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CHAPTER 5

TO WHOM IS THE SELF PRESENTED?

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Many psychologists have answered the question posed in this chapter's title by saying that the audience for self-presentation is an outer audience, an audience of *other persons.* Goffman (1959) states that "when an individual appears in presence of *others,* there will usually be some reason for him to mobilize his activity so that it will convey an impression to *others* which it is in his interests to convey" (p. 4, emphasis added). Similarly, Jones and Pittman (1982) define strategic self-presentation as "those features of behavior . . . designed to elicit or shape *others'* attributions of the actor's dispositions" (p. 233, emphasis added). And Baumeister (1982) considers self-presentation to be "aimed at establishing . . . an image of the individual in the minds of *others*" (p. 3, emphasis added).

In this chapter we make the case for an alternative view in which a primary audience for self-presentation is oneself. We refer to this as the inner-audience hypothesis. The presented self is, in terms of the inner-audience hypothesis, a true, privately accepted self—not one that is harboring, deep down, a less worthy being that it hopes to prevent others from discovering. (The idea of an inner audience for self-presentation has also been discussed by Schlenker, 1980, and by Snyder, Higgins, & Stucky, 1983.)

Our argument starts by first establishing that the presented self is (usually) too good to be true. We then show that the (too) good self is often genuinely believed, by showing that self-descriptions are self-enhancing in private (and also under other conditions that should yield honest reporting). We do not intend, however, for the inner-audience hypothesis to replace the prior outer-audience view. Rather, we regard both audiences—as well as one more that we introduce below—as important. Our major aim is to show this multiply oriented

character of the presented self, to which end we show that self-presentations are variably directed to different audiences, as a function of both situational and personal variables.

THE PRESENTED SELF IS (USUALLY) TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE

Beneffectance

In a recent review, Greenwald (1980) interprets the self (or ego) as an organization of knowledge that is characterized by three information-control strategies. The three strategies, or cognitive biases, are (1) *beneffectance,* the tendency for self to be perceived as effective in achieving desired ends while avoiding undesired ones, (2) *cognitive conservatism,* the tendency to resist cognitive change, and (3) *egocentricity,* the tendency for judgment and memory to be focused on self. The constellation of these three biases was labeled the "totalitarian ego," acknowledging that the biases match ones that are considered to be characteristic of the information-control strategies of a totalitarian dictatorship. Perhaps the most important of these three cognitive biases is *beneffectance* (a term fabricated from *benef*icence [doing good] and e*ffectance* [competence]). Beneffectance is the cognitive bias of perceiving oneself as selectively responsible for desired or successful outcomes. The beneffectance bias is manifest in self-descriptions that are typically more favorable than can be justified by objective information—in other words, a self that is too good to be true.

Four lines of research indicate the pervasiveness of this beneffectance bias in the normal personality. These are (1) the tendency to recall successes more readily than failures (Glixman, 1949; Rosenzweig, 1943), (2) the acceptance of responsibility for successes but not for failures on individual or group tasks (Johnston, 1967; Miller & Ross, 1975; Schlenker & Miller, 1977; Snyder, Higgins, & Stucky, 1983; Weary Bradley, 1978; Wortman, 1976); (3) denial of responsibility for harming others (Harvey, Harris, & Barnes, 1975), and (4) the tendency to identify with victors and disaffiliate with losers ("basking in reflected glory") (Cialdini et al., 1976; Tesser & Campbell, 1983).

Absence of Beneffectance in Depressives

Although manifestations of beneffectance are frequently observed in research, it is not always so. An interesting set of exceptions occurs in research with depressed subjects. Lewinsohn et al. (1980) compared depressed and normal subjects' self-ratings with similar ratings of them made by observers. Normals rated themselves more favorably than did observers, consistent with the usual beneffectance pattern. It was expected that depressed subjects would rate themselves less favorably than would observers. However, the obtained finding was that depressed subjects rated themselves *objectively,* in the sense of judging themselves no more nor less favorably, on average, than did observers. Alloy

and Abramson (1979) found similarly that, after succeeding on a probabilistic experimental task over which they objectively had little control, normal subjects overestimated the extent of their control. In contrast, depressed subjects perceived their relatively low level of control more accurately, and (unlike normals) did not perceive greater control for successful than unsuccessful performances. The contrast with the "realism" of depressed subjects quite strikingly highlights the self-enhancing bias of normals.

