶν ἀσπίδων** is almost certainly an inadequate explanatory interpolation.

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46. Syracusan Activity

46. **Ἀκράγαυρα στασιάζοντα**: On the politics of Akragas cf. 32. 1 n. **Σικανόν**: Elected general in the autumn of 415 (vi. 73. 1), and deposed the following summer after the Syracusan setbacks (103. 4), he is now back in favour; cf. 70. 1.

47-49. Conference of the Athenian Generals

47. 1. **ἀρρωστῖαν**: *κατὰ πάντα* and the details which follow show that *ἀρρωστῖα* here has the general sense 'weakness' or 'impotence' (cf. iii. 15. 2 *ἀρρωστία τοῦ στρατεύειν*), not (as LSJ) 'loss of morale'.

2. **νόσῳ τε γὰρ ἐπιέζοντο** . . . **τά τε ἄλλα ὄντι κτλ.**: 'For they were oppressed by sickness . . . and because everything else . . . *κατ'*

ἀπόρροια = 'for two reasons', which are then given, the first in a participial clause (*τῆς τε ὥρας* . . . *ὁδοῦς κτλ.*) and the second in an independent finite clause (*καὶ τὸ χροσίον* . . . ἦν).

The Athenians may have fallen victim, like other armies after them, to the malaria of the coastal regions of Sicily; and, like armies in all ages, they knew that marshy ground was unhealthy without knowing why. But it is uncertain how far Sicily was malarial at that period of history, and there will have been other diseases; fly-borne intestinal infections must have flourished in the conditions in which the Athenians were compelled to live.

3. **καὶ μὴ διαρπίβειν**: The recurrence of this word (42. 3-43. 1) conveys the urgency with which Demosthenes strove to make Nikias see the situation as it was; cf. the repetition of *αἰσχροῦν* in the summary of Phrynichos' arguments in viii. 27. 2 f.

ὥς ἔτι . . . **κπαρέτιν**: lit., 'while it was still possible for them to be conveyed across the sea' (i.e. before bad weather made a return voyage risky) 'and, of their force, they had the upper hand at least with the ships which had come as reinforcements'. As it is still only August (cf. 50. 4 n.) it is remarkable that Demosthenes should be thinking of the onset of winter storms, but the words leave no doubt of this; he speaks of crossing the sea, not simply of getting away from Syracuse, and the position of *τοῦ στρατεύματος* points to an emphatic distinction between the two elements on which the issue turned, nature and arms, both at the moment in their favour. Demosthenes had formed a strong impression of Nikias' capacity for delay, and he may well have thought that unless a decision to withdraw were taken at once he might not persuade Nikias to consider it again until the winter was at hand.

4. **τοὺς ἐν τῇ χῶρῳ σφῶν ἐπηρειζόντας**: The fact that Demosthenes could use this argument is a strategic vindication of the Spartan occupation of Dekeleia.

εἰκός: Here 'reasonable' or 'rational'.

48. 1. **ἐγγίνωσκεν**: 'Argued.' *γνώμη* is the term used for the opinion which one delivers in an assembly or conference (e.g. vi. 47).

ὑψηλομένουσ μετὰ πολλῶν: How large a body Nikias had in mind is not clear; he may possibly have contemplated putting the issue to the vote of the whole Athenian component of his forces, but he does not seem to envisage that in § 4, and even if only the taxiarchs (as in 60. 2) and trierarchs were brought into the discussion enough men would be involved to make it certain that the decision would become generally known.

λαθεῖν γὰρ ἂν . . . **πολλῶ ἦσαν**: As *γὰρ* commonly = 'for thus', 'for then they would have much less chance of doing this', i.e. withdrawing,

'when they wanted to, without the Syracusans' knowledge' is a more probable translation than 'for if they did this', i.e. voted for withdrawal after discussion, 'they would have much less chance of escaping the Syracusans' notice', i.e. in withdrawing.

2. τὸ δέ τι: lit., 'and this, a certain thing', i.e. 'and, for another thing'

ἀφ' ὧν . . . ἠσθάνετο αὐτῶν: lit., 'from the perception which he had of them' (αὐτῶν refers to τὰ τῶν πολεμίων, 'the enemy's situation') 'to a greater extent than the others', i.e. 'as he judged from his knowledge of it, which was greater than his colleagues'.

θαλασσοκρατούντων: The reference is to the Athenians, who are the subject of ἐτροχάσεν; the accusative would have created ambiguity, and evidently Thucydides felt that a genitive absolute was more elegant than a nominative.

καὶ (ἦν γὰρ τῶν . . .) ἐπεκρηπυκύνετο κτλ.: The identity, strength, and motives of this 'fifth column' are unknown to us; cf. 49. 1 n. Probably some of the wealthy citizens of Leontinoi who in 422 had become citizens of Syracuse and had not broken away among the earlier malcontents (v. 4. 3 f.) were now hankering after an independent Leontinoi; when the Athenians first arrived in Sicily they issued a proclamation calling on men of Leontinoi in Syracuse to come over to their side (vi. 59. 4), and Diod. xiii. 18. 5 says that the Athenians believed that the seeming-friendly message delivered to them after the final battle in the harbour came from Leontinians. Whoever they were, these men, in order to retain the help of a powerful ally, would not have hesitated to deceive Nikias, and themselves too, by an exaggerated picture of Syracusan difficulties—the conduct of émigrés in our day provides abundant parallels—but Thucydides does not deny (49. 1) that Syracuse was short of money.

οὐκ εἶα ἀπανίστασθαι: οὐκ εἶα commonly means not 'forbid' but 'ask . . . not to . . .' or 'urge . . . not to . . .', even sometimes 'disapprove of

3. σφῶν ταῦτα . . . ἀπελθεῖν: lit., 'will not accept this of them, so as to go away when they themselves', i.e. the assembly at Athens, 'had not voted (sc. for their going away)', i.e. . . . would not approve such conduct on their part, departure from Sicily without a vote of the Assembly'. Nikias and his colleagues had been dispatched εὔροκράτους (vi. 8. 2), i.e. empowered to end the campaign when they judged that its purposes had been fulfilled or had become impossible to fulfil, but this would not save them from punishment if the Assembly disapproved of the manner in which they had exercised their judgement.

οὐ τοὺς αὐτοὺς . . . γνώσεσθαι: lit., 'for not the same men will vote about them' (i.e. the Athenian forces in Sicily; αὐτῶν must be wrong,

for σφῶν αὐτῶν could only refer to those who are the subject of γνώσεισθαι) and will understand the situation by seeing it, as they themselves' (the forces in Sicily) 'do, and not having heard (about it) through the criticism made by others', i.e. 'for those who would pass a verdict on them would not be men who would depend for their knowledge of the situation on their own eyes—as they themselves did—rather than on the criticisms of others'.

ἄλλ' ἐξ ὧν ἂν τις . . . πιστεύσθαι: lit., 'but from what one could, speaking well, vilify, from this they (the Athenian assembly) would believe', i.e. 'they would be convinced by whatever vilification a plausible speaker could produce'.

4. τάναντία βοήσοσθαι: Nikias is afraid that if they return to Athens not only will the majority in the Assembly be judging them in ignorance of what the situation really was at Syracuse but even some of those who were there and do know will fall in with the prevailing mood and blame the generals for their failure.

ὑπὸ χρημάτων καταπροδόντες: The three generals who had returned from Sicily in 424 after the Peace of Gela were punished on a charge that they were bribed to withdraw (iv. 65. 3); accusations of this kind were made very freely in a Greek state.

ταῦτο παθεῖν ἰδίᾳ: Death under sentence from a jury would be death δημόσια, the decision being taken by the state; ἰδίᾳ therefore means 'on his own initiative', 'at a time, and in a manner, of his own choosing'. Nikias' pride and consequent moral cowardice in the face of personal disgrace lead him to put forward as discreditable a proposition as any general in history. Rather than risk execution, he will throw away the fleet and thousands of other people's lives and put his country in mortal peril. We might compare Phaidra's false accusation against Hippolytos in the interests of her own reputation; we might even wonder whether a perverse spite (like Phaidra's) underlay Nikias's later obstinacy (50. 4).

5. οἷος: 'In spite of everything'; cf. 1. 2 n.
διοχλία . . . τάλατρα: We have no other evidence for the revenue and expenditure of Syracuse in peace or war at this period.

τῷ μὴ δίδόναι τροφήν: τροφή, 'sustenance', is commonly used of the pay on which a soldier or sailor supports himself. Nikias' point is that if Syracuse cannot pay the forces of her allies they will go home.

τὰ πρᾶγματα: 'Their strength', 'their forces'.
ἐπικουρικά μάλλον ἢ δι' ἀνάγκης: Whereas ἐπικουρία is 'help', ἐπικουρικὸς normally implies 'mercenary'; δι' ἀνάγκης, lit. 'in circumstances of compulsion' = 'under compulsion', is used in place of ἀνεγκαστά for linguistic variety (note καὶ . . . τὰ -πα -τα).

6. **πρίβειν**: 'Wear <them, i.e. Syracuse> down'; cf. 49. 2 (v. n.) and viii. 46. 4 **πρίβειν** **ὅν ἐκέλευε πρῶτον ἀμφοτέροισ**. There is no certain example of intransitive **πρίβειν** = **διαπρίβειν**.

χρημασιν, ὧν πολὺ κρείσσοις εἶσι: **ὧν** B: **ὧ** f: **ὧ** [sic] JK: **ὡς** cett. **φ** is supported by 62. 3 **παχύρρητος, ὥπερ δὴ κτλ.**, and in this context corruption of **φ** to **ὧ** or **ὡς** is much more likely than the reverse process. The expression **χρημάτων κρείσσω** = 'incomparable' (ii. 60. 5), which is inappropriate here.

49. 1. **πολύ**: This is Linwood's conjecture for **πῶν** (B: om. cett.), and since Plutarch (Nic. 20. 5) speaks of **ὅκ δλίγοι**, he probably read **πολύ**, surprising though it may seem; cf. 48. 2 n.

ταῖς γῶν ναυσι μάλλον ἢ πρότερον ἐβόρησε κρατήσεων: The MSS. are confused here; B has **θαλασῶν** (om. cett.), for which **μάλλον** is Herwerden's conjecture; then **ἐβόρησε** B, **θαλασῶσι** cett., and at the end **κρατήσε** codd. (**κρατήσων** Herwerden). I suppose that **θαλασῶν** (note **-pp**), contrary to Thucydides' practice) is an intrusive gloss designed to 'correct' the construction **αἰεθόμενος . . . καὶ ἄμα . . . ἐβόρησε** into a 'regular' co-ordination of two participles, and that Thucydides in fact wrote **ταῖς γῶν ναυσι ἐβόρησε, πρότερον κρατήσε**, 'he felt confidence at any rate in the fleet, the arm in which he had previously lost superiority'. Cf. 55. 2 **ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐκρατήθησαν** = 'they lost superiority at sea'; ii. 79. 5 **θαλασσοῦς τοῖς προσηνενημέρους** = 'regaining confidence through this accession of strength'; and vi. 16. 2 **μεῖζον ἤμῶν τῆν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν . . . πρότερον ἐπιζήσαντες αὐτῆν καταπεπολημέθησθαι**, iii. 81. 2 **λαβόντες τοὺς τε Μεσσηνίους ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἡγαγον, πρότερον ἐξέω ὄντας**.

