PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE SELF

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Jerry Suls

State University of New York at Albany

6 Is Anyone in Charge? Personalysis Versus the Principle of Personal Unity

Anthony G. Greenwald
Ohio State University

> *Unity of personality is only a matter of degree, and we should avoid exaggerating it.* (Gordon W. Allport, 1965)
> *. . . we shall take no account of the soul.* (William James, 1890)

PREFACE

The principle of nonunity of the person, which is developed in this chapter, has many predecessors. Although this principle has received many favorable mentions in psychological literature, there is nevertheless a widespread implicit acceptance of an opposing principle of personal unity. This chapter attempts no systematic survey of previous treatments of personal nonunity. Among the more prominent prior treatments not reviewed is that of Jung, whose work contains a number of ideas that anticipate ones presented here (as well as many that would be quite out of place); similarly, Lewin's theorization about differentiated regions within the person is mentioned only in passing, and Hilgard's (1977) recent presentation of the neodissociationist position is discussed only briefly. I do focus on portions of Freud's psychoanalytic theory, both because of its influence on my ideas and because of its value as an aid to exposition.

A problem encountered in writing the chapter was that of labeling several hypothesized entities. I appropriated suitable terms from everyday language in using *body, verbal, social,* and *self* as names for partially independent subsystems of the person. In a few places I made up new terms for concepts for which satisfactory old ones did not exist. The new terms are *personalysis* as the designation for the chapter's general approach to nonunity of the person, *personalytic* (pronounced with the stress pattern of "personalistic") as a deriva-

tive adjective, and *sociation*, which designates a special type of deindividuation. I ask the reader's indulgence in these attempted enlargements of an already unwieldy psycholexicon.[1] In knowledge that useless terms will be ignored, I have tried to make these useful.

Prospectus

The usefulness of the concept of self in psychology has been limited by psychologists' attempting to deal simultaneously with the self both as an empirical object of study and as the assumed vehicle of conscious experience. This seems an impossible task. A method of divorcing self's content from its consciousness is suggested by an analogy between person and computer as multisystems. In the multisystem analysis of the person (here labeled personalysis), the self is a subsystem of the person and is partially independent of body, verbal, and social subsystems. The independence among these subsystems follows from their using different coding schemes and having limited access to each other's knowledge. This personalytic approach's assumption of independent subsystems stands in contrast to a principle of personal unity that appears as an implicit assumption in many psychological analyses. In this chapter, the conceptual difficulties that are imported into psychology via the implicit principle of personal unity are illustrated by considering six topic areas of social psychology in terms of the contrast between personalysis and personal unity. The multisystem view is developed further by comparing it to Freud's tripartite division of the psyche, and then by using it to resolve paradoxes in the existing conception of deindividuation. The chapter concludes by arguing that the principle of personal unity has dominated psychology because the work of psychology is done by the self-subsystems of scientist-persons.

CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS OF SELF

"Self" is a very popular term in psychology but is at times an embarrassment. The embarrassment is the difficulty of saying just what is meant by this widely and frequently used term. The problem can be caricaturized by suggesting that the concept of self has been too (self-)conscious, as is apparent from its surrounding itself with mirrors and its unwillingness to appear alone (unhyphenated) in public.

Both the origin of the mirror metaphor for self and a hint of this metaphor's

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[1]The term, *sociation*, has an existing usage in sociology, but one that has not gained any widespread adoption; the present definition is unrelated to this earlier use. The word, *personalysis*, has been characterized, by some colleagues who first encountered it in an earlier draft of this chapter, as hateful, revulsion inducing, and of impure ancestry. Although I tend to agree, nevertheless I failed in persistent attempts to find a better term, and the term has tended to grow on me with repeated use.

difficulties can be found in the Greek myth of Narcissus, whose fascination with his reflected image led to his metamorphosis into a flower. The virtue of the mirror metaphor is that it captures the dual-faceted conception of self simultaneously as subject and object—just as the person who stands in front of a mirror is both the perceiver and perceived (Cooley, 1902). Interestingly, actual mirrors have seen productive use in empirical studies of properties of the self (especially by Duval & Wicklund, 1972, and Gallup, 1977). Nevertheless, the mirror metaphor is at heart insubstantial and mysterious, as suggested by the following remark by Hilgard (1949): "[The] self-evident character of self-awareness is in fact most illusive. You presently find yourself as between the two mirrors of a barbershop, so that as the self takes a look at itself taking a look at itself, it soon gets all confused as to the self that is doing the looking and the self which is being looked at. [p. 377]."

As for the hyphen, any inspection of psychologists' uses of "self" will show that it is used primarily in combinatorial forms, and only infrequently as a noun. The hyphen is used to connect "self" to a wide variety of abstract nouns, as in *self-concept, self-esteem, self-awareness,* and *self-presentation.* In the index of *Psychological Abstracts* for the second half of 1979, self is used as the first part of a combination with 18 different nouns, covering 16 pages of citations.

The use of self in hyphenated terms and the mirror metaphor both capture the property of reflexiveness—the fusing of subject and object. I don't mean to suggest that it is a mistake to associate the self with the concept of reflexiveness. It is, rather, the insubstantialness of the way the hyphen and the mirror capture the idea of reflexiveness that is a problem. We need, not the pure reflexiveness of the hyphen and the mirror, but rather an embodied concept. Examples of embodied conceptions of reflexiveness are Hofstadter's (1979) appeal to the self-referential structure of Godel's proof and to the self-replicating mechanism of DNA.

The disembodied reflexiveness that is represented by the hyphen and the mirror is also a characteristic of the mental attribute of *consciousness,* a term that has a lengthy past association with the concept of self. Psychologists who have studied the self have often felt obliged to merge their scientific enterprise with their subjective experience of consciousness. The reason for this merger was well-stated by Allport (1965), who may have been speaking more for others than for himself: "The fugitive and undependable nature of consciousness has led some psychologists to deny it any place at all in psychological science . . . And yet the objective method preferred by these psychologists depends completely upon the testimony of their own conscious experience. Of what use are pointer readings unless they are consciously perceived and interpreted [p. 139]?"

William James (1890) provided a brief, but effective, counterargument to the view that psychologists must take subjectivity (consciousness) as a topic of investigation. His point was that the metaphysical status of thoughts and their objects constituted a puzzle that pervaded all science, not just psychology: "About such *ultimate* puzzles he [the psychologist] in the main need trouble himself no

more than the geometer, the chemist, or the botanist do, who make precisely the same assumptions as he [p. 184]."

Metaphors and Models for the Self

In addition to the mirror, several more tangible metaphors for the self have been proposed, and these have shown increasing complexity of structure with the passage of time. Hume (1739/1888), in denying self as a special entity, called it: "nothing but a *bundle* or collection of different perceptions [p. 252, italics indicate the metaphor]." James (1890) played with metaphors, some borrowed from other philosophers, of a *herd of cattle* (p. 337), a *train* of ideas (p. 355), and *stockings,* the *thread* of which could be replaced without altering the identity of the stockings (p. 372). His preferred metaphor was a *stream* of successive thoughts, with the self identified as the relation of the present thought to those that had preceded it—the present thought is "the *hook* from which the *chain* of past selves dangles [p. 340]." Among the more recent models of self are Koffka's (1935) *trace column,* Sherif and Cantril's (1947) organization of *attitudes,* Markus's (1977) trait *schemata,* T. B. Rogers's (1980) self as *prototype,* Epstein's (1973) and Loevinger's (1976) analogy of self to *scientific theory,* and my own (Greenwald, 1980) analogy of self to *totalitarian political organization.*

This sample of metaphors and models helps to introduce the computer as a further metaphor, one that has the special virtue of allowing consideration of complex cognitive aspects of self without concern about consciousness. In the early years of impact of the computer as the dominating model on which cognitive psychology was based, hardware aspects of computers provided the source of theoretical inspiration (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960, Ch. 14). In such models information was seen as flowing from one location to another within the processing apparatus, and considerations of organizational aspects of the information were subordinated to considerations of organizational aspects of the information-housing apparatus. More recently, there has been recognition of the power of the computer program (rather than the computer itself) as the medium in which psychological processes can be modeled. An essential aspect of such models is that the organization of stored information determines the manner in which new incoming information is processed and stored. The capability of the computer to model an actively functioning organization of knowledge permits the study of cognitive organization to be separated from the phenomenon of consciousness.