THE (TOO) GOOD SELF IS OFTEN GENUINELY BELIEVED

We here develop four predictions based on the proposition that subjects genuinely believe the favorable self-presentations that they typically make. First, when self-reports are made in private and are believed to be anonymous, subjects should have little reason to mispresent themselves. Therefore, if favorable presentations occur even in the absence of any public audience, it would appear that they are honest. Second, if the experimenter is believed to have accurate data on characteristics for which self-reports are requested, subjects should be specially motivated to be honest. If favorable self-presentations are undiminished by such an honesty constraint, it would then appear that these presentations are genuinely believed. Third, judgments that are intentionally falsified should take longer to make than ones that are truthfully reported. Therefore, if subjects routinely give favorable reports more rapidly than other self-judgments, it would seem likely that these reports are truthful. Finally, although it may make a good appearance to present oneself as having control over an experimental task, it is neither impressive to others nor personally satisfying to persevere at a task at which one truly expects to fail. Therefore, if subjects who report that they have control over a task also work persistently at that task, it would appear that they believe in their control. We now proceed to review evidence that confirms *all* four of these predictions.

Self-Attributions Are Favorable in Private as well as in Public

Weary (Weary Bradley, 1978) reviewed the literature on self-serving biases in attribution. A self-serving bias is typically manifest in subjects' taking personal credit for favorable outcomes, while blaming unfavorable outcomes on external forces (e.g., bad luck, task difficulty, or interference by others). In all the studies reviewed by Weary Bradley, subjects made causal attributions for favorable and unfavorable outcomes only under conditions of experimenter or other observation. It was therefore plausible that observed self-enhancing self-reports were intended to impress others. More recently, however, several studies have examined attributions for success and failure made under private as well as public conditions. In a study by Weary Bradley et al. (1982), subjects showed self-enhancing biases, surprisingly, *only* when their attributions were made in private. Public self-presentations were apparently distorted, not in the direction of self-enhancement, but in the direction of modesty. In another study, Schlenker, Hallam, and McCown (1983) investigated actor-observer differences

in attributions made for the positive act of helping another. Self-enhancement occurred about equally under public and private conditions. Findings of self-enhancement under private reporting conditions have also been obtained by Arkin, Appleman, Burger (1980), Frey (1978), and Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon (1982). From all these studies it appears that beneffectance is at least as much in the service of maintaining private self-regard as it is in the service of one's public image.

Favorable Self-Attributions Occur under Strong Constraint to be Honest

Whether or not lie detectors work they can be powerful elicitors of honesty simply because many people assume that they do (or may) work. This phenomenon provides the basis for the laboratory device known as the "bogus pipeline," which is little more than a set of electrodes that appear to be attaching a subject to some recording equipment. (Jones & Sigall, 1971, originally described the bogus pipeline; Quigly-Fernandez & Tedeschi, 1978, have provided evidence for its effectiveness in creating a powerful constraint toward honest self-reporting.) The bogus pipeline was used in a study of self-enhancing attributions by Riess, Rosenfeld, Melburg, and Tedeschi (1981). In that study, half of the college student subjects were led to believe that they had done well on a supposed social intelligence test, and the remainder were informed that they had done poorly. In the "reliable bogus pipeline" condition, subjects were persuaded that the response apparatus could detect false responses. In the "unreliable bogus pipeline" condition, subjects were told that the apparatus was unreliable. In a third condition, subjects learned nothing about the apparatus. After being connected to the apparatus, subjects were asked questions that elicited attributions regarding their performance on the social intelligence test. The reliable bogus pipeline condition was the one that should have eliminated any dishonest responding. Thus, if beneffectance is due to falsified self-presentations, a self-enhancing bias should have been observed in only the other two conditions. However, a beneffectance pattern—in the form of both attributing successes more to internal factors (ability and effort) than to external ones (easy task or good luck), and attributing failures more to external than internal factors—was obtained in *all three* conditions. Riess et al. concluded "that so-called self-serving attributions are not merely misrepresentations . . . in the service of self-presentation. Instead, this attributional asymmetry seems to reflect actual bias in *private* perceptions of objective causality" (p. 229, emphasis added).