2. **πρίβειν αὐτοῦ**: The MSS. have **πρίβειν αὐτοῖς**, which is right, = 'wear Syracuse down'; cf. 48. 6 n.

θάψων: The little low-lying peninsula projecting from the coast between Syracuse and the site of Megara.

πρὸς τῶν πολεμίων: cf. 36. 3.

3. **καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων . . . ξυνηγόρευεν**: Whether this gave Demosthenes' proposal a majority we cannot say, in view of the uncertainty (cf. 16. 1 n.) about the constitutional position of Menandros and Euthydemos; nor, in any case, do we know what they thought.

4. **πλέον εἰδώς**: 'With special knowledge' not shared by the others.

AUGUST 413

50. 1-2. Reinforcements for Syracuse

50. 1. **ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος καὶ ὁ Σικανός . . . παρήσαν**: cf. 46. [δς] **φύλια ἐξεπεπτόκει**: **ἐς**, deleted by Bauer, is impossible, since (**α**) **ἡ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις στάσις** is not Greek for 'the pro-Syracusan faction',

and (**β**) **ἐς φύλια** (neut. plur.) would be an unexampled expression for 'into friendly territory'. Hence: 'the faction which was friendly to Syracuse had been expelled'. On the situation at Akragas cf. 46. **τοὺς . . . τοῦ ἤψος . . . ἀποσταλάεσθαι**: cf. 19. 3 f.

2. **Κυρνηαίων**: Kyrene, as a colony of Thera (and thus ultimately of Sparta) could reasonably be expected to help Peloponnesians.

Εὐσεπείτριαι: Euseperides is the later Berenike, the modern Benghazi. **Νέων πόλιν**: The modern Nabeul, on the east coast of C. Bon in Tunisia. The distance from there to Selinus is 230 km., so that the average speed implied by Thucydides' datum is rather less than 6.5 km.p.h. It is interesting that the Peloponnesians preferred this circuitous route, which brought them eventually to the wrong end of Sicily, to a direct voyage from Euseperides to Syracuse; possibly the direct route was little used and the distance exaggerated, but more probably they were uncertain about the naval situation at Syracuse and intended in any case to land elsewhere.

50. 3 f. Athenian Decision to Withdraw Eclipse of the Moon

50. 3. **οἰδὲ ὁ Νικίας . . . ψηφίσασθαι**: 'Not even Nikias now opposed <the decision> as he had done before, except to the extent of saying that they ought not to vote on it openly'. Cf. 48. 1 n.

προσέπον . . . σπηγήν: lit., 'told everyone in advance, as secretly as possible, a sailing out from their station and to prepare <now> <to sail out> when the order <to sail out> was given'; **ἐκπλοῦν** and **παρσκεύασθαι** are co-ordinated objects of **προσέπον**, and obviously the generals did not want the men to delay getting ready until some future order to get ready should be given, but to get ready at once so that a future order to depart could be carried out without delay.

4. **ἡ σελήνη ἐκλείπει**: 27 August 413.

πασσέλιπτος: Thucydides may have known that a lunar eclipse can occur only when the moon is full—cf. his empirical statement about solar eclipses in ii. 28—or **γὰρ** may make only the simple point that the visible event which we call a lunar eclipse was able to happen on this occasion because there was a substantial amount of moon to be eclipsed.

ἐπιχεῖν ἐκέλευον: Later writers have tended to blame Nikias and so to exonerate 'the majority' of the Athenians who demanded delay. Thucydides' own criticism of Nikias is not that he was more superstitious than the men whom he commanded, but that an educated man in a responsible position should have been much *less* superstitious.

Perhaps he thought that Demosthenes, left to himself, would have persuaded the men to disregard the omen.

θεῖασηφ: Utterance which claims to reveal through a human medium the intentions of the gods (LSJ is wrong about this word), including the production of oracles, the interpretation of omens and dreams, and 'inspiration'.

οἱ μέγιστοι: Seers were regarded as indispensable members of Greek expeditions.

τοῖς ἀνέμοις: The phraseology is oracular; cf. v. 26. 4, where Thucydides recalls that some people said, from the very beginning of the Peloponnesian War, that 'it was destined to last thrice nine years'.

δυνασὶν ἢ πρότερον κινήσει: '(Decide) . . . on how any earlier move could be made'; πρότερον is superfluous, given πρῶτον . . . μέγιστα.

SEPTEMBER 413

51-54. Syracusan Victory in the Harbour

51. 2. πρὸς τὰ τεῖχη: This attack was made against the eastern face of the upper Athenian fortifications (ἀνω, 54).

κατὰ πύλας πύλας: πύλαι here, as commonly, is used of a single gate. ἑπταυ . . . ἀπολλύουσι: They abandoned their horses in order to escape into the fortifications on foot.

52. 1. ἔξ και οὐδοήκοντα: Before the arrival of their reinforcements the Athenians had put 75 ships to sea (37. 3), of which 'one or two' were sunk on the first day's fighting (38. 1), and 'seven sunk and many damaged' on the second day (41. 4). Thereupon Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with 73 (42. 1); but the majority of these ships were carrying troops, and, apart from the technical problem of re-converting troop-carriers in a hurry, casualties, sickness, and desertion must have made it impossible to man every ship.

2. ἐν τῷ κοίλῳ . . . τοῦ λιμένος: At the beginning of the action the Athenian fleet must have faced east or north-east, the Syracusan fleet west or south-west. Therefore the land which Eurymedon approached in trying, from his station on the Athenian right wing, to encircle the Syracusan left, must have been Ortygia. When the Syracusans defeated the Athenian centre, pushing it back westwards and southwards, Eurymedon found himself at the northern end of the harbour with the bulk of the Syracusan fleet between him and his base.

53. 1. ἔξω τῶν σταυρομένων . . . καταφερομένων: South of their base, between it and the river-mouth. Gylippos has therefore approached from Plennmyrion or the Olympieion.

ἐπὶ τὴν χερσὶν: The narrow spit of land which lay north of the river-mouth and between the sea and the lake (Lysimeleia).

2. οἱ Τυρσηνοὶ: On the Etruscans in the Athenian force cf. 57. 11 n. **ἐς τὴν λίμνην**: The Etruscans, whose purpose was to protect the crews of the ships which had been forced ashore, naturally pressed on southwards to occupy the whole of the spit, and Gylippos' men had to disperse and escape across the southern part of the 'lake'.

3. καὶ τοὺς ἀόρητος πάντας ἀπέκρεναν: In similar circumstances earlier in the summer (41. 4) the Syracusans took some prisoners; now their temper is harsher.

4. [τὴν ναῦν]: These words are superfluous, since without them we have a quite normal construction—'a merchant ship, having filled . . . they sent . . .—and are probably interpolated.

σφαιρίδια κολύματα: 'Preventive measures to extinguish the fire', or, more exactly, 'measures which prevented <disaster> by extinguishing <the fire>'; we have no idea what these were.

πύσαντες . . . τὴν ἀλάδα: lit., 'having stopped the flame and the boat approaching near of the merchant ship', i.e. 'having put an end to the flames and to the approach of the vessel'. The negative is used here as it is with words meaning 'prevent'.

55-56. The Morale of Both Sides

55. 1. λαμπρῶς: 'Decisive.'
καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ: The night battle on Epipolai had been the *λαμπρὰ νίκη* on land.

2. δημοκρατουμένους: Aristotle *Pol.* 1304^a27 says that *after* the defeat of the Athenians the Syracusan people changed from *πολιτεία* to *δημοκρατία*; it appears from other passages that he means by *πολιτεία* a constitution more democratic than oligarchic but restricting the rights and powers of the poorest citizens. Similarly, *Diod.* xiii. 34-6 dates to 412 the introduction of certain democratic measures at Syracuse, notably appointment to office by lot. But there is no reason to question the clear implication of Thucydides' words that Syracuse in 415-413 was in essentials a democracy and to be classified constitutionally with Athens herself rather than with the Peloponnesian states. Indeed, both Aristotle *Pol.* 1316^a33 and *Diod.* xi. 68. 6 speak of the democracy at Syracuse as enduring from the end of the Deinomenid tyranny (466) down to the tyranny of Dionysios (405).

μεγίστη ἐχούσας: lit. 'having bignesses', i.e. 'with all resources on a large scale'.

οὐ δυνάμενοι . . . κρείσσονος: 'Not being able to bring to bear upon them' (or 'use as a weapon against them') . . . either through (ἐκ) a change in political structure . . . or through greatly superior forces . . . clearly says something about the consequences of the similarity between Syracuse and the Athenians; the Athenians could neither overcome Syracuse by strength (because she was a strong city herself) or gain the help of a revolutionary democratic party within the city (for a democracy was in power already). The interpretation of τὸ διάφορον is difficult.

(i) If it refers to political difference only, lit., 'to bring to bear upon them something from a change of constitution, (& mean) the (political) difference (between them), by which they were accustomed to bring (an enemy) over, the separation of αὐτοῖς from ἐπεινεγκεῖν is remarkable, for it is thrust into the middle of a parenthesis which amplifies τ.

(ii) If, on the other hand, τὸ διάφορον refers to difference of all kinds, political and military, the position of αὐτοῖς is less abnormal (cf. ἄμω in 64. 1), τ will have to be an internal accusative with the verbal noun μεταβολῆς, and προσήγορο will cover the inducement of surrender by any means, including the threat of force: lit., 'to bring to bear upon them the difference (between them), by which they were accustomed to induce (an enemy) to surrender, either through a (promised) change, in some respect, of constitution, or through much greater forces.'

No one will pretend that either is easy Greek; (ii) seems to me less difficult. It is possible that τὸ διάφορον is in origin an intrusive gloss on τ.

Thucydides represents Nikias in the debate before the expedition (vi. 20. 2) as warning the Athenians that they were going to attack an enemy who did not seek political liberation.

δ οὐκ ἂν ᾤοντο: 'Which they did not think would happen.'

56. 2. καλύσσαι: sc. σωθῆναι.

ἐλευθεροῦσθαι . . . ἀπολυεσθαι: The association of these words with futures (φανεσθαι, ἔσεσθαι, θαυμασθήσεσθαι) shows that they are prophetic and do not imply that the Syracusans believed that the Athenian Empire was already dissolving.

οὐ γὰρ ἔτι . . . ἐνεγχεῖν: This belief, at any rate, was wrong. αὐτῶν: 'The situation' described in the preceding lines.

3. πῆν σφετέρην πόλιν ἐπαρσασχόντες προειδυμένους: lit., 'and among these (ἐμ-) having offered their own city for running a risk beforehand', i.e. confronting a danger which, if the Athenians had beaten Syracuse, would afterwards have come upon the rest of the Greek world.