The Computer Metaphor in More Detail

The self can be defined as *a protected domain within a larger knowledge system.* The computer metaphor amplifies this definition. "Domain" is meant in the sense of an area of dominance, and the protection is not so much against information outside the domain (although self's cognitive biases, see Greenwald, 1980, do indeed provide some such protection), as it is against the loss of mutual access

among the portions of the domain. These usages are easily understood by those familiar with computer operating systems. Successful operating systems employ error-detection routines to assure, for example, that the area of memory in which the program operates is the proper domain of the operating system, or that the values of variables retrieved from memory are within ranges that the system's programs are prepared to deal with. Without these protective routines, a runaway condition can readily occur, with potentially disastrous results such as loss of important stored information. A well-designed operating system will protect itself against loss of control by interrupting an errant routine and returning control to an executive (or monitor) routine that reports the error condition and awaits further input. The analogy to the computer's operating system has the virtue of making clear that there need be no homunculus hidden within the conception of self as a protected domain of knowledge. The psychological importance of the protected-domain property of the self system can be appreciated by noting that loss or weakness of this property is likely at the root of a variety of pathological dissociation phenomena such as multiple personality, amnesia, fugue, and depersonalization (Hilgard, 1977).

An important aspect of the protected-domain definition of self is that the self system is contained within a larger knowledge system, from which it is partially independent. This aspect of the definition can be elucidated in terms of the computer metaphor by considering the relation of the computer's operating system to the larger computer system in which it participates. Various portions of the computer system may be independent of the operating system, either by being able to function without the aid of the operating system (e.g., read-only memories and some peripheral devices) or by being unintelligible to the operating system (e.g., data files or programs recorded in an unknown format by another operating system, perhaps a prior and now obsolete version of the current operating system).

Boundaries Between Subsystems

In order for there to be independence among subsystems of an organization, there must be some restrictions on communication between them. Two types of such restrictions are apparent in many large knowledge systems—*language barriers* and *access limits.* Sometimes these two classes of restrictions work together, as when an intelligence agency both encrypts information and prevents access of outsiders to these records. Other examples come readily to mind: The independence of American and Russian scientific establishments, due to different publication languages and to travel and communication restrictions; or the independence between psychological knowledge and lay wisdom due to much of the former being encrypted (in jargon) and hidden (in journals on library shelves and in professors' offices).

The computer metaphor readily provides illustrations of language barriers and access limits as the basis for independence among knowledge systems. A language barrier is apparent when there is an inability to use a program that, al-

though stored in an accessible file, is written in a programing language for which the operating system has no compiler. An access restriction occurs when understandable information on a peripheral medium must be accessed via a directory that is in a format unknown to the operating system. A frequent virtue of access limitations is that they prevent one subsystem from modifying valuable information in another. An access limit that serves this function is the recording of the information needed to invoke the operating system in unmodifiable (read-only) form. One readily thinks of knowledge encoded in the form of reflexes and instincts as a parallel to such read-only computer memories.

PERSONALYSIS VERSUS THE PRINCIPLE OF PERSONAL UNITY

Many philosophers and psychologists have theorized about the validity of characterizing the person as a unitary entity. Philosophical positions range from Hume's nonunified view of the person as a bundle of perceptions to Kant's unified formulation of the transcendental (or pure) ego. (A review of these early philosophical positions can be found in James's, 1890, chapter on the self.) Psychological positions range from behaviorist views of people as collections of reflexes and habits through the views of various self and ego theorists who regard unity as an accomplishment of the developing ego. (A review of ego-development theories is available in Loevinger, 1976.) An important type of intermediate position is one that considers the person as composed of dissociated subsystems. (See, for example, the review of Jung's position in Hall & Lindzey, 1978, and Hilgard's, 1977, recent statement of a neodissociationist position.)

Lewin (1935) and Allport (1965) devoted chapters to the question of personal unity. Although each of them was reluctant to say outright that the person is nonunitary, their remarks indicate that they saw substantial nonunity in personality. Lewin (1935) suggested that the self was a separate region (system) within the "psychical totality," and that even the self might be conceived as a multiplicity of systems:

> The question of the unity of consciousness is not identical with the question of the unity of the whole region of psychical forms and processes. . . . Further, it is at least questionable whether that which may be called the ego or self, the unity of which is important for many problems, is not merely one system or complex of systems, a functional part region within this psychical totality [p. 56].

> It would be natural from Gestalt theoretical considerations to understand the self in terms of the psychical totality perhaps as its structural individuality. . . . A number of facts, however, drive one in the opposite direction to the view that a special region, within the psychical totality, must be defined as the self in the narrower sense [p. 61].

> Psychical tensions and energies belong to systems which are in themselves dy-

namic unities and which show a greater or less degree of abscission [i.e., separation] [p. 62].

Allport (1965) viewed unity as an accomplishment toward which personality appeared to be directed, but which was not likely to be fully achieved: "Personality is many things in one—a *unitas multiplex*. . . . For two reasons [the problem of unity] is a preplexing problem: first, because there are many senses in which the term *unity* may be applied to personality; and second, because it is questionable whether unity is ever achieved. Such unification as exists seems to be only a matter of degree [p. 376]."

If there is a position on the unity issue that summarizes the consensus among theorists who have specifically addressed that issue, it is that unity of the person is not to be taken for granted. Yet, that is precisely what we find to have been done by researchers in a number of familiar topic areas of psychology. In the analysis of these topics, unity of the person is never stated as an explicit assumption—yet, the problems chosen for investigation and the manner of stating questions for research show that unity is being assumed implicitly. Perhaps this occurs because psychological researchers, like most lay persons, have a theory of the self (Epstein, 1973) as a unified entity that extends to the boundaries of the person. Before proceeding to document this widespread implicit assumption of personal unity, it is useful to develop concepts and language that make it as easy to talk about the alternative—the person as nonunitary—as it is presently to refer to the person as a unity.

My proposal of a set of designations for subsystems of the person is not intended as a known catalog of the subsystems of the person and their interrelations. This *caveat* is important because it will be easy to assume, when I refer to "the verbal system" or to "body systems," that these terms are intended to have well-defined referents. Rather, these terms are being used in a pretheoretical or metatheoretical sense. They are place-filler terms that should eventually be replaced by better specified concepts. The label for this metatheoretical effort, *personalysis,* designates the general enterprise of characterizing the person as a set of subsystems. The value of this personalytic approach should not stand or fall on the basis of the terms used here as first approximations to designate subsystems.