Favorable Self-Referent Judgments Are Made Rapidly

Markus (1977) and Rogers, Kuiper, and Kirker (1977) have demonstrated that information central to one's self-concept is processed rapidly. A similar finding reported by Breckler and Greenwald (1981) relates directly to the inner-audience hypothesis. They found that favorable self-referent judgments are made faster than unfavorable ones. This latency effect is in agreement with the

assumption that favorable self-referent information is (usually) central to the self-concept. If favorable self-referent judgments were falsified, then one would expect that the latencies of those judgments would be slowed by the cognitive demands of fabricating. An interesting contrast with Breckler and Greenwald's findings comes from research on the self-referent judgments of depressed subjects. Derry and Kuiper (1981) have shown that depressives are most efficient in processing *un*favorable self-relevant information. They concluded that, for depressives, negative information is central to the self-concept.

Self-Enhancing Judgments Are Acted Upon

Subjects who expect to succeed at a task will work persistently at it (Bandura, 1982; Brown & Inouye, 1982; Feather, 1961), suggesting that they truly believe that they will eventually succeed. Similarly, high self-esteem subjects—who presumably have a high expectation of success—persevere longer at difficult tasks (McFarlin & Blascovich, 1981; Shrauger & Sormon, 1977) and actually do better than their low self-esteem counterparts (Shrauger & Rosenberg, 1970). Individuals high in achievement motivation (McClelland et al., 1953), compared to those low in achievement motivation, spend more time attempting to solve difficult problems (Feather, 1962). Also, Weiner (1965) reported that subjects high in need for achievement continued to persevere at difficult problems after failing to solve earlier ones, whereas those low in need for achievement gave up following their initial failure. Weiner and Kukla (1970) have observed that such performance differences are associated with divergent causal attributions. Persons who ordinarily expect to succeed (such as those high in achievement motivation) attribute their poor performance to lack of effort, whereas those who ordinarily expect to fail most often attribute their poor performance to lack of ability. (See also Diener & Dweck, 1978, 1980; Dweck & Repucci, 1973.) In sum, the research evidence indicates that people who report personal responsibility for success (those high in self-esteem and high in achievement motivation) persevere as if they genuinely believe in their self-efficacy.

EGO TASK ANALYSIS—FOUR FACETS OF THE SELF

The preceding sections have developed the distinction between inner and outer audiences for self-presentations. This distinction was recently associated (by Greenwald, 1982a) with two meanings of ego involvement that could be identified in research done between the mid-1930s and the early 1960s.

Ego Involvement$_1$ Concern about public impression, or evaluation by outer audiences; similar to evaluation apprehension, need for approval.

Ego Involvement$_2$ Concern about self-evaluation, private self-image, or evaluation by the inner audience; similar to self-esteem maintenance, need for achievement.

Greenwald also noted a third use of ego involvement, but he did not (at the time) associate it with a specific evaluative audience. This third sense of ego involvement originated in the work of Sherif and Cantril (1947), and has been used in subsequent work that was influenced by their treatment, especially in research on persuasive communication (e.g., Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965).

Ego Involvement$_3$ Personal importance, linkage to central values.

In this section we extend the analysis of audiences for self-presentations to accommodate the third type of ego involvement. We do this by identifying a third type of audience, one that contains both inner and outer components—the reference group. Reference groups serve as the source of the central values that are mentioned in the definition of ego involvement. Having identified this third audience, we proceed to relate the three audiences to an analysis of facets of the self[1]—one directed to the outer audience (the public facet of the self), one directed to the inner audience (the private facet), and one directed to the reference-group audience (the collective facet). (There is also a fourth, more primitive, facet—the diffuse self—that has no identifiable audience.) The analysis of audiences for self-presentation and their associated facets of the self is rooted in the concept of an *ego task*, which is the persisting task of earning the approval of a significant audience (Greenwald, 1982a).

Ego Task Analysis—A Framework for Describing Person-Situation Interaction

Task Analysis Figure 5-1 presents basic concepts of *task analysis*, which offers a model of the interaction of situation and personality in determining behavior. Figure 5-1 shows behavior as a direct function of two cognitive task components, *goals* and *strategies*. The goal component is determined jointly by incentives in the situation and by the person's goal preferences. Similarly, the strategy component is influenced both by situational influences (instructions, the behavior of others) and by personal preferences among strategies.

Greenwald (1982a) used the game of golf as an illustration of the way in which goals and strategies are jointly determined by situation variables and person variables. In golf, *goals* are *situation*ally determined by the rules of the game, the layout of the course, and the performance of other players. Goals can also be determined by *person*al preferences, such as expectations based on past performance, and relative concerns about hitting for distance, hitting with good form, and minimizing score. Similarly, *strategies* are determined *situation*ally (by design of the course, lie of the ball, and instructions from teachers or playing companions) and *person*ally (by previous practice and ability to hit various strokes).