4. τοῦ ἔμπεαντος λόγου: λόγος commonly means 'account' or 'reckoning', and (in some inscriptions of Εἰπίδαυρος) 'total'; cf. English 'count' = 'counted total'.

57-59. 1. Catalogue of Allies

These chapters are a specimen of a genre which extends in European literature from Book II of the Iliad, via Book VII of Herodotus, to the Order of Battle printed as an appendix to a modern war history. Thucydides' purpose, however, is not to provide us with numbers of men and horses and ships; indeed, he gives us none in these chapters, and though some are to be found elsewhere in Books VI and VII we never learn, for example, how many troops, or of what categories, were provided by Zakynthos or the Aitolians. His purpose is quite different: to comment on the international relationships which led, for example, Chios or Metapontion to participate in the fighting.

In the course of the catalogue he makes certain statements which have a bearing on the date of its composition. These are:

(i) 57. 2: 'The Aiginetans, who at that time (τότε) possessed Aigina.' Aigina was occupied by Athenians from 431 (ii. 27. 1) to 405 (X. HG ii. 2. 9). τότε might therefore imply either a contrast with the period before 431 or a contrast with the period after 405. It is unlikely that Thucydides, writing a κτῆμα ἐς αἰεὶ between those two dates, would assume either that Athens would win the war but voluntarily give up Aigina or that Athens would lose the war and be compelled to give it up. If, therefore, he wrote these words before 405, he would more naturally have said οἱ νῦν Αἰγιναῖοι ἔχουσιν.

(ii) 57. 8: 'Those who are now (νῦν) called Messenians, from Naupaktos and from Pylos, which was at that time (τότε) held by Athens.' The Messenians were expelled from Naupaktos after the end of the war, but probably not before 401/400 (Diod. xiv. 17. 4 ff., 34. 1 f.), and Μεσσηνίαι as a state thereupon ceased to exist. Pylos was lost by the Athenians in 409 (X. HG i. 2. 18, Diod. xiii. 64. 5 ff.). If, however, Thucydides wrote these words before 409 he could reasonably assume that however the war ended it would not leave Athens in permanent control of Pylos.

(iii) 58. 1: 'The Himeraeans from the north coast of Sicily, ἐν ᾧ καὶ μῦθοι Ἑλλήνες αἰκόουσι.' Himera was totally destroyed in 409 (Diod. xiii. 62); but a people calling themselves Ἰμεραῖοι, and independent of Carthaginian rule, existed in 397-6 in the region of the site of the city (Diod. xiv. 47. 6, 56. 2).

Thus if we are to think of the whole of the Catalogue as composed at one time, 57. 2 suggests 405 as the upper terminus, and the reference to

the Messenians in 57. 8 indicates 401 as the lower terminus. The references to Pyllos and Himera are reconcilable with these termini.

57. 1. ἐπὶ Συρακοῦσας: If the correct analysis of the sentence is 'having come to Sicily and to decide the fate of Sicily . . . fought at Syracuse', ἐπὶ with the accusative is an unusual way of saying 'at', and Bauer's emendation ἐπὶ Συρακοῦσας is plausible. Yet it is unnatural to associate ἐπὶ Συρακοῦσας with ἐλθόντες—the words from τοῖς μὲν to φωνασάσασσας naturally isolate themselves as parenthetical—and that leaves, lit.: 'fought a war to Sicily and about Sicily, to Syracuse', i.e. 'came to Sicily to fight at Syracuse for the fate of Sicily'. This analysis raises a fresh stylistic objection, the accumulation of two ἐπὶ-phrases with the same verb, ἐπολέμασαν, the awkwardness is, however, diminished by (i) the absorption of the first phrase into a larger complex, ἐπὶ . . . Συρακῶν, and (ii) the intervention of τοῖς μὲν . . . φωνασάσασσας.

κατὰ δίκην: i.e. in the prosecution of τοῖς μὲν . . . φωνασάσασσας. ὡς ἐδάσσοις . . . ἔσχεν: Since impersonal ἔσχειν does not occur elsewhere in Thucydides, read ἔκαστοι (B) and ἔσχον (JK), and cf. i. 22. 3 ὡς . . . τὸ εὐνοίας ἢ μὴ μῆτις ἔχοι. Hence, lit., 'according as each nation had of chance . . .', i.e. 'in accordance with the situation in which each nation found itself at the time, either in respect of its own interest or under compulsion'.

57. 2-57. 11. *Allies of Athens*

The fundamental criterion of classification is geographical: Athenian allies from Greece and the Aegean are listed (§§ 2-10) before those from the West (§ 11). The further criteria may be represented as follows:

- (A) (§ 2) Athenian colonies.
- (B) (§§ 4-6) Subject-allies.
 - (i) (§ 4) Ionians, plus Karystos.
 - (ii) (§ 5) Aeolians.
 - (iii) (§ 6) Dorians.
- (C) (§§ 7-8) Formally independent, but in fact dependent in varying degrees.
- (D) (§§ 9-10) Essentially independent; this category includes mercenaries.

Thucydides obviously attaches importance to racial divisions; not only is difference of race the basis for the sub-classification of (B), but race is mentioned in (A), (C) and (D). As we would expect from his introductory section, the extent to which a nation's participation was determined by 'interest' or 'necessity' is mentioned in each case, and attention is drawn to the cases in which this made members of the same race fight against each other. No explicit comment is made on

participation κατὰ δίκην, but ἐξόριος in § 5 indicates that the fighting of Plataians against other Boeotians came into this category.

57. 2. αὐτοῖς: With τῇ αὐτῇ.

Λήμνιοι καὶ Ἰμβροῖοι: Athens gained possession of Lemnos and Imbros at the beginning of the fifth century.

Αἰγυθῆρας: cf. supra.

Ἐστιαίης: The territory of Hestiaia was confiscated by Athens in 445, after the suppression of the Euboian revolt.

ἄστροι οἵντες: Athenian ἄστροι were citizens of the ἀσπείκεια which they constituted, not of Athens; κληροῦχοι owned pieces of land confiscated by Athens from other states, but their rights and obligations as Athenian citizens were not impaired.

3. οἱ μὲν ὑπήκοοι . . . ξυνοστράτευον: 'Subjects' are listed in §§ 3-6, 'independent allies' in §§ 7-8.

4. αὐτόνομοι: In § 3 a firm distinction was drawn between 'subject' and 'independent'; now Thucydides rather confusingly distinguishes, within the category 'subject', (i) 'subject and compelled to pay tribute', (ii) Chios, 'not compelled to pay tribute, but independent, providing ships', and (iii) Methymna in § 5, lit., 'subject with ships and not with tribute'. Clearly Chios had a degree of 'independence' not shared by other 'subjects', not even by Methymna, which was the only state in the Empire apart from Chios to possess a fleet of her own. Presumably Chios was exempted from some of the measures which Athens took to increase her political, juridical, and economic control over her allies, but we do not know from which ones. Since Athens ruled her empire to a large extent by meeting individual difficulties as they arose singly, 'independence' was a matter of degree, and sometimes, no doubt, of opinion and feeling.

καὶ τὸ πλείστον . . . ἠκολούθουν: Thucydides is making three points: (i) the states listed in this section constituted the greater part of the Athenian force, τὸ πλείστον οἱ τοὶ ἠκολούθουν; (ii) they were all, except Karystos, Ionian, Ἴωνες οἵντες πάντες; (iii) therefore, although subjects, they belong to the familiar category 'Ionians against Dorians'. The manner in which this third point is made is obscured by something which is either a textual corruption or incoherent expression. ἀνάγκη must qualify ἠκολούθουν, since ὑπήκοοι οἵντες καὶ ἀνάγκη 'being subjects and under compulsion' is not Greek; one cannot say ἀνάγκη εἶμι; 'I am under compulsion'. So then must ὑπήκοοι οἵντες qualify ἠκολούθουν. But although Ἴωνες οἵντες, ὑπήκοοι δ' οἵντες καὶ ἀνάγκη ἠκολούθουν, 'they followed as Ionians, but as subjects and under compulsion', is correct Greek, Ἴωνες οἵντες, ὑπήκοοι δ' οἵντες καὶ ἀνάγκη ὅμως Ἴωνες ἠκολούθουν

is not correct Greek for 'since they were Ionians, although they followed as subjects and under compulsion they nevertheless followed as Ionians'. δὲ after ὑπήκοοι is suspect, and must be either attributed to a confusion in Thucydides' thought, 'Ionians, but subjects' superimposing itself on 'although subjects, they nevertheless followed as Ionians', or transposed to follow ὄμως, giving: 'these nations, who were all Ionian . . . constituted the greater part of the force which came with the Athenians; they came as subjects, but none the less as Ionians against Dorians'. It is to be noted that the mutilated text of Π¹⁸, although it probably had δ' after ὑπήκοοι, also had at least one and probably two letters between ὄμως and Ἰωνες.

Δρύονες: Hdt. viii. 46. 4 classifies both Styra and Kythnos as 'Dryopes', but expresses no opinion on Karystos. Thucydides evidently accepted an alternative tradition which made Styra Ionian.

5. **κατὰ τὸ ἔχθος:** Enmity between Thebes and Plataiai went back to the sixth century.

6. **Κυθήριοι:** cf. 26. 2 n.

7. **Κεφάληνες μὲν καὶ Ζακύνθιοι:** cf. 31. 2 n. **ἀνάγκη μὲν ἐκ τοῦ εὐπρεπούς:** Kerkyra was an ally of Athens, and was required to help her under the terms of this alliance. Such help would have been—*one might have thought—κατὰ δίκην*; but since in § 1 Thucydides makes a clear distinction between *κατὰ δίκην* and *ἀνάγκη*, and here says that Kerkyra professed to be fighting *ἀνάγκη*, we have to interpret *κατὰ δίκην* as referring only to the prosecution of grievances, excluding the fulfilment of alliances, and we have to accept the classification of Kerkyra with much less powerful island states such as Kephallenia and Zakynthos. We may compare vi. 44. 3, 46. 2, where, in describing the unfriendly reception given by Rhegion to the Athenians in 415, Thucydides does not think the existence of a long-standing formal alliance between Rhegion and Athens worth mentioning, but speaks only of the *sentiment* of Rhegion.

κατὰ ἔχθος τὸ Κορινθίων: This too was a traditional enmity of very long standing.

8. **καὶ οἱ Μεσσηνιοὶ . . . ἐχομένης:** cf. 31. 2 n. and 26. 2 n.

Μεγαρέων φυγάδες: The pro-Athenians in Megara had taken refuge with the Athenians in 424; 120 of them served in the Athenian expedition as light-armed troops (vi. 43).

9. **οὐ τῆς ἑμμοχίας ἔνεκα:** cf. 26. 1.

Μαντινῆς δὲ . . . μισθοφόροι: Mantinea, like Argos, was pro-Athenian in sentiment, and the importance of this sentiment is emphasized in vi. 61. 5; but here Mantineans are classified unambiguously as mercenaries.

ἐπὶ τοὺς αἰεὶ . . . ἀποδεικνυμένους: 'Against those who were at any given time indicated to them as the enemy . . .'
Κρήτες δὲ: The Cretan cities as such were indifferent to the Peloponnesian War.