The label personalysis—deliberately built as a parallel to *psycho*analysis to indicate indebtedness to Freud's approach—also calls attention to one of a few critical differences from psychoanalysis. Freud's theory of the id, ego, and superego was conceived as an analysis of the *psyche* (mind) into functional subsystems. The present approach is conceived instead as an analysis of the *person* into subsystems.[2] Two other critical differences of this personalytic approach from

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[2] By using a designation, person, that includes both mental and physical systems, I hope to avoid, rather than be trapped by, philosophical mind/body issues. The term *body* is used to name one class of subsystems, but it is not intended for other subsystems therefore to be interpreted as *mind*. The term, person, is additionally preferable to *individual*, which can be seen (from its derivation) to prejudge the personal unity question.

psychoanalytic theory are: (1) the conception of subsystem boundaries in terms of language barriers and access limitations (adapted from the computer metaphor); and (2) a stronger emphasis on the independence among the subsystems.[3]

Any demarcation of the person into subsystems can be specified only to the extent that we know the nature of languages (codes) used and patterns of knowledge access within the person. Because such knowledge is presently far from complete, the Fig. 6.1 specification of four subsystems—body, self, verbal, and social—is no more than a speculation that is subject to revision. Some justification for using these four as an initial set of subsystems follows.

Body (nonverbal) Systems. We know enough of biology, physiology, and psychology to know that there exist distinct codes for genetic information, several channels of sensory information, various channels of nonverbal behavioral communication, and affective or emotional information. For the most part, we don't know the details of these codes. (It is only this ignorance that justifies lumping these various nonverbal systems into the catchall category of "body" systems.) These several nonverbal codes have widely varying functions. The genetic code is a remarkably stable language (across time and species) that ties all life forms on the planet into one large system. Nonverbal behavior (e.g., gestural) codes serve a social communication function, even permitting some interspecies communication. Sensory codes are strictly for intrapersonal use and are extensively verbally translated. Affective codes appear also to serve largely intrapersonal functions and have translations into the verbal system that are probably far from perfect (Schachter & Singer, 1962).

The Verbal System. This may be the central subsystem of the person because of its potential for providing the common language that can permit access to the knowledge of all the other subsystems—that is, its potential for providing what unity the person can achieve. Figure 6.1 indicates that a portion of the verbal system lies outside the self system. This portion of the verbal system is especially significant psychologically and corresponds in part to the psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious (some differences are noted later). Another interesting overlap is that of the verbal and social systems *outside* the self system. This suggests the existence of some verbal social communications that do not involve the the self system, such as unremembered conversations with a hypnotist

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[3]Erdelyi and Goldberg (1979) present an impressive argument to the effect that Freud would have used a computer metaphor had one been available in the early 20th century. In a personal communication, Erdelyi has further suggested that Freud's theories, elaborated with the aid of the computer metaphor, might closely resemble the multisystem view that I am presenting here. Even though the point is necessarily hypothetical, I am inclined to agree—which may explain why I have the feeling of having used the computer metaphor more to enable me to understand, rather than to disagree with, Freud.


FIG.6.1   Representation of subsystems of the person. The hint of a cerebral-hemisphere structure, with the verbal system located in the left hemisphere. is based on much evidence of verbal specialization of the left hemisphere. The biasing of self and social systems toward the left hemisphere is sensible, if one assumes that the verbal system is crucial to these other two systems. The potentially misleading aspect of the hemispheric representation is the appearance that the subsystems of the person are confined to the cerebrum. However, the systems potentially include not only other parts of the brain but also the remainder of the physical person.

or verbally mediated mass behaviors in which the participants appear to be deindividuated (see section, "Behavior Without Self: Deindividuation").

The Self System. The special character of the self system is the protected-domain property that was described earlier in terms of the computer operating system as a metaphor. The protected-domain property is assumed to be associated with a set of cognitive biases that also characterize other protected knowledge systems such as governmental propaganda and scientific theory (Greenwald, 1980), and with a capacity to retrieve long-established memories. Other subsystems of the person may also have learning or memory capacities, but those capacities must be rudimentary in comparison with those of the self system. This view of the special role of the self system in memory was central to the theorizing of the gestalt psychologist, Koffka (1935). Recent views of the role of the self

system in memory can be found in Greenwald (1981b) and Rogers (1980), as well as in the chapter by Markus and Sentis in this volume.

The Social System. In Fig. 6.1 the social system is shown as one of the subsystems of the person. This manner of depiction is intended only to capture an emphasis in this chapter; it is also indicated that the social portions of person systems can be represented as subsystems of a social system. It is in keeping with the personalytic approach to suggest that social roles (Sarbin & Allen, 1968) can be construed as subdivisions of the overlap of the social and self systems, an idea that can be related to James's (1890) suggestion about the multiplicity of "social selves": "Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves . . . as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares. He generally shows a different side of himself to each of these groups [p. 294]."

The relation of the self and the social system is considered further in the section following on deindividuation (see section "Behavior Without Self: Deindividuation").

APPLICATIONS OF PERSONALYSIS TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Theoretical analysis of a number of topics in social psychology has been more troublesome than necessary because of researchers' implicit assumption of personal unity. The personalytic orientation of Fig. 6.1, which avoids the assumption of unity of verbal, nonverbal, social, and self systems, is illustrated for six topic areas—verbal and nonverbal communication, attitude–behavior consistency, relation of affect and cognition, accuracy of introspection, the attribution of consistent dispostions, and sociobiological versus cognitive interpretations of social behavior. In each of these cases, I try to show the subtle and sometimes obstructive manifestations of the implied unity principle.

Before proceeding to these battlegrounds between the forces of unity and nonunity, it is useful to mention some cases for which the principle of nonunity is fairly well-accepted. The disjunction between autonomic and voluntary response systems provides a good illustration. Although there are plausible claims of the possibility of gaining voluntary control over many autonomic nervous system and endocrine functions, few would oppose the hypothesis that control over circulation, digestion, etc. is *usually* independent of verbal process. Similarly, reflexive actions that are organized subcortically are usually assumed to operate independently of verbalization. The evidence from patients commisurotomized for the treatment of epilepsy (Gazzaniga, 1970) suggests a large degree of independence between functions that are respectively localized in the left (e.g., verbal) and right (e.g., affective) cerebral hemispheres. As a final example, it is commonplace for people to have cognitive abilities that are not matched by bodily abilities. There are many would-be athletes who have verbal knowledge of

some skill—such as serving a tennis ball—but this verbal knowledge is independent of (i.e., not translatable into) the body system. Correspondingly, there are highly skilled athletes who are incapable of expressing verbally the knowledge that is encoded in their bodily performances. These last examples are specially interesting because such bodily-verbal independence is widely believed to be remediable by practice. In the multisystem (personalytic) view, such practice serves to develop translations between verbal and motor systems.

Communication Discrepancies Between Verbal and Nonverbal Channels

Taking their inspiration from the conclusions of Mehrabian (Mehrabian & Wiener, 1967) and Ekman and Friesen (1969), many textbook writers make the point that when verbal and nonverbal channels communicate discrepant evaluative messages, it is the nonverbal channel that can be expected to convey the true or accurate message (Berkowitz, 1980, p. 148; Freedman, Sears, & Carlsmith, 1978, p. 95; Schneider, 1976, p. 113; Worchel & Cooper, 1979, p. 275). A perhaps-abused example from popular novels and films is the woman whose words are presumably not to be believed when her mouth says "no," while her body says "yes." (But should those words be disbelieved?)