[1]We refer, in this discussion, to *the self* without having said just what we mean by that term. In the conception that guides the present analysis, the self is a complex entity that has cognitive, affective, and conative components. Ego-task analysis is concerned just with the conative, or motivational, aspect of the self. For a treatment that places ego-task analysis in the context of the self's other components, see Greenwald and Pratkanis (1984).



FIGURE 5-1
Basic concepts of task analysis (after Greenwald, 1982a).

Ego Tasks An ego task is an important, persisting task that provides a basis for self-evaluation. It is an important task in the sense that the goal of an ego task will take precedence over the goals of most other tasks. It is a persisting task in the sense that obtaining the goal does not end the task—the goal continues to be important. Greenwald initially identified three types of ego tasks, one based on each type of ego involvement. In the present extension of ego task analysis, we introduce new designations for the three major ego tasks and we analyze each ego task as a distinct (motivational) facet of the self.

Four (Motivational) Facets of the Self

Table 5-1 summarizes our extension of ego-task analysis. This analysis is based on the identification of four ego tasks, or *facets* of the self, which we believe to develop in the left-to-right order of the table.[2] The *diffuse self* is, in some senses, a preself, a condition of not distinguishing sharply between self and others, with behavior hedonically guided toward positive affective states. The *public self* is sensitive to the evaluations of others and seeks to win the approval of significant outer audiences of parents, peers, and authorities. Developmentally, the public self depends on achievement of a cognitive discrimination between self and others, and an ability to attend to those aspects of one's behavior that are also noticed by others. The ego task of the public self can be described, in part, as social accreditation—that is, earning credit in exchange relationships with others. However, another important aspect of the public self's task is to internalize the evaluative standards of significant others. This self-definition aspect of the public self's task leads to development of the *private self*. By providing an inner audience for behavior, the private self permits self-evaluation to be effected in the absence of others. We designate the private self's ego task as individual achievement, with "achievement" being used, in the sense of

[2]It should be noted that our speculation that the four facets of the self-develop in the left-to-right order of Table 5-1 is partly at odds with others' suggestions that the private self developmentally precedes the public self (Buss, 1980; Cheek & Hogan, 1983). (See Loevinger, 1976, for a broad review of theories of ego development.)

McClelland et al. (1953), to indicate guidance by internal standards. As a further developmental step, the goals of groups with which the person is identified (reference groups) become internalized, yielding the *collective self.* The collective self is a *we* facet of the self, in contrast to the *I* facet of the private self and the *you-they* facet of the public self. The collective self's task is a collective-achievement task, the task of achieving a reference group's attainment of its goals.

Strategies in the Service of Ego Tasks

Winning a Nobel Prize or an Olympic gold medal are, we would guess, strongly satisfying experiences. Perhaps they are so satisfying because they simultaneously serve the interests of a public self, a private self, and a collective self. That is, they simultaneously earn the approval of others, achieve success by personal standards, and signify fulfillment of a reference group's goal. Many everyday achievements, similarly, serve two or more ego tasks simultaneously. Examples are being promoted in one's job, earning a college degree, winning in competitive sports, and raising children. If all human endeavors simultaneously pleased inner and outer audiences and achieved group goals, we could be sure that the ego task analysis of Table 5-1 would be useless. But that is not the case.

Interestingly, some of the everyday activities that focus on one ego task correspond well to tasks that have been cultivated for use in the social psychological laboratory. In particular, the procedures of experiments on conformity, obedience, and persuasion characteristically put the subject in a dilemma that pits the public self against the private self. That is, concern about approval by an outer audience pulls behavior in the direction of conformity, obedience, and opinion moderation. At the same time, the attempt to adhere to the private standards of the inner audience pulls in the opposite direction of independence, defiance, and opinion resistance.

The Diffuse and Collective Selves

The pattern of entries in Table 5-1 indicates that the facets identified as diffuse and collective selves have been relatively neglected in social-psychological research. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to justify their inclusion in Table 5-1 and to encourage further research efforts.