καὶ Αἰτωλοὶ: The Aitolians' last appearance in Thucydides' narrative was as enemies of Athens (iii. 94. 3 ff.). Demosthenes must have recruited these Aitolians when he was at Kerkyra (31. 2).

10. **Δημοσθένους . . . εὐνοίᾳ:** A result of Demosthenes' successful campaign in 426/5, which brought the Akarnanians some spectacular gains (iii. 94 ff., 100 ff., 105 ff.).

11. **ἐν τοιαύταις . . . καταληγμένοι:** cf. 33. 5 f. **στρασιωτικός καιρός** is a stage or moment in a process of internal conflict, and the point of **τοιανύτως** is 'of such a kind as to lead to their fighting on the Athenian side'. Hence: 'as was inevitably imposed upon them by the state of their internal conflicts at that time.'

καὶ Σικελῶν τὸ πλεόν: According to vi. 88. 4, the Sikels of the inland districts came over to the Athenians in the winter of 415/14, and many more, who had up to that time been under Syracusan control, in the summer of 414 (vi. 103. 2).

Τυρρηγῶν ῥέ τιτες: The Etruscans took the initiative in 415/14 in offering help to Athens; enmity between them and Syracuse went back to the early fifth century.

καὶ Ἰάπωνες: cf. 33. 4.

58. *Allies of Syracuse*

The fundamental criterion is again geographical: from Sicily, or from overseas. The category 'from Sicily' is classified thus:

- (A) Greeks.
(i) South coast.
(ii) North coast.
(B) Sikels.

Just as Thucydides commented on race and political compulsion throughout the list of Athenian allies, so here he comments that all the states in (A) were Dorian and independent.

58. 1. **μὲρ αὐρούς:** This is said from the point of view of a man travelling along the coast westwards, not from that of a man reading a map.

2. **ἐν ᾧ . . . οἰκοῦσιν:** cf. supra.

3. **Δωριῆς τε:** This is contradicted by vi. 5. 1, where we are told that Himera was founded by Zankle (i.e. Messene), which was Ionian, that exiles from Syracuse later joined it, and that though its dialect was

mixed Ionian and Dorian its laws and customs were Chalkidian (i.e. Ionian; Zankle, mother-city of Himera, owed its origin to Chalkis). καὶ [οἱ] αὐτόνομοι: [οἱ] is impossible, as it would imply that these Greek allies of Syracuse constituted all the independent cities of Sicily; and they did not.

συνημέχουσι: The plural verb may be justified by the intervention of Δωριῆς τε καὶ.

Σικελιοί: cf. 57. 11 n. μῶνοι is to be taken with βαρβάρων, 'alone among the foreign peoples', not with ὅσοι καὶ.

ἡγεμόνα Σπαρτιάτην: Ekkritos (19. 3) commanded the force described in νεοδαμώδεις δὲ καὶ, but the reader more naturally thinks of Gylippos.

νεοδαμώδεις δέ: cf. 19. 3 n.

δύναται δέ . . . εἶναι: Although the inference drawn in the apparatus criticus of the Oxford Text, 'ut videtur, non legit Schol.', is unjustified, it is probable that these words are an interpolation, since (a), given the complexity of structure of the Spartan state, they offer a vague and inadequate explanation, (b) they are a characteristic scholion in form, and (c) Thucydides has already used the word νεοδαμώδεις in this book (19. 3) without explaining it. This last objection is, of course, of limited validity, for Thucydides may have written this chapter before he wrote ch. 19.

καὶ Λευκάδιοι καὶ Ἀμπρακῶνται: cf. 7. 1. Leukas and Ambrakia, like Syracuse, were colonies of Corinth; hence τὸ ἐγγυμένον.

ἀναγκαστοί: A consequence, rather allusively expressed, of the Spartans' intervention to restore control of Sikyon in 417 (v. 81. 2). The 'compulsion' was perhaps exercised by Corinth, not directly by Sparta; cf. 19. 4.

4. κατὰ πάντα: 'In all arms', amplified by καὶ γὰρ ὅπλα καὶ κατὰ.

59. 2-59. 3. The Great Battle in the Harbour

59. 2-59. 3. The Syracusans Close the Harbour Mouth

59. 3. ὀκτὼ σταδίων μάλιστα: The distance from the rocks at the southern tip of Ortygia to the little island off the tip of Plemmyrion is 1.04 km., and to the western projection of Plemmyrion 1.24 km. On the term 'stade' cf. 2. 4 n. It should be noted that Syracusan sources would naturally magnify the width of the mouth, to emphasize the difficulty of blocking it, and Athenian sources would minimize it, to emphasize the difficulty of breaking out.

60. Athenian Plans for a Break-out

60. 2. καὶ οἱ ταχέτεροι: These men corresponded roughly to the battalion

commanders of a modern army. Their invitation to conferences seems to have lain within the discretion of the generals.

τροπέμψαντες γὰρ: Before the eclipse (50. 3 f.).

τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τὰ ἄνω: The fortifications on the plateau, and, as the following words suggest, part, at least, of the 'double wall' between the plateau and the shore.

καὶ δύναται καὶ ἀπλοῦσθαι: lit., 'both capable and more unfitted for sailing', i.e. 'sound and unsound alike'. Cf. ii. 35. 1 εὖ τε καὶ χεῖρον, 'well or ill'.

3. ἡλικίας μερέχων: Since all the soldiers and sailors would naturally have been 'of military age', these words imply that fit slaves too were now pressed into service.

4. δέκα μάλιστα καὶ ἑκατόν: This number must include many which were not judged fit for use in the previous sea-battle, in which the Athenians put 86 to sea and lost at least 18 (50. 1, 53. 3).

ἐξ ἀναγκαίου τε . . . διανοίας: Either (a) 'as their circumstances dictated' (cf. ἐξ ἰσού, &c.) and in accordance with a plan', then either (i) 'which reflected that stress' (cf. τοιαύτως in 57. 11) or (ii) 'of the kind described' (i.e. involving the use of archers, &c.)—in these interpretations we have almost a 'zeugma' with ἐξ—or (b) 'in accordance with a plan which was forced upon them by circumstances and was of the kind described', making ἀναγκαίου agree with διανοίας; for feminine ἀναγκαῖος cf. i. 2. 2. In either case the point is that in the circumstances they were compelled to fill their decks with archers and javelin-men; (a) (ii) is perhaps the least peculiar way of saying that. ὅσα (for ὅς) in B and the presence of καὶ ὡς after ἦν in Π¹⁸ reveal some uncertainties in the textual tradition, but do not solve any problems.

61-64. Speech of Nikias

61. 2. τὴν ἄλιστα . . . ἔχουσιν: lit., 'have the expectation of the fear-like setbacks', i.e. 'the expectation which their fear' (arising from their previous defeats) 'engenders does not rise above their misfortunes'. Nikias cannot pretend that the Athenian situation is not a ξυμφορά; he can only try to encourage optimism.

3. καὶ τὸ τῆς τύχης . . . τοῦ πλῆθους: lit., 'and, expecting that the contribution (τὸ) of fortune may stand with us, and with the intention of fighting back . . . τὸ τῆς τύχης is the contribution of fortune to the situation (cf. 62. 2 τὸ τῆς ἐπιτολήτης), here to a slight extent personified; cf. 68. 1.

62. 1. ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ λιμένος σπενδόνῃ: ἐπὶ here almost = 'given'. ἔσσεσθαι: With τὸν μέλλοντα.

2. ναυμαχίαν μὲν . . . ἐν πελάγεσι: 'If we were fighting a (sc. real) sea-battle, on open water.'

3. καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἐπιπέδων αὐροῖς παχύνοντας: Thucydides dislikes the juxtaposition of genitives with different references; hence αὐροῖς here = 'their'.

ἄπερ δὴ: i.e. the thickening of their anchor-blocks.

4. ἔων: sc. ἀνακρουέσθαι.

63. 1. πρότερον . . . ἢ . . . ἀπαράγγητε: Except for this passage and one in Antiphon, πρότερον ἢ with the subjunctive, equivalent to πρὶν ἂν with the subjunctive, is purely Ionic.

2. τῶν ἀνοθεν: 'Those on deck.'

3. τοῖς δὲ ναύταις: καὶ ταῦτα κτλ. in § 2 show that the tactical advice and encouragement of 62-63. 1 have been primarily directed to the sailors, including the trierarchs and officers, and the last part of 63. 1 makes this doubly clear. Now Nikias returns to the ναῦται in the narrow sense, the oarsmen, to give them moral encouragement rather than tactical instructions.

ἐκείνην τε τὴν ἡδονήν: Nikias treats the sailors, without restriction or qualification, as non-Athenians, culturally and linguistically Atticized (there may well be exaggeration here), but not as subjects of Athens, as ἐς τε τὸ φοβερὸν τοῖς ἑπηκόοις and κοινῶν μοῶν . . . τῆς ἀρχῆς show. Again in 64. 1 f. the Athenian contribution is treated as ships and soldiers, not as sailors. Either, then, these men came from subject states, and the ὑπήκοοι in whom they inspired fear were their own fellow citizens, or—and this is the easier interpretation—they were metics and foreigners from states not included in the empire. This casts an interesting light on the statement attributed to a Corinthian speaker in i. 121. 3, 'the power of Athens is bought (ἀγορήθη), not native', and is in accord with the implication of 'our pilots are Athenian citizens' (i. 143. 1), viz. 'our oarsmen are not'. Note also the absence of sailors (except petty officers) from the categories of loss listed in viii. 1. 2.

καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς . . . μετέχετε: 'Your share in our empire has been no less'—either sc. 'than our own' or sc. 'than your share in our culture'—'so far as benefits are concerned' (i.e. but you have not shared so much in the responsibility, expense, and danger), 'in inspiring our subjects with respect and, far more important, in immunity from wrong'. It is hard to see any decisive grounds for choice between the two possible interpretations of οὐκ ἔλασσον. πᾶσι πλεόν looks as if it belongs with μετέχετε, 'you had a much larger share', and it may be an intrusive variant on οὐκ ἔλασσον.

4. ἠμαρξέ: cf. 12. 3. 14. 1.

καὶ μὲν ἀσθενείας . . . βίωμης: The complex antithesis, half concealed by careful phonetic and syntactical variety, is characteristic; ἀσθενείας ~ βίωμης, ξυμφορᾶν ~ εὐτυχουσίης, ἢ ὑμετέρα ~ ἐτέρας.

64. 1. τοῖς τε Ἀθηναίοις ὑμῶν: It looks at first sight as if the reference were only to the Athenians among the sailors; but since the Athenian hoplites have so far been given no encouragement of the kind offered in 63. 3-64, 'the Athenians among you' is probably meant to include soldiers.

ὑπομνήσκω: Two different constructions are co-ordinated: (1) ὅτι κτλ., and (2) the participles πλεουσιμένους . . . εὐσιμένους.

οὐτε ἀπλιτῶν ἠλιείων: sc. τοιοῦδε ὁμοίαν.