As others have noted (Krauss, Apple, Morency, Wenzel, & Winton, in press), the conclusion of nonverbal dominance derives from research settings that have used artificial tasks, such as instructing subjects to dissimulate. Nevertheless, secondary reporters have used these findings to conclude that nonverbal communications provide a pipeline to an underlying truth that characterizes the person as a whole. This conclusion—which subjects in bogus pipeline experiments (Jones & Sigall, 1971) seem also to accept willingly—shows the implicit principle of personal unity in operation. In contrast, the personalytic (subsystem independence) approach permits the interpretation that *inconsistent truths can be communicated simultaneously by verbal and nonverbal systems of the same person.* The epistemological status of discrepant verbal and nonverbal messages thus resembles that of discrepant responses to a survey question by two members of the population being surveyed. The aim of characterizing the person's knowledge by a single state of truth is accordingly no more (or no less) achievable than that of characterizing a population of voters as having a single preference among competing candidates.

Some other illustrations may help to make this point. Suppose you are asked if you are afraid of snakes and you say, with the conviction of belief, that you aren't. Surreptitiously, the questioner arranges for a harmless snake to appear crawling toward you on the arm of your chair—and you leap in haste out of the chair. Does this mean that you were lying when you said you weren't afraid of snakes? Not necessarily—it could be that your verbal knowledge included no fear of snakes, whereas your bodily reaction was controlled emotionally and reflexively by genetically transmitted knowledge. (Continued experience with peo-

ple who arrange for snakes to crawl toward you might alter your verbal knowledge, but the naive situation of independence of verbal and bodily knowledge is not at all implausible.) A related example is based on the assumption that some bodily knowledge is sex-specific—which is to say, it has been transmitted by sex-linked genes. One's verbal knowledge may well not have good access to sex-linked nonverbal knowledge. Thus, our verbal reports concerning the way our personal interactions are contingent on our own or others' gender may truthfully reflect verbal knowledge, even though they may be contradicted by our nonverbal behavior. This example shows how asking the question as to whether a given *person* discriminates among others on the basis of their sex implies the questioner's assumption of personal unity. From the personalytic perspective, the question about sexual discrimination can be asked and answered separately for verbal, nonverbal, and social subsystems of the person.

Attitude–Behavior Consistency and the Three-Component Definition of Attitude

Following first LaPiere (1934) and later Wicker (1969), social psychologists have frequently observed that attitudes are poor predictors of behavior (Goldstein, 1980, p. 106; Schneider, 1976, p. 390; Worchel & Cooper, 1979, p. 70; Wrightsman, 1977, p. 342). Although this argument has lost some of its force as a consequence of recent reporting of conditions that can produce greater consistency (especially Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974; see also Dillehay, 1973), still there are many circumstances in which verbally measured attitude and overt behavior disagree by implying different evaluations of the same social object. The problem, stated this way, can be recognized as a close relative of the problem of verbal-nonverbal communication discrepancy. As before, these discrepancies need be troublesome only to a theory that assumes that there is a unified system in control of all behavior.

The problem of evaluative consistency between verbal attitude and nonverbal overt behavior should be (but is not often) distinguished from that of consistency between verbally measured attitude and *verbal reports* of behavior. The latter discrepancies, unlike the former, are problematic to the personalytic approach. Fortunately, it appears that these discrepancies within the verbal system are more apparent than real. When verbal measures are selected on the basis of reasonable psychometric criteria, high levels of consistency can generally be achieved (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974; see also Ross, McFarland, & Fletcher, 1981). Additional available evidence shows that consistency between verbal attitude and nonverbal overt behavior is greater for people who have prior experience in overt behavioral interaction with the attitude object (direct experience) than for those who do not (Regan & Fazio, 1977). This result suggests that direct experience provides the verbal system with information that is otherwise unavailable to it (presumably due to independence among systems—cf. the snake example on pp. 161–162).

This discussion of attitude-behavior consistency can be extended readily to the problem of consistency among the affective, cognitive, and behavioral components of attitudes (Krech, Crutchfield, & Ballachey, 1962). The possibility of independence among these three attitude components has generally been regarded as a viable theoretical alternative to the assumption of a unitary attitude underlying the three components. The best evidence for consistency among the three components comes from studies in which the components have all been assessed in verbal form (Ostrom, 1969). From the present view, this verbal measurement approach can well give a much-inflated picture of intercomponent consistency. It is much more difficult to do the needed study with affect and behavior measured nonverbally—particularly when the unreliability and possible invalidity of single observations necessitate multiple observations for each component (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974). Nevertheless, until such a definitive study is done it is inappropriate to conclude that the unity of the attitude construct is well-founded on an empirical basis.

Relation of Affective and Cognitive Processes

Zajonc (1980) has recently reviewed evidence in support of the position that affective reactions to stimuli occur more rapidly than, and may be independent of, cognitive reactions. The evidence reviewed by Zajonc is consistent with the multisystem personalytic view developed here, in which affect and cognition can be regarded as outputs of independent systems.

The conclusion that the affective (body) system responds more rapidly than the cognitive (verbal) system has interesting implications. If we add the assumption that the cognitive system is capable of detecting the affective system's reactions with at least partial accuracy, we may anticipate the frequent occurrence of a situation in which a person who is asked to report affective reactions to a stimulus employs the verbal (cognitive) system to describe a reaction that originated outside that system. Psychologists are likely to assume, however, that the system that reports the result is the system that was directly influenced by the stimulus. (Bem's [1967] self-perception analysis of this situation is an important exception to this generalization.)

Psychologists who take seriously the conclusion of affective-cognitive independence might advocate affective change techniques that operate directly on the affective system rather than ones—such as verbal persuasion—that operate on the cognitive system. Possibly the technique that Zajonc (1968) has pioneered—mere (repeated) exposure to a stimulus—is one such technique that operates directly on an affective system, even though its results may be (and are necessarily in experiments) reported via the verbal system. In support of that interpretation, Zajonc and his colleagues (reviewed in Zajonc, 1980) have shown that verbal reports of affective reactions to stimuli are influenced by repeated exposure under conditions in which subjects cannot reliably report effects of repeated exposure on verbal measures of familiarity or recognition.

The result of an affective consequence of a stimulus being manifest in the absence of ability of the verbal system to report the occurrence of the stimulus is fa-

miliar from research on perceptual defense (Dixon, 1971; Erdelyi, 1974). In the present multisystem view, such independent effects of the same stimulus on verbal and nonverbal systems are expectable. The preference of some prominent reviewers (Eriksen, 1960; Goldiamond, 1962) to dismiss perceptual defense results as artifacts of experimental procedures reflects, perhaps, some mixture of astute criticism with predilection toward the principle of personal unity.

The assumption of affective-cognitive independence has implications also for theories of emotion that postulate an important cognitive contribution to emotional experience. The influential analysis by Schachter and Singer (1962), for example, proposes that emotions are relatively undifferentiated in physiological terms and depend on cognitive interpretive processes to acquire distinctive characteristics. In the personalytic view, Schachter and Singer's conclusion can be regarded as a plausible characterization of the verbal system that reports emotions, but does not require an assumption that emotions are physiologically undifferentiated. Rather, emotional events in the body system may be well-differentiated (Winton, Putnam, & Krauss, unpublished), but these differentiations may be only weakly accessible to the verbal (cognitive) system. When asked to report the body's emotional state, the verbal system may provide its best hypothesis. Such hypotheses are more than idle speculation, not only because they may accurately reflect the body system, but also because the verbal system's hypotheses can influence behavior independently of their accuracy.