The diffuse self has been investigated in research on *deindividuation,* which is a condition in which one's individual identifiability is decreased, and internal constraints against various types of action tend to be reduced. Previous reviewers' observations about paradoxical aspects of deindividuation (Diener, 1977, 1980; Dipboye, 1977) were summarized by Greenwald (1982b):

> Deindividuation is sometimes associated with loss of identity but other times with acquisition of identity via a distinctive group (of which one is an indistinguishable member); it is sometimes sought but other times avoided; and it is sometimes

TABLE 5-1
INTERRELATION OF FACETS OF THE SELF, EGO TASKS, PERSONALITY MEASURES, EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES, AND PERFORMANCE STRATEGIES

Facets of Self	Diffuse Self	Public Self	Private Self	Collective Self
Ego task designation	Hedonic satisfaction	Social accreditation; Self-definition	Individual achievement	Collective achievement
Basis for self-evaluation	Attainment of positive affect	Approval of others (outer audience)	Internal standards (inner audience)	Internalized goals of reference group
Individual difference measures of task orientation		Public self-consciousness; Need for approval; High self-monitoring	Private self-consciousness; Need for achievement; Low self-monitoring	
Situation inducers of task orientation	Anonymity in group; Drug intoxication	Minority status in group; Solo before audience; Camera; Public failure	Privacy; Exposure to performance replay; Mirror; Private failure	Reference group salience; Cohesive group; Superordinate goals
Strategies in service of task	Norm violation	Conformity; Obedience; Opinion moderation; Basking in reflected glory	Independence; Defiance; Opinion resistance	

associated with chaotic, norm-violating behavior but other times with conforming, uniform behavior (p. 172).

This paradox can be resolved with the aid of the distinction between the diffuse and the collective selves. All deindividuating conditions, including anonymity, alcohol intoxication, and strong stimulation, reduce the salience of internal standards. However, some of these situations can make the subject's participation in a reference group salient—for example, being amidst a shouting crowd of home-team supporters at a football game, or wearing a uniform that hides one's individual features, while making one's group affiliation apparent. Deindividuation procedures that make a reference group salient can engage the collective self, leading to coordinated or norm-adhering behavior. This is in contrast to nonsocial conditions—for example, alcohol intoxication or being in a darkened room—which can engage the diffuse self, leading to social chaos or

norm-violating behavior. Greenwald suggested that the term "deindividuation" be restricted to the effects of nonsocial procedures that elicit norm-violating behavior—ones that (in present terms) invoke the diffuse self.

In contrast to the modest amount of (deindividuation) research on the diffuse self, the collective self has received almost no research attention from social psychologists, apart from the contributions of Muzafer Sherif and his coworkers. Sherif and Cantril's (1947) description of ego involvement stressed participation in the causes of reference groups, causes that give the individual "some relative role with respect to other individuals, groups, or institutions" (p. 96). And the famous Robbers' Cave experiment of Sherif et al. (1961) stands as a relatively isolated, but nevertheless convincing, plea for the usefulness of superordinate, collective goals in overcoming intergroup hostility.

An Illustration of Ego-Task Analysis—the Conformity Experiment

The usefulness of ego-task analysis can be suggested by applying it to a classic social psychology experiment, Asch's (1951) conformity experiment. In the conformity experiment, the subject's explicit task is to judge line lengths. However, there are also some implicit tasks, such as completing requirements for a psychology course, or learning about laboratory research in psychology, or trying to achieve a favorable evaluation by the experimenter. The last of these is, of course, part of the public self's social accreditation ego task. The frequent presence of this ego task in experiments helps to explain the importance that subjects often attach to their participation in laboratory experiments (cf. Weber & Cook, 1972).

Neither the explicit task nor any of the implicit tasks of the conformity experiment pose any problem to the subject until the first critical trial—that is, the first trial on which each of the experimenter's confederates gives a blatantly incorrect response, and it then becomes the subject's turn to respond. It is then apparent that, in addition to the experimenter, there are two other important audiences present, and the subject cannot choose a strategy that will please all three. One audience is the group of which the subject is a part; to achieve the goal of this group (a reference group of sorts), there should be consensus among all group members, and to have consensus the subject would have to go along with the others' already-stated incorrect judgments. The remaining audience is the inner audience, which can be pleased only by independence—in other words, by the subject's rejecting the obviously incorrect majority judgment. The power of the conformity experiment, in ego task analysis terms, is (a) its simultaneous evocation of the three major ego tasks—social accreditation (pleasing the experimenter), individual achievement (pleasing oneself), and collective achievement (achieving the group goal of consensus)—and (b) putting at least the last two of these into direct conflict with one another. In the face of this conflict, it is left to the subject's relative predispositions to please one or another audience to determine whether to conform or to act independently.