εἴ τε ξυμβήσεται τι . . . ὑμῖν: This euphemism for defeat is more elaborate and artificial than the common εἴω τε πάθω, 'if anything happens to me.'

οἷα γνώμη ἐπιλήθετε: Since their position is admittedly desperate, Nikias' point is not that it would be shameful for so proud an enterprise to be defeated, but that they can expect no mercy from an enemy whose independence they proposed to destroy. Cf. 68. 2 n.

65. Syracusan Preparations

65. 2. καὶ τῆς νεῶς ἄνω τὸ πολύ: 'And over much of the upper parts of each (τῆς) ship.'

ὅπως ἂν ἀπολασθήνοι: The distinction intended between this and an ordinary final clause (which would be ὅπως ἀπολασθῶσι or ὅπως ἂν ἀπολασθῶν) is not clear; perhaps 'so that . . . might be likely to slip off', or, giving a conditional sense to the participle ἐπιβαλλομένη, 'so that if/ cast on . . . it would slip off'.

3. παρεκλεύσαντο . . . τοιοῦδε: Thucydides does not indicate whether we are to think of this speech as made by a single spokesman whom he does not name or as compounded of several speeches made by several people. The sentiment and standpoint are Syracusan throughout, and we cannot at any rate regard the speech as the utterance of Gylippos.

66-68. Syracusan Speech

66. 1. οὐδέ γὰρ ἂν: 'For otherwise you would not . . .'

2. ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος: 'You have every reason to think . . .'; a translation involving 'probability' would strike a false note.

3. τό γ' ὑπόλοιπον αὐτῶν τῆς δόξης: lit., 'the remaining element of their opinion', i.e. 'their opinion <of themselves> thereafter'.

ἀσθενέστερον . . . τὸ πρῶτον: The comparative is followed both by the genitive εἰρωτῶ and by ἡ κτλ., i.e. weaker than (it would have been) if they had not thought (that they were superior) to start with' is superimposed on 'weaker than it was'.
καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἔλαττα . . . ἐνδίδουσι: lit., 'and being defeated by that (which is) contrary to the expectation of their boast' (or, sacrificing the balance between the two halves of the sentence but giving more point to τῶ, 'falling short of their boast through that (which happens) contrary to expectation'), 'they also give in contrary to the strength of their power', i.e. 'when their pride is cast down by unexpected events they collapse more quickly than the strength of which they are capable warrants'.

67. 1. τὸ κραιπνότερον . . . ἐκρήσαντες. These words give the content of the δοκίμος; for the construction cf. 36. 5 n.

2. χερσαίως ὡς εἰπεῖν: 'Land animals, so to speak'; χερσαίως is not normally used of human beings.
οὐδ' οὐδ' ὄντως καθήκειν . . . εὐρήσονται: lit., 'who will not even find how placing themselves it is right that they should discharge the missile', i.e. 'who will not even be able to discover what position to adopt for the discharge of their missiles', or possibly ' . . . to discover how, from a sitting position. . . Landlubbers are unsteady on a moving ship, and (which is more important) a man needs room for movement if he is to throw a javelin effectively.'

3. εἴ τις κτλ: '<—I say this> just in case anyone among you—'.

4. τὸ δ' ἀληθέστερον . . . πεπόθει: What has preceded is speculation and prediction; now the speaker refers to an existing fact. 'I will tell you the one thing which is quite certain, in the light of what we are confident we have discovered without doubt.' Cf. vi. 17. 6, 'the position in Sicily, εἴ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀκοῆ ἀποδείξαι, will be as I have described'.
εἰς ἀπώροτον . . . ἴν' ἢ κτλ: 'They are reduced to the desperate expedient—trusting to fortune, not to their arms—of taking a supreme risk in the only way they can, in order . . .'

68. 1. καὶ τύχην . . . πολεμωτέραν: lit., 'a fortune of most inimical men now that it has handed itself over'. The personification of τύχη here is a phenomenon of language, not of theology; cf. Lys. xii. 80, 'do not be less active in your own cause than τύχης τύχης, ἢ τοῖσιν παρεδίωκε τῆ πόλει'.

οὐδ' ἂν . . . τὸ θυμώμενον: 'If men . . . or 'that men should . . .'; the whole clause is the subject of νομιμάταρον εἶναι.
ἕμα δέ . . . ἦδιστον εἶναι: 'And secondly, that to punish enemies . . .', and then either (a) 'which will be possible for us, is actually, as the

saying goes, the greatest of delights', or (b) 'will be possible for us, and is . . .'. A participial construction after νομιζέω is everywhere rare, and unexampled in Thucydides; this fact favours (a), in which ἐγενήσασθαι ἦν is parenthetical and καὶ adverbial. Yet τὸ λεγόμενον σου is also parenthetical, and two parentheses in one short clause are stylistically objectionable; this consideration favours (b), in which ἐγενήσασθαι is co-ordinated with ἦδιστον εἶναι by καὶ (and the whole complex co-ordinated with νομιμάταρον εἶναι) in order to achieve variety.

Greek poetry and tradition agree that revenge is νομιμάταρον, i.e. fully sanctioned by custom and accepted morality, but they seldom say outright that it is also ἦδιστον. Nevertheless, Thucydides appears to be referring to an actual proverb or proverbial verse, of the type κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιώτατον κτλ.

2. ἀνδρῶν μὲν ἂν . . . ἐπίκλητον: He means that, as happened at Melos, the men would have been killed, the women and children enslaved, and the site of the city would have passed into alien hands; the ἀρχὴν ἐπίκληταις is probably ἀνίστατος. Nothing that Thucydides himself says of the Athenian plans suggests that they actually intended the massacre and enslavement of the population of Syracuse; Diod. xiii. 2. 6 calls this a *secret* decision of the Athenian generals and the Council, which is tantamount to saying that there was no evidence that such a decision was taken by anyone. The Syracusan generals would naturally inflame their men by representing Athenian intentions in the worst light.

3. προξένων: sc. both sides.
παραδοῦναι: sc. the Syracusans.

69. 1-2. *Final Exhortations of Nikias*

69. 1. ἠσθάνοντο: sc. παρρησίαν.

2. πάσχουσιν: sc. 'generals'.

σφίσι . . . αὐτοῖς: 'The generals . . . to the men.'

παρῶθεν τε . . . καὶ φιλίην: lit., 'naming (them) from their fathers and themselves by name and (each one's) tribe'. To praise or exhort a man by addressing him as 'son of . . .' was normal. Nikias reminded each trierarch of his tribe, not of his deme, because the eponymous hero of each tribe was a paradigm of valour, whereas few demes (the Achaeans are a notable exception) were felt to have martial traditions of their own. Cf. Demosthenes' use, in his *Epitaphios* (lx. 27 ff.), of legends about the eponymous heroes of the tribes.

ἀξίον . . . μὴ προσδοῦναι τῷ: lit., 'demanding that one to whom there already existed something of distinction should not betray his

own part', i.e. 'demanding that no one who had distinguished himself before should fail to do his best'.

ὅν . . . οἱ πρόγονοι: ὅν is masculine, and the relative clause is the subject of ἀνανήξεν.

καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ . . . ἕξουσίας: An appeal on the eve of battle to the liberal organization of society represents a great advance on a simple appeal to ἐλευθερία, which in Greek eyes was consistent with the tyranny of law and custom. Athenian society was remarkably liberal by Greek standards; cf. the words attributed to Pericles in a famous passage of the Funeral Speech, II. 37.

καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων . . . προφερόμενα: The structure of the sentence as a whole is:

(πατρίδος τε ὑπομνησκαν
ἄλλα τε λέγων | ὅσα ἀνθρώποι
| οὐ | φιλαλέεμενοι | εἶποιεν ἂν
| ἀλλὰ ἐπιβοῶνται

καὶ before ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων cannot be co-ordinated with ἄλλα τε, making παραπλήσια a second object of λέγων, for the superimposition of the antithesis οὐ . . . εἶποιεν ἂν / ἀλλὰ . . . ἐπιβοῶνται upon this co-ordination would be impossible, and ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων παραπλήσια 'things in similar form for all occasions' must refer to general practice, not to Nikias on this one occasion. καὶ = 'including especially', as in 62. 3. Hence: 'and saying all the other things which men would not say if they . . . (including . . .) but do invoke . . .'

ἀρχαιολογεῖν (absurdly translated by LSJ, apparently with reference to this passage, as 'discuss antiquities') means 'say what has always been said'. The kind of thing Thucydides has in mind is exemplified by A. Pz. 403 f. 'free your children and wives and the shrines of the gods and the graves of your ancestors!'

69. 3-71. *The Battle*

69. 3. ἦ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα: 'A bare minimum.'

4. πρὸς τὸ ζεύγμα: The barrier described in 59. 3. Nothing is said there of a gap left in it, but clearly one was needed for the Syracusans' own transference of ships between the Great and the Lesser Harbour.

70. 1. καὶ πρότερον: 52. 1.

2. οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀθηναῖοι: οἱ ἄλλοι does not appear to be contrasted, either retrospectively or prospectively, with any other portion of the Athenian force. If it is correct (B omits it), it can hardly mean 'one of the several detachments', for whereas οἱ ἔτεροι can mean 'one of the two detachments' no comparable use of οἱ ἄλλοι is attested. Ἀθηναῖοι cannot be an intrusive gloss on οἱ ἄλλοι, for Thucydides does not say 'the others' =

'the opposing side' in any of his numerous descriptions of battles. It is possible that if παρρηχόθεν . . . ἐπιφερομένων was regarded by Thucydides as a statement not of what the Syracusans did but of what the Athenians experienced—and the use of ὁφίοι rather than αἰετοῖς gives some support to this interpretation—of ἄλλοι does in fact make a prospective contrast with all the rest of the Athenian ships, upon which the enemy fell; but it must be admitted that this is a recherché explanation.

4. διακόσται: About 76 Syracusan ships (§ 1) and 110 Athenian (50. 4). αἱ μὲν ἐμβολαὶ . . . αἱ δὲ προσβολαί: 'Ramming attacks . . . collisions.'

ὡς τύχοι: 'Whenever . . .' is the natural translation; the choice of ὡς is perhaps determined by the fact that ships collided in different ways.

5. ἐπιβαίνων: ἐπιβάται were not so named from 'boarding' enemy ships—for boarding tactics were most abnormal in classical times—but because they went on board ship.

6. τὰ μὲν . . . ἐμβεβλήθησθαι: 'That on one quarter they had rammed an enemy, while on another they had themselves been rammed.' The choice of the perfect aspect, not the aorist, shows that Thucydides is speaking of the condition in which a ship found itself after such an event.

7. ἀφ' ἑκατέρων τοῖς κελυσταῖς: Ὅτι both sides by the coxwains'. κατὰ τε τὴν τέχνην . . . ἐγγυερο: lit., 'in accordance with their skill and to deal with the zeal for victory of the moment'; the exercise of their duty required them to give technical orders, but they also shouted encouragement in response to the emotional demands of the situation.

τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις: At first glance it might be thought that these words were in apposition to τοῖς κελυσταῖς; but ἐπιβοῶντες—the transition to the nominative is characteristic (cf. Infr. I. 3. 18)—refers to the coxwains, while τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις and τοῖς δὲ Συρακούσιοι are the sailors to whom they shouted.

βιάζεσθαι τε . . . ἀντιλαβέσθαι: These infinitives represent imperatives of direct speech, unlike the infinitive in καλὸν εἶναι. ἀντιλαβέσθαι is 'absolute' here, as περί shows (cf. II. 61. 4 τοῦ κουοῦ τῆς σαρπηρίας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι); cf. Pl. Crat. 506 A εἶν . . . μὴ τὰ δὲντα δοκῶ ὁμολογεῖν ἑμαυτῷ, χρὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν.

νῦν . . . ἀντιλαβέσθαι: The correct punctuation is a comma after ποτε and none after αὐθις: 'now again, if ever (before)'; cf. εἴτερ ποτε in 64. 2.

71. 1. ὁ αὐτόθεν . . . οἱ ἐπείθοντες: 'The Siceliot . . . the invaders.'

2. οὐδενὶ ἐοικώς: 'Indescribable'; cf. our expression 'like nothing on earth.'
3. ἀνεθέσπαστόν τε ἄν: ἄν with the aorist in a frequentative sense is rarer than with the imperfect.
- διὰ τὸ ἀερίως ξυνοχῆς ἡδὲ ἀμύλλητος: cf. Intr. I. 3. 8.
αἰεὶ γὰρ . . . ἀπώλλυτο: 'For all the time they were either just on the point of escaping or just on the point of destruction.'
4. νικῶντες κρατούμενοι: This splendid and lucid incoherence does justice to the subject: 'walls, yells—winning, losing—.' Contrast the frigid correctness of X. Cyp. vii. 1. 40, 'he saw the plain full of horses, men, chariots', φεγγόντων δίκωντων, κρατούντων κρατούμενων.
5. λαμπρῶς: Not quite 'decisively', as in 55. 1, but 'manifestly victorious' or 'in manifest triumph', in contrast to the uncertainty which had prevailed before (3 f.).
6. μετέωρος: 'On the water.'
οὐκ ἐτι διαφόρος: By contrast with the situation described in §§ 3 f.

72-74. *Aftermath of the Battle*

72. 2. νεκρῶν μὲν πέρι ἢ ναυαγίων: For the recovery of wrecks under truce cf. ii. 92. 4: 'they recovered the dead and the wrecks on their own shore, and gave the enemy his (τὰ ἐκείνων) under truce.' In the immediate aftermath of a battle it would be mainly from the wrecks that the dead would be collected; the bodies of drowned men would not yet have risen to the surface.
3. ἦσαν γὰρ . . . ἡ πενήκοντα: It follows that the Athenians had lost fifty ships, the Syracusans 30.
4. καὶ ξυγχοῦντος Νικίου: Now, at least, Nikias is not in a dilatory or obstructive mood, but the initiative lies with Demosthenes.
οὐκ ἤθελον ἐρθεῖν: The tragedy of this refusal lay in the fact that Demosthenes' plan might well have worked, to judge from what we are told in 73. 2.
73. 1. τοῖς ἐν τέλει οὖσαν: The meaning of this expression in any given context depends on the state concerned and on the level of authority required for the issue concerned. Thus 'οἱ ἐν τέλει' declared war on Sparta, said of Athens, would refer to the Assembly, whereas 'οἱ ἐν τέλει' fined the butcher for giving short weight' would refer to a minor magistracy. In the present case the reference is clearly to the Syracusan and allied generals, τοῖς ἀρχοῦσι in § 3.

λέγων ταῦτα δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ ἔδοκει: The object of λέγων is a summary reference to the content of Hermokrates' thought, set out in δεῖνόν εἶναι . . . ποιεῖσθαι above; and the parenthesis is put just where his reasons for saying οὐ γράων . . . περιπέτεῖν would be given if they had not already been given in an earlier part of the sentence. ταῦτα means 'this which I have just described' (cf. the first clause of § 2), and, combined with α . . . ἔδοκει, 'these thoughts of his which I have just described' (in Thucydides ταῦτα αἰ is not simply synonymous with εἰ). The position of καὶ, which in B, C, H, and Oxyrhynchus Papyrus 1376 immediately follows εἰ—in other MSS, it precedes or comes in both places—is important. To say (e.g.) εἰλεγε δὲ καὶ ἔδοκει αὐτῷ, 'he said what he also thought', is not the most logical way of expressing 'what he thought, he also said' (we should expect, on the lines of viii. 1. 4. δὲ ἔδοκει αὐτῷ, ταῦτα καὶ εἰλεγε), but it is a way often used in Greek. If, therefore, we could here treat καὶ as modifying ἔδοκει, despite the intervening αὐτῷ (and this is not impossible, though the parallels adduced are open to alternative explanations), the meaning would be 'speaking these thoughts of his'. But καὶ αὐτῶς, common in Thucydides, regularly means 'he, too', 'he, in turn', or 'he, for his part'; cf. οἱ δὲ . . . καὶ αὐτοὶ in § 2. The best interpretation is therefore, lit., 'saying these things, what seemed to him himself', i.e. 'speaking these thoughts of his'. καὶ looks forward, as it were, to the fact that the Syracusans are going to agree with him.

2. τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρώποις κτλ.: 'But (sc. they said that) the men . . . ; τοῖς ἀνθρώποις (i.e. 'the rank and file', cf. 50. 3) being the subject of δοκεῖν; but in the following sentence the generals are to be understood as the subject of ἐπίτερον, αὐτοῖς referring to the men.
ταύτην ἡν ἡμέραν: 'That day' rather than 'on that day'; the day as a whole is regarded as a festival day of Herakles.
οὐ δοκεῖν ἄν . . . ὑπαικούσαι: It is interesting to observe that the Syracusan army in victory, even with a Spartan commander, was as recalcitrant as the Athenian army in defeat.
σφῶν: The genitive with ὑπακούειν is common, but with περιπέτεσθαι very rare; this is the only example in Attic prose.

3. τὰδε: Amplified by πέμψει κτλ.

τῶν ἐνδοθῶν: The gender is doubtful: 'certain men, among those in the city, who brought Nikias news' or 'certain men who brought Nikias news of events in the city'?

74. 1. νομίσαντες . . . εἶναι: They might have had some doubts, recalling the trick they had played on the Syracusans two years earlier (vi. 64. 2 ff.); but there were, after all, pro-Athenian elements in

Syracuse (49. 1), and in any case the Athenians may have thought it would be easier to fight through a well-established blocking force in daylight than through a hastily organized one in the dark.

καὶ ἐπειδὴ . . . ὄρμησαν: Let us call the day of the battle 'Day 1', the following day 'Day 2', and the day of their departure (75. 1) 'Day 3'. The decision here described (ἔδοξε) was taken either during the night of Day 1 or on the morning of Day 2. (a) If it was taken during the night of Day 1, *καὶ ὥς* must mean 'in spite of their original intention', *περμείναι* 'wait during', and *τῆν ἐπιόσσαν ἡμέραν* Day 2. On this interpretation *καὶ ὥς* is somewhat vague (but cf. *ὅμως* in 77. 3) and the aorist aspect of *περμείναι* surprising. (b) If the decision was taken on Day 2, *καὶ ὥς* means 'in spite of their intention to depart that morning', *ὥς ἐθῆς ἀρμησαν* 'they did not succeed in getting away promptly' (why, Thucydides leaves to our imagination), *περμείναι* 'wait for' (cf. vi. 56. 2 al.), and *τῆν ἐπιόσσαν ἡμέραν* Day 3. If we are content not to be told just why they could not get away promptly on the morning of Day 2, we can be satisfied with the second interpretation. If we are not content, and so fall back on the first interpretation, we can remove one of its difficulties by Stahl's *καὶ ὥς* for *καὶ ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὥς*.

2. **ἄσπερ δεινοθήσαν:** 60. 2.
ὥς ἐκίστην ποὶ ἐκπεπτακυΐαν: = *ὄποι ἐκίστη ἐκπεπτακυΐα εἶη*.

75-77. The Athenian Retreat

75. **1. τρίτη ἡμέρη:** With ordinal numerals the count is inclusive; hence 'two days later'.

2. **δεινὸν οὖν ἦν . . . τὸν προγυμᾶτων:** *καθ' ἑν*, like *καθ' ἕκαστ-* (cf. 8. 1), may function as subject or object of a verb; it gave rise in later Greek to a new pronoun, *καθείς*.

3. **ἀτάφων ὄντων:** This indicates low morale; and cf. the Ambrakian herald at Olpai (iii. 113. 5), who 'aghast at the magnitude of the disaster . . . did not ask again for the return of the bodies'.
πολύ . . . ἀθλιώτεροι: 'More distressing' (sc. in sight and sound) 'than the dead to the living, and less fortunate than those who had perished'; *ἀσπυρός* describes them from the point of view of the living, *ἄθλιος* from their own point of view, while *τρεθεώρες* denotes dead men as objects, *ἀπολωλότες* as beings whose capacity for action or suffering was ended.

4. **οὐκ ἔνευ ὀλίγων . . . ὑπολειπόμενοι:** *ὀλίγων*, 'few' (not, as in English 'a few' = 'some') strikes a false note in this scene. *οὐκ ἔνευ* in classical

prose is not a synonym for *μετά*, and were it so here *οὐκ ἔνευ ὀλίγων* would mean 'without many' (cf. 79. 1 *οὐκ ἔπ' ὀλίγων ἀπέδιδον* = 'many shields deep'); it implies inevitability or indispensability. The point is that the sick and wounded did not lightly accept their fate, and hearing their lamentations was the price which the able-bodied had to pay for leaving them behind. Therefore *οὐκ ἔνευ ὀλίγων* must be emended, preferably (and most simply) to *οὐκ ἔνευ πολλῶν*; *ἄλλα* has *non sine multitudine*. *οὐκ ἔνευ ὀλίγων* would give the right sense, but would be very bad Greek.

κατήφειά τε τις: This word is used by no extant author between Homer and Thucydides, though the adjective *κατήφης* occurs in tragedy and in Hippocrates.

5. **μυριάδες γάρ . . . ἐπορεύοντο:** The figure of 40,000 men 'lost in Sicily' recurs in Isoc. viii. 86 (where, however, the figure given for the triremes lost is higher than can be reconciled with Thucydides). Thucydides may have arrived at 40,000 from the data which he has given in vi. 43, vii. 16. 2, and 42. 1, on the assumption that forty ships in the original expedition and the same number in the reinforcement were troop-transports. Unless he has simply disregarded casualties (which would be surprising), he has included slaves in the 40,000 on the assumption that the number of slaves left was roughly equal to the number of soldiers and sailors killed, missing, or left behind.

παρὰ τὸ εἰσθός: This is our clearest evidence for the extent to which a hoplite force in the field used slaves.

ἀστυρομολήκσαν γάρ . . . παραχρήμα: lit., 'for they had deserted some time before and the majority of them at once', i.e. 'for some had deserted long before, and the greatest number did so now'.