Accuracy of Attributions and Introspections

In the last few years there has been renewed and vigorous attention to a problem that is methodologically fundamental to much of psychology—the validity of verbal explanations of behavior. The method of introspection foundered early in the 20th century when behaviorists undermined the belief that verbal report data could be taken at face value. The occasion for the renewed interest in this problem (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) has been the heavy reliance of contemporary psychologists on methods that assume validity of verbal reports about behavior-mediating processes. Areas of recent research that rely heavily on verbal explanations of behavior include attribution, cognitive response analysis of persuasion, and complex problem solving. It should not be assumed from these uses of verbal report data that contemporary psychologists are simply mining old veins with obsolete tools. The gain over introspectionism is well represented in the position taken by Ericsson and Simon (1980)—specifically, that the processes underlying verbal reports are now understood to the point at which some conditions associated with valid reports can be specified.

In terms of the multisystem interpretation of Fig. 6.1, verbal reports are most likely to be accurate when the processing between stimulus and response occurs largely within the verbal system. On the other hand, verbal reports are likely to be less accurate in explaining behavior that is mediated by nonverbal systems.

Attribution of Consistent Dispositions to Self and to Others

Psychologists, as well as lay persons, are prone to assume that behavior is under the control of cross-situationally and temporally stable dispositions. Psychologists' predilections for such dispositional interpretations are evidenced in the extensive effort invested, over many years, in developing measures of dispositions. They are indicated in quite another way by the flurry of empirical and theoretical responses that were elicited by Mischel's (1968) critique of the adequacy of dispositional constructs in personality research. By now, there are many supports for the conclusion that cross-situational consistency can be found when suitable subsets of persons and situations are samples (Bem & Allen, 1974; Epstein, 1979; Kenrick & Stringfield, 1980; Markus, 1977). By assuming that the major locus of consistency within personality is the self system (cf. Epstein, 1980; Greenwald, 1980; Greenwald & Ronis, 1978), personalysis provides a plausible framework for interpreting the variable efficacy of dispositional interpretations; that is, evidence for cross-situational consistency should be expected to be strong only when the measures being used in different situations all tap the operation of the self system (cf. Allport, 1943). Further, because the structure of the self system need not be the same across persons, it should not be expected that one could specify a set of situations and measures that should yield strong evidence of consistency for all persons.

Although it requires a mild digression, this is a convenient place to comment on a point of some recent confusion concerning the attribution of stable dispositions. Jones & Nisbett (1971) have hypothesized that people typically perceive others' behavior as being responsive to features of the situation in which the behavior occurs. Although this *situation/disposition hypothesis* has received adequate empirical support, the theoretical conclusion that people are loathe to attribute dispositions to themselves cannot be regarded as justified. The point is relevant to personalysis because it concerns the extent to which people perceive unity in their own behavior. Two comments can make clear that people are as susceptible to assuming unity in their own behavior as they are in the behavior of others.

Firstly, there is no justification for extending the situation/disposition hypothesis to a conclusion that people tend to see their own behavior as *caused* by external influences, rather than as being internally controlled. This extension of the situation/disposition hypothesis is based on the faulty assumption that the phrases, "responsive to features of the situation," and "externally controlled," are psychologically equivalent. To the contrary, people may see their behavior as being fully under internal control, in the sense that they feel *responsible for* their actions, even though they also see their behavior as properly *responsive to* the situation in which it occurs. For example: The person who gives the "situational" attribution, "I helped because the other person needed help," cannot be interpreted as denying internal control over—that is, personal responsibility for—the act of helping.[4]

Secondly, explanations of very recent behavior are affected by self-presentational concerns that can suppress description of oneself in terms of stable dispositions. It is well-established that subjects generally seek to present themselves in a favorable light in their interactions with experimenters (Rosenberg, 1969; Weber & Cook, 1972). When asked to explain an action that has just occurred, subjects can expect to appear more intelligent if they claim to have responded to appropriate features of the situation (e.g., I helped because the other person was in need of help, not because I am always helpful). On the other hand, when subjects are asked to explain a comparable action that occurred some time ago, a favorable impression may best be generated by giving the appearance of consistent responding to similar situations (e.g., I generally help people in need, it was nothing about that particular person). As can be seen from the examples just used, the explanation of the action from the subject's perspective has not really changed—in both explanations, help was given because the other person needed help. However, the emphasis contained in the statement of the reason nevertheless shifted dramatically from the stimulus properties of the situation to the stable dispositional properties of the actor. Experimental findings showing just this shift in emphasis as a function of temporal distance from the event being explained have been reported by Moore, Sherrod, Liu, and Underwood (1979; cf. Funder, 1980).

We can conclude that the tendency to attribute consistent dispositions to persons characterizes not only psychologists administering personality inventories and lay persons viewing others' behavior, but also people perceiving their own behavior over time. All of these tendencies to attribute stable dispositions reveal the widespread tendency to assume personal unity. As noted a few paragraphs back, the unity assumption may be well-justified for selected situations and behaviors that tap fundamental dimensions of the person's self system.

Instinct and Purpose: Sociobiology Versus Cognitive Social Psychology

During the last decade social psychology has become strongly cognitive. At the same time that academic social psychology has moved toward a cognitive approach, there have been important developments toward a noncognitive approach to social behavior in the emerging field of sociobiology (Alexander, 1979; Dawkins, 1976; Wilson, 1978). These competing developments have not been integrated, with the result that students often are compelled to choose sides. With a multisystem analysis, however, the two approaches can readily coexist. This

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[4]In the case of one's actions causing undesired outcomes, then attributions "to the situation" *are* often meant as a denial of responsibility or intentionality. However, when one's actions cause desired outcomes, there is no reluctance to accept personal responsibility (Greenwald, 1980, pp. 605–606).

coexistence depends on a recognition that cognitive social psychology applies most to the self and verbal systems, whereas sociobiology deals with physiological, nonverbal (body) systems.

The conflict between sociobiological and cognitive approaches may be nowhere more apparent than in the clash between instinctive and purposive accounts of aggressive behavior. In contemporary (cognitive) social psychology texts, it is customary to define aggression as behavior that has the purpose or goal of harming another. In contrast, the sociobiological approach defines aggression in terms of overt behavior, without reference to purpose. From the personalytic perspective, there is no reason to confine the meaning of aggression to just one of these two definitions. Further, in order for the analysis of aggression to be responsive to the needs of society to control injurious behavior, neither the cognitive nor the sociobiological approach should be excluded. Harming behavior, that is, can be deliberate and purposeful (guided by the self system), but it can also be emotional and impulsive (controlled outside the self system). The multisystem approach thus supports and provides added justification for treatments such as that of Buss (1961), who has distinguished between instrumental (goal-directed) and angry (emotional) aggression. Zillmann (1979) makes a parallel distinction between incentive-motivated and annoyance-motivated aggression but does so in the context of a perhaps overly strong attack on sociobiological views of human aggressive behavior.

The justification for analyzing aggression in terms of multiple systems that may achieve similar effects (harming, in the case of aggression) applies with equal force to several other topic areas of social psychology—such as altruism, attraction, affiliation, and sexual behavior.

PERSONALYSIS COMPARED TO PSYCHOANALYSIS

Freud's analysis of the psyche into id, ego, and superego was a multisystem view, in that he did not oblige these three systems to function as a unity. Given the force with which Freud justified this multisystem view in his own writings, and the influence of those writings on major segments of world culture, it is surprising that the personal unity principle remains so deeply entrenched, albeit implicitly, in both lay and psychological thought. Perhaps one reason that Freud's multisystem theoretical theme did not take stronger root was that Freud and his followers focused more on the coordination among psychic systems than on their independence. Indeed, Freud's treatment of the *unconsious* did not make full theoretical use of the possibility that the psyche's subsystems could function independently. The present view that knowledge subsystems are separated by language barriers and access limits—that is, that some information available to one system may not be translatable by or accessible to another system—provides a basis for reconsidering the Freudian notions of repression and the unconscious.