The Concept of Ego-Task Orientation

Almost every adolescent or adult should have some tendency to display each of the four facets of the self—in other words, to perform each of Table 5-1's four ego tasks. The importance of any ego task can be referred to as the strength of *orientation* toward that task. Consistent with the framework of task analysis, as presented in Figure 5-1, ego-task orientations can vary as a function of both situational influences and personality differences. We proceed to consider research that demonstrates these sources of influence, particularly for the ego-task orientations of the public and private selves.

Situational Determinants of Ego-Task Orientation

Situations vary in the opportunity they provide to evoke the various ego-task orientations. Concern over one's public self is likely to be engaged when admired or socially powerful others are present. On the other hand, the individual achievement task may be engaged most readily when the subject is alone. Collective achievement should be engaged by the presence of members of an important reference group, or by participation in a group task that requires cooperation. The diffuse self can be engaged by drug intoxication, by isolation, or by anonymity in a group.

Because the actual presence of others considerably complicates a laboratory situation, it is useful to be able to establish ego-task orientations without having others actually present. Toward this end, the ego task of the public self should be engaged by having a camera prominently present. Consistent with this interpretation, the presence of a camera has been shown to increase susceptibility to conformity pressure (Duval, 1976). The individual achievement task of the private self can be engaged by confronting subjects with feedback from performance, such as by allowing self-observation in a mirror or by providing subjects with audio or video playbacks of their performance. For example, the presence of a small mirror increases resistance to persuasion (Carver, 1977), which can be regarded as a strategy in the service of the private self. The procedures just noted for inducing the ego tasks of the public and private self correspond to ones suggested by Buss (1980) for inducing public and private self-awareness, respectively. The collective achievement task should be evoked by symbolic presence of reference groups—for example, by suggesting to subjects that their performances will be compared with those of other racial, religious, or ethnic groups, or with students from rival schools.

Some common laboratory procedures have not been included in Table 5-1 because they evoke more than one ego task. For example, having the subject perform in the presence of a one-way mirror makes salient both the private and public selves, by providing self-feedback at the same time as indicating the presence of an audience of others. Similarly, having the subject take a test that measures an important skill or personality attribute can evoke inner and outer audiences simultaneously. These compound ego-task procedures, despite their

apparent motivational impurity, can be useful precisely because they may succeed in motivating more subjects than do procedures that engage only one ego task.

Individual Differences in Orientation toward the Public and Private Selves

Public and Private Self-Consciousness Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) developed a scale that provides separate measures of consciousness of the public and private facets of self.[3] Fenigstein et al. define the public self as consisting of observable, self-produced stimuli, such as physique, clothing, grooming, facial expression, and speech; the private self consists of self-produced stimuli that are not publicly observable, such as internal bodily sensations, emotional feelings, thoughts, and self-evaluations. (See also Buss, 1980.) Fenigstein et al. interpret public vs. private self-consciousness as a difference in *focus of attention*, which can be directed toward the public or private self. In contrast, ego-task analysis makes *evaluative orientation* toward outer versus inner audiences central to the public vs. private contrast. Despite this difference in interpretation of the public vs. private contrast, these two analyses nevertheless overlap substantially in their empirical implications. This is because persons concerned about evaluations of others should be attentive to the signals that they transmit to others. In other words, they may focus attention on the public self. Similarly, persons guided by internalized evaluative standards should be relatively attentive to their private thoughts and feelings. Because of this conceptual overlap, the measures that Fenigstein et al. (1975) developed to assess individual differences in focus of attention—that is, their Public and Private Self-Consciousness Scales[4]—may serve also to measure predispositions to seek evaluation from outer and inner audiences, respectively.

Studies in which subjects have been put in situations of social pressure indicate the usefulness of the Public and Private Self-Consciousness Scales as measures of ego-task orientations. Scheier (1980) found that opinion moderation in anticipation of a discussion (that is, anticipatory change in the direction of possible opposition) was greater for subjects high in Public Self-consciousness than for ones low in Public Self-consciousness. Scheier and Carver (1980) found that resistance to the opinion change effects of a counterattitudinal role-playing procedure was associated with high scores on Private Self-consciousness; in contrast, expression of opinion change in this situation (interpreted as an

[3]The present formulation has been strongly influenced by the analyses of Buss (1980), Carver and Scheier (1981), Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975), and Scheier and Carver (1983), which, in turn, evolved from important earlier work by Duval and Wicklund (1972).