6. **καὶ μὴ ἢ ἄλλη . . . ἐδοξάετο:** If the text is right, the meaning is, lit., 'and the rest of their suffering and the equal sharing of their evils, although it had nevertheless—"in company", as they say (τὸ)—a certain lightening, not even so was regarded as easy in their present situation', and *ἢ ἄλλη . . . τῶν κακῶν* is treated as a single concept, 'the impartial distribution of the misery of their degradation in every other way'. But the dative *τῇ σομομολῇ* would be easier (and B has the dative of the noun, though the nominative *ῆ*): 'their degradation in every other respect, even though by reason of the impartial distribution of misery it contained—"in company . . .", as they say—in spite of everything, an element of relief, even so did not at the present moment seem to them lightened.'

καὶ ἀπὸ οἴας . . . ἀφίκετο: sc. 'as they reflected . . .', *ἀφίκετο*, if correct, can only be impersonal; but Thucydides almost certainly wrote *ἀφίκετο* (= *ἀφίγγεσθαι ἦσαν*), cf. 4. 6.

7. [νό]: This is impossible, and its interpolation was perhaps occasioned by οἷς, for which (. . . to a Greek army; for to this army . . .) cf. 44. 1.

76. *Nikias' Exhortations*

76. ὡς ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων: 'As best he could in the circumstances.'
 βοῆ τε χρώμενος The two reasons why Nikias raised his voice are (i) his προθυμία and (ii) his desire to be heard. τε therefore belongs with ὑπὸ προθυμίας, not with βοῆ χρώμενος, and should be moved.
 ἔτι μάλλον: This means 'even more', never 'more and more'. As there is no point of reference for any comparison except 60. 5, which is now impossibly remote, emendation is required; either (i) αἰέτι μάλλον (Weidgen), or (ii) <τ> before καθ' οὖς, giving the sense, lit., 'even more than in proportion to those on whose front he was', i.e. 'even more than was required by (sc. the numbers of) those before whom he stood'. For the 'double' sense of κατά cf. vi. 31. 6 σπαραχῆς πρὸς οὖς ἐτίσαν ὑπερβολῆ, where πρὸς has to mean both 'in comparison with' and 'against'; and for ἐτι μάλλον ἢ κατά cf. 45. 2.

77. *Speech of Nikias*

77. 1. The absence of (e.g.) ἐλεγε ῥαῖθε (cf. 60. 5) is noteworthy, but to suppose these words lost by accident and tack them on would yield a stylistically graceless sentence.

μηδὲ καταμύθεσθαι . . . αὐτοῦς: μηδὲ co-ordinating the positive ἔχειν with the negative καταμύθεσθαι is highly abnormal in Attic prose; καὶ μή would be normal. μύθεσθαι and its compounds do not always mean 'blame' in the sense of attributing moral responsibility; the sense here is not 'blame yourselves for your reverses' but 'judge yourselves inadequate because of your reverses'.

παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν: lit., 'contrary to your worth'; the point is that a strong, well-equipped, well-trained force ought not to have failed.

2. κἀγὼ τοι . . . αἰσχροῦμαι: The sequence of thought here is unusually obscure. The point of § 1 and § 3 is: 'we are good enough to win', and § 2 must be so interpreted that it is relevant to that point. In saying that he is, lit., 'neither superior in strength nor inferior in luck' to others, Nikias means that whereas in respect of strength fault can be found with him and victory is not his ἀξία, in respect of good luck—which he treats as a lasting attribute—he *does* 'deserve' to win.
 καίτοι πολλά μὲν . . . καὶ ἀνεπίφθορα: cf. 86. 5 n.

3. δῆμος: 'In spite of our present condition.'

οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν δῆ: The point of δῆ is that disaster has led the Athenians to question their own ἀξία, as § 1 indicates, and Nikias is saying that for

him the question of ἀξία does not arise. Hence: 'so far as "desert" is concerned, our reverses do not alarm me', implying 'we are still good enough to win through'.

ἰκανά γάρ . . . περιωρημένα: Nikias joins together two ideas: one is that they have surely been adequately punished for any respect in which they may have incurred divine anger (recollection of heroic legend must have made him wonder in his heart whether one can judge what a god will think adequate); the other is that complete success in itself provokes divine resentment, so that the anger of the gods may now be re-directed against the Syracusans.

4. καὶ ἀνθρώπεια δρᾶσαντες: The traditional antithesis δρᾶσαι/παθεῖν suggests crime and punishment, and the argument requires ἀνθρώπεια to mean 'acts such as men, prone to error, commit'. Cf. X. Cyr. vi. 1. 37 συγγνώμην τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπαρηγόρευον. Nikias implies: 'we have certainly done nothing worse than men in general do' (the Athenian speakers in the Melian Dialogue [v. 105. 1] defend their demands on Melos as ἀνθρώπειος), and therefore our fate, like that of other armies which have been punished in the past, is likely to be bearable.'

τά τε ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ: When a Greek speaks of ὁ θεός in a context where there is no reference to the recognizable functions of some particular god, he may mean Zeus, or he may mean 'whatever god is concerned with this'.

οἴκτου γάρ: In E. El. 1329 f. one of the Dioskuroi, justifying his exclamation of distress at the plight of Orestes, asserts that the gods are capable of pitying mortal suffering; but in general the Greek gods do not feel pity, although mortals sometimes appeal to them for it.

ἰξήσασθε: 'Stand in your way' or 'stand up to you'; in this military sense, δέχεσθαι is the opposite of φεύγειν.

6. σπουδῇ δέ . . . τῆς δόδο: These words are a promise by the generals, not an order (which would not be grammatically impossible) to the troops.

οἴτοι γάρ ἡμῶν . . . βέλαιοι εἰσιν: The Athenians were to have no opportunity of discovering how long the friendship of the Sikels would survive defeat.

7. ἀνδράσιν ἀγαθοῖς γίνεσθαι: 'To be good men' = 'to be good soldiers', i.e. to fight well and endure; this is a normal Greek expression.

ὧν ἐπιθυμῆτέ που ἐπιθεῖν: i.e. your homes.

ἀνδρες γάρ πρόαις: This famous sentiment was not invented by Thucydides; it is at least as old as Alkaios.

78-85. March and Destruction of the Athenians

78. 1-4. *Day 1; across the Anaplos; 40 stades*

78. 1. καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης: sc. ἐπιφε.

2. ἐν πλατείῳ: The formation called *πλαίσιον* was a hollow rectangle; it was commonly used on the move, and had a 'mouth' and a 'tail' (X. *An.* iii. 4. 42 f. &c.), which suggests resemblance to a snake rather than to a square. In the present case it is not clear whether there was only one *πλαίσιον*, Nikias commanding the 'mouth' and Demosthenes the 'tail', or two separate *πλαίσιαι*, Nikias commanding one and Demosthenes the other. If there was only one, we may wonder who commanded the hoplites on each flank; X. *An.* iii. 2. 36 f. thinks of a *πλαίσιον* as needing *four* commanders. If there were two, we may wonder *why* there should be two; and later, when Demosthenes' force becomes separated from Nikias', the word *ἀπεσπασθή* (80. 4) and the remark 'the Syracusan cavalry encircled them more easily *δίχα* δι' ὄντας' (81. 2) suggest that the two forces had hitherto constituted a single formation. Possibly, however, the very large numbers involved made it desirable to organize two separate *πλαίσιαι*, even if the intention was that the two forces should keep as close together as possible.

ἐν πλατείῳ is the reading of B; the other MSS. have ἐν διαλασίῳ, which is not Greek, but prompted Heitland's ingenious conjecture ἐν διπλασίῳ (cf. *διστάδιον* &c.).

ἠγούμενον κτλ.: We would expect genitive absolutes; but an appositive construction is used since τὸ Νικίου and τὸ Δημοσθένους are the components of τὸ δέ, which refers to τὸ στρατεύμα.

3. καὶ ἐπειδὴ [τε] κτλ.: τε is unlikely, since two statements of events which stand in a strict temporal succession ('when they arrived . . . they found . . . + 'having defeated them . . . they moved . . .') are not normally co-ordinated by τε/καί.

ἐν τῇ διαβάσει . . . ποταμοῦ: Due west of their camp, where the river runs NW-SE.

οἱ ψαλοί: In 'partitive apposition' to 'the Syracusans'; . . . and—the light-armed troops—shooting into them'.

78. 4-5. *Day 2; across a plain to the Akraion Lepas; 20 stades*

78. 4. ἐς χερσίων ἀρεδόν π: In the region of the modern Floridia, 10 km. west of Syracuse.

5. Ἀκραίων λέπας: The valley which the Syracusans blocked has traditionally been identified with the Cava di Culatrello, of which the

entrance lies 2-3 km. west of Floridia; it is a deep-sided gorge which suits the description given here, but not a place in which the Syracusan cavalry could easily have attacked the Athenians from the flanks (§ 6). A route further south, through the area now called Contrada Raiana, suits Thucydides' description of the Syracusan tactics better but his description of the ground less well. Both routes would have led the Athenians to Akrai. Certain identification is precluded by Thucydides' characteristic imprecision in his account of the fighting; the cavalry may have attacked the Athenians only as they approached and entered the valley, not after they were in it.

78. 6. *Day 3; no progress*

78. 6. ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ στρατόπεδον: In the plain (§ 4).

79. 1-5. *Day 4; no progress*

79. 1. οὐκ ἐπ' ὀλίγων ἀρτίδων: 'Many shields deep'; the order negative-preposition-adjective is normal.

2. δυνεοῦντο: 'Reached their targets.'

3. ἐν τῷ σφετέρῳ ὀλέθρῳ: As indicating divine displeasure.

5. πρὸς τὸ πεδῖον μάλλον: Near enough the entrance to the valley to avoid the danger of being walled off from the rear during the night.

79. 5-6. *Day 5; attempt to bypass the valley; 5-6 stades*

79. 5. προυχόμενον: Plainly not up the valley again, for after an advance of 5-6 stades they paused in the plain (§ 6). Moreover, the fighting on this day is described in quite different terms from the fighting in the valley; among other things, the Syracusans attack them *παραχῆ* . . . *κόκλῳ*. The Athenians must therefore have been moving south in an attempt to bypass the valley that led to the Akraion Lepas.

κατὰ βραχύ: lit., 'a small bit at a time', almost 'on a narrow front' or 'at a single point'.

80. 1-4. *Night of Day 5; south-eastwards to the coast; Nikias and Demosthenes separated*

80. 1. πῦρ καύσαντας ὡς πλεῖστα: To make the enemy think that they were still in their camp.