The Equestrian Metaphor

The present conceptions of body and self systems have clear antecedents in Freud's conceptions of id and ego. Freud (1923/1961) likened the relation between id and ego to that between a horse and its rider. This metaphor is a powerful one that helps to develop the present multisystem approach:

> The functional importance of the ego is manifested in the fact that normally control over the approaches to motility devolves upon it. Thus in its relation to the id it is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse; with this difference, that the rider tries to do so with his own strength while the ego uses borrowed forces. The analogy may be carried a little further. Often a rider, if he is not to be parted from his horse, is obliged to guide it where it wants to go; so in the same way the ego is in the habit of transforming the id's will into action as if it were its own [p. 25].

The horse-rider metaphor effectively captures the concept of systems that have both relation and independence. Perhaps the only fault in the metaphor is that one expects the horse and rider to separate periodically, whereas the subsystems housed within the human organism must necessarily keep each other company throughout their existences. Try the thought experiment of obliging the horse and rider to be perennial companions. Among the results I get from this experiment are:

1. Despite the lack of direct neural interconnections, the rider develops great sensitivity to the actions of the horse, and vice versa. (The metaphor leads one to wonder where the reference to intuition as "seat of the pants" knowledge originated.)

2. The rider acquires the ability to influence many of the horse's movements and to anticipate others. In this sense the rider gains "control over the approaches to motility." It would not be surprising if the rider developed the illusion that it was directly "willing" the actions of the horse (and perhaps vice versa also).

3. When asked to explain the behavior of the horse, the rider readily produces answers, but these may have little validity, unless the rider has managed to form a theory of the separateness of the horse's nervous system.

Perhaps I have biased the results of this thought experiment, but it is apparent that my results suggest that the equestrian pair has many of the properties of human behavior and cognition.

Repression and the Unconscious

Freud was much less concerned with the independence of the id from the ego than he was with their interdependence. Indeed, he made such strong assumptions about their interdependence that he effectively treated the two systems as a unit. This assumption of close interrelation required a cumbersome account of repression and the unconscious. He asserted (1923/1961):

> "The repressed merges into the id . . . and is merely a part of it. The repressed is only cut off sharply from the ego by the resistances of repression; it can communicate with the ego through the id [p. 24]."

Freud thereby assumed that ego lacked access to certain knowledge (the unconscious) because of an active force (repression) that prevented access. The inaccessible knowledge consisted of: (1) the primitive id; (2) the repressed; and (3) the agency of repression within the ego. Freud (1923/1961) acknowledged that the necessity of postulating the third aspect of the unconscious was especially troublesome:

> When we find ourselves thus confronted by the necessity of postulating a third Ucs. [Ucs. is the dynamic unconscious, consisting of all inaccessible knowledge], which is not repressed, we must admit that the characteristic of being unconscious begins to lose significance for us. It becomes a quality which can have many meanings, a quality which we are unable to make, as we should have hoped to do, the basis of far-reaching and inevitable conclusions [p. 18].

Personalysis uses the concepts of coding differences and access limitations in place of psychoanalysis's concepts of the unconscious and repression. The portions of the body system that are unintelligible or otherwise inaccessible to the self system correspond to the primitive id portion of the psychoanalytic unconscious. Corresponding to the repressed portion of the unconscious are portions of the verbal system that are outside the self system.[5] Personalysis needs no counterpart of the troublesome third portion of the psychoanalytic unconscious—ego's agency of repression.

Interestingly, personalysis allows readily for phenomena corresponding to the notion of the collective unconscious that was developed as a variant of psychoanalytic theory by Jung (1936/1959). In Fig. 6.1 the verbal and body systems are shown as having an overlap with the social system outside the self system. This overlap comprises socially shared knowledge that is inaccessible by the self system. (Of course, the present analysis provides no new evidence regarding the existence of such socially shared knowledge.)

A legitimate criticism of this personalytic account is that the assumption of subsystem independence provides enough degrees of freedom to enable it to ac-

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[5]Although explanations of the nature of the barrier between portions of the verbal system that lie within versus outside the self system is not attempted in this chapter, it is sufficiently important a task to warrant a few remarks that suggest its possible accomplishment within the personalytic framework. Part of the explanation can make use of an analogy to the evolution of natural language systems, in which contemporary speakers cannot understand ancestral forms of their own language. Thus, the person's evolving use of verbal codes amounts to a dialect change that prevents access by the user of the current dialect (the self system) to verbal information encoded early in life. (This explanation may be recognized as equivalent to Schachtel's, 1959 explanation of amnesia for childhood experiences.) The dialect-evolution analogy cannot, however, explain lack of access to recently established knowledge. This important residual problem may best be addressed by building on recent analyses of retrieval failures (Loftus & Loftus, 1980; Watkins & Tulving, 1975).

count for virtually anything. Indeed, personalysis has been described here in a fashion that renders it (like psychoanalysis) difficult to disprove. Nevertheless, personalysis and psychoanalysis do differ in the way that they direct researchers' attention. Psychoanalysis orients researchers to look for antecedents and indicators of motivational conflict, and to seek evidence for an active barrier (the agency of repression) that restricts access to knowledge. Personalysis, on the other hand, suggests a search for evidence of independent operation of person subsystems and suggests that important general research tasks for psychologists are to seek and to decipher the codes that define subsystems within the person.[6]

BEHAVIOR WITHOUT SELF: DEINDIVIDUATION

The multisystem personalytic approach provides for analysis of behavior that is *not* mediated by the self system. In social psychology, the study of deindividuation is concerned with just such behavior. Deindividuation is widely understood to mean loss of individuality, although, as we shall see, there are disagreements about just what happens when individuality is lost. Before showing how personalysis can resolve these disagreements, let us examine the variations in social psychologists' treatments of deindividuation.[7]

Paradoxical Aspects of Deindividuation

In the initial laboratory investigation of deindividuation, Festinger, Pepitone, and Newcomb (1952) defined deindividuation:

> as a state of affairs in a group where members do not pay attention to other individuals *qua* individuals, and, correspondingly, the members do not feel they are being singled out by others.[This] results in a reduction of inner restraints in the members and . . . the members will be more free to indulge in behavior from which they are usually restrained . . . . This is a satisfying state of affairs and its occurrence would tend to increase the attractiveness of the group [p. 389].

Since the Festinger et al. article, the concept of deindividuation has expanded

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[6]This difference in the way psychoanalysis and personalysis direct researchers' attention can be illustrated in the domain of ordinary errors—of the sort that Freud analyzed in *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901/1938). Personalysis seeks explanations in terms of inadequate linkage between intention (verbal) and performance (body) systems, whereas psychoanalysis searches for hidden intentions that can explain the precise form of the error. A strong form of personalysis that excluded the possibility of hidden intentions or self-deceptions (Gurs, Sackeim, 1979) cannot be justified. Therefore, it might be best to characterize the personalytic approach as encouraging the discrimination of within-system errors (symptoms) from between-system errors (slips).

[7]Deindividuation is the only topic of social psychological study (to my knowledge) in which there is an apparent willingness to oppose the implicit assumption of personal unity. The increasing recent interest in this topic, as evidenced in the literature reviews by Diener (1977) and Dipboye (1977), may presage some readiness to overthrow the unity principle.

progressively with the research contributions of others. Ziller (1964) introduced the idea that deindividuated group members might become perceptually indistinct to themselves at the same time that they were becoming indistinguishable to others. He did not regard the result of such "ego diffusion" as necessarily satisfying: "Under conditions of ego diffusion, the individual has difficulty in distinguishing his uniqueness; contrasts and similarities between the self and others fail to be perceived and the result is an amorphous, diaphanous, or obscured self portrayal [p. 342]."