[4]The self-awareness theorists have clearly distinguished the situationally induced *state*, of focusing attention on the public or private self, from the *trait*, or personality predisposition, of focusing on one or the other self. They refer to the state as (public or private) self-*awareness*, and the trait as (public or private) self-*consciousness*.

impression management strategy of maintaining consistency) was associated with high scores on Public Self-consciousness. Froming and Carver (1981) found that subjects high in Private Self-consciousness were more likely to resist group pressure than were those low in Private Self-consciousness. In an experiment in which women subjects were deliberately ignored by two peers holding a conversation, Fenigstein (1979) found that those high in Public Self-consciousness were most sensitive to this rejection.

Self-Monitoring The conceptual analysis underlying Snyder's (1974) Self-Monitoring Scale suggests its relation to the motivational orientations of the public and private facets of the self. In Snyder's concept, the high self-monitoring person is one who is sensitive to cues transmitted in interpersonal interaction. Snyder (1979) asserts that the self-presentations of low self-monitors are "controlled from within by their affective states and attitudes (they express it as they feel it) rather than molded and tailored to fit the situation" (p. 89). This suggests that the low self-monitor's concern is primarily with the private facet of the self, consistent with Snyder and Campbell's (1982) description of the low self-monitor as a "principled self." At the same time, the high self-monitoring person is "particularly sensitive to the expression and self-presentation of relevant others in social situations and uses these cues as guidelines for monitoring (that is, regulating and controlling) . . . verbal and nonverbal self-presentation" (Snyder, 1979, p. 89). This description is suggestive of the outer-audience orientation of the public self.

Need for Achievement McClelland et al. (1953) developed the concept of achievement motivation to describe individual variations in motivation to succeed in intellectual and social endeavors. Because McClelland et al. defined success in such endeavors as the surpassing of *internal* standards of excellence, their concept of need for achievement is similar to the ego task that we have labeled individual achievement. (Indeed, we chose this label in consideration of the McClelland et al. definition of achievement motivation.) If need for achievement is indicative of a general orientation toward an inner audience, then subjects high in need for achievement should, like ones high in private self-consciousness, be resistant to group pressure. McClelland et al. did report such a finding (1953, p. 287).

Need for Approval Crowne and Marlowe (1964) formulated their Social Desirability Scale as a measure of need for approval, defined as concern about evaluation by others. Strickland and Crowne (1962) reported that subjects scoring high on the Social Desirability Scale (that is, those classified as high in need for approval) were more responsive to a social-influence attempt. This is consistent with an interpretation of the Social Desirability Scale as a measure of the ego-task orientation of the public self.

All of the personality measures discussed in this section were developed in theoretical contexts unrelated to the analysis of ego tasks as facets of the self.

Nevertheless, until measures based directly on the concepts of ego-task analysis are developed, these various related measures will be useful for assessing ego-task orientations. The Public and Private Self-Consciousness Scales are especially close, conceptually, to measures of the public and private facets of the self. However, there are no existing measures that tap the predisposition to engage in the collective achievement ego task of the collective self, or the hedonic satisfaction task of the diffuse self.

Self-Esteem: Measures of Expected Success at Ego Tasks

Ordinarily, we assume, one expects to succeed at personally important tasks. But it is not necessarily so. A person may, for example, strongly wish to impress others, but may nevertheless expect to make a poor impression. This person can be described as oriented toward the social-accreditation ego task of the public self, but as having a low expectation of success. Variations in expected success are important in predicting behavior, because persons who expect to succeed should often act differently from those who expect to fail. (As noted previously, one important difference is that those who expect to succeed should persevere at a task more than those who expect to fail.)

Ambiguity of Self-Esteem Measures The concept of self-esteem, if taken literally, implies evaluation of self by the inner audience—or, in present terms, evaluation of success at the individual-achievement ego task. However, examination of the items in most self-esteem scales (and there are many—see Wylie, 1974) suggests that they measure expected success *also* at the ego tasks of the public self. For example, the well-known and widely used Janis-Field scale (Hovland & Janis, 1959) includes several items that refer to expected evaluation by outer audiences (e.g., "How often are you troubled with shyness?" and "Do you find it hard to make talk when you meet new people?"), as well as items that refer to evaluation by the inner audience (e.g., "Do you ever feel so discouraged with yourself that you wonder whether anything is worth while?"). (See Berger, 1968, for a factor analysis of the Janis-Field scale.)