2. ἦν δέ . . . αὐτῇ: Before the last battle in the harbour the Athenians intended was to go to Katane if their ships could break out, but otherwise to take whatever route would most quickly lead to friendly territory, 'Greek or foreign' (60. 2). Nikias in 77. 4 ff. says nothing of

Katane, but reveals that notice of the retreat had been sent to Sikeli tribes; and 80. 5 shows that the intended rendezvous with the Sikeli was on the upper Kakyparis, i.e. in the area of Akrai. It is therefore unlikely that Thucydides means here 'their destination was *no longer* Katane, but the south-west coast', and if he did mean that it is surprising that he did not say it plainly; *οὐκ ἐστὶν* would have removed any doubts. His point is: 'their destination was not Katane, as one might expect from their turning back towards the coast, but . . . ἡ ἐμπόσια οὐδὲς is the overall journey, as distinct from any particular stage of it. *τὸ πρὸς Κατάραν καὶ Γάλαν*: They cannot have expected a friendly reception from the Greek cities, which had fought (except Akragas) on the side of Syracuse, but they hoped to reach in safety an area into which the Syracusans would not be interested in maintaining pursuit.

3. *οἷον φιλᾶί . . . ἐγγίγνεσθαι*: = οἷον φιλεῖ ἐγγίγνεσθαι (δόβοι γὰρ καὶ δέμαρα φιλοῦσιν ἐγγίγνεσθαι).

4. *ἄσπερον ἤγειρο*: = οὐδ' ἴω γὰρ ἤγειρο.

80. 5-82. 3. *Day 6*: *Nikias reaches the Erineos*; *Demosthenes surrenders*
80. 5. *ἄσπερος*: Given the previous sentence, the point of 'nevertheless' must be that Demosthenes too reached the coast, although the gap between the two forces soon widened to 50 stades (81. 3).

Ἐλωπινην: Heloron lay near the coast c. 25 km. south of Syracuse.
Κακυσάρα: The Cassibili, which rises near Akrai.

6. *φολαστήν τινα*: A product of the activity described in 74. 2.

Ἐμπεδόν: A watercourse called Cava Mammaleddi—dry since a great earthquake in the seventeenth century—just south of Avola, 9 km. south of the Cassibili. In older maps this watercourse is called 'Miranda', a name which now belongs only to a spring at Avola.
ἡγεμόνες: 'Guides', not 'commanders'.

81. 1. *ἰκόντρα ἀφ' ἑναις*: It would be interesting to know their interpretation of Gylippos' motives. Possibly they thought that as a Spartan he was content with decisive victory—his training and military instincts would have dissuaded him from fighting an unnecessary battle—while they were in the mood for spectacular revenge provided it did not cost them too much (cf. 81. 5, 84. 4 f.). More probably the 'pan-Siceliot' sentiment encouraged by Hermokrates manifested itself, in a moment of disappointment, in a suspicion that there might exist a similar bond of sentiment between their Spartan general and their enemy. Nikias, too, was regarded as having close relations with Sparta (cf. 85. 1, 86. 3). Gylippos' unwillingness, later, to allow the captured Athenian generals to be executed (86. 2) must have strengthened their suspicions.

3. *ἰκόντρας εἶναι*: = *ἰκόντρας γε*, 'if they could help it, anyway'; cf. *τὸ νῦν εἶναι* = 'at present, at least'.

4. *οὐ προυχόμεναι . . . ξυνετόσσετο*: lit., 'he did not advance rather than drew up his ranks for battle', i.e. . . . *but rather* drew up . . .

5. *φειδῶ τέ τις . . . προαναλωθῆναι τῷ*: lit., 'a certain sparingness came into being for a man (τῷ), not to be expended beforehand in furtherance of a success already clear', i.e. 'everyone felt a certain reluctance to lose his life unnecessarily when success was already assured'; *προ-* implies 'before it was necessary' and carries the further implication that it would *not* be necessary.
καὶ ὅς: lit., 'even so', i.e. 'in any case'.

82. 1. *κήρυγμα . . . πρῶτον μὲν κτλ.*: lit., 'a proclamation . . . first of all, of the Islanders if anyone wishes . . .', i.e. 'a proclamation . . . first, to invite any Islanders who wished . . .'. On the term 'Islanders' cf. 5. 4 n.

πόλεως οὐ πολλαί: The poor response furnishes an interesting comment on Nikias' speech, 63. 3 f.

2. *μὴ ἀποθανεῖν μηδένα . . . διαίτης*: The Syracusans did not keep their word; cf. 86. 2, 87. 1 f.

3. *ἕξακισχίλιοι*: Since the total number which began the retreat six days before was 40,000 (75. 5), there were few slaves among them (ibid.). Demosthenes had rather more than half the total force with him (80. 4), and 'not many' contingents of islanders took advantage of the Syracusan offer, Demosthenes' force must have suffered casualties on a prodigious scale.

83. *Day 7*: *Nikias south of the Erineos*

83. 2. *ἀπήγγελε πάλιν*: 'Brought word back.'
ἐπισημικότεραι: sc. Nikias.

3. *καὶ ρούτους*: καὶ glances back at 82. 1.

4. *ἐπαιτῶσαν*: cf. 44. 6 n.

84-85. *Day 8*, *the massacre at the Assinaros*; *surrender of Nikias*

84. 2. *Ἀσσίναρον*: The Fiumara di Noto (called 'Palcomara' in some older maps), which flows past Noto and into the sea 11 km. south of the Cassibili.

ἄβῶν τὸ σφίον ἐσοθαί: Exhausted men in retreat often feed on the illusory hope that if they can, as it were, get into the next square on

the board the rules of the game will allow them a rest from enemy attack.

85. 1. *ἐαυτῷ μὲν χρίσασθαι* . . . *ὄτι βούλουται*: 'To do what they liked with himself', i.e. to kill him, if they wished.

2. *ἀπερφόβαντο*: sc. the Syracusan soldiers; the point of 'hiding away' an Athenian captive was to make money for oneself, and not for the public treasury, by selling him.

4. *ἐν τῷ [Σικελικῷ] πολέμῳ τοῦτ' ἐμ'*, drawing attention to 87. 5, conjectures 'Ελληνικῷ'; the conjecture is wrong, since 'Ελληνικῷ would be a pointless addition to *τῷ πολέμῳ τούτῳ*, but the suspicion is right. Thucydides means by 'this war', here as elsewhere, the Peloponnesian War as a whole; demonstratives often attract glosses, and *Σικελικῷ* was in origin a foolish gloss on *τούτῳ*.

τούτους δ' ἦν ἀναχόμενος ἐς Καράνην: Among them was the speaker of [Lys.] xx, who claims to have taken part in raids carried out by Katane against Syracusan territory.

86-87. The Fate of the Prisoners

86. 2. *ἐς τὰς λιθοτομίας*: The great quarries east of the theatre.

Νικίας δέ . . . ἀπέφραξαν: This event provided material for historical controversy and rhetorical invention in later times. Philistos followed Thucydides, but Timaios, magnifying the virtues of the Syracusans, represented Hermokrates as trying to give the Athenian generals the opportunity to escape by suicide the disgrace of execution. The story in *Phl. Nic.* 28. 3 that Hermokrates advocated mercy probably comes from Timaios. The execution of Demosthenes, a grim compliment to his quality (cf. the Athenians' execution of Aristeus [ii. 67. 4]), was a flagrant violation of the promise given to him (82. 2).

3. *ἐν τῇ νήσῳ*: Sphakteria.
σπονδὰς . . . ποιήσασθαι: Nikias was the protagonist of peace in 421.
ἀπέθηναι: τοῖς . . . τῶν *Λακεδαιμονίων* is the subject.

4. *ἐκκοινολόγητον*: cf. 48. 3, 73. 3.
ὄτι πλοῦσιος ἦν: There is evidence from fourth-century sources independent of Thucydides for Nikias' great wealth.
νεότερόν τι: 'Trouble'; cf. 87. 1 n.

5. *διὰ τὴν πάσαν . . . ἐπιτήδευσαν*: 'Because of his way of life, which he conducted wholly in accordance with high standards,' *πάσαν* agrees with *ἐπιτήδευσαν*, not with *ἀπερτήν*, for the Greeks do not speak of 'every virtue' or of 'the virtues'. *νεομιμήμεν* also agrees with *ἐπιτήδευσαν*;

cf. E. fr. 87. 3 *τοὺς νομίζοντας τέχνην*, 'those who practise a craft', and A. Ch. 1003 *ἀργυροσεπὲρ βίαν νομίζων*, 'living a robber's life'. Although it would be grammatically possible for *νεομιμήμεν* to agree with *ἀπερτήν* (cf. v. 105. 1 for the coupling of abstract nouns in *-ας* with phrases with *ἐπ'*), if Thucydides had meant to draw a distinction between 'traditional' or 'conventional' virtue and some more original concept of virtue, he could have done so easily and unambiguously by writing *ἀπερτὴν τὴν νεομιμήμεν*.

There is no reason to think that Thucydides would have wanted to deny the name of *ἀπερτή* to a sustained effort to be just and honest and conscientious in fulfilling one's obligations; cf. v. 105. 4, 'at home the Spartans *ἀπερτὴν χρώνται* more than anyone, but in their dealings with others . . . they treat what is agreeable to themselves as honourable and what is in their interest as just'. We may think, after reading his history of the Sicilian Expedition, that he is lenient towards Nikias, or that his (and Nikias') standards of *ἀπερτή* were defective; but that is a different question. The expression of the view that Nikias did not *deserve* to be executed does not in itself imply that Thucydides believed in a system of divine rewards and punishments for virtue and vice, but is a natural reaction with which anyone of moderate sensitivity may concur.

87. 1. *ἐπιγινόμεναι*: i.e. succeeding, on each occasion, a hot day.
τούναντων . . . ἐνωτέρωζον: *νέωτέρος* and *ννωτέρωζον* have unpleasant associations, especially in politics, implying violence and execution.
τῇ μεταβολῇ: The effects of sudden changes in temperature, humidity, diet, or habits were taken very seriously by ancient medical theory.

2. *πάντα τε ποιούντων*: The point is: including excretion.

ἐπι δετῷ μῆνας: Since many were sold after seventy days (83), this figure refers to the Athenians and others who remained. Presumably at the end of eight months these too were sold.

κοτύλην . . . σίτου: A liquid *κοτύλη* was 0.27 litres, a dry *κοτύλη* 270-275 cc. Under the terms of the truce at Pylos (iv. 16. 1) the Spartans had been allowed to supply even the slaves on Sphakteria with 4 *κοτύλαι* of flour per man per day.

4. *οὐκ ἐλάσσευς ἐπτασιχάλιον*: Since 6,000 were captured with Demosthenes (82. 3) it follows that only 1,000 of Nikias' contingent (originally about 20,000 [75. 5 ~ 80. 4]) came into the custody of the Syracusan state.

5. ['Ελληνικόν']: Since all *ἔργα* of any significance in 'this war' were Greek, 'Ελληνικόν is a pointless addition and is rightly deleted; cf. 85. 4 n.

6. τὸ λεγόμενον: This apologizes for the unusual word *παραλελειμμένον*, which Herodotus (ii. 120. 5) uses of the destruction of Troy.

No one who has completed Book VII should omit to read viii. 1, which is the real end of the story, describing the resolution with which the Athenians faced the news of the disaster and the prospect of the years to come.

INDEXES

(All references are to pages of the Introduction and Commentary)

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- (i) Oxford Classical Text rejected or questioned:
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