An article by Singer, Brush, and Lublin (1965) reported two experiments that were guided by the initial Festinger et al. formulation. However, Singer et al., like Ziller, interpreted deindividuation from the self's perspective: "Deindividuation is a subjective state in which people lose their self-consciousness. . . . The hallmark of deindividuation is the performance of a socially disapproved act and the attendant liking for the deindividuated setting. [pp. 356, 376]."

In a review that encompassed a broad sweep of contemporary events as well as imaginative original laboratory and field experiments, Zimbardo (1969) amplified earlier treatments by formulating deindividuation as a "minimization of: 1. self-observation-evaluation [and of] 2. concern for social evaluation [leading to] weakening of controls based upon guilt, shame, fear, and commitment [and] lowered threshold for expressing inhibited behaviors [p. 253]."

A new and problematic perspective on deindividuation was introduced by Maslach (1974), when she commented on the close relation between deindividuation and a common social strategy for establishing *uniqueness*. Her description of such "collective attempts at individuation" is reminiscent of Sherif and Cantril's (1947) interpretation of ego-involvement in terms of adopting the attitudes and other characteristics of reference groups: "By being part of a group that is singled out by others, the individual receives some sort of personal identity or sense of uniqueness . . . In collective individuation, the individual group member must first become very similar to some people in order to become very different from others [p. 424]."

In his recent review Dipboye (1977) drew explicit attention to the inconsistencies in the evolving conception of deindividuation. He noted the contrast "between deindividuation as a release of restraints and deindividuation as a search for identity," suggesting that the former was mediated by "a momentary reduction in self-awareness [whereas] the latter seems to be mediated by a threat to the uniqueness and/or stability of the person's important self-conceptions [p. 1072]." Paradoxically, as he pointed out, the search for identity associated with deindividuation could take the form either of conformity or nonconformity: "Conformity should result from a threat to the stability of self-conceptions, whereas anticonformity to group norms should result from a threat to uniqueness [p. 1071]."

Another recent reviewer (Diener, 1977, 1980) has noted the paradoxical as-

pects of deindividuation—particularly the fact that it may sometimes by sought and sometimes avoided—but has otherwise followed more closely in the line of development that includes the work of Festinger et al. (1952), Singer et al. (1965), and Zimbardo (1969). Diener (1980 asserts: "People who are deindividuated have lost self-awareness and their personal identity in a group situation. . . . Prevented from self-attention and self-monitoring by the group situation, they become more reactive to immediate stimuli and emotions and are unresponsive to norms and to the long-term consequences of their behavior [p. 210]."

In sum, *deindividuation is sometimes associated with loss of identity but other times with acquisition of identity via a distinctive group (of which one is an indistinguishable member); it is sometimes sought but other times avoided; and it is sometimes associated with chaotic, norm-violating behavior but other times with conforming, uniform behavior.*

Resolving the Paradoxes: Deindividuation Versus Sociation

The concept and phenomena of deindividuation can be analyzed into two usages that, from the multisystem perspective of personalysis, are mutually antithetical. These two usages agree in conceiving deindividuation as a loss of control over the person's behavior by the self system, but they differ sharply in the nature of control that replaces the self system. In what appears to be the more common usage, both the self and the social system as sources of control are inoperative. It is with this form of deindividuation that one can associate antinormative behavior, such as riot, panic, and revelry, and perhaps also certain other forms of unrestrained behavior that call less attention to themselves, such as sleep and vigorous exercise. The second form of deindividuation entails a high degree of social control and organization, such as military action, congregational prayer, organized cheering, and a variety of more intricate organized group efforts, such as ballet and orchestral performances, athletic teamwork, and more mundane social coordinations like driving an automobile in traffic.

Although the single term, deindividuation, may be a proper designation for both of these categories—in the sense that each involves reduction of the controlling role of the self system—nevertheless it is obviously useful to be able to distinguish the form that lacks social control from the one that is characterized by a high degree of social organization. The former category seems best to warrant the original label of deindividuation. The latter form, in which the person is subordinated to the social system, can be referred to as *sociated deindividuation*. or more simply as *sociation*. The basis for distinguishing deindividuation from sociation is summarized in Table 6.1.

Most of the conclusions summarized in Table 6.1 are drawn from the reviews of deindividuation by Zimbardo (1969), Dipboye (1977), and Diener (1977, 1980). The recent analyses of self-awareness by Buss (1980) and by Scheier and

Carver (1980). and my integration of their concepts with phenomena of ego-involvement (Greenwald, 1981a) provide the bases for the table's reference to I-type (intrapersonally-oriented) and S-type (socially oriented) settings. As defined in Greenwald, (1981a): "The essence of I-type situations is that they focus the subject's attention on evaluation of self in relation to personal standards. In contrast, the essence of S-type settings is that they focus others' attention onto evaluation of the subject [p. 132]."

I-type settings are ones that involve self-confrontation, such as looking in a mirror, reading one's diary, listening to the sound of one's voice, or seeing a photograph or videotape of oneself (cf. Buss's, 1980, list of inducers of *private* self-awareness). S-type situations involve confrontation with an audience of others, including symbolic self-confrontations such as the presence of a camera (Buss's discussion of inducers of *public* self-awareness).

A Sometimes Subtle Distinction. Despite the fact that the antecedents of deindividuation and sociation are conceptual opposites, the situational differences associated with these opposites are sometimes subtle—which makes it understandable that these processes have not been differentiated in previous treatments. Loud music, for example, may sometimes be perceived as strong unstructured stimuli, sometimes as structured rhythmic stimulation. People in uniforms may perceive themselves as separate and anonymous or, alternately, as

TABLE 6.1
Deindividuation Versus Sociation

Deindividuation	Sociation
ANTECEDENTS	
1. Strong unstructured stimuli	1. Strong structured (e.g., rhythmic) stimuli
2. Privacy (also anonymity)	2. Uniformity in group
3. Absence of self-control inducers (absence of I-type evaluative settings)[a]	3. Presence of social controls or authorities (presence of S-type evaluative settings)[a]
4. Intoxicating drugs	4. Tranquilizers?
CONSEQUENCES	
1. Norm violation (independence)	1. Norm adherence (conformity)
2. Enhanced responsiveness to nonsocial stimuli	2. Enhanced responsiveness to nearby others
3. Social chaos	3. Collective organization

[a]I-type and S-type are summary labels developed in Greenwald (1981a) and also described further in the text.

participants in a well-defined social structure (Johnson & Downing, 1979). In such circumstances, the effect on the person (deindividuation versus sociation) may depend critically on other situational features, such as use of drugs and presence or absence of social controls. It may also depend importantly on personality differences, which are now considered further.

Because the difference between induction of deindividuation and of sociation can depend on the way a situation is perceived, and because different people may perceive the same situation differently, it might often happen that some people are deindividuated, whereas others are sociated, in the same setting! A nightclub with loud music may house a mixture of drunk and deindividuated revelers together with sober and sociated dancers. A lynch mob may include sociated organizers and followers,[8] together with more disorderly and deindividuated participants.

Predisposition to Vacate the Self System?   Personalysis offers a suggestive interpretation of the nature of personality differences associated with predispositions to enter states of deindividuation and sociation. Figure 6.2 shows the segments of the person's multisystem that should be involved in the four states defined by combining the presence or absence of individuation with the presence or absence of sociation.[9] The four states are assumed, that is, to correspond to a temporary dominance of different subsystems. An initial, and admittedly speculative, suggestion is that self-esteem, in combination with the I-type and S-type predispositions that I have described elsewhere (Greenwald, 1981a), may predict differential predispositions to enter the four states.