Public Self-Esteem vs. Private Self-Esteem Ego-task analysis indicates the desirability of having separate measures for public self-esteem (expected success at social accreditation)and private self-esteem (expected success at individual achievement).Ordinarily, these two varieties of self-esteem may be mutually dependent and therefore correlated. Nevertheless, they are conceptually distinguishable as varieties of self-esteem, and it should be useful to have separate measures of them. Among existing measures, Rosenberg's (1965) scale is one that appears to include almost exclusively items that measure private self-esteem (e.g., "I feel I have a number of good qualities"), and Fenigstein et al.'s (1975) Measure of Social Anxiety appears to focus well on public self-esteem (e.g., "I don't find it hard to talk to strangers"). We are aware of no existing measures that focus on expected success in achieving reference-group goals—that is, there are no measures of what might be referred to as collective self-esteem.

CONCLUSIONS—REMAINING TASKS FOR EGO-TASK ANALYSIS

The results reviewed in the preceding section are generally consistent with expectations based on the concepts of task analysis applied to the classification of ego tasks in Table 5-1. Nevertheless, the claim that ego-task analysis provides a satisfactory framework for analyzing person-situation interactions is far from established. Perhaps the main usefulness of our review has been to make clear the substantial gaps in present knowledge.

Collective Achievement Ego Tasks

One major general gap is the lack of empirical knowledge concerning the type of ego task that we have identified as collective achievement. By and large, social psychologists have failed to follow the lead of Sherif and Cantril (1947), who defined ego-involvement as concern with the goals of reference groups, or of Sherif et al. (1961) who induced cooperation among initially hostile factions in a boys' camp by providing them with collective goals. One might interpret the limited study of collective tasks as an indication that few persons attach importance to collective endeavors (a point that receives some support from the findings of Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 1979). Alternatively, one might fault the psychological establishment for undervaluing the study of collective tasks—perhaps a symptom of individualistic biases in our contemporary culture (a point made by Sampson, 1977). Our ignorance notwithstanding, collective efforts are undeniably important in political, industrial, scientific, and even recreational endeavors. This importance justifies much new effort in developing procedures and measures needed to investigate collective performance.

Esteem Measures

Another apparent deficiency is the lack of standardization among measures of self-esteem—or what we have referred to as expected success at ego tasks. Although many measures of "self-esteem" exist, it is apparent that these measures assess mixtures of expected favorable evaluation from outer and inner audiences, and none measures expected success at the collective efforts of reference groups.

Other Audiences, Other Objects of Evaluation

Table 5-1 can be regarded as a portion of a larger classification that potentially includes other evaluative audiences and other objects of evaluation. For example, the goal of being evaluated favorably by a sexual partner may be sufficiently different from the other goals in Table 5-1 to be worthy of separate treatment. A second possible extension is to go beyond the single person as the evaluated object to a collective entity. Such an extension might be needed, for example, to accommodate intentional acts of risk-taking or self-sacrifice in the

defense of friends, family, or nation. Another possible extension would be to differentiate among the various groups of others toward whom social accreditation efforts are directed, or among reference groups that have different collective goals. Such additional distinctions may be useful to the extent that the favorable regard of each subgroup requires a different strategic approach. These speculations are reminiscent of William James's (1890) well-known observation, which effectively captures a central point of this chapter—that there is an intimate connection between audiences for self-presentation and facets of the self.

> Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind. . . . But as the individuals who carry the images fall naturally into classes, we may practically say that he has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares (p. 294).

Conclusion

In answer to the question asked in this chapter's title: *The self is presented to multiple audiences.* The prevalent assumption heretofore has been that self-presentations are targeted at audiences of others. We have reviewed evidence establishing that there is also an important inner audience, oneself. Reference groups provide yet a third type of audience, one that is composed of others—but these are others with whom one is a coparticipant. We have associated each of the three audiences for self-presentation with a distinct motivational facet of the self—the public self, the private self, and the collective self, respectively. Each of these facets of the self corresponds to an orientation toward an ego task—that is, toward the persisting task of establishing one's self-worth by achieving a significant audience's favorable evaluation.

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