The proposed role of self-esteem draws on Hoffer's (1951) conception of "the true believer": "to be one thread of the many which makes up a tunic; one thread not distinguishable from the others. No one can then point us out, measure us against others and expose our inferiority [pp. 29-30]." More specifically, we may extend Hoffer's conception by proposing that self-esteem in effect measures the capacity of the self system to retain dominance. Persons with low self-esteem, then, should have self systems that are predisposed to vacate control, in the direction of *either* deindividuation or sociation.

What determines whether the self system, in giving up control, will yield in the direction of (unsociated) deindividuation versus sociation? Here, the analysis of differential predispositions to engage in the socially oriented (S-type) task of impression management may be useful. People who are high in this S-type orien-

tation may be predisposed to enter the sociated, rather than the deindividuated state, and those low in the S-type orientation may be more susceptible to becoming deindividuated. (The I-type and S-type orientations correspond approximately to, and may prove to be measurable by, Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss's, 1975, scales of *private* and *public* self-consciousness, respectively.)

As indicated in Fig. 6.2, individuation and sociation need not be regarded as mutually exclusive. Among the settings in which one may be simultaneously individuated and sociated are various types of public performances by groups. The


FIG. 6.2   Personalytic representation of deindividuation and sociation. Four members of the social system are shown with different "sizes" of self and social systems. Persons with "small" self systems (C and D) should be most prone to deindividuation, but C should be more likely to show the sociated form of deindividuation than D because of C's larger social subsystem. Similarly, having "large" self systems both A and B should show individuation (i.e., resist deindividuation), but, because of B's larger social subsystem, B should be more predisposed than A to show the sociated form of individuation.

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[8]Description of lynch-mob organizers and followers as sociated obviously considers only their relation to the mob, which temporarily establishes norms that violate those of the larger community.

[9]The use of deindividuation and sociation and their complements in four combinations presents a nomenclature problem that had best be treated explicitly. In order to avoid having to use many compound expressions, such as "unsociated deindividuation" or "deindividuated sociation," I suggest the convention of assuming the negative value of a term that is not specified. The only compound term that is needed, then, is sociated individuation (or, equivalently, individuated sociation). The solitary term, sociation, thus replaces both "sociated deindividuation" and its equivalent "deindividuated sociation," etc.

members of athletic teams, theater companies, dance troupes, and musical groups are often sociated by virtue of their uniform dress and the need to coordinate their performances—but at the same time they can retain personal identifiability. (The recent trend for athletes' names to be printed in large letters on their uniforms is a sign of the individuation that can accompany sociation.) People who are simultaneously high in the S-type orientation *and* in the predisposition to engage in the intrapersonally oriented (I-type) task of self-image management may be prone to the combined sociated-individuated state.

Applications of the Deindividuation-Sociation Analysis

The foregoing multisystem analysis is undisguisedly speculative. A justification for this extent of speculation in the absence of specifically supporting data is the practical significance of the theoretical topics being considered. One example is automobile driving. Because driving in traffic at high speeds calls for a high degree of social coordination, it is obviously not desirable for drivers to be deindividuated. Some of the stimulus characteristics of driving, however, may produce deindividuation. These include the anonymity afforded by the masking exterior of the automobile and the infrequency of encounters with controlling agents (highway police) in ordinary driving. Additionally, use of drugs by drivers is an important concern, not just because of direct effects of intoxicants on the motor and perceptual skills needed for driving, but because of the likely effect of drugs in producing deindividuation and concomitant disregard for norms. This analysis of driving can be applied by suggesting the desirability of reducing the anonymity afforded by automobiles (perhaps by using much larger license-plate identifications), of increasing the symbolic or actual presence of control agents, and of designing driver education programs in consideration of the deindividuating effect of intoxicants.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS:
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SELF

The twist on this book's title that is used in the heading of this concluding section is to be taken in two senses. The straightforward meaning suggests that the concept of self can provide an organizing basis for many of the major phenomena of social psychology. The less obvious meaning—but the one that is more in keeping with the content of this chapter—is that much of social psychology reflects the (incomplete) perspective of the (psychologist's) self system on the behavior of the person.

The chapter has reviewed a variety of manifestations of an implicit assumption of personal unity in social psychological theory. This implicit assumption may best be accounted for by observing that it is the self system of the psychologist that does the work of formulating theories. The person *does* appear to be a unified system from the self's perspective, because the self lacks ready access to evidences of nonunity. From the personalytic perspective of person as multisystem, this theory-formulating enterprise becomes questionable when the implicit unity assumption generates a search for an assumed single, coherent, consistent structure underlying all appearances of nonunity. Included in the class of such questionable theory are:

1. Analyses of the relative truth of verbal and nonverbal communications (from the multisystem perspective, both channels can be true even when in conflict because they can reflect the operation of different knowledge bases).
2. Protection of the integrity of the attitude concept by using verbal measures of its components (from the multisystem perspective, these efforts observe the integrity of the verbal system and suppress genuine independence of affective, verbal, and behavioral responses to the same object).
3. Attempts to provide coherent accounts of phenomena such as aggression, attraction, and altruism either from an exclusively cognitive perspective or from an exclusively sociobiological perspective (from the multisystem view, such behaviors are influenced by verbal, body, self, and social systems, with these influences not being fully accountable from the perspective of any one of these).

The tendency for social (and other) psychologists to perceive the world through their own self systems is a variety of what William James (1890) called "the psychologist's fallacy":

> The great snare of the psychologist is the confusion of his own standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report [p.196].
> Crude as such a confusion of standpoints seems to be when abstractly stated, it is nevertheless a snare into which no psychologist has kept himself at all times from falling and which forms almost the entire stock-in-trade of certain schools [p. 197].

Even Freud—whose methods for discovering knowledge that was not accessible to the self system allowed him to lead others around one set of snares—was not completely immune. His struggles to formulate the concepts of repression and the unconsious, and the complexities of the resulting formulations, suggest that he accepted a principle of personal unity that he held to be more fundamental than his tripartite division of the psyche into id, ego, and superego.

The present multisystem analysis has used the metaphor of language barriers and access restrictions to characterize independence among the subsystems of the person. Each subsystem, it is assumed, possesses significant knowledge that is unavailable to other subsystems because they use different coding systems, they lack exact translations, and/or they lack access to the knowledge. The notion of an exact translation of codes between systems corresponds to the idea of "direct knowledge" passing between systems. It is this lack of direct knowledge between the verbal system and other systems that makes the introspective method, at best, an unreliable device for psychological analysis of nonverbal processes.

Perhaps more germane to psychology than the fact that knowled/ ubsystems

of the person do not possess exact translations of each others' codes is the fact that psychologists do not possess translations of these codes either. This situation has been characterized in part by Simon (1980):

> While an enormous amount of knowledge has been gathered about brain structures and functions at chemical and neurological levels, we still do not even know the physiological basis for long-term or short-term memory—whether it involves macromolecules, neuronal circuits, some combination of these, or something entirely different. We are in a position similar to that of 19th-century chemistry, which had developed an extensive theory of chemical combination long before that theory could be linked to the physics of atoms [p. 77].

It seems obvious that identifications and translations of the codes for knowledge in the different subsystems of the person will be among the major contributions to be produced in the future of behavioral science. Further, those discoveries can have profound impact if they can be applied to dissolve the language barriers among verbal and nonverbal subsystems of the person. The presently unjustified assumption of personal unity could become a justified assumption.